area handbook series 

Portugal 

a country study 



Portugal 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Eric Solsten 
Research Completed 
January 1993 



On the cover: The Tower of Belem, on the outskirts of 
Lisbon, dates from the early sixteenth century. 



Second Edition, First Printing, 1994. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Portugal : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Con- 
gress ; edited by Eric Solsten. — 2d ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam ; 550-181) 

Rev. ed. of: Area handbook for Portugal / coauthors, Eugene 
K. Keefe . . . [et. al.]. 1st ed. 1976. 
"Research completed January 1993." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 285-300) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0776-3 

1. Portugal. I. Solsten, Eric, 1943- . II. Library of Con- 
gress. Federal Research Division. III. Area handbook for Portu- 
gal. IV. Series. V. Series: DA Pam ; 550-181. 
DP517.P626 1993 93-30722 
946.9— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-181 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



in 



Acknowledgments 



This edition supersedes Portugal: A Country Study, published in 
1976. The authors wish to acknowledge their use of portions of that 
edition in the preparation of the current book. 

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book. 
Sandra W. Meditz made helpful suggestions during her review of 
all parts of the book. Timothy L. Merrill assisted in the prepara- 
tion of some of the maps, checked the content of all the maps, and 
reviewed the sections on geography and telecommunications. 
Thanks also go to David P. Cabitto, who provided graphics sup- 
port; Wayne Horn, who designed the cover and chapter art; Mar- 
ilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing and production and edited 
portions of the manuscript; Andrea T. Merrill, who provided in- 
valuable assistance with regard to tables and figures; and Barbara 
Edgerton, Alberta Jones King, and Izella Watson, who performed 
word processing. 

The authors also are grateful to individuals in various United 
States government agencies who gave their time and special 
knowledge to provide information and perspective. These individu- 
als include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country 
Studies/ Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army; 
and Scott B. MacDonald of the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, who offered advice in the preparation of sections of the 
manuscript. In addition, the authors wish to thank various mem- 
bers of the staff of the Embassy of the Republic of Portugal in 
Washington for their assistance. 

Others who contributed were Harriett R. Blood and the firm 
of Greenhorne and O'Mara, who assisted in the preparation of 
maps and charts; Mimi Cantwell, who edited the chapters; Beverly 
Wolpert, who performed final prepublication editorial review; 
Judite Fernandes, who read and commented on portions of the text; 
and Joan C. Cook, who prepared the index. Linda Peterson of the 
Library of Congress Composing Unit prepared camera- ready copy, 
under the direction of Peggy Pixley. The inclusion of photographs 
was made possible by the generosity of various individuals and pub- 
lic and private agencies. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction xxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting l 

Walter C. Opello, Jr. 

ORIGINS OF PORTUGAL 4 

Early Inhabitants 4 

Phoenicians, Greeks, and Carthaginians 5 

Romanization 6 

Germanic Invasions 6 

Muslim Domination 7 

Christian Reconquest 8 

FORMATION OF THE MONARCHY 9 

Afonso Henriques Becomes King 10 

Territorial Enlargement 10 

Settlement and Cultivation 12 

Political and Social Organization 13 

Control of the Royal Patrimony 16 

Development of the Realm 18 

THE HOUSE OF AVIS 19 

Wars with Castile 20 

Anglo-Portuguese Alliance 21 

Social Revolution 21 

Intradynastic Struggle 22 

Assertion of Royal Supremacy 23 

MARITIME EXPANSION 23 

Early Voyages 24 

Sea Route to India 26 

Empire in Asia 31 

Colonization of Brazil 32 

Counter-Reformation and Overseas 

Evangelization 32 

IMPERIAL DECLINE 34 

Dynastic Crisis 34 



vii 



Iberian Union 35 

Restoration 37 

Development of Brazil 38 

Absolutism 39 

Peninsular Wars 41 

CONSTITUTIONALISM 43 

Revolution of 1820 43 

War of the Two Brothers 45 

Moderate vs. Radical Liberals 46 

Rotativismo 48 

Portuguese Africa 48 

REPUBLICANISM 49 

The First Republic 51 

Military Dictatorship 54 

The New State 55 

The Social State 60 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 63 

Howard J. Wiarda 

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 66 

DEMOGRAPHY 70 

Population Size and Structure 73 

Emigration 75 

FAMILY AND KINSHIP RELATIONS 79 

Family 80 

Women 82 

The Extended Family and Kinship Relations 84 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL CLASSES 85 

The Elite 88 

The Middle Class 90 

The Lower Class 91 

A New Portugal? 92 

ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC GROUPS 94 

RELIGION AND THE ROLE OF THE ROMAN 

CATHOLIC CHURCH 96 

History 96 

The Salazar Regime 98 

Changes after the Revolution of 1974 98 

Religious Practices 99 

Non-Catholic Religious Groups 102 

EDUCATION 103 

SOCIAL WELFARE 108 

Social Welfare Programs 109 

Health Care 109 



vm 



Housing 110 

Chapter 3. The Economy 113 

Eric N. Baklanoff 

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE . . 117 

The Economy of the Salazar Regime 117 

Changing Structure of the Economy 120 

Economic Growth, 1960-73 and 1981-90 122 

REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 123 

Nationalization 125 

The Brain Drain 127 

ROLE OF THE CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR 128 

The Nonflnancial Public Enterprises 128 

The General Government 130 

Macroeconomic Disequilibria and Public Debt 132 

HUMAN RESOURCES AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION . . 134 
Employment and Sectoral Composition 

of the Labor Force 134 

Wages and the Distribution of Income 137 

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 139 

Agricultural Zones 140 

Crops and Livestock 141 

Forestry and Fishing 142 

Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform 143 

Agricultural Policy and the European Community ... 144 

THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 145 

Industrial Regions 146 

Industrial Organization 146 

Energy and Mineral Resources 148 

SERVICES 150 

Commerce and Tourism 150 

Transportation and Communications 152 

Banking and Finance 153 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 155 

Composition and Direction of Trade 156 

The Balance of International Payments 158 

Tourism and Unilateral Transfers 159 

Foreign Direct Investment 160 

External Public Debt 162 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 165 

Howard J. Wiarda 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1974 AND THE TRANSITION 

TO DEMOCRACY 169 

The Salazar-Caetano Era 169 



ix 



Spmola and Revolution 171 

The Transition to Civilian Rule 174 

Consolidation of Democracy 176 

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 180 

Constitutional Development 181 

The Presidency 183 

The Council of State 185 

The Prime Minister 185 

The Council of Ministers 186 

The Assembly of the Republic 187 

The Judiciary . 190 

Civil Service 191 

Local Government 192 

Autonomous Regions and Macau 194 

The Electoral System 195 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 196 

Political Parties 197 

Interest Groups 202 

Political Events since 1987 207 

THE MEDIA 210 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 212 

Africa 213 

Western Europe 214 

United States 216 

Other Countries and Areas 217 

Chapter 5. National Security 221 

Jean R. Tartter 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 224 

The Military in the Salazar Era 225 

The Role of the Armed Forces in Africa 227 

ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PORTUGUESE 

POLITICAL LIFE 229 

The Military Takeover of 1974 230 

The Armed Forces in Political Life after 1975 234 

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS UNDERLYING THE 

PORTUGUESE DEFENSE POSTURE 237 

THE ARMED FORCES 239 

Army 241 

Navy 244 

Air Force 246 

Conditions of Service 249 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 253 

Defense Expenditures 256 



x 



PORTUGAL AND NATO 257 

BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS WITH 

OTHER COUNTRIES 258 

DOMESTIC DEFENSE PRODUCTION 260 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 261 

The Police System 262 

National Republican Guard 262 

Public Security Police 263 

Other Police Forces 264 

Intelligence Services 264 

Terrorist Groups 266 

JUDICIAL SYSTEM 267 

Criminal Law Procedure 268 

Incidence of Crime 270 

Penal System 271 

Appendix. Tables 275 

Bibliography 285 

Glossary 301 

Index 305 

Contributors 327 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions, 1992 xxii 

2 The Reconquest, 1185-1250 14 

3 The Portuguese Empire and Routes of Exploration, 

Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries 30 

4 Historical Regions 68 

5 Topography and Drainage 72 

6 Estimated Population Distribution by Age and Sex, 

2000 76 

7 Structure of Education System, 1992 106 

8 Economic Activity, 1992 148 

9 Transportation System, 1992 154 

10 Organization of the Armed Forces, 1992 240 

11 Major Military Installations, 1992 242 

12 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1992 254 

13 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1992 255 



xi 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study attempts to review the history 
and treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social, 
political, economic, and military aspects of Portugal. Sources of 
information included books, scholarly journals, foreign and domes- 
tic newspapers, official reports of government and international 
organizations, and numerous periodicals on Portuguese and in- 
ternational affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the 
book, and brief comments on some of the more valuable sources 
recommended for further reading appear at the end of each chap- 
ter. A Glossary is also included. 

Spellings of place-names used in the book are in most cases those 
approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names. Ex- 
ceptions are the use of Lisbon rather than Lisboa, the Portguese 
form of the capital's name, and Azores rather than Acores. 

Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion ta- 
ble is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric 
measures (see table 1, Appendix). 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Janu- 
ary 1993. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated: the Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- 
curred since the completion of the research, and the Bibliography 
includes recently published sources thought to be particularly helpful 
to the reader. 



xiii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Portuguese Republic. 
Short Form: Portugal. 

Term for Citizen(s): Portuguese (singular and plural); adjective — 
Portuguese. 

Capital: Lisbon (Portuguese, Lisboa). 

Geography: 92,080 square kilometers; land area: 91,640 square 
kilometers; includes Azores (Portuguese, Acores), and Madeira 
islands. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



XV 



Topography: Hills and mountains north of Tagus River (Rio 
Tejo); rolling plains to south. 

Climate: Varied with considerable rainfall and marked seasonal 
temperatures in north; dryer conditions in south with mild tem- 
peratures along coast but sometimes very hot in interior. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 10.5 million in 1992; growth rate of 0.4 
percent in 1992. 

Education and Literacy: Primary education (age six to twelve) 
and junior high school (age thirteen to fifteen) free and compulsory, 
but because many children began working at early age, education 
ended at the primary level for many. Senior high school (age six- 
teen to seventeen) had academic and vocational components. 
Twelfth grade (age eighteen) prepared youths for university and 
technical college. Estimated literacy rate 85 percent for those over 
age fifteen in 1990. 

Health: Uneven provision of health care; health care available 
ranged from high quality to that prevalent in the Third World. 
Many Portuguese, especially those living in rural areas, not able 
to enjoy liberal health benefits provided for in legislation. Infant 
mortality rate greatly improved in last few decades to estimated 
rate of 10 per 1,000 in 1992. Life expectancy seventy-one years 
for males and seventy-eight for females in 1992. 

Language: Portuguese. 

Ethnic Groups: Homogeneous Mediterranean stock on mainland, 
Azores, and Madeira Islands. Less than 100,000 citizens of black 
African descent, who immigrated in 1970s to Portugal from its 
former colonies in Africa; small number of Gypsies; small Jewish 
community. 

Religion: Nominally Roman Catholic 97 percent; Protestant 
denominations 1 percent; others 2 percent. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP — see Glossary): Purchasing power 
equivalent estimated at US$87.3 billion in 1991 (US$8,400 per cap- 
ita). Economy stagnant during second half of 1970s and first half 
of 1980s because of world economic slump and extensive nation- 
alizations during Revolution of 1974. Between 1986 and 1990, GDP 
grew at 4.6 percent each year. 



xvi 



Agriculture: Made up 6.1 percent of GDP and employed about 
17.8 percent of labor force in 1990. Small farms in north, larger 
farms in south; productivity and mechanization below European 
Community (EC — see Glossary) levels; imports more than half of 
food needs. Major crops: grain, corn, rice, potatoes, olives, grapes, 
cork; important livestock: pigs, cattle, sheep, chickens; dairy farms 
mostly in northwest. EC membership threatened long-term sur- 
vival of southern grain-growing and cattle-raising farms; farms 
producing rice, vegetables, and wine likely to fare well. 

Industry: 38.4 percent of GDP in 1990. Concentrated in two 
regions: Lisbon-Setubal, much heavy industry (steel, shipbuild- 
ing, oil refineries, chemicals); and Porto- Aveiro-Braga, mostly light 
industry (textiles, footwear, wine, food processing). In 1990 owner- 
ship of industries varied: light industry usually privately owned; 
heavy industry often state owned; high technology manufacturing 
often foreign owned. 

Services: 55.5 percent of GDP in 1990; accounted for 47 percent 
of work force. Tourism important component of service sector; 19.6 
million visitors in 1991. 

Imports: In 1990 imports of goods and services accounted for about 
47 percent of GDP. Manufactured goods (machinery, transporta- 
tion equipment, chemicals) accounted for about 75 percent of mer- 
chandise imports, food and beverages for about 10 percent, and 
raw materials (mostly petroleum) for about 16 percent. 

Exports: In 1990 exports of goods and services accounted for about 
37 percent of GDP. Manufactured goods accounted for 80 per- 
cent of merchandise exports in 1989. In 1990 textiles, clothing, and 
footwear made up 37 percent of total export value; machinery and 
transport equipment, 20 percent; forest products, 10 percent; and 
agricultural products, 8 percent. 

Major Trade Partners: EC major trading partner, buying nearly 
75 percent of Portugal's exports, and supplying nearly 74 percent 
of its imports in 1992. Germany and Spain the most important 
trading partners. Only 3.0 percent of Portugal's imports in 1992 
came from the United States; Organization of the Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries (OPEC) accounted for less than 4 percent. 

Balance of Payments: Despite negative trade balances, large earn- 
ings from tourism and remittances from Portuguese living abroad, 
in addition to direct foreign investment and EC transfers, result- 
ed in generally favorable balances of payments (US$3.5 billion in 
1990). 



xvii 



Exchange Rate: In March 1993, 151.04 escudos (Esc — see Glos- 
sary) per US$1. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: Railroad network amounting to about 3,600 kilometers 
in 1990, of which about 450 kilometers were electrified. Except for 
several small railroads owned by mining industry and Lisbon's sub- 
way system, all of Portugal railroad network operated by the state 
company, Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses (CP). 

Roads: Total road network amounting to about 73,660 kilome- 
ters, of which 61,000 surfaced (bituminous, gravel, and crushed 
stone); 140 kilometers limited-access divided highway. 

Inland Waterways: 820 kilometers of navigable inland waterways; 
relatively unimportant to economy; used by shallow-draft craft limit- 
ed to 300-metric-ton capacity. 

Ports: Lisbon, LeixSes, and Sines fully equipped with adequate 
warehousing facilities. Also important: Viano do Castelo, Aveira, 
Figueira daFoz, Setubal, Portimao, Ponta Delgada (Azores), and 
Velas (Azores). 

Civil Airports: 65 total, 62 usable; 36 with permanent surface run- 
ways. Lisbon's Portela Airport, major European air terminal and 
transit point. International flights also scheduled to Porto, Faro, 
Santa Maria (Azores), Sao Miguel (Azores), and Funchal 
(Madeira). 

Telecommunications: Generally adequate facilities. Integrated net- 
work of coaxial cables and microwave; numerous AM and FM radio 
stations; International Telecommunication Satellite Corporation 
(INTELSAT) and European Telecommunication Satellite Corpo- 
ration (EUTELSAT) service. 

Government and Politics 

National Government: Constitution of 1976, substantially revised 
in 1982 and 1989, established system of government, both presiden- 
tial and parliamentary. Division of executive power between presi- 
dent and the government (prime minister and his cabinet, the 
Council of Ministers). Division of legislative power between govern- 
ment and parliament (Assembly of the Republic). Government 
responsible to parliament, from which prime minister and most 
cabinet members come. President, government, and parliament 



xvin 



have varying degrees of power and influence over each other. Presi- 
dent elected every five years in nationwide vote; Mario Alberto 
Nobre Lopes Soares elected in 1986 and 1991. Assembly of the 
Republic, with 230 to 235 members, elected every four years if 
legislative period completed. Earlier election possible if parliament 
dissolved. 

Politics: Free and democratic, with variety of parties articulating 
wide range of political viewpoints. Four main parties consistently 
in parliament since 1976: Portuguese Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista Portugues — PCP); Socialist Party (Partido Socialista — 
PS); Social Democrat Party (Partido Social Democrata — PSD); So- 
cial Democratic Center Party (Partido do Centro Democratico 
Social — CDS). Political system gradually being dominated by PSD 
and PS. In 1987 and 1991 national elections, PSD won with slight 
majorities and formed governments with its leader, Anibal Cava- 
co Silva, as prime minister. PS secured 29.3 percent of the vote 
in 1991; PCP, 8.8 percent; CDS, 4.4 percent. 

Legal System: An independent judiciary guaranteed by the con- 
stitution. Constitution also provides for Constitutional Court to 
review constitutionality of legislation, Supreme Court of Justice 
to oversee regular courts, both civil and criminal, and Supreme 
Administrative Court to supervise system of administrative courts. 
In addition, constitution mandates the appointment of ombuds- 
man to protect rights of Portuguese citizens by investigating their 
complaints about actions of state authorities. 

Local Government and Administration: Constitution provides 
for a number of administrative regions, but not yet realized. In 
meantime, mainland divided into eighteen districts, each named 
after its capital. Districts responsible for police, elections, and 
monitoring local government. Local government managed by 305 
municipalities, further divided into about 4,000 parishes. Elections 
for governing assemblies of municipalities held every four years. 

Autonomous Regions and Macau: Archipelagoes of Azores and 
Madeira enjoyed extensive autonomy since 1976. Each had own 
assembly; sent members to national parliament; government's 
representative to each region was minister of the republic. Macau, 
consisting of peninsula attached to the Chinese mainland and two 
islands, Portugal's last colony. According to agreement between 
Lisbon and China, Macau to become part of China in 1999, but 
to retain its free-market economic system. 

Foreign Relations: Historically aloof from European affairs except 



xix 



for 1386 Treaty of Windsor with Britain. Neutral in World War 
II, but permitted Britain and United States military use of Azores. 
Since end of World War II, formed many international links. Most 
notably: founding member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in 1949, joined the United Nations (UN) in 1955, Euro- 
pean Free Trade Association (EFT A) in 1959, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961, Coun- 
cil of Europe in 1976, European Community (EC) in 1986, and 
Western European Union (WEU) in 1988. 

National Security 

Armed Forces (1993): Total personnel on active duty, 50,000 
(17,600 conscripts); army 27,200 (15,000 conscripts); navy, 12,500 
(800 conscripts); air force, 11,000 (1,800 conscripts). Reserves (all 
services), 210,000. 

Major Units: Army has six territorial commands with one com- 
posite brigade, three infantry brigades, and one special forces 
brigade; navy has three commands (mainland, Azores, and 
Madeira) and 2,500 marines organized into three battalions (two 
infantry, one police); air force has one operational command of 
eighteen squadrons, including three attack squadrons. 

Military Equipment (1993): Army has about 200 tanks, 350 ar- 
mored personnel carriers, variety of other combat vehicles; 300 
pieces of towed artillery; fifty-one TOW (tube-launched, optically 
tracked, wire-guided) missiles, sixty-five Milan wire-guided mis- 
siles, and seventeen SAM (surface-to-air) missiles; and 240 recoil- 
less launchers. Navy had three submarines, eleven frigates 
(including three MEKO 200s), and twenty-nine patrol and coastal 
boats. Air force had 40 Alpha Jets, about seventy A- 7 and A-7P 
Corsairs, and six Lockheed P-3B Orion maritime reconnaissance 
aircraft. Major transport aircraft included six C-130H Hercules 
and forty-four CASA C-212 planes of various types. 

Military Budget 1992: US$1.7 billion, 2.0 percent of GDP. 

Foreign Military Treaties: Founding member of NATO. Treaty 
signed in 1951 and periodically renewed permits United States use 
of Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island in Azores. 

Internal Security Forces: National Republican Guard (Guarda 
Nacional Republicana — GNR), heavily armed paramilitary con- 
stabulary, consisted in 1990 of about 19,000 personnel organized 
into battalions in major cities and companies in district capitals. 



xx 



Equipped with Commando armored cars and Alouette II helicop- 
ters. Available to quell demonstrations and labor unrest. Public 
Security Police (Policia de Seguranca Publica — PSP), paramilitary 
force responsible for security in urban areas, consisted of 17,000 
personnel in 1990. Subsection, Intervention Police, could be 
deployed anywhere in the country. Fiscal Guard (Guarda Fiscal), 
border control force with staff of 8,500 in 1990, also investigated 
tax evasion and financial fraud. 



xxi 



International 

boundary 

District 

boundary 

® National 
capital 

O District capital 

Districts are named after their 
respective capitals. Lisbon is 
the capital ot Lisboa district. 

25 50 Kilometers 



"I. 

/ / 



Castelo 



Mlantic 
Ocean 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 

10 

l 




Figure 1. Administrative Divisions, 1992 



xxii 



Introduction 



ON APRIL 25, 1974, scores of junior Portuguese Army officers 
staged a coup d'etat that in a manner of hours toppled the 
authoritarian regime that had ruled their country for nearly half 
a century. The virtually bloodless coup was followed by what be- 
came known to the world as the Revolution of 1974 as Portugal's 
archaic and repressive governing system was swept away in a period 
of political and social turbulence. The young officers, members of 
the secret Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas 
Armadas — MFA), wished to end the wars their country had been 
fighting in its African colonies since the early 1960s. Their modest 
aim of changing Portugal's political leadership, however, let loose 
long pent-up social and political energies that soon turned into a 
veritable revolution and kept Portugal in the headlines of the world's 
newspapers for the next eighteen months. A nervous Western Eu- 
rope looked on as Portugal's governing and financial elites fled the 
country or were exiled, as a variety of forces vied for dominance 
and the Stalinist Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista 
Portugues — PCP) seemed close to seizing power, as leading banks 
and businesses were nationalized, and as large estates were collec- 
tivized by landless peasants. 

The revolution eventually played itself out. Many of its feared 
consequences, such as a communist takeover or a civil war, did 
not occur. Moreover, many of the actions, for example nationali- 
zations and collectivizations, that were implemented during the 
revolution, had been reversed to a great extent by 1993, and the 
serious damage done to the overall economy was gradually being 
repaired. The economy grew rapidly in the second half of the 1980s 
and continued to show respectable growth rates in the early 1990s. 
As another indication of improving economic health, Portugal's 
currency, the escudo (for value of the escudo — see Glossary), was 
strong enough to be placed in the exchange rate mechanism of the 
European Monetary System in April 1992. 

The revolution's legacy also had a positive side, however, and 
nearly two decades after the sequence of events that began in April 
1974, some remarkable achievements could be seen. After centu- 
ries of isolation and backwardness, Portugal had become an in- 
tegral part of Western Europe through its membership in the 
European Community (EC — see Glossary). In the first half of 1992, 
Portugal assumed the presidency of the EC and fulfilled the obliga- 
tions of this office in a professional manner. Even more significant, 



xxni 



perhaps, were the establishment and consolidation of a system of 
parliamentary democracy. After a troubled start, this democracy, 
watched over by a free and vigorous press, had given the country 
a strong and competent government able to bring about peaceful 
change . 

Portugal has a glorious past. It is the oldest European nation- 
state, having attained its present extent by about 1200, centuries 
before neighboring Spain or France became unified states. In the 
early decades of the fourteenth century, Portugal began a period 
of exploration that within a hundred years gave it an empire that 
literally spanned the globe. 

The wealth the empire brought mainland Portugal had woeful 
long-term consequences, however. The country's leaders turned 
away from Europe and its political and technological advances. Por- 
tugal's economy battened on the colonies, rather than developing 
through competition with other European countries. Because Por- 
tugal was too small a country to defend its extensive possessions, 
much of the empire was soon lost. Even into the second half of 
the twentieth century, however, enough of the empire remained 
that Portugal continued to exist somewhat outside the world econ- 
omy. The colonies provided the mainland with foodstuffs and raw 
materials and were a captive market for low-quality Portuguese 
manufactures. A greater threat to the long-term well-being of the 
Portuguese people than the country's backward economy, however, 
was perhaps the state of its social and political institutions. Long 
ruled by a tiny oligarchy supported by the military and a rigid 
authoritarian church untouched by the Reformation, the mass of 
the Portuguese population was passive and ignorant. The nation's 
wealth was reserved for a few, most of whom lived in Lisbon. The 
small middle class was docile and without experience in government. 

The European Enlightenment had a powerful exponent of its 
ideas in the Marques de Pombal, who attempted a thorough-going 
reform of Portugal in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. 
His reforms were paternalistically enforced from above, however, 
and after his fall from power were soon reversed. The early nine- 
teenth century saw the fashioning of a constitutional monarchy, 
but parliamentary politics was soon a cynical rotation of public office 
among members of a small elite in Lisbon. Most of the population 
labored neglected and illiterate in the countryside. 

A more serious attempt at parliamentary democracy occurred 
in 1910 when a republic, the so-called First Republic, was pro- 
claimed. Suffrage was restricted, however, and most Portuguese were 
without the right to vote. The small urban middle class that was 
active in the republic's affairs formed into numerous personalistic 



xxiv 



parties that soon showed themselves incapable of governing. The 
dozens of inefficient governments in the republic's brief life of six- 
teen years did not win many Portuguese to the cause of parliamen- 
tary democracy. Anticlerical laws also alienated many, as did 
frequent instances of corruption. 

When a coup by junior military officers in 1926 put an end to 
the First Republic, few regretted the death of Portuguese parliamen- 
tary democracy. But no member of the military was able to effec- 
tively direct Portugal's affairs, and a young economist, Antonio 
de Oliveira Salazar, gradually came to govern the country. First 
as minister of finance, then as prime minister beginning in 1932, 
he brought a new order and stability to the country. In 1933 an 
authoritarian, traditionalist, statist system, the New State (Estado 
Novo), was inaugurated to protect Portugal from both Western 
liberal democracy and communism. 

Salazar directed this regime until he was incapacitated by an ac- 
cident in 1968. He was succeeded by Marcello Jose das Neves 
Caetano, who governed until April 1974. The governing system 
they ruled attempted to shield Portugal from such modern problems 
as labor strife, rapacious wealth, and departure from traditional 
concepts of personal morality. Salazar outlawed labor unions, 
replacing them with organizations that were supposed to bring labor 
and capital together in such a way that class conflict was avoided. 
He banned all political parties except one official party, rigorous- 
ly controlled the press, and carefully supervised the country's few 
schools. Mindful of the social changes a modernizing economy en- 
genders, he even attempted to arrest commercial change and stop 
the expansion of the country's small industrial sector. An exten- 
sive system of informants and an efficient secret police easily coun- 
tered the regime's few opponents. 

Portugal's authoritarian regime lasted for nearly half a centu- 
ry. It loosened its strictures on the economy somewhat after 1959, 
and the Portuguese economy grew at a very rapid rate until 1974. 
It permitted a few elections in which dissenting voices were heard 
but to no lasting effect. The press was allowed a slightly greater 
degree of freedom in the early 1970s, but otherwise the regime re- 
mained firmly in control. 

The sudden collapse of the regime in April 1974 surprised every- 
one. Also unexpected were the engineers of its collapse, young 
officers who served in the military, long the regime's chief sup- 
port. These officers were brought to their extreme action by the 
regime's stubborn determination to retain Portugal's African colo- 
nies. Having served on the front lines and seen the human costs 
of the wars firsthand, the officers knew that defeating the strong 



xxv 



rebel movements in these colonies was beyond Portugal's power. 
They staged the April coup to stop further futile bloodshed. Their 
simple coup became a revolution. 

The sudden and unexpected collapse of the regime created a po- 
litical vacuum. Decades of political repression had left the Por- 
tuguese people with no practical experience of governing themselves. 
The widespread hatred of the regime barred its major figures from 
any active role in politics. A few younger politicians active within 
the regime were seen as sufficiently untainted to continue to be 
involved in public affairs. Their experience allowed them to as- 
sume leadership positions in several parties located on the moder- 
ate right of the political spectrum. Francisco Sa Carneiro took 
control of the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Demo- 
cratico — PPD), and Diogo Freitas do Amaral, a law professor, came 
to head the Party of the Social Democratic Center (Partido do Cen- 
tro Democratico Social — CDS). Mario Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares, 
who had long opposed the regime and had endured imprisonment 
and exile because of his open resistance, returned to Portugal within 
days of the coup to lead the newly reestablished Socialist Party (Par- 
tido Socialista — PS). Communists had been active underground 
for decades under the leadership of the Stalinist Alvaro Cunhal, 
who directed the PCP from Eastern Europe. Like Soares, Cunhal 
also returned to Portugal immediately after the coup and plunged 
into the turbulent politics that filled the capital's streets and squares. 
Because the PCP alone among political parties had a sizeable 
organized infrastructure in place, it occupied a political space greater 
than its actual strength. 

Political power was by no means limited to these parties, which 
in the first months of the revolution had marginal roles, but was 
held by a broad variety of groups. Numerous splinter groups to 
the left of the PCP were soon active and made themselves known 
through street demonstrations. The PCP-controlled labor union 
Intersindical emerged from its semi-underground position and 
worked alongside the often independent Workers' Committees, 
which quickly began taking control of numerous factories and busi- 
nesses. The MFA, with its select military force, the Continental 
Operations Command (Comando Operacional do Continente — 
COPCON), wielded much power, as well. The most visible poli- 
tician of the first months of the revolution was General Antonio 
de Spmola, who became the president of the country's interim 
government. 

Given this array of forces, there was no one center of power. 
Groups formed temporary alliances, giant street rallies attempted 
to influence the direction of politics, the PCP placed its people in 



xxvi 



many key positions in the country's public institutions, and politi- 
cal parties to the right of the PCP attempted to prevent a com- 
munist takeover. Given its nature as an organized and disciplined 
force, the military was the single most important element during 
the revolution, although most officers were not radicals. 

A series of provisional governments was formed that with time 
became increasingly leftist and dominated by radical military 
officers. An attempted rightist coup by Spinola in March 1975 
caused a leftist countermovement, a wave of nationalizations of 
banks and other businesses, and the seizure of many large farms 
in southern Portugal. Attempts to bring the revolution to the north 
backfired, and that region's smallholders offered the first success- 
ful resistance to the revolutionary left's program to turn Portugal 
into a socialist state. 

Another indication that the country as a whole did not wish a 
revolutionary government was the April 1975 election of the Con- 
stituent Assembly, in which parties to the right of the PCP had 
an overwhelming majority. The assembly had no legislative pow- 
ers but had as its sole purpose the drafting of a constitution for 
a democratic government. It began this work against the backdrop 
of an increasingly radical revolution. 

During the summer of 1975, splits appeared within the MFA 
itself. Moderate elements favoring a political program akin to Scan- 
dinavian social democracy gained the upper hand in the organiza- 
tion, deposed the most radical of all the provisional governments 
in September, and put in place the last of these six governments, 
one destined to last until the first constitutional government came 
into existence in July 1976. An attempted coup in November 1975 
by extremists was put down by a counterattack led by moderates. 
The arrest of several hundred radical officers and the dissolution 
of COPCON ended the radical stage of the Revolution of 1974. 

The military remained active in politics, however. Although the 
African wars ended when the colonies were granted independence 
in 1975, elements of the military were determined to defend the 
accomplishments of the revolution. The MFA arranged with the 
drafters of the constitution that the military would retain guard- 
ian rights over the new democracy, ensuring that it remained true 
to "the spirit of the revolution." The constitution of 1976 provid- 
ed for a strong president who, with the help of a military-dominated 
Council of the Revolution, could veto any legislation that reversed 
such revolutionary actions as the extensive nationalizations of 1975. 
General Antonio dos Santos Ramalho Eanes, the hero of the 
November 1975 countercoup, was elected the new democracy's first 



xxvn 



president in 1976. An austere man of unquestioned integrity, Eanes 
could be trusted to preserve the revolution's gains. 

The first regular parliamentary elections were held in April 1976. 
The winner was the PS with 35 percent of the vote, far ahead of 
its competitors, but not enough for an absolute majority in the new 
unicameral parliament, the Assembly of the Republic. With its lead- 
er Soares as prime minister, the PS formed a minority government 
that governed for eighteen months. When it fell because of a mo- 
tion of censure, the PS formed a governing coalition with the Chris- 
tian democrat CDS that lasted another year. Enormous social and 
economic problems, including the return of an estimated 600,000 
Portuguese settlers and demobilized soldiers from Africa, combined 
with factionalism and personal rivalries, were the undoing of these 
first two constitutional governments. Eanes then appointed a se- 
ries of nonpartisan caretaker governments composed of experts and 
technocrats in the hope that they could better deal with pressing 
issues and govern until the next parliamentary elections mandat- 
ed by the constitution for 1980. 

Each of the three caretaker governments failed, and Eanes was 
forced to call for early elections in December 1979, even though 
parliamentary elections would still have to be held the following 
year. The Democratic Alliance (Alianca Democratica — AD), a coa- 
lition of the PPD — now called the Social Democrat Party (Partido 
Social Democrata — PSD) — the CDS, and several smaller groups, 
won the election, but without a majority. The coalition formed a 
government with the forceful and charismatic PSD leader Sa Car- 
neiro as prime minister. The AD won the October 1980 election, 
as well, and governed Portugal until 1983. New elections were called 
that year because the AD, without the leadership of Sa Carneiro, 
who had died in a December 1980 plane crash, had disintegrated, 
and no effective government could be formed. 

During its time in power, however, the AD coalition had effect- 
ed some far-reaching constitutional amendments that strengthened 
the system of parliamentary government. With the support of the 
PS, which gave the AD the required two-thirds majorities, con- 
stitutional amendments were passed in 1982 that weakened the pow- 
er of the president and strengthened both the prime minister and 
the legislature. The presidency remained an essential governing 
institution, but the balance of political power shifted to favor the 
cabinet and the legislature, as in most other Western democracies. 
A further amendment ended the military's guardianship over the 
new democracy. The amendment eliminated the Council of the 
Revolution, through which the military had frequently vetoed legis- 
lation, and replaced it with the Constitutional Court, which functions 



xxvin 



in the same manner as similar bodies in other parliamentary 
democracies. President Eanes, easily reelected in late 1980 for a 
second five-year term, signed the amendments into law, although 
he opposed them because they reduced the president's powers and 
returned the military to the barracks. 

After the 1983 parliamentary elections, the PS formed a coali- 
tion government with the PSD. The huge losses stemming from 
the many firms nationalized during the revolution, the enormous 
expansion of the numbers of those employed by the state, the ef- 
fects of the two oil-price hikes of the 1970s, and the flight of much 
entrepreneurial talent from Portugal had left the economy in a 
desperate state. Inflation was as high as 30 percent a year, and 
many workers had real earnings lower than those of the early 1970s. 
In addition, many companies were in such financial straits that 
wages were often months in arrears. 

No government had been able to deal with these economic 
problems in a meaningful way. The AD and PS combination that 
had effected some vital constitutional changes was not able to amend 
the constitutional provisions that declared the revolution's nation- 
alizations irreversible. In addition, the country's labor laws in 
essence guaranteed employees jobs for life and made rational de- 
ployment of labor nearly impossible. Given these circumstances, 
the PS-PSD government had to make some very difficult decisions 
and became unpopular as the economy worsened. The alliance, 
troubled also by personal rivalries, collapsed in early 1985. 

The PSD began its political ascent in the 1985 parliamentary 
elections. As the senior partner in the coalition and with its leader 
Soares as prime minister, the PS was blamed by voters for the 
failures of the fallen government; it polled only 20.8 percent of the 
vote, compared with 36.3 percent in 1983. Despite its participa- 
tion in the government, the PSD won more votes than ever be- 
fore, 29.9 percent, and for the first time was the party with the 
most parliamentary seats. Much of the PSD's success was due to 
its new leader, Anibal Cavaco Silva, who waged a clever campaign 
and presented his party in a new light. His personal qualities of 
austerity, probity, and competence appealed to many Portuguese, 
who saw in him, an economist and former minister of finance, some- 
one who could deal with the country's serious problems. 

Cavaco Silva formed a minority single-party government with 
himself as prime minister and managed to remain in power for 
nearly a year and a half. He was fortunate in that painful economic 
decisions made by the previous government began to bear fruit dur- 
ing his time in office. Portugal's accession to the EC at the beginning 
of 1986 also benefited the country; the first of the organization's 



xxix 



extensive aid packages began to improve Portugal's backward in- 
frastructure almost immediately. When a motion of censure brought 
down the PSD government in the spring of 1987, Soares, elected 
president in early 1986, decided to call new elections in July 1987 
rather than form another weak single-party or coalition government. 

The improving economy and the feeling on the part of many 
Portuguese that the PSD was taking their country in the right direc- 
tion allowed the party to win an absolute parliamentary majority 
in the national elections of 1987. The 50.2 percent of the vote gave 
the party a solid parliamentary majority, the first in the new de- 
mocracy, and permitted the formation of a strong single-party 
government. Cavaco Silva's government also became the first to 
serve out the entire four- year legislative term. In 1991 Cavaco Sil- 
va led his party to a second victory in which it again won more 
than 50 percent of the vote and 135 seats in the 230-seat parliament. 

For many observers, the PSD's electoral successes and the sta- 
bility of the Cavaco Silva government indicated that Portugal's new 
democracy, the Second Republic as it is often called, had at last 
taken root. During the first decade of the new political system, there 
were numerous weak governments, and four national elections were 
called because no effective governing coalitions were available. This 
instability caused some observers to fear that Portugal's second at- 
tempt at parliamentary democracy might eventually prove as un- 
successful as was the First Republic. 

The Second Republic was more fortunate than the First Republic 
in several regards, however. Despite its serious problems, Portu- 
gal had come to enjoy a much greater prosperity and a higher lev- 
el of education than in the first decades of the century. As a result, 
the Portuguese were better able to understand public affairs than 
in the past. In addition, the new government possessed a greater 
legitimacy because it was based on universal suffrage and high rates 
of voter participation. Portugal was also lucky to have a number 
of capable politicians committed to establishing parliamentary 
democracy. Also vital was the willingness of the military to abide 
by the laws of the new republic. All of these factors contributed 
to the eventual success of the new political system. 

However healthy Portuguese democracy was by the 1990s, it still 
exhibited some shortcomings. Factionalism, whether caused by 
ideology or personal ambition, was still noticeable. Strict party dis- 
cipline ensured a degree of party unity, but party "barons" some- 
times put personal welfare before that of their parties. Small parties 
centered around an individual were less common than in the past, 
but in the 1985 elections a big winner was a short-lived group 
pledged to President Eanes. The parties sometimes overshadowed 



xxx 



the Assembly of the Republic as centers of political power, but in- 
ternal reforms, increased support staff, and an evolving institu- 
tional ethos had increased that body's performance to the benefit 
of parliamentary democracy. 

By the early 1990s, Portuguese democracy appeared to be mov- 
ing to a two-party system consisting of the PSD and the PS. The 
two parties together won nearly 80 percent of the vote in the 1991 
national elections and between them controlled 90 percent of the 
seats in parliament. As of early 1993, there was no reason to think 
this dominance would be upset in the near future. 

The PSD, in power since early 1980 through coalitions with par- 
ties first to its right, then to its left, and then through both minority 
and majority single-party governments, gradually came to occupy 
a large place in the middle of the political spectrum. Generally, 
the PSD held views similar to those advocated by liberal Republi- 
cans in the United States. Anibal Cavaco Silva, the party's leader 
since 1985, remained very popular with Portuguese voters, and 
the government he formed after the October 1991 elections was 
expected to remain in power for the entire legislative period sched- 
uled to end in late 1995. 

Portugal's other leading political party, the PS, had lost its early 
dominance but far outdistanced its nearest rivals, the PCP and the 
CDS. The PS had been troubled by leadership problems and in- 
ept campaigns since Soares resigned as its head to campaign for 
the presidency in the mid-1980s. However, it renamed dominant 
in many areas and won the 1989 local elections. The PS had gradu- 
ally moved to the center of the political spectrum, having long aban- 
doned the fierce advocacy of socialism that characterized it in the 
mid-1970s. Indeed, by the early 1990s, its positions on main is- 
sues were often hard to distinguish from those of the PSD. To the 
right of the PSD was the Christian democratic CDS. Long led by 
its founder Diogo Freitas do Amaral, who nearly won the presidency 
in 1986, the CDS had seen a steady erosion of support in national 
elections during the 1980s. The party was last part of a govern- 
ment in early 1983, and only a weakening of the PSD seemed likely 
to bring it back into power as a coalition partner. 

The only major political party not regarded as a wholehearted 
supporter of liberal democracy was the PCP. Parties to its right 
never saw the PCP as a suitable coalition partner, however, and 
after the constitution of 1976 became effective, it was never part 
of any cabinet. The PCP had many supporters in some southern 
areas, both rural and industrial, but rival parties were making head- 
way even in these traditional strongholds. The PCP remained reso- 
lutely Stalinist even into the 1990s, expelling members who sought 



xxxi 



to reform it. The PCP's share of votes declined during the 1980s, 
and by the 1991 election it had lost half its support. This decline 
and an aging membership suggested that the PCP was condemned 
to political marginality. 

The first decade of the Second Republic was marked by frequent 
political missteps and failures; the decade was also a very difficult 
one for Portugal's economy, and in some years there were real 
declines in both wages and production. This situation was a pain- 
ful contrast to the accelerated rates of growth between 1960 and 
1973 when the Salazar-Caetano regime had allowed partial eco- 
nomic liberalization and increased foreign investment. Growth end- 
ed, however, when the revolution's extensive nationalizations and 
the subsequent mismanagement of the government's large hold- 
ings were exacerbated by the global recession caused by the oil price 
hikes of 1973 and 1979. 

Austerity measures undertaken in the mid-1980s and large trans- 
fers of financial aid to Portugal by the EC led to a sustained peri- 
od of growth in the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s that 
was among the best achieved by member countries of the Organi- 
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD— 
see Glossary). Growth was further strengthened by substantial direct 
foreign investment (US$15 billion in the 1989-92 period) and the 
government's sales of many companies nationalized during the revo- 
lution (nearly US$6 billion in the same period). However favora- 
ble these trends were, during the remainder of the 1990s the 
resourcefulness of Portugal's businesspeople and politicians will be 
seriously challenged by long-term structural problems in Portu- 
gal's economy and its complete opening by 1995 to competition 
from more efficient rivals in the EC. 

Portugal's agricultural sector is only one-half to one-fourth as 
productive as those of most other EC member states, despite US$2 
billion of EC funds that had been invested in modernization ef- 
forts between 1986 and the early 1990s. Although nearly one-fifth 
of the work force was engaged in agriculture in the early 1990s, 
as much as one-half of the food the country consumed had to be 
imported. The small fragmented farms of the north are probably 
too small for efficient farming. Progress has been made in introduc- 
ing modern methods and equipment to the large estates in the south, 
many of which were collective farms for a time, but as a whole 
the sector remains overstaffed and backward. 

The industrial sector consists of three components: modern 
foreign-owned plants that produce a large variety of sophisticated 
products; a large, generally unprofitable state-owned sector, often 
concentrated in heavy industry; and privately owned, often quite 



xxxn 



small and labor-intensive manufacturing firms that have managed 
to survive international competition because of protective tariffs 
and low wages. Modern high-technology companies are likely to 
continue to prosper in the 1990s. The nationalized sector is being 
privatized by the Cavaco Silva government, and those companies 
that appear to have a promising future have found buyers. Portu- 
gal's privately owned companies, active in textiles, shoe manufac- 
turing, food processing, and similar activities, are likely to find the 
1990s difficult. Often too small to purchase or use modern equip- 
ment and slow to learn the latest managerial methods, a good num- 
ber of these firms might well not survive the decade. 

Portugal's service sector is also in the throes of meeting the 
challenges of the European single market (see Glossary). Tourism 
remains vital to the country and is being upgraded. The financial 
sector is being transformed by foreign firms that have set up com- 
panies in Portugal. The many banks the government nationalized 
in 1975 were being sold off at a brisk rate in the early 1990s. Por- 
tuguese banking as a whole is overstaffed and underautomated, 
but foreign competition is forcing the sector to strive for greater 
efficiency. 

The government also attempted to deal with legacies of both the 
Salazar regime and the revolutionary period when it proposed 
streamlining the state bureaucracy and reforming labor laws. Per- 
sistence is needed to deal with the deadening effects of a too large 
and unresponsive government bureaucracy, which during Salazar' s 
rule had come to regulate much of everyday life and then was ex- 
panded in the revolutionary mid-1970s. The bureaucracy takes 
many of the state's resources and through extensive regulation 
hinders ordinary citizens in their dealings with state authorities and 
firms in the conduct of their business. Labor laws passed during 
the revolution made dismissing employees very difficult. Attempts 
to reform employment methods have had only moderate success 
and foundered on union resistance. Companies have circumvent- 
ed some of these laws by resorting to fixed-term work contracts, 
but personnel management practices still had not been put on a 
wholly rational footing as of the early 1990s. 

Portugal needs a well-trained work force in order to fare well 
in an increasingly competitive world economy. More Portuguese 
are being educated than ever before, even at the university level, 
which long had been reserved for a tiny elite. It was estimated, 
however, that in the early 1990s up to 20 percent of Portuguese 
over the age of fifteen were illiterate. This illiteracy rate represented 
a striking improvement over the 1930 rate of 68 percent but was 



xxxm 



still much higher than the European average. Even at the begin- 
ning of the 1990s, most Portuguese had had only five or six years 
of schooling, and the percentage of children attending school be- 
yond the sixth grade was below the EC average by a wide margin. 
Morale in the teaching profession was also low because teachers, 
like most state employees, were very poorly paid. EC financial trans- 
fers to Portugal to raise the standards of the country's education 
were significant, but much remained to be done before Portuguese 
schooling corresponded to that of other West European countries. 

The severity of the education system's problems is matched by 
the serious problems found throughout Portugal's social welfare 
and health systems. A comprehensive social welfare system had 
been established by law in the second half of the 1970s but never 
fully realized, and benefit payments and pensions were set at a very 
low level. Significant progress had been made in reducing infant 
mortality and dealing with some other health problems, but pub- 
lic health care is not generally up to West European standards. 
The country' s backwardness when measured against the rest of the 
EC, with the exception of Greece, is striking and could be seen 
as a legacy of Portugal's long isolation from Europe and the repres- 
sion of the Salazar regime. 

Given the advances made in the two decades after 1974, however, 
Portuguese have reasons to rejoice. Poverty remains, especially in 
rural areas, and housing is frequently inadequate, but the popula- 
tion as a whole lives better than ever before. The traditional neces- 
sity to emigrate to find employment that had forced millions of 
Portuguese to leave their country, especially in the 1960s when 
Paris, in effect, became the second largest Portuguese city, has less- 
ened greatly. Many Portuguese can now find employment at home, 
if not in rural regions where emigration is still the rule, then along 
the coasts where most Portuguese have come to live. The improved 
economy also gives young Portuguese a greater choice in occupa- 
tions and a chance for social mobility. 

A modernizing society also presents Portuguese with oppor- 
tunities for a better life. Portuguese society is more varied than 
during the Salazar period. The free media have brought the out- 
side world to the Portuguese and engendered a greater liberality 
in how people lived. Divorce was permitted in the old regime, but 
abortion not legalized until 1984. The change went through de- 
spite the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church, which has 
become less influential. More Portuguese women work outside the 
home, and if occupational opportunities are not yet as great as those 
enjoyed by women in Northern Europe, Portuguese women are 
freer than their mothers. Until 1969, for example, Portuguese 



xxxiv 



women who were not heads of households had to have the permis- 
sion of their husbands or male relatives to obtain passports. In the 
new Portugal, in contrast, a government agency existed with the 
purpose of preventing discrimination against women. 

The greatest achievement of the Portuguese people since 1974, 
however, and the one that has allowed and encouraged other posi- 
tive developments and permitted confidence about the future, is 
the consolidation of a system of parliamentary democracy, the first 
successful such system in the country's history. It is hoped that 
a modern political system responsive to the people's needs will 
allow the Portuguese to prepare for the next century in a united 
Europe. 



October 9, 1993 Eric Solsten 



XXXV 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Ruins of Roman temple in Evora 



THE HISTORY OF PORTUGAL can be divided into seven 
broad periods. The first begins in the Paleolithic period and ex- 
tends to the formation of Portugal as an independent monarchy. 
During this period, Lusitania, that portion of the western Iberian 
Peninsula known today as Portugal, experienced many waves of 
conquest and settlement by Iberos, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, 
Swabians, Visigoths, and Muslims. Of these successive waves of 
people, the Romans left the greatest imprint on present Portuguese 
society. 

The second broad period of Portuguese history runs from the 
founding of the monarchy in 1128 until the disappearance of the 
House of Burgundy, Portugal's first dynasty, in 1383. During this 
period, the monarchy was established and expanded by reconquer- 
ing territory from the Muslims and populating those lands with 
Christian settlers. Consolidation and economic development were 
furthered by policies designed to increase agricultural productivity. 

The third period begins with the founding of the House of Avis, 
Portugal's second ruling dynasty. During this period, Portugal ex- 
perienced a dynastic struggle that brought the House of Avis to 
the throne, a series of wars with Castile that threatened the indepen- 
dence of the new kingdom, a social revolution, a second dynastic 
struggle, and the assertion of royal supremacy over the nobility. 

The fourth period begins in 1415 when the Portuguese seized 
Ceuta in Morocco, thus beginning Portugal's maritime expansion. 
During this period, Portugal explored the west coast of Africa, dis- 
covered and colonized Madeira and the Azores, opened the pas- 
sage to India around Africa, built an empire in Asia, and colonized 
Brazil. 

The fifth period, that of imperial decline, begins with the dy- 
nastic crisis of 1580, which saw the demise of the House of Avis. 
During this period, Portugal was part of the Iberian Union until 
1640, when the monarchy was restored and a new dynasty, the 
House of Braganca, was established. This period includes the ad- 
vent of absolutism in Portugal and ends with the Napoleonic in- 
vasions in the early 1800s. 

The sixth period, the period of constitutional monarchy, begins 
with the liberal revolution of 1820, which established in Portugal 
for the first time a written constitution. This period includes a civil 
war in which constitutionalists triumphed over absolutists, the win- 
ning of independence by Brazil, and the exploration of Portugal's 



3 



Portugal: A Country Study 

African possessions. It ends with the collapse of rotativismo (see Glos- 
sary) in the early twentieth century. 

The final period begins in 1910 with the downfall of the monar- 
chy and the establishment of the First Republic. This period in- 
cludes the corporative republic of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar; the 
collapse of that regime on April 25, 1974; and the establishment 
of Portugal's present democratic regime, the Second Republic. 

Origins of Portugal 

The Iberian Peninsula is a geographic unit encompassing a num- 
ber of distinct regions distinguished by different climate and geo- 
morphology, such as Andalusia, Castile, Galicia, and Lusitania. 
Lusitania, which now encompasses the modern nation-state of Por- 
tugal, is generally set off from the other regions of the peninsula 
by areas of higher elevation running parallel to the Atlantic coast, 
greater rainfall, and a more moderate climate. It was this regional 
distinctiveness, as well as the internal geography of Lusitania — an 
area largely open to the south but hemmed in by mountains on 
the east and the Atlantic Ocean on the west — that gave rise to a 
culturally and socially distinct people, the Portuguese, and later 
to an independent nation-state, Portugal. 

Early Inhabitants 

Lusitania has been inhabited since the Paleolithic period, and 
implements made by humans have been found at widely scattered 
sites. The Ice Ages did not touch Lusitania, and it was only after 
the disappearance of the Paleolithic hunting cultures that a warmer 
climate gave rise to a river-centered culture. At the end of the 
Paleolithic period, about 7000 B.C. , the valley of the Tagus River 
(Rio Tejo) was populated by hunting and fishing tribes, who lived 
at the mouths of the river's tributaries. These people left huge 
kitchen middens containing the remains of shellfish and crustaceans, 
as well as the bones of oxen, deer, sheep, horses, pigs, wild dogs, 
badgers, and cats. Later, perhaps about 3000 B.C., Neolithic peo- 
ples constructed crude dwellings and began to practice agriculture. 
They used polished stone tools, made ceramics, and practiced a 
cult of the dead, building many funerary monuments called dol- 
mens. By the end of the Neolithic period, about 2000 B.C., regions 
of cultural differentiation began to appear among the Stone Age 
inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula, one of these being the western 
Megalithic culture. Present-day Portugal is thus rich in Megalithic 
neocropolises, the best known of which are at Palmela, Alcalar, 
Reguengos, and Monsaraz. 



4 



Historical Setting 



The Paleolithic and Neolithic periods were followed by the Bronze 
Age and the Iron Age (probably between 1500 and 1000 B.C.). 
During this time, the Iberian Peninsula was colonized by various 
peoples. One of the oldest were the Ligures, about whom little is 
known. Another were the Iberos, thought to have come from North 
Africa. The Iberos were a sedentary people who used a primitive 
plow, wheeled carts, had writing, and made offerings to the dead. 

Phoenicians, Greeks, and Carthaginians 

In the twelfth century B.C. , Phoenicians arrived on the west coast 
of the Iberian Peninsula in search of metals and founded trading 
posts at Cadiz, Malaga, and Seville. They traded with the peoples 
of the interior, taking out silver, copper, and tin and bringing in 
eastern trade goods. Between the eighth century and sixth century 
B.C., successive waves of Celtic peoples from central Europe in- 
vaded the western part of the peninsula, where the topography and 
climate were well suited to their herding-farming way of life. They 
settled there in large numbers and blended in with the indigenous 
Iberos, giving rise to a new people known as Celtiberians. Their 
settlements were hilltop forts called castros, many vestiges of which 
remain in northern Portugal. 

Later, during the seventh century B.C., Greeks arrived and 
founded several colonies, including Sargunto on the Mediterrane- 
an coast and Alcacer do Sal on the Atlantic coast. During the fifth 
century B.C., the Carthaginians replaced the Phoenicians and 
closed the Straits of Gibraltar to the Greeks. The Carthaginians 
undertook the conquest of the peninsula but were only able to per- 
manently occupy the territory in the south originally controlled by 
their Phoenician and Greek predecessors. The Carthaginian oc- 
cupation lasted until the defeat of Carthage by the Romans in the 
third century B.C. 

The Romans made the former Carthaginian territory into a new 
province of their expanding empire and conquered and occupied 
the entire peninsula. This invasion was resisted by the indigenous 
peoples, the stiffest resistance coming from the Lusitanians who 
lived in the western part of the peninsula. The Lusitanians were 
led by warrior chieftains, the most powerful of whom was Viriato. 
Viriato held up the Roman invasion for several decades until he 
was murdered in his bed by three of his own people who had been 
bribed by the Romans. His death brought the Lusitanian resistance 
to an end, and Rome relatively quickly conquered and occupied 
the entire peninsula. The Portuguese have claimed Viriato as the 
country's first great national hero. 



5 



Portugal: A Country Study 
Romanization 

After the conquest was completed, the Romans gathered the in- 
digenous peoples into jurisdictions, each with a Roman center of 
administration and justice. Olissipo (present-day Lisbon) served 
as the administrative center of Roman Portugal until the found- 
ing of Emerita (present-day Merida, Spain) in A.D. 25. By the 
beginning of the first century A.D. , Romanization was well under- 
way in southern Portugal. A senate was established at Ebora 
(present-day Evora); schools of Greek and Latin were opened; in- 
dustries such as brick making, tile making, and iron smelting were 
developed; military roads and bridges were built to connect ad- 
ministrative centers; and monuments, such as the Temple of Di- 
ana in Evora, were erected. Gradually, Roman civilization was 
extended to northern Portugal, as well. The Lusitanians were forced 
out of their hilltop fortifications and settled in bottom lands in Ro- 
man towns (citanias). 

The citanias were one of the most important institutions imposed 
on Lusitania during the Roman occupation. It was in the citanias 
that the Lusitanians acquired Roman civilization: they learned Lat- 
in, the lingua franca of the peninsula and the basis of modern Por- 
tuguese; they were introduced to Roman administration and 
religion; and in the third century, when Rome converted to Chris- 
tianity, so did the Lusitanians. The Roman occupation left a pro- 
found cultural, economic, and administrative imprint on the entire 
Iberian Peninsula that remains to the present day. 

Germanic Invasions 

In 406 the Iberian Peninsula was invaded by Germanic peoples 
consisting of Vandals, Swabians, and Alans, anon-Germanic people 
of Iranian stock who had attached themselves to the Vandals. With- 
in two years, the invaders had spread to the west coast. The Swa- 
bians were primarily herders and were drawn to Galicia because 
the climate was similar to what they had left behind. The Vandals 
settled to the north of Galicia but soon left with the remnants of 
the Alans for the east. After the departure of the Vandals, the 
Swabians moved southward and settled among the Luso-Romans, 
who put up no resistance and assimilated them easily. The urban 
life of the citanias gave way to the Swabian custom of dispersed 
houses and smallholdings, a pattern that is reflected today in the 
land tenure pattern of northern Portugal. Roman administration 
disappeared. The capital of Swabian hegemony was present-day 
Braga, but some Swabian kings lived in the Roman city of Cale 
(present-day Porto) at the mouth of the Rio Douro. The city was 



6 



Historical Setting 



a customs post between Galicia and Lusitania. Gradually, the city 
came to be called Portucale, a compound oiportus (port) and Cale. 
This name also referred to the vast territory to the immediate north 
and south of the banks of the river upstream from the city. 

With large parts of the peninsula now outside their control, in 
415 the Romans commissioned the Visigoths, the most highly 
Romanized of the Germanic peoples, to restore Rome's hegemony. 
The Visigoths forced the Vandals to sail for North Africa and defeat- 
ed the Swabians. The Swabian kings and their Visigothic over- 
lords held commissions to govern in the name of the emperor; their 
kingdoms were thus part of the Roman Empire. Latin remained 
the language of government and commerce. The Visigoths, who 
had been converted to Christianity in the fifth century, decided 
to organize themselves into an independent kingdom with their cap- 
ital at Toledo. The kingdom was based on the principle of abso- 
lute monarchy, each sovereign being elected by an assembly of 
nobles. Visigothic kings convoked great councils made up of bishops 
and nobles to assist in deciding ecclesiastical and civil matters. 
Visigoths gradually fused with the Swabians and Hispano-Romans 
into a single politico-religious entity that lasted until the eighth cen- 
tury, when the Iberian Peninsula fell under Muslim domination. 

Muslim Domination 

In 7 1 1 Iberia was invaded by a Muslim army commanded by 
Tariq ibn Ziyad. The last Visigothic king, Rodrigo, tried to repel 
this invasion but was defeated. The Muslims advanced to Cordo- 
ba and then to Toledo, the Visigothic capital. The last resistance 
of the Visigoths was made at Merida, which fell in June 713 after 
a long siege. In the spring of 714, a Muslim army commanded 
by Musa ibn Nusair marched to Saragossa and then to Leon and 
Astorga. Evora, Santarem, and Coimbra fell by 716. Thus, within 
five years, the Muslims had conquered and occupied the entire 
peninsula. Only a wedge of wet, mountainous territory in the ex- 
treme northwest called Asturias remained under Christian control. 

In Lusitania land was divided among Muslim troops. How- 
ever, bad crops and a dislike for the wet climate put an end to 
the short-lived Muslim colonization along the Rio Douro. Mus- 
lims preferred the dry country below the Tagus River because 
it was more familiar, especially the Algarve, an area of present- 
day Portugal where the Muslim imprint remains the strongest. 
The Muslim aristocracy settled in towns and revived urban life; 
others fanned out across the countryside as small farmers. The 
Visigothic peasants readily converted to Islam, having only been 



7 



Portugal: A Country Study 

superficially Christianized. Some Visigothic nobles continued to 
practice Christianity, but most converted to Islam and were con- 
firmed by the Muslims as local governors. Jews, who were always 
an important element in the urban population, continued to exer- 
cise a significant role in commerce and scholarship. 

Al Andalus, as Islamic Iberia was known, flourished for 250 
years, under the Caliphate of Cordoba. Nothing in Europe ap- 
proached Cordoba's wealth, power, culture, or the brilliance of 
its court. The caliphs founded schools and libraries; they cultivated 
the sciences, especially mathematics; they introduced arabesque 
decoration into local architecture; they explored mines; they de- 
veloped commerce and industry; and they built irrigation systems, 
which transformed many arid areas into orchards and gardens. Fi- 
nally, the Muslim domination introduced more than 600 Arabic 
words into the Portuguese language. 

The Golden Age of Muslim domination ended in the eleventh 
century when local nobles, who had become rich and powerful, 
began to carve up the caliphate into independent regional city-states 
(taifas), the most important being the emirates of Badajoz, Merida, 
Lisbon, and Evora. These internecine struggles provided an op- 
portunity for small groups of Visigothic Christians, who had taken 
refuge in the mountainous northwest of the peninsula, to go on 
the offensive against the Muslims, thus beginning the Christian 
Reconquest of Iberia. 

Christian Reconquest 

Although their empire had been defeated by the Muslim on- 
slaught, individual Visigothic nobles resisted, taking refuge in the 
mountain stronghold of Asturias. As early as 737, the Visigothic 
noble Pelayo took the offensive and defeated the Muslims at 
Covadonga, for which he was proclaimed king of Asturias, later 
Leon. Subsequent kings of Asturias-Leon, who claimed succession 
from Visigothic monarchs, were able to retake Braga, Porto, Viseu, 
and Guimaraes in northern Portugal, where they settled Chris- 
tians around strongholds. For 200 years, this region was a buffer 
zone across which the frontier between Christians and Muslims 
shifted back and forth with the ebb and flow of attack and coun- 
terattack. 

The creation of Portugal as an independent monarchy is clearly 
associated with the organization of the military frontier against 
the Muslims in this area. This buffer zone between Christian and 
Muslim territory was constantly being reorganized under counts ap- 
pointed by the kings of Leon. The territory known as Portucalense 



3 



Historical Setting 



was made a province of Leon and placed under the control of 
counts, who governed with a substantial degree of autonomy 
because the province was separated from Leon by rugged moun- 
tains. 

In 1096 Alfonso VI, king of Leon, gave hereditary title to the 
province of Portucalense and Coimbra as dowry to the crusader- 
knight Henry, brother of the duke of Burgundy, upon his mar- 
riage to the king's illegitimate but favorite daughter, Teresa. 
Although Henry was to be sovereign in Portucalense, it was recog- 
nized by all parties that he held this province as a vassal of the 
Leonese king. Henry set up his court at Guimaraes near Braga. 
He surrounded himself with local barons, appointed them to the 
chief provincial offices, and rewarded them with lands. Bound by 
the usual ties of vassal to suzerain, Henry was expected to be loyal 
to Alfonso and render him service whenever required. Until Al- 
fonso's death in 1109, Henry dutifully carried out his feudal obli- 
gations by attending royal councils and providing military assistance 
in the king's campaigns against the Muslims. Alfonso's death 
plunged the kingdom of Leon into a civil war among Aragonese, 
Galician, and Castilian barons who desired the crown. Count Henry 
carefully stayed neutral during this struggle and gradually stopped 
fulfilling his feudal obligations. When he died in 1 1 12, his wife Tere- 
sa inherited the county and initially followed her husband's policy 
of nonalignment. 

The victor in the struggle for the Leonese crown was Alfonso 
VII, who, when he ascended the throne, decided to assert his suzer- 
ainty over Teresa, his aunt, and her consort, a Galician noble- 
man named Fernando Peres. Teresa refused to do homage and 
was forced into submission after a six- week war in 1127. Her bar- 
ons, who saw their fortunes and independence declining, took this 
opportunity to align themselves with her son and the heir to the 
province, Afonso Henriques, who had armed himself as a knight. 
Supported by the barons and lower nobility, Afonso Henriques 
rebelled against his mother's rule. On July 24, 1128, he defeated 
Teresa's army at Sao Mamede near Guimaraes and expelled her 
to Galicia, where she died in exile. Afonso Henriques thus gained 
control of the province of Portucalense, or Portugal, as it was known 
in the vernacular. 

Formation of the Monarchy 

Afonso Henriques was a robust, visionary young man of about 
twenty years of age when he acquired control of the province of 
Portugal. He was anxious to free himself from Leon and establish 



9 



Portugal: A Country Study 

his own kingdom. Consequently, he invaded Galicia and defeated 
Fernando Peres and the Galician barons at the Battle of Cerneja. 
This action brought a response from Alfonso VII, who had in the 
meantime proclaimed himself emperor. He ordered the Galician 
barons to make war on Afonso Henriques, who, threatened by Mus- 
lims from the south recently reinvigorated by the Almohads from 
Morocco, made peace with Alfonso VII in 1137 at Tuy. 

Afonso Henriques Becomes King 

After the peace of Tuy, Afonso Henriques temporarily turned 
his attention to the Muslim threat in the south. In 1 139 he struck 
deep into the heart of Al Andalus and defeated a Muslim army 
at Ourique, a place in the Alentejo. After this battle, Afonso Hen- 
riques began to be referred to in documents as king. In 1140 he 
renewed his claim on southern Galicia, which he invaded. This 
action again sparked a reaction by Alfonso VII who, in return, 
marched on Portugal. The two armies met at Arcos de Valdevez 
and engaged in a joust won by the Portuguese knights. Afonso Hen- 
riques's self-proclamation as king was finally recognized in 1143 
at the Conference of Samora when Alfonso VII recognized him 
as such, although, because he was an emperor, Alfonso VII still 
considered Afonso Henriques his vassal. 

Territorial Enlargement 

Afonso Henriques was a brilliant military commander and dur- 
ing his reign reconquered more Muslim territory than any other 
of the Christian kings on the peninsula. He established his capital 
at Coimbra, and as early as 1135 he built a castle at Leiria. In 
1147 he took advantage of a series of religious rebellions among 
the Muslims, and, with the help of a passing fleet of English, Flem- 
ish, and German crusaders bound for Palestine, captured Lisbon 
after a seventeen- week siege. Continued internecine fighting among 
the Muslims, Lisbon's strategic location, and additional help from 
passing fleets of crusaders eventually allowed Afonso Henriques 
to advance across the Tagus and capture and hold large sections 
of the Alentejo. As a result of this vigorous prosecution of the recon- 
quest, the pope officially recognized Afonso Henriques as king of 
Portugal in 1 179 and granted him all conquered lands over which 
neighboring kings could not prove rights. At his death in 1185, 
Afonso Henriques had carved out an officially recognized Christian 
kingdom that extended well into Muslim Iberia. 

Sancho I (r. 1 185-121 1), Afonso Henriques 's son and heir, contin- 
ued to enlarge the realm. In 1189 he captured the Muslim castle 



10 




Afonso Henriques, founder and first king of Portugal (r. 11 39-85) 
Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington 



i 1 



Portugal: A Country Study 

at Alvor, the city of Silves, and the castle at Albufeira. These 
territories however, were retaken by the Muslims and had to be 
reconquered by his son and heir, Afonso II (r. 121 1-23). With the 
help of his brother-in-law, Alfonso VIII of Castile, Afonso retook 
territory in the Alentejo, fighting major battles at Navas de Tolo- 
sa in 1212 and Alcacer do Sal in 1217. Sancho II (r. 1223-48) 
conquered additional territory in the Alentejo and carried the 
Reconquest into the Algarve, where Muslim armies were defeat- 
ed at Tavira and Cacela in 1238. The Reconquest was completed by 
Afonso III (r. 1248-79) in 1249 when he attacked and defeated an 
isolated enclave of Muslims ensconced at Faro in the Algarve. This 
last battle, which extended Portuguese territory to the sea, estab- 
lished the approximate territorial limits Portugal has had ever since 
(see fig. 2). 

Settlement and Cultivation 

The rapid advance of Afonso Henriques from Coimbra to Lis- 
bon created a vast, relatively uninhabited tract of land between 
north and south. The repopulation of this deserted territory with 
Christian settlers began immediately. Afonso Henriques invited 
many of the crusaders to remain after the siege of Lisbon and 
granted them lands, especially at Atouguia and Lourinha, as pay- 
ment for their help. In addition, Sancho I directed most of his time 
and energy to settling the new monarchy, for which he is known 
as The Populator (O Povoador). He sent agents abroad, especially 
to Burgundy, the land of his ancestors, to recruit colonists, who 
settied at various places, but especially at Vila dos Francos (present- 
day Azambuja). Such communities spread rapidly throughout the 
realm thanks to the protection of the king, who saw in them not 
only a way to populate the kingdom but also a way to diminish 
the power of the nobility. 

The vacant territory between north and south was also filled by 
various monastic orders, including the Franciscans, Dominicans, 
and Benedictines. The Roman Catholic Church granted charters 
to the orders to build monasteries and cultivate the surrounding 
land. The most successful of these orders were the Benedictines, 
who built a monastery at Alcobaca and planted the surrounding 
land in orchards that remain to this day. This monastery grew to 
over 5,000 monks and occupied a huge territory stretching from 
Leiria in the north to Obidos in the south, including the port-town 
of Pederneira (present-day Nazare). 

In the valley of the Tagus and to the south, settling commu- 
nities of unarmed colonists was too dangerous; therefore, early 



12 



Historical Setting 



Portuguese kings called upon religious-military orders to fortify, 
cultivate, and defend this territory. Founded in the early twelfth 
century to wage war against infidels and protect pilgrims, these 
religious orders of knights had become powerful in the Holy Land 
and in many areas of Europe. Several orders of knight-monks were 
given huge tracts of land in the Tagus Valley and the Alentejo as 
recompense for their military service to the king at a time when 
he had no standing army on which to rely. The most successful 
of these knight-monks was the Order of the Templars, which was 
granted territory on the Rio Zezere, a tributary of the Tagus, where 
they built a fortified monastery in Templar fashion at Tomar. The 
Templar domain gradually grew to encompass territory from To- 
mar in the north to Santarem in the south and as far west as the 
lands of the Benedictines at Alcobaca. As more territory in the 
Alentejo was reconquered, additional orders were granted tracts 
of land to defend and cultivate. The Order of the Hospitallers was 
given land surrounding Crato; the Order of the Calatravans (later 
Avis) was established at Evora; and the Order of the Knights of 
Saint James was given lands at Palmela. 

Political and Social Organization 

Afonso Henriques and subsequent Portuguese kings ruled by 
divine right until a constitutional monarchy was established in the 
early nineteenth century. The early kings were assisted by a royal 
council composed of the king's closest advisers and friends from 
among the higher nobility and clergy. The royal council was staffed 
by a number of functionaries, such as the chancellor, who kept the 
royal seal and was the highest official in the land; the notary, who 
gave advice on legal matters; the scribe, who wrote the king's let- 
ters and documents (many early kings were illiterate); and the 
majordomo, who commanded the king's household guard. 

When questions of exceptional importance arose, the king would 
convoke the cortes, an expanded royal council that brought together 
representatives of the three estates of the realm: nobility, clergy, 
and commoners. The first such cortes was called in 1211 at Coim- 
bra in order to legitimate the succession of Afonso II, Afonso Hen- 
riques' s grandson, to the throne, as well as to approve certain laws 
of the realm. After the Cortes of Leiria, which was convoked in 
1254 by Afonso III, representatives of the self-governing settier com- 
munities began to attend. Cortes were convoked at the king's will 
and were limited to advising on issues raised by the king and 
presenting petitions and complaints. Resolutions passed by the 
cortes did not have the force of law unless they were countersigned 



13 



Portugal: A Country Study 




Figure 2. The Reconquest, 1185-1250 

by the king. Later, the cortes came to limit the power of the king 
somewhat, but gradually the monarchy became absolute. The cortes 
was convoked less and less frequently, and in 1697 it stopped be- 
ing called altogether. 

As to territorial administration, northern Portugal was subdivided 
into estates {terras), each a quasi-autonomous political and economic 
unit of feudal suzerainity governed by a nobleman (donatdrio) whose 
title to the land was confirmed by the king. Religious administration 



14 



Historical Setting 



was carried out by the Roman Catholic Church, which divided 
the north into bishoprics and parishes. In the south, administra- 
tion was the responsibility of the military orders: Templars, 
Hospitallers, Calatravans, and Knights of Saint James. In the 
center, administration fell to the monastic orders: Benedictines, 
Franciscans, and Dominicans. The towns and communities of set- 
tlers, as well as a certain amount of land around them, were owned 
by the king, who was responsible for regulating them. 

The settler communities (concelhos) were each recognized by a 
royal franchise, which granted local privileges, set taxes, specified 
rights of self-government, and controlled the relationship among 
the crown, the concelho, and the donatdrio, if the community was 
located within a terra. Each concelho governed itself through an 
assembly chosen from among its resident "good men" (homens-bons); 
that is, freemen not subject to the jurisdiction of the church, the 
local donatdrio, or the special statutes governing Muslims and Jews. 
Each concelho was administered by a local magistrate, who was as- 
sisted by several assessors selected from among the homens-bons of 
the assembly. The tutelary power of the king was represented by 
an official {alcalde) appointed by the king, who was empowered to 
intervene in local matters on the king's behalf when necessary to 
ensure justice and good administration. The degree of self- 
government of these communities gradually declined as the monar- 
chy became increasingly centralized. 

During its formative stages, Portugal had three social classes: 
clergy, nobility, and commoners. By virtue of the religious fervor 
of the times, the clergy was the predominant class. It was the most 
learned, the wealthiest, and occupied the highest office in the realm: 
the chancellorship. The clergy comprised two categories; the bishops 
and parish priests of the regular church hierarchy and the abbots 
and monks of the religious and military orders. These two categories 
were divided into the higher clergy (bishops and abbots) and low 
clergy (priests and monks). The clergy enjoyed various privileges 
and rights, such as judgment in ecclesiastical courts according to 
canon law, exemption from taxes, and the right to asylum from 
civil authorities within their churches. 

The next social class, the nobility, owed its privileged position 
above all to its collaboration with the king in the reconquest. The 
highest level among the nobility was made up of the "rich men" 
{homens-ricos) who owned the largest feudal estates, had private 
armies, and had jurisdiction over great expanses of territory. Be- 
low them were the lesser nobility, who held smaller estates and were 
entrusted with the defense of castles and towns but did not have 



15 



Portugal: A Country Study 

private armies or administrative jurisdiction. Below the lesser no- 
bility were the highest class of free commoners, the villein-knights, 
who maintained their own horses and weaponry, serving the king 
as required. These knights were often encouraged to settle in or 
near the colonial communities of the frontier where they were grant- 
ed special privileges and organized raids against the Muslims for 
their own profit. 

The commoners formed the bottom of the social strata. Among 
them, the serfs were the lowest group. The most numerous group, 
they were bound by heredity to the estates of the crown, nobility, 
and clergy, where they were occupied in agriculture, stockrais- 
ing, and village crafts. Serfs could become free by serving as 
colonists in the underpopulated territories in the south. The se- 
cond lowest group consisted of the clients, that is, freemen who 
did not own property and received protection from an overlord in 
exchange for service. Above the clients were the villein-knights, 
who formed a stratum that merged the commoners with the nobil- 
ity. Finally, outside the basic social structure were the slaves, usually 
Muslim captives, who tilled the lands of the military orders in the 
Alentejo. 

Control of the Royal Patrimony 

Disputes over land ownership became an increasing source of 
conflict between the crown and the upper nobility and clergy. Land 
ownership was important because the crown's main source of 
revenue was taxes from the great estates and tithes from lands owned 
directly by the king. But in medieval Portugal, hereditary title to 
land did not exist in any developed legal form. As the original grants 
of land were obscured by passing years, many of the upper nobility 
and clergy of the church came to believe that they held their land 
by hereditary right. Thus, each time a new king ascended the 
throne, the crown had to review land grants and titles in order to 
assert its authority and reclaim land removed from the king's 
patrimony. 

The first king to confront this problem was Afonso II, who dis- 
covered when he ascended the throne in 1211 that his father, San- 
cho I, had willed much of the royal patrimony to the church. In 
1216, after a lengthy legal battle between the crown and the Holy 
See over various provisions of Sancho's will, the pope recognized 
Afonso IPs right to maintain the royal patrimony intact. From 1216 
until 1221 , the Portuguese crown asserted this general right by re- 
quiring those who had received donations from previous kings to 
apply for letters of confirmation. The crown thus created the power 



16 



Historical Setting 



to review grants to nobles and ecclesiastical bodies. 

The process of confirmation was carried a step further when the 
king appointed royal commissions authorized to investigate land 
ownership, especially in the north where much of the feudal land 
tenure predated the creation of the monarchy. These inquiries, as 
they were called, gathered evidence from the oldest, most ex- 
perienced residents in each locale without consulting local nobles 
or church officials. They revealed a large number of abuses and 
improper extensions of boundaries, as well as conspiracies to defraud 
the crown of income. The first inquiry found that the church was 
the biggest expropriator of royal property. The archbishop of Braga, 
angered by the activities of the commissions, excommunicated Afon- 
so II in 1219. The king responded by seizing church property and 
forcing the archbishop to flee Portugal for Rome. In 1220 the pope 
confirmed the king's excommunication and relieved him of his oath 
of fealty to the Holy See. This dispute between church and crown 
ended temporarily when the excommunicated king died in 1223 
and his chancellor arranged an ecclesiastical burial in exchange for 
the return of the seized church property and the promise that fu- 
ture inquiries would respect canon law. 

The conflict between the church and crown concerning property 
was finally resolved during the reign of King Dinis (r. 1279-1325). 
In 1284 Dinis launched a new round of inquiries and in the fol- 
lowing year promulgated deamortization laws, which prohibited 
the church and religious orders from buying property and required 
that they sell all property purchased since the beginning of his reign. 
For this action against the church, Dinis, like his father and grand- 
father, was excommunicated. This time, however, the king refused 
to pledge obedience to the pope and established once and for all 
the power of the Portuguese crown to regulate and control the royal 
patrimony. 

This power allowed Dinis to nationalize the most powerful and 
wealthy of the military-religious orders. The Calatravans, found- 
ed in Castile, had in effect become Portuguese when the town of 
Avis was bestowed upon them by Afonso and they became known 
as the Order of Avis. In 1288 the Knights of Saint James, also of 
Castilian origin, became Portuguese when the order elected its own 
master. In 1312, as the result of an investigation into the activities 
of the Templars, Pope Clement V suppressed this order and trans- 
ferred their vast properties in Portugal to the Hospitallers. Dinis 
was able to prevail upon the pope to give this wealth to a newly 
founded Portuguese military- religious order called the Order of 
Christ, which was initially situated at Castro Marim but was later 



17 



Portugal: A Country Study 

moved to Tomar. After nationalization, most of these orders be- 
came chivalric bodies of quasi-celibate landowners. The Order of 
Avis, however, remained on a war footing and contributed sig- 
nificantly to Portugal's independence from Castile. The Order of 
Christ also remained a military-religious order, and its wealth was 
later used by Prince Henry the Navigator to pay for the voyages 
of discovery. 

Development of the Realm 

Having established the boundaries of the national territory, as- 
serted their authority over the church and nobility, and gained con- 
trol over the resources of the military orders, Portuguese kings began 
to turn their attention to the economic, cultural, and political de- 
velopment of the realm. This was especially true of King Dinis, 
who is referred to by the Portuguese as The Farmer (O Lavrador) 
because of his policies designed to encourage agricultural develop- 
ment. He decreed that nobles would not lose their standing if they 
drained wetlands, settled colonists, and planted pine forests. The 
pine forests were to produce timber for the shipbuilding industry, 
which Dinis also encouraged, the crown having already at that time 
begun to look toward the sea for future fields of conquest. 

Dinis chartered many settlements of colonists on lands conquered 
from the Muslims and authorized the holding of fairs and markets 
in each of these, thereby creating a national economy. He laid the 
basis for Portugal's naval tradition by bringing the Genoese, Em- 
manuele Pessagno (Manuel Pecanha in Portuguese) to Portugal 
in 1317 to be the hereditary admiral of the Portuguese navy. Mari- 
time commerce was encouraged when Dinis negotiated an agree- 
ment with Edward II of England in 1 303 that permitted Portuguese 
ships to enter English ports and guaranteed security and trading 
privileges for Portuguese merchants. Dinis provided the impetus 
for the development of Portuguese as a national language when 
he decreed that all official documents of the realm were to be writ- 
ten in the vernacular. Finally, Dinis stimulated learning when, in 
1290, he founded an academic center similar to the "General 
Studies" centers that had been created in Leon and Aragon. In 
1308 this center was moved to Coimbra where it remained, ex- 
cept for a brief time between from 1521 to 1537, and became the 
University of Coimbra, Portugal's premier institution of higher 
learning. 

Afonso IV (r. 1325-57) continued his father's development poli- 
cies. He also improved the administration of justice by dismissing 
corrupt local judges and replacing them with judges he appointed. 
When a large Muslim army landed on the peninsula in 1340, 



18 



Historical Setting 



Afonso IV allied himself with the king of Castile, Alfonso XI, and 
the king of Aragon in order to do battle against this threat to the 
Christian kingdoms. Afonso sent a fleet commanded by Manuel 
Pecanha to Cadiz and marched overland himself to meet the Mus- 
lim army, which was destroyed at the Battie of Salado. 

When Afonso's grandson and heir, Fernando I (r. 1367-83), 
ascended the throne, the economic productivity of the country had 
been so greatly disrupted by a plague that had ravaged the coun- 
try in 1348 and 1349 that he found it necessary to take measures 
to stimulate food production. In 1375 he promulgated a decree, 
called the Law of the Sesmarias, which obliged all landowners to 
cultivate unused land or sell or rent it to someone who would. The 
law also obligated all who had no useful occupation to work the 
land. This decree had its intended effect and led to the rebuilding 
of the country's wealth. Fernando also stimulated the development 
of the Portuguese merchant fleet by allowing all shipbuilders who 
constructed ships of more than 100 tons to cut timber from the royal 
forests and by exempting the owners of these ships from the full 
tax on the exports and imports of their first voyage. He also estab- 
lished a maritime insurance company into which owners of mer- 
chant ships of more than fifty tons paid 2 percent of their profits 
and from which they received compensation for shipwrecks. 

The House of Avis 

When Fernando died in 1383, he left no male heir to the throne. 
His only daughter, Beatriz, was married to Juan I, king of Castile. 
The marriage writ stipulated that their offspring would inherit the 
Portuguese crown if Fernando left no male heir and that, until any 
children were born, Portugal would be ruled by a regency of Fer- 
nando 's widow, Leonor Teles. When Fernando died, Leonor as- 
sumed the regency in accordance with the marriage writ. The 
assumption of the regency by the queen was badly received in many 
Portuguese cities because Leonor was a Castilian and considered 
an interloper who intended to usurp the Portuguese crown for 
Castile and end Portugal's independence. Leonor's principal rival 
for control of the throne was Joao, the master of the Order of Avis 
and illegitimate son of Fernando's father, Pedro I (r. 1357-67). On 
December 6, 1383, Joao broke into the royal palace and murdered 
Count Andeiro, a Galician who had been Fernando's chancellor. 
Leonor Teles fled to the town of Alenquer, the property of the 
queens of Portugal. She appealed to Juan I for help, and he in- 
vaded Portugal in January 1384. Leonor abdicated as regent. In 
Lisbon the people proclaimed Joao governor and defender of the 



19 



Portugal: A Country Study 

realm. Joao immediately began to prepare an army and sent a mis- 
sion to England to recruit soldiers for his cause. 

Wars with Castile 

The bourgeoisie of Lisbon, enriched by commerce, decided to 
support Joao and donated substantial sums for war expenses. 
Money also arrived from the bourgeoisie in Porto, Coimbra, and 
Evora. The majority of the nobility, among whom national senti- 
ment was not well developed and feudal customs based on oaths 
of vassalage were still obeyed, took the side of Juan of Castile, which 
gave him the support of fifty castles. A few nobles, however, in- 
cluding Alvaro Pais, Joao Afonso, and Nun'Alvares Pereira, were 
more attuned to national sentiment and sided with Joao. 

In March 1384, Juan marched on Lisbon, which he besieged 
by land and sea. In April, in the Alentejo, Nun'Alvares Pereira 
defeated the Castilians at the Battle of Atoleiros, a victory that result- 
ed from the new military tactic of forming defensive squares from 
dismounted cavalry because the Portuguese had far fewer troops 
than the enemy. The siege of Lisbon was broken after seven months 
by an outbreak of the plague in the Castilian camp, and Juan 
retreated to Seville to prepare another invasion the following year. 

The retreat of the Castilians gave Joao an opportunity to legiti- 
mate his claim to the throne. In March 1385, a cortes was sum- 
moned to resolve the succession. Joao's case was argued by Joao 
das Regras, who attacked the claims of the various pretenders to 
the throne. On April 6, the opposition ended and Joao was 
proclaimed king as Joao I (r. 1385-1433). The new king named 
Nun'Alvares Pereira constable of Portugal. At the same time, a 
contingent of English longbowmen began to arrive. Nun'Alvares 
Pereira marched north in order to obtain the submission of Bra- 
ga, Guimaraes, and other places loyal to Juan, who responded by 
sending an army to attack Viseu. The Portuguese routed this 
Castilian force at Rancoso using the same new military tactic that 
had brought them victory at Atoleiros. Juan, nonetheless, was still 
intent on besieging Lisbon and led his army southward. Joao I and 
Nun'Alvares Pereira decided to engage Juan's army before it ar- 
rived in the capital. The two armies met on the plain of Aljubar- 
rota about sixty kilometers north of Lisbon on August 14, 1385. 
Using the same tactic of defensive squares of dismounted cavalry 
that had brought them success in previous battles, a force of 7,000 
Portuguese annihilated and scattered a Castilian army of 32,000 
in little more than thirty minutes of combat. Although additional 
battles were fought and final peace was not made with Castile 



20 



Historical Setting 



until October 1411, the Battle of Aljubarrota secured the indepen- 
dence of Portugal for almost two centuries. 

Anglo-Portuguese Alliance 

English aid to the House of Avis set the stage for the coopera- 
tion with England that would be the cornerstone of Portuguese for- 
eign policy for more than 500 years. In May 1386, the Treaty of 
Windsor confirmed the alliance that was born at Aljubarrota with 
a pact of perpetual friendship between the two countries. The next 
year, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, son of Edward III, and 
father of Henry IV, landed in Galicia with an expeditionary force 
to press his claim to the Castilian throne with Portuguese aid. He 
failed to win the support of the Castilian nobility and returned to 
England with a cash compensation from the rival claimant. 

John of Gaunt left behind his daughter, Philippa of Lancaster, 
to marry Joao I in order to seal the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. By 
this marriage, celebrated in 1387, Joao became the father of a gener- 
ation of princes called by poet Luis de Camoes the "marvelous 
generation," who led Portugal into its golden age. Philippa brought 
to the court the Anglo-Norman tradition of an aristocratic educa- 
tion and gave her children good educations. Her personal quali- 
ties were of the highest, and she reformed the court and imposed 
rigid standards of moral behavior. Philippa provided royal patron- 
age for English commercial interests that sought to meet the Por- 
tuguese desire for cod and cloth in return for wine, cork, salt, and 
oil shipped through the English warehouses at Porto. Philippa' s 
sons were accomplished. Her eldest son, Duarte, authored moral 
works and became king in 1433; Pedro, who traveled widely 
and had an interest in history, became regent when Duarte died 
of the plague in 1438; Fernando, who became a crusader, partici- 
pated in the attack on Tangiers in 1437; and Henrique — Prince 
Henry the Navigator — became the master of the Order of Avis and 
the instigator and organizer of the early voyages of discovery. 

Social Revolution 

The crisis of 1383-85 that brought Joao I to the throne was not 
only a dynastic revolution but also a social one. Joao I distrusted 
the old aristocracy that had opposed his rise to power and promot- 
ed the growth of a new generation of nobility by confiscating the 
titles and properties of the old and distributing them to the new. 
He thus formed a new nobility based on service to the king. 

Joao rewarded members of the urban bourgeoisie that had sup- 
ported his cause by giving them positions and influence and by 
allowing them to send representatives to the king's royal council. 



21 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Artisans grouped themselves according to professions into guilds 
and were permitted to send delegates to the governing chamber 
of Lisbon, where they were actively involved in the administra- 
tion of the capital and other cities. The king also surrounded him- 
self with skilled legalists who professionalized royal administration 
and extended royal jurisdiction at the expense of the old aristocracy. 
This new class of bureaucrats, having studied Roman law at the 
university, defended the Caesarist principle that the will of the king 
had the force of law. This belief encouraged the later development 
of absolutism in Portugal and pitted the king against the landed 
nobility, especially the old aristocracy that wished to regain its lost 
power and privilege. 

Intradynastic Struggle 

The future of the House of Avis seemed assured by the presence 
of Joao' s five legitimate sons, but the king also provided for his 
illegitimate children as he had been provided for by his father. Joao 
conferred on his bastard son Afonso the hereditary title of duke 
of Braganca and endowed him with lands and properties that 
amounted to the creation of a state within a state supported by a 
huge reserve of armed retainers. The House of Braganca accumu- 
lated wealth to rival that of the crown and eventually assumed the 
leadership of the old aristocracy in opposition to Avis. 

When Joao I died in 1433, the crown was assumed by his eldest 
son, Duarte, who died five years later of the plague. Before his 
death, Duarte convoked a cortes in order to legitimate the compi- 
lation of Portuguese royal law, but the work was not completed 
until the reign of his son, Afonso, and is, therefore, named the 
Afonsine Ordinances. He also declared that the grants of land so 
lavishly awarded by his father to his supporters would have to be 
confirmed, as was the custom at the start of each reign. 

Afonso was six years old when his father died and his mother, 
Queen Leonor of Aragon, assumed the regency. There was oppo- 
sition to the assumption of all authority by a woman, and Leonor 
agreed that Duarte 's brother, Pedro, should become regent. This 
was opposed by Afonso, duke of Braganca, the eldest illegitimate 
son of Joao I. Both men aspired to gain influence over the young 
king by marrying him to their daughters. The populace of Lisbon 
strongly favored Pedro and acknowledged him as regent. Pedro 
received confirmation for his regency by summoning the cortes at 
Evora and paved the way for his continuance in power by arrang- 
ing the marriage of his daughter Isabel to the young king, who, 
when he reached his majority in 1446, agreed to the match and 
asked his uncle to continue the regency. 



22 



Historical Setting 



The duke of Braganca reasserted his ambitions and was able to 
influence the young king to dismiss Pedro by convincing him that 
his uncle was plotting to seize the throne. Pedro was banished to 
his estates. When rumors of a plot against him surfaced, he decided 
to resist and marched on Lisbon, where he had the support of the 
populace. Pedro was met by the troops of the king and the duke 
of Braganca at the Battle of Alfarrobeira on May 24, 1449, where 
he was killed and his army defeated. This battle resulted in the 
enlargement of the property and wealth of the illegitimate line of 
the House of Avis, which allowed it to enjoy enormous influence 
over the pliable Afonso V until his death in 1481. 

Assertion of Royal Supremacy 

When Afonso 's son and heir, Joao II (r. 1481-95), assumed the 
throne, the power of the Bragancas and their supporters had reached 
its height. The new king, who was more resolute than his father, 
convoked a cortes at Evora, where he imposed a new written oath 
by which nobles swore upon their knees to give up to the king any 
castle or town they held from the crown. At Evora commoners 
complained about the abuses of the nobility and asked for the abo- 
lition of private justice and the correction of abuses in the collec- 
tion of taxes. The king ordered that all nobles present their titles 
of privilege and that his constables be admitted to their estates in 
order to investigate complaints concerning administration. 

These measures provoked a reaction by the nobility led by the 
powerful Fernando, duke of Braganca, who conspired against the 
king with the help of the king of Castile. Upon learning of the in- 
trigues of Fernando, the king accused the duke of treason and tried 
him at a special court in Evora. He was sentenced to death and 
beheaded in the main square on June 29, 1484. The king confis- 
cated his properties and those of his accomplices, some of whom 
were also killed, while others fled Portugal. A second conspiracy 
was hatched by the duke of Viseu, but it, too, was discovered, and 
the duke was killed, perhaps by the king himself, in Setubal. These 
events established the supremacy of the crown over the nobility 
once and for all. 

Maritime Expansion 

The maritime expansion of Portugal was the result of the threat 
to Mediterranean commerce, especially the trade in spices, that 
had developed very rapidly after the crusades. Spices traveled by 
various overland routes from Asia to the Levant, where they were 
loaded aboard Genoese and Venetian ships and brought to Eu- 
rope. Gradually, this trade became threatened by pirates and the 



23 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Turks, who closed off most of the overland routes and subjected 
the spices to heavy taxes. Europeans sought alternative routes to 
Asia in order to circumvent these difficulties. 

The Portuguese led the way in this quest for a number of rea- 
sons. First, Portugal's location on the southwesternmost edge of 
the European landmass placed the country at the maritime cross- 
roads between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Second, Por- 
tugal was by the fifteenth century a compact, unified kingdom led 
by an energetic, military aristocracy, which, having no more ter- 
ritory on the peninsula to conquer, sought new fields of action over- 
seas. Third, Portuguese kings were motivated by a deeply held belief 
that their role in history was as the standard-bearers of Christiani- 
ty against the Muslims. Fourth, Portugal's kings had, since the 
founding of the monarchy, encouraged maritime activities. Dinis 
founded the Portuguese navy, and Fernando encouraged the con- 
struction of larger ships and founded a system of maritime insur- 
ance. Finally, Portugal led the world in nautical science, having 
perfected the astrolabe and quadrant and developed the lantine- 
rigged caravel, all of which made navigating and sailing the high 
seas possible. 

Early Voyages 

Portugal's maritime expansion began in 1415 when Joao I seized 
Ceuta in Morocco, the western depot for the spice trade. The mili- 
tary campaign against Ceuta was launched for several reasons. First, 
war in Morocco was seen as a new crusade against the Muslims 
that would stand Portugal well with the church. Second, there was 
a need to suppress Moroccan pirates who were threatening Por- 
tuguese ships. Third, the Portuguese wanted the economic benefit 
that controlling Ceuta' s vast market would bring to the crown. Fi- 
nally, the campaign against Ceuta was seen as preparatory to an 
attack on Muslims still holding Granada. The possession of Ceuta 
allowed the Portuguese to dominate the Straits of Gibraltar. 

After the conquest of Ceuta, Prince Henry the Navigator, who 
had participated in the campaign as an armed knight, settled at 
Sagres on the extreme end of Cape St. Vincent, where in 1418 
he founded a naval school. He continued to direct Portugal's ear- 
ly maritime activity. As the master of the Order of Christ, Prince 
Henry was able to draw on the vast resources of this group to equip 
ships and pay the expenses of the early maritime expeditions. Prince 
Henry was motivated by scientific curiosity and religious fervor, 
seeing the voyages as a continuation of the crusades against the 
Muslims and the conversion of new peoples to Christianity, as well 
as by the desire to open a sea route to India. 



24 



Monument to the ~ ' ' 

Discoveries, Lisbon \ 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Portugal, Washington 



Shortly after the school was established, two of Prince Henry's 
captains discovered the island of Porto Santo, and the following 
year the Madeira Islands were discovered. In 1427 Diogo de Silves, 
sailing west, discovered the Azores archipelago, also uninhabited. 
Both Madeira and Porto Santo were colonized immediately and 
divided into captaincies. These were distributed to Prince Hen- 
ry's captains, who in turn had the power to distribute land to set- 
tlers according to the Law of the Sesmarias. 

Prince Henry's plan required the circumnavigation of Africa. 
His early voyages stayed close to the African coast. After repeated 
attempts, Gil Eanes finally rounded Cape Bojador on the west coast 
of Africa in present-day Western Sahara in 1434, a psychological, 
as well as physical, barrier that was thought to be the outer boundary 
of the knowable world. After passing Cape Bojador, the explora- 
tion of the coast southward proceeded very rapidly. In 1436 Gil 
Eanes and Afonso Baldaia arrived at the Senegal River, which they 
called the River of Gold because two Africans they had captured 
were ransomed with gold dust. In 1443 Nuno Tristao arrived at 
the Bay of Arguin off the coast of present-day Mauritania. These 
voyages returned African slaves to Portugal, which sparked an in- 
terest in the commercial value of the explorations, and a factory 
was established at Arguin as an entrepot for human cargo. In 1444 
Dinis Dias discovered the Cape Verde Islands, then heavily forested, 
and Nuno Tristao explored the mouth of the Senegal River. In 



25 



Portugal: A Country Study 

1445 Cape Verde was rounded, and in 1456 Portuguese arrived 
at the coast of present-day Guinea. The following year, they reached 
present-day Sierra Leone. Thus, when Prince Henry died in 1460, 
the Portuguese had explored the coast of Africa down to Sierra 
Leone and discovered the archipelagoes of Madeira, the Azores, 
and the Cape Verde Islands. 

Sea Route to India 

After the death of Prince Henry, the Portuguese continued to 
explore the coast of Africa, but without their earlier singleness of 
purpose. A dispute had arisen among the military aristocracy over 
whether Portugal could best achieve its strategic objectives by con- 
quering Morocco or by seeking a sea route to India. Duarte had 
continued his father's Moroccan policy and undertook a military 
campaign against Tangiers but was unsuccessful. Afonso V ordered 
several expeditionary forces to Morocco. In 1458 he conquered Al- 
cazarquivir; in 1471 he took Arzila, followed by Tangiers and 
Larache. Afonso 's successors continued this policy of expansion 
in Morocco, especially Manuel I (r. 1495-1521), who conquered 
Safim and Azamor. The Moroccan empire was expensive because 
it kept Portugal in a constant state of war; therefore, it was aban- 
doned by Joao III (r. 1521-57), except for Ceuta and Tangiers. 

In 1 469 Afonso V granted to Fernao Gomes a monopoly of trade 
with Guinea for five years if he agreed to explore 100 leagues (about 
500 kilometers) of coast each year. A number of expeditions were 
carried out under this contract. In 1471 Portuguese sailors reached 
Mina de Ouro on the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) and ex- 
plored Cape St. Catherine, two degrees south of the equator. Mina 
de Ouro became the chief center for the gold trade and a major 
source of revenue for the crown. The islands of Sao Tome and Prin- 
cipe were also discovered in 1471, and Fernao do P6 discovered 
the island that now bears his name in 1474. 

During the reign of Joao II, the crown once again took an ac- 
tive role in the search for a sea route to India. In 1481 the king 
ordered a fort constructed at Mina de Ouro to protect this poten- 
tial source of wealth. Diogo Cao sailed farther down the African 
coast in the period 1482-84. In 1487 a new expedition led by Bar- 
tolomeu Dias sailed south beyond the tip of Africa and, after hav- 
ing lost sight of land for a month, turned north and made landfall 
on a northeast-running coastline, which was named Terra dos Va- 
queiros after the native herders and cows that were seen on shore. 
Dias had rounded the Cape of Good Hope without seeing it and 
had proven that the Atlantic connected to the Indian Ocean. 



26 



Arches of the Royal Cloister at the Monastery of Santa Maria da Vitdria, Batalha 

Courtesy Daniele Kohler 
Monastery of Santa Maria da Vitdria, Batalha 
Courtesy Walter Opello 



27 



Portugal: A Country Study 

In the meantime, Joao sent Pero da Covilha and Afonso de Paiva, 
who were versed in warfare, diplomacy, and Arabic, on a mission 
in search of the mythical Christian kingdom of Prester John. 
Departing from Santarem, they traveled to Barcelona, Naples, and 
the island of Rhodes, and, disguised as merchants, entered Alex- 
andria. Passing through Cairo, they made their way to Aden, where 
they separated and agreed to meet later in Cairo at a certain date. 
Afonso de Paiva went to Ethiopia, and Pero da Covilha headed 
for Calicut and Goa in India by way of Ormuz, returning to Cairo 
via Sofala in Mozambique on the east coast of Africa. In Cairo 
he learned from two emissaries sent by Joao II that Afonso de Paiva 
had died. One of the emissaries returned to Portugal with a letter 
containing the information Pero da Covilha had collected on his 
travels. Da Covilha then left for Ethiopia where he was received 
by the emperor but not allowed to leave. He settled in Ethiopia, 
married, and raised a family. The information provided in his letter 
complemented the information from the expedition of Bartolomeu 
Dias and convinced Joao II that it was possible to reach India by 
sailing around the southern end of Africa. He died during prepa- 
rations for this voyage in 1494. 

Manuel I assumed the throne in 1495 and completed the prepa- 
rations for the voyage to India. On July 8, 1497, a fleet of four 
ships commanded by Vasco da Gama set sail from Belem on the 
outskirts of Lisbon. The expedition was very carefully organized, 
each ship having the best captains and pilots, as well as handpicked 
crews. They carried the most up-to-date nautical charts and naviga- 
tional instruments. Vasco da Gama's fleet rounded the Cape of 
Good Hope on November 27, 1497, and made landfall at Natal 
in present-day South Africa on December 25. The fleet then 
proceeded along the east coast of Africa and landed at Quelimane 
in present-day Mozambique in January 1498, followed by Mom- 
basa in present-day Kenya. An Arab pilot directed the fleet to In- 
dia. After sailing for a month, the fleet reached Calicut on the 
Malabar coast in southwest India. In August, after sailing to Goa, 
the fleet left for Portugal, arriving in September 1499, two years 
and two days after the departure. 

In 1500 Manuel organized a large fleet of thirteen ships for a 
second voyage to India. This fleet was commanded by Pedro Al- 
vares Cabral and included Bartolomeu Dias, various nobles, priests, 
and some 1,200 men. The fleet sailed southwest for a month, 
and on April 22 sighted land, the coast of present-day Brazil. Cabral 
sent a ship back to Lisbon to report to Manuel his discovery, which 
he called Vera Cruz. The fleet recrossed the Atlantic and sailed 
to India around Africa where it arrived on September 13, 1500. 



28 




30 



Historical Setting 



After four months in India, Cabral sailed for Lisbon in January 
1501 , having left a contingent of Portuguese to maintain a factory 
at Cochin on the Malabar coast (see fig. 3). 

Empire in Asia 

Having discovered the sea route to India, Manuel organized suc- 
cessive fleets to that region in order to establish Portuguese com- 
mercial hegemony. In 1505 Francisco de Almeida left Lisbon with 
a fleet of 22 ships and 2,500 men, 1,500 of whom were soldiers. 
Invested with the title of viceroy of India, Almeida was instructed 
to conclude alliances with Indian rulers, set up factories, and build 
forts on the east coast of Africa, which he did at Mombasa and 
at Kilwa in present-day Tanzania before arriving in India. After 
his arrival, he fortified the island of Angediva and Cochin. He im- 
posed a system of licenses on trading vessels that threatened to ruin 
the Muslim traders, who reacted by seeking spices in Malacca in 
present-day Malaysia and the Sunda Islands in the Malay Ar- 
chipelago and sailing directly to the Persian Gulf, bypassing India. 

Almeida sought to suppress this trade and secure Portuguese com- 
mercial hegemony. He was joined in this effort by two more fleets 
sent from Lisbon, one under the command of Tristao da Cunha 
and the other under Afonso de Albuquerque, who had been ap- 
pointed Almeida's successor as viceroy. Cunha explored Madagas- 
car and the coast of east Africa, occupied the island of Socotra (now 
part of Yemen), and built a fort at the mouth of the Red Sea, be- 
fore sailing to India. Albuquerque ravaged the Oman coast and 
attacked Ormuz, the great entrepot at the mouth of the Persian 
Gulf, where he began constructing a fort. 

The activities of the Portuguese motivated the Muslims to take 
military action. The sultan of Egypt, allied with the Venetians and 
Turks, organized a large armada that crossed the Indian Ocean 
to Diu, where it was engaged by a Portuguese fleet. On February 
2, 1509, a great sea battle was fought and the sultan's armada de- 
stroyed. This victory assured Portuguese commercial and military 
hegemony over India and allowed Portugal to extend its empire 
to the Far East. 

Albuquerque established his capital at Goa, which he attacked 
and occupied in 1510. In 1511 he departed for the conquest of 
Malacca, the emporium for the spice trade and trade with China, 
which he accomplished in August of that year. After returning to 
Goa, Albuquerque made plans to occupy strategic positions in the 
Persian Gulf and Red Sea. On his first expedition, he failed to take 
Aden and returned to Goa. His second expedition, which was to 
be his last, attempted to conquer Ormuz and Aden, as well as seize 



31 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Mecca. During this expedition, Albuquerque fell ill and returned 
to Goa, where he died in 1515. 

When Manuel I died in 1521, his son and heir, Joao III, sent 
expeditions to the islands of Celebes, Borneo, Java, and Timor, 
all part of the Malay Archipelago. Relations were established with 
Japan after the visits of Francisco Xavier and Fernao Mendes Pinto 
in 1549. Portuguese captains founded factories in China and took 
possession of Macau in 1557. 

Colonization of Brazil 

The growth of Portuguese interests in the Americas was slow, 
the king being absorbed with establishing Portuguese hegemony 
in Asia. In addition, the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, arranged 
by Pope Alexander VI, divided the unexplored world between Spain 
and Portugal and forbade Portugal from exploring beyond a merid- 
ian drawn 1 ,600 kilometers miles west of the Cape Verde Islands. 
In 1502 Fernao Noronha was given a three-year commercial mo- 
nopoly on dyewood in return for exploring 300 leagues (about 1 ,500 
kilometers) of the Brazilian coast each year. During the last years 
of Manuel Fs reign, the first colonists were sent to Brazil to estab- 
lish a sugar industry. Additional colonists were sent during the reign 
of Joao III, and, in 1530, Martim Afonso de Sousa was named 
major captain of Brazil and invested with the power to distribute 
land among captains or donatdrios, much as had been done in 
Madeira when it was colonized a century before. These captain- 
cies were large strips of land that extended from the coast into the 
interior. The captains settled colonists in their respective captain- 
cies and were required to provide them protection and justice. 

Because captaincies were independent of one another and hence 
weak, they were unable to defend themselves from foreign pirates. 
Consequently, Joao III appointed a governor general with authority 
over the captaincies. The first governor general, Tome de Sousa, 
was appointed in 1549 and established his capital at Sao Salvador 
da Baia. He defeated French pirates in a naval engagement in the 
bay of Rio de Janeiro. Intensified colonization under de Sousa be- 
gan in the form of coastal settlements and spread to the interior. 
The colonists cultivated indigenous crops, especially manioc, and 
introduced new ones such as wheat, rice, grapes, oranges, and 
sugarcane from Madeira and Sao Tome. Sugar soon became 
Brazil's most important export. 

Counter-Reformation and Overseas Evangelization 

The eruption of the Protestant Reformation in the first decades 
of the sixteenth century brought forth a Roman Catholic response, 



32 



Historical Setting 



the Counter-Reformation, a determined campaign to strengthen 
the Roman Catholic Church and restore religious unity to Europe. 
One of Rome's key instruments to purify doctrine and root out 
heresy was the Inquisition. The Counter-Reformation soon reached 
Portugal, and Joao III was granted permission to establish the Court 
of Inquisition in 1536. The court did not began its work until 1539 
when the first inquisitor general was replaced by a religious zealot, 
the archbishop of Evora, who stood for public confession and im- 
mediate execution. As elsewhere, the Inquisition in Portugal dealt 
with all forms of heresy, corruption, and disbelief, but its main 
victims were the so-called New Christians, Jews who had convert- 
ed to Christianity after Manuel I had ordered in 1497 the expul- 
sion from Portugal of all Jews who refused to accept the Christian 
faith. Many Portuguese believed that the New Christians secretly 
practiced Judaism at home, and the Inquisition was used to stop 
such an "abomination." Courts of the Inquisition functioned in 
larger settlements around Portugal. The first auto-da-fe, or pub- 
lic burning of a heretic, took place in 1540 in Lisbon. In the next 
150 years, an estimated 1,400 people perished in this manner in 
Portugal. 

Another of Rome's strongest weapons in the Counter-Reforma- 
tion was the Society of Jesus, a religious order founded by Ignatius 
de Loyola in 1539. The order was dedicated to furthering the cause 
of Catholicism and propagating its teachings in missions among 
nonbelievers. In 1540 three of Loyola's followers — Simao Rod- 
rigues, who was Portuguese; Paulo Camerte, who was Italian; and 
Francisco Xavier, who was Spanish — arrived in Portugal. Simao 
Rodrigues became the tutor of the king's son and later founded 
Jesuit schools at Coimbra and Evora. By 1555 the Jesuits had con- 
trol of all secondary education in the realm and by 1558 had es- 
tablished a university in Evora. 

Joao III invited the Jesuits to carry out their apostolic mission 
in the lands of Portugal's overseas empire. Francisco Xavier left 
Portugal in 1541 for India as a result of the king's request. He ar- 
rived in Goa in 1 542 and immediately began proselytizing among 
the indigenous inhabitants, converting many thousands. From Goa 
he went to Cochin and Ceylon; in 1545 he traveled to Malacca, 
and in 1549, to Japan, where he stayed for two years. After return- 
ing to Goa, in 1552 he went to China, where he died. 

Evangelization began in Brazil in 1549 with the arrival of six 
Jesuits led by Father Manuel de Nobrega, who accompanied Tome 
de Sousa, the first governor general. They built a church at Sao 
Salvador da Bafa, as well as schools at Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. 
They also evangelized northern and southern Brazil. In the south, 



33 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Father Jose Anchieta opened a school for Indians and authored 
the first grammar in a native language, Tupf-Guarani. The Jesuits 
built churches, schools, and seminaries. They settled the indigenous 
inhabitants in villages and defended them against attempts to en- 
slave them. 

Imperial Decline 

Portugal's empire in Asia made its monarchy the richest in Eu- 
rope and made Lisbon the commercial capital of the world. This 
prosperity was more apparent than real, however, because the new- 
found wealth did not transform the social structure, nor was it used 
to lay the basis for further economic development. The country's 
industry was weakened because the profits from Asian monopo- 
lies were used to import manufactured goods. As the empire in 
Asia was a state-run enterprise, no middle class or commercial sector 
independent of the crown of any consequence emerged as it had 
in other parts of Europe. Moreover, the persecution of the Jews, 
who possessed vital technical skills, robbed the country of an im- 
portant force for modernity and reinforced feudal elements. Add- 
ing to the drain on the economy was the large amount of money 
spent on sumptuous palaces and churches. 

Because the wealth from the discoveries did not produce a mid- 
dle class of competent, trained individuals to whom the affairs of 
state gradually fell, leadership in Portugal remained in the hands 
of the king and the military aristocracy. Moreover, the imperial 
system had intensified the already centralized system of govern- 
ment, which meant that the quality of national policy was closely 
tied to the abilities of the top leadership, especially the king him- 
self. Unfortunately, the House of Avis did not produce a king of 
great merit after Joao II, and Portugal entered a long period of 
imperial decline. 

Dynastic Crisis 

When Joao III died in 1557, the only surviving heir to the throne 
was his three-year-old son, Sebastiao, who took over the govern- 
ment at the age of fourteen. Sickly and poorly educated, Sebastiao 
proved to be mentally unstable, and as he grew to young man- 
hood he developed a fanatical obsession with launching a great cru- 
sade against the Muslims in North Africa, thus reviving the 
Moroccan policy of Afonso V. In 1578, when he was twenty-four 
years old, Sebastiao organized an army of 24,000 and assembled 
a large fleet that left Portugal on August 4 for Alcazarquivir. 
Sebastiao 's army, poorly equipped and incompetently led, was 
defeated, and the king, presumed killed in battle, was never seen 



34 



Historical Setting 



again. A large number of the nobility were captured and held for 
ransom. This defeat, the most disastrous in Portuguese military 
history, swept away the flower of the aristocratic leadership and 
drained the coffers of the treasury in order to pay ransoms. Worse, 
it resulted in the death of a king who had no descendants, plung- 
ing Portugal into a period of confusion and intrigue over the suc- 
cession. 

With Sebastiao 's death, the crown fell to his uncle, Henrique, 
the last surviving son of Manuel I. Henrique's crowning solved 
the succession crisis only temporarily because Henrique was an in- 
firm and aged cardinal who was unable to obtain dispensation from 
the pope to marry. There were several pretenders to the throne, 
one of whom was Philip II of Spain, nephew of Joao III. 

When Henrique died in 1580, a powerful Spanish army com- 
manded by the duke of Alba invaded Portugal and marched on 
Lisbon. This force routed the army of rival contender, Antonio, 
prior of Crato and the illegitimate son of Joao Ill's son Luis. Por- 
tugal was annexed by Spain, and Philip II was declared Filipe I 
of Portugal. 

Iberian Union 

After Philip was declared king of Portugal, he decreed that his 
new realm would be governed by a six-member Portuguese coun- 
cil; that the Portuguese cortes would meet only in Portugal; that 
all civil, military, and ecclesiastical appointments would remain 
Portuguese; and that the language, judicial system, coinage, and 
military would remain autonomous. Philip supported the two in- 
stitutions in Portugal that he believed might unite the two coun- 
tries: the Jesuits and the Inquisition. One result was that New 
Christians were persecuted even more severely. 

The incorporation of Portugal into the Iberian Union was ac- 
cepted by the Portuguese nobility without much difficulty. The royal 
court had used the language and etiquette of Castile since the 
fifteenth century, and much serious work had been done in Castile 
by Portuguese writers, who were conscious of belonging to a com- 
mon Iberian culture. In the countryside, however, there developed 
a current of resistance that took the form of a messianic cult of the 
"hidden prince," Sebastiao. Members of this cult believed that 
Sebastiao did not actually die at Alcazarquivir but would return 
to deliver Portugal from Spanish domination. This cult became 
deeply rooted, and over the years a number of impostors appeared 
and sparked rebellions, all of which were easily put down. To this 
day, Sebastianism (Sebastianismo), or the nostalgic longing for the 
unattainable, is a continuing feature of Portuguese life. 



35 



Portugal: A Country Study 

During the reign of Philip II, the terms of the proclamation of 
the union of the two crowns were generally upheld. With Philip's 
death in 1598 and the ascension to the Spanish throne of his son, 
Philip III, much less respect began to be paid to the provision that 
preserved Portugal's autonomy. Philip III did not visit Portugal 
until 1619, very near the end of his reign, and he began to appoint 
Spaniards to the six-member governing council as well as to lesser 
posts. His son and heir, Philip IV, had no interest in government 
and consequently turned over the administration of Portugal to the 
duke of Olivares. The duke alienated Portuguese of all classes, in- 
cluding the hispanophile elite. In order to prop up the waning power 
of the Spanish monarchy, he levied excessive taxes and troop req- 
uisitions on Portugal to support Spanish military activities, espe- 
cially against France. Moreover, he sought to unify Portugal with 
Spain. 

In 1637 a rebellion broke out in Evora when the Spanish attempt- 
ed to collect these taxes by force. Portuguese nobles were summoned 
to Madrid and ordered to recruit soldiers for war against France. 
The Portuguese nobility, encouraged by Cardinal Richelieu of 
France, who promised to support a Portuguese pretender with sold- 
iers and ships, began to conspire against the Spanish. During the 
1637 rebellion, the populace acclaimed Joao, duke of Braganca, 
as king. The duke, who was the nearest noble to the House of Avis, 
was Portugal's leading aristocrat and largest landowner. The choice 
of the populace was supported by the nobility, which conspired to 
make Joao king. The duke, who was cautious, initially resisted ac- 
cepting the Portuguese crown, but eventually began to equip a pri- 
vate army. In 1640 the Catalans rebelled against Philip IV, and, 
thus encouraged, Joao's supporters went into action on Decem- 
ber 1 . They entered the royal palace and arrested Portugal's Spanish 
governor, the duchess of Mantua, a cousin of the king of Spain. 
Five days later, the duke of Braganca arrived in Lisbon and was 
crowned as Joao IV (r. 1641-56), thus restoring the Portuguese 
monarchy and founding a new ruling dynasty, the House of 
Braganca. 

Although Portugal's seaborne empire had begun to decline be- 
fore the sixty years of incorporation in the Iberian Union, the 
"Spanish captivity," as this period is called by the Portuguese, 
hastened this process. The Portuguese, who were dragged into 
Spain's wars with England and Holland, began to see those two 
countries attack their holdings in Asia, as well as in Brazil. By the 
time independence was regained, Portugal's empire was greatly 
reduced, having lost its commercial monopoly in the Far East to 
the Dutch and in India to the English. Only the resolute action 



36 



Historical Setting 



of Portuguese settlers had saved Brazil from the Dutch, who had 
attacked Rio de Janeiro and Baia, and occupied Pernambuco. 

Restoration 

Joao IV was proclaimed king by a cortes convoked in 1641 . Faced 
with the general ruin of the realm and threats to his crown from 
Spain, his first act was to defend the kingdom. He immediately 
created a council of war, appointed military governors in the 
provinces, recruited soldiers, rebuilt forts, and constructed an arms 
foundry. At the same time, he vigorously sought diplomatic recog- 
nition of his monarchy and Portugal's independence from Spain. 
On June 1, 1641, Joao IV signed an alliance with Louis XIII of 
France and soon made peace with Holland and England. By the 
time of his death in 1656, Joao IV had consolidated and restored 
the monarchy by making peace with former enemies, recouped 
some lost colonial possessions, and defeated Spanish attempts to 
reincorporate Portugal into the Iberian Union. 

When Joao died, his queen, Lufsa de Gusmao, became regent 
because the royal couple's oldest son, Teodosio, had died three years 
before his father and their youngest son, Afonso, was only ten years 
old. Although a disease in infancy had left Afonso partially para- 
lyzed and had impaired his intelligence, his mother succeeded in 
having him proclaimed king. Afonso VI (r. 1662-67) grew into a 
degenerate who preferred riding, coursing bulls, and watching cock- 
fights. His marriage to Marie -Francoise Isabelle of Savoy was an- 
nulled, and, in 1667, aware of the need for a successor, Afonso 
consented to his own abdication in favor of his brother, Pedro. Dur- 
ing this period, the Portuguese managed to fight off the last at- 
tempt by Spain to reincorporate them into the Iberian Union by 
defeating the Spanish invaders at Ameixial near Estremos. In 1666, 
three years after this victory, Spain at last made peace and recog- 
nized Portugal's independence. 

When Afonso abdicated, he was banished to Terceira Island in 
the Azores and his brother, who had married Marie-Francoise, as- 
sumed the regency of the throne until Afonso 's death in 1683, af- 
ter which he ruled in his own right as Pedro II until 1706. During 
his regency, Pedro had given the task of producing a coherent eco- 
nomic policy to Luis de Menenses, count of Ericeira, who was ap- 
pointed head of the treasury. Known as the "Portuguese Colbert," 
Ericeira implemented mercantilist policies in Portugal similar to 
those of France. These policies sought to protect Portuguese in- 
dustries against foreign competition. He published laws to enforce 
sobriety and criticized luxury. Ericeira organized the textile industry 
and imported looms from England. He stimulated the national 



37 



Portugal: A Country Study 

production of wool and silk by decreeing that only Portuguese wool- 
ens and silks could be worn. 

Development of Brazil 

Having lost the empire in Asia, Portugal's policy makers turned 
their attention to Brazil, where they intensified the cultivation of 
sugar, cotton, and spices. This expansion of agriculture required 
a great deal of labor, which led to the importation of slaves from 
Angola and Guinea. Amerindians were saved from this fate by the 
Jesuits, who protected them from enslavement. 

The southern part of Brazil was occupied first and the north, 
later, owing to resistance put up by Amerindians allied with French 
pirates. In 1580 the Portuguese conquered Paraiba and, later, Ser- 
gipe. In 1603 they penetrated to Ceara and, later, to Para, where 
they founded the city of Belem. In 1637 Pedro Teixeira launched 
a daring expedition into the Amazon Basin, following the river to 
its headwaters near the Pacific coast. During the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, various expeditions were sent into the in- 
terior, especially at the end of the seventeenth century when gold 
was discovered. 

These expeditions were made up of adventurers known as ban- 
deirantes (after the Portuguese word for flag) because they traveled 
under the flag of their leader, who took with him kin, friends, slaves, 
and friendly Amerindians. These expeditions, which followed rivers 
into the interior, lasted years. The most notable bandeirantes were 
Pais Leme, who traveled for seven years throughout present-day 
Minas Gerais, and his son-in-law, Manuel Borba Gato, who dis- 
covered several sources of gold on the Rio das Velhas. In addition 
to gold, diamonds were also found in abundance. The discovery 
of gold and diamonds sparked a gold rush from all over the world 
to Brazil and from the central zones to the interior, which devastated 
Brazilian agriculture. The gold and diamonds enriched the Por- 
tuguese crown and allowed it to spend lavishly on imported goods 
and baroque palaces, thus destroying once again the initiatives 
previously taken for indigenous economic development. 

Brazilian gold also encouraged England to update its commer- 
cial relations with Portugal. The Methuen Treaty of 1703 allowed 
the Portuguese a preferential duty on wine exported to England, 
in return for which Portugal removed restrictions on the importa- 
tion of English-made goods. The Portuguese market was soon ab- 
sorbing 10 percent of the English export trade, which represented 
an increase of 120 percent above the quantity of goods imported 
to Portugal before the treaty. Portuguese exports to England, mainly 



38 



Historical Setting 



wine, rose by less than 40 percent. Gold from Brazil was used to 
pay for this trade imbalance. 

Absolutism 

Pedro II was succeeded by Joao V (r. 1706-50), a youth of seven- 
teen. He was an energetic king who introduced absolutist rule into 
Portugal, copying the style of the royal court of Louis XIV of 
France. Brazilian gold allowed Joao V to spend lavishly on major 
architectural works, the greatest being the royal palace at Mafra, 
begun in 1717, which sought to rival the Escorial in Spain. He 
also endowed the University of Coimbra with an elegantly deco- 
rated library, and built the Aqueduct of Free Waters (Aqueduto 
das Aguas Livres) that brought water to Lisbon. Joao encouraged 
the development of decorative arts such as furniture design, clock- 
making, and tapestry weaving. He pursued mercantilist policies 
to protect indigenous industries, including papermaking at Lousa, 
glassmaking at Marinha Grande, and textile weaving at Covilha. 
He subsidized the publication of notable works such as Caetano 
de Sousa's Historia Genealogica da Casa Real. In general, Joao V ani- 
mated what has been called Portugal's second renaissance. 

Joao V died in 1750 and was succeeded by his son Jose I 
(r. 1750-77), who was indolent and placed the reins of government 
into the hands of Sebastiao Jose de Carvalho e Melo, later the Mar- 
ques de Pombal. A petty noble who managed to surmount Portu- 
gal's rigid class system by a combination of energy, intelligence, 
good looks, and a shrewd marriage, Pombal became the veritable 
dictator of Portugal. Once Portugal's ambassador to Britain and 
Austria, Pombal had been influenced by the ideas of the Enlight- 
enment. Realizing how backward Portugal was, he sought through 
a ruthless despotism to reform it and create a middle class. 

On the morning of November 1, 1755, a violent earthquake shook 
Lisbon and demolished most of the city. Thousands were killed 
in the subsequent fire and tidal wave. Pombal, who was at Belem 
at the time, energetically took appropriate measures. He impro- 
vised hospitals for the injured, controlled prices for various ser- 
vices, requisitioned food from the countryside, and organized public 
security. He decided to rebuild the city after a survey of the ruins. 
Under the direction of the architect Eugenio dos Santos and the 
engineer Manuel da Maia, a master plan for a new city was drawn 
up. The old city center was cleared of rubble and divided into 
squares of long avenues and cross streets. New buildings conforming 
to a standard architectural style were quickly erected using the latest 
construction techniques. Lisbon thus emerged from the earthquake 



39 



Portugal: A Country Study 

as Europe's first planned city. Flanked by the Praca do Rossio at 
one end and the Praca do Comercio at the other, this quarter of 
the city is known today as the Baixa Pombalina. 

For his prompt and efficient action, Pombal was elevated to chief 
minister, which allowed him to consolidate his power. Desiring to 
destroy all forces within the society that could oppose his plans for 
modernizing Portugal, he began systematically to annihilate them, 
beginning with the nobility. An attempt on the life of the king on 
September 3, 1758, provided Pombal with a pretext to take action 
against the nobility. He accused many nobles of responsibility for 
the attempt and arrested about 1,000 individuals. Many confessed 
under brutal torture and were executed. 

Pombal also attempted to rid Portugal of the Jesuits, whom he 
accused of taking part in the attempt on the king's life. He searched 
the houses belonging to the Jesuits, confiscated their belongings, 
closed their schools, and, in 1759, expelled them from the king- 
dom and its overseas possessions. In an effort to restrain the church, 
Pombal broke diplomatic relations with the Holy See in 1760 and 
imprisoned the bishop of Coimbra. 

Pombal' s economic policies were inspired by the protectionist 
doctrines of Colbert, which gave royal companies monopolies in 
certain fields. Following the initiatives in this regard established 
by the count of Ericeira, Pombal prohibited the export of gold and 
silver. In order to increase cereal cultivation, he prohibited the grow- 
ing of grape vines in certain areas of the country. He protected 
the winemaking industry by founding, in 1756, a company with 
a monopoly on exporting port wine. Pombal created other com- 
panies with exclusive rights to commercial activities in various 
regions of Brazil, as well as a fishing and processing company for 
sardines and tuna in Portuguese waters. He transformed the silk 
industry into a textile industry and turned over the operation of 
the glassmaking factory at Marinha Grande to a British manager, 
who introduced new manufacturing techniques. 

Pombal also made notable changes in the area of education. Af- 
ter expelling the Jesuits and confiscating their schools, he took the 
first steps toward establishing a system of public instruction. He 
founded a commercial school and established schools, paid for with 
a special tax, in the major cities. In addition, Pombal instituted 
numerous reforms of the university, whose decline he blamed on 
the Jesuits. He created two new departments — mathematics and 
philosophy — and increased the number of professors in the already 
existing departments. He put forward new methods of instruction 
based on the writings of Luis Antonio Verney and Antonio Nunes 



40 



Historical Setting 



that stressed observation and experience, and set up laboratories, 
a natural history museum, a botanical garden, and an observatory. 

Jose I died in 1777 and was succeeded on the throne by his daugh- 
ter Maria I (r. 1777-92), who dismissed Pombal and banished him 
to the village of Pombal. She immediately freed hundreds of 
prisoners, restored the old nobility to its former status, reestab- 
lished relations with the Holy See, revoked laws against the cler- 
gy, abolished many of the state companies, and generally dismantled 
Pombal' s dictatorship. The strong, secular society that Pombal 
hoped to create did not materialize, and the old social and eco- 
nomic order quickly restored itself. 

Peninsular Wars 

The events of the French Revolution, especially the regicide of 
Louis XVI and the Terror, made the rest of Europe's monarchs 
fear for their lives. The Portuguese monarchy, like others, took 
measures to prevent the infiltration of revolutionary propaganda 
into the kingdom. Maria I, who suffered nightmares and fits of 
melancholy, imagined that she was damned. In 1792 she turned 
the reigns of government over to her second son, Joao, who was 
prince of Brazil. As the situation in France deteriorated, Portugal 
signed treaties of mutual assistance with Britain and Spain in 1793. 
In the same year, the Spanish army, reinforced by 6,000 Portuguese 
troops, attacked France across the Basque frontier. In 1794 the 
French launched a major counterattack, which forced the combined 
Spanish-Portuguese army to retreat from French territory. The 
French army reached the Ebro River and threatened Madrid. 

In 1795 Spain made peace at Basel with France without con- 
sulting the Portuguese. Despite having fought with the Portuguese 
against France, the Spanish now allied themselves with the French 
and signed a secret treaty at San Idelfonso in 1800. In 1801 France 
and Spain sent the Portuguese an ultimatum threatening to invade 
Portugal unless it abandoned its alliance with Britain, closed its 
ports to the British and opened them to French and Spanish ships, 
and handed over one-quarter of its territory as a guarantee for Span- 
ish territories held by Britain. The Portuguese refused to comply, 
and the Spanish marched into the Alentejo in May. After two weeks 
of fighting, the "War of the Oranges," as it is known, was con- 
cluded in 1801 at Badajoz. According to the terms of the peace 
treaty, Portugal agreed to close its ports to British shipping, granted 
commercial concessions to the French, paid an indemnity, and ced- 
ed Olivenca to Spain. 

When Napoleon became emperor in 1804, he renewed his strug- 
gle with Britain. The British declared a naval blockade of France, 



41 



Portugal: A Country Study 

and, in retaliation, Napoleon decreed that all nations of Europe 
should break relations with Britain. Portugal declared itself neu- 
tral in the struggle. Napoleon ordered the Portuguese to close their 
ports to the British, which they were prepared to do if they could 
do so without breaking relations with their old ally. In October 
1807, Napoleon signed a treaty with Spain at Fontainebleau, ac- 
cording to which France and Spain agreed to invade Portugal and 
partition the country, one-third going to France, one- third to Spain, 
and one-third to Spain's chief minister, Manuel de Godoy. 

On November 17, 1807, an army of French and Spanish sol- 
diers under the command of the French general Andoche Junot 
entered Portugal and marched on Lisbon. The British were in no 
position to defend their ally; consequently, the prince regent and 
the royal family left for Brazil. On November 27, Junot 's army 
took control of Lisbon. 

French occupation eventually sparked rebellions among the 
populace, and provisional juntas were organized in several cities. 
The junta in Porto, to which other local juntas finally pledged obe- 
dience, organized an army and, with British help, was able to defeat 
a strong French force at Lourinha on August 21, 1808. After this 
defeat, the French opened negotiations with the Portuguese and 
signed the Convention of Sintra, which provided for the evacua- 
tion of Junot 's forces. The government was placed in the hands 
of the juntas. In January 1809, the prince regent designated a British 
officer, William Carr Beresford, to reorganize the Portuguese army, 
granting him the rank of marshall and commander in chief. 

In March 1809, French troops under the command of General 
Nicholas Soult invaded Portugal once again. Entering the coun- 
try from Galicia, they occupied Chaves and marched on Porto. 
A combined Portuguese-British army, commanded by Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, pushed Soult back to Galicia and defeated another French 
army at Tavera in Spain, after which Wellesley was made the duke 
of Wellington. 

The expulsion of Soult 's forces gave the Anglo-Portuguese army 
time to prepare for Napoleon's third invasion, which was ordered 
in 1810. The third French army under the command of General 
Andre Massena entered Portugal at Guarda and marched to Viseu. 
Because Wellington's forces held the main roads, Massena took 
his army across the Bugaco Mountains and marched on Coimbra, 
which he sacked. Wellington withdrew his army southward, lur- 
ing Massena into positions he had prepared at Torres Vedras. Find- 
ing the positions impenetrable, Massena, far from his source of 
supply and short of food, withdrew his forces. Wellington pursued 



42 



Historical Setting 



Massena and overtook him at Sabugal where his army was defeated. 
Massena retreated from Portugal. 

Constitutionalism 

Although the ideology of liberalism was known in Portugal in 
the late 1700s by way of the American and French revolutions, 
it was not until after the Peninsular Wars that it became a force 
with which the monarchy had to contend. Freemasonry introduced 
by foreign merchants played an important role in spreading liberal 
doctrines in Portugal. In 1801 there were five Masonic temples 
in Lisbon, and the first Portuguese grand master was elected in 
1804. The three French invasions encouraged the spread of liberal 
ideas. In 1812 Freemasons founded the Sinedrio, a secret society 
that propagated revolutionary ideas. Radical ideas were also dis- 
cussed by Portuguese who lived in London or Paris where they 
had observed and been influenced by the functioning of the British 
and French systems. Newspapers and pamphlets, despite the 
vigilance of the crown's censors and police, were smuggled into 
Portugal and widely read by a small and increasingly important 
educated elite, called the afrancesados, who wanted to reconstruct 
Portugal on the French model. After the Peninsular Wars, the ex- 
iles themselves returned to Portugal and began to agitate for a con- 
stitutional monarchy. One of these was General Gomes Freire 
Andrade, the grand master of Portuguese Masons, who became 
the leader of liberals in Portugal. The liberals were eventually to 
be successful because of a crisis of royal leadership. 

Revolution of 1820 

In 1816 Maria I, after twenty-four years of insanity, died, and 
the prince regent was proclaimed Joao VI (r. 1816-26). The new 
king, who had acquired a court and government in Brazil and a 
following among the Brazilians, did not immediately return to Por- 
tugal, and liberals continued to agitate against the monarchy. In 
May 1817, General Gomes Freire Andrade was arrested on trea- 
son charges and hanged, as were eleven alleged accomplices. Beres- 
ford, who was still commander in chief of the Portuguese army, 
was popularly blamed for the harshness of the sentences, which 
aggravated unrest in the country. The most active center of Por- 
tuguese liberalism was Porto, where the Sinedrio was situated and 
quickly gaining adherents. In March 1820, Beresford went to Brazil 
to persuade the king to return to the throne. His departure allowed 
the influence of the liberals to grow within the army, which had 
emerged from the Peninsular Wars as Portugal's strongest insti- 
tution. On August 24, 1820, regiments in Porto revolted and 



43 



Portugal: A Country Study 

established a provisional junta that assumed the government of Por- 
tugal until a cortes could be convoked to write a constitution. The 
regency was bypassed because it was unable to cope with Portu- 
gal's financial crisis, and Beresford was not allowed to enter the 
country when he returned from Brazil. 

In December 1820, indirect elections were held for a constitu- 
tional cortes, which convened in January 1821. The deputies were 
mostiy constitutional monarchists. They elected a regency to replace 
the provisional junta, abolished seignorial rights and the Inquisi- 
tion, and, on September 23, approved a constitution. At the same 
time, Joao VI decided to return to Portugal, leaving his son Pedro 
in Brazil. Upon his arrival in Lisbon, Joao swore an oath to up- 
hold the new constitution. After his departure from Brazil, Brazilian 
liberals, inspired by the independence of the United States and the 
independence struggles in the neighboring Spanish colonies, be- 
gan to agitate for freedom from Portugal. Brazilian independence 
was proclaimed on October 12, 1822, with Pedro as constitutional 
emperor. 

The constitution of 1822 installed a constitutional monarchy in 
Portugal. It declared that sovereignty rested with the nation and 
established three branches of government in classical liberal fashion. 
Legislative power was exercised by a directly elected, unicameral 
Chamber of Deputies; executive power was vested in the king and 
his secretaries of state; and judicial power was in the hands of the 
courts. The king and his secretaries of state had no representation 
in the chamber and no power to dissolve it. 

Two broad divisions emerged in Portuguese society over the is- 
sue of the constitution. On the one hand were the liberals who 
defended it and, on the other, the royalists who favored absolutism. 
The first reaction to the new liberal regime surfaced in February 
1823 in Tras-os-Montes where the count of Amarante, a leading 
absolutist, led an insurrection. Later, in May, Amarante once again 
sounded the call to arms, and an infantry regiment rose at Vila 
Franca de Xira, just north of Lisbon. Some of the Lisbon garrison 
joined the absolutists, as did the king's younger brother, Miguel, 
who had refused to swear to uphold the constitution. After the 
Vilafrancada, as the uprising is known, Miguel was made gener- 
alissimo of the army. In April 1824, Miguel led a new revolt — the 
Abrilada — which sought to restore absolutism. Joao, supported by 
Beresford, who had been allowed to return to Portugal, dismissed 
Miguel from his post as generalissimo and exiled him to France. 
The constitution of 1822 was suspended, and Portugal was governed 
under Joao's moderate absolutism until he died in 1826. 



44 



Historical Setting 



War of the Two Brothers 

Joao's death created a problem of royal succession. The right- 
ful heir to the throne was his eldest son, Pedro, emperor of Brazil. 
Neither the Portuguese nor the Brazilians wanted a unified monar- 
chy; consequently, Pedro abdicated the Portuguese crown in favor 
of his daughter, Maria da Gloria, a child of seven, on the condi- 
tion that when of age she marry his brother, Miguel. In April 1826, 
as part of the succession settlement, Pedro granted a new consti- 
tution to Portugal, known as the Constitutional Charter. Pedro 
returned to Brazil leaving the throne to Maria, with Miguel as 
regent. 

The Constitutional Charter attempted to reconcile absolutists 
and liberals by allowing both factions a role in government. Un- 
like the constitution of 1822, this document established four 
branches of government. The legislature was divided into two cham- 
bers. The upper chamber, the Chamber of Peers, was composed 
of life and hereditary peers and clergy appointed by the king. The 
lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies, was composed of 111 
deputies elected to four-year terms by the indirect vote of local as- 
semblies, which in turn were elected by persons meeting certain 
tax-paying and property-owning requirements. Judicial power was 
exercised by the courts; executive power by the ministers of the 
government; and moderative power by the king, who held an ab- 
solute veto over all legislation. 

The absolutists, however, were not satisfied with this com- 
promise, and they continued to regard Miguel as the legitimate 
successor to the throne because he was Portuguese whereas Pedro 
was Brazilian. In February 1828, Miguel returned to Portugal to 
take the oath of allegiance to the charter and assume the regency. 
He was immediately proclaimed king by his supporters. Although 
it initially appeared that Miguel would abide by the charter, pres- 
sure mounted for a return to absolutism. A month after his return, 
Miguel dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of 
Peers and, in May, summoned the traditional cortes of the three 
estates of the realm to proclaim his accession to absolute power. 
The Cortes of 1828 assented to Miguel's wish, proclaiming him 
king as Miguel I and nullifying the Constitutional Charter. 

This usurpation did not go unchallenged by the liberals. On May 
18, the garrison in Porto declared its loyalty to Pedro, Maria da 
Gloria, and the Constitutional Charter. The rebellion against the 
absolutists spread to other cities. Miguel suppressed these rebel- 
lions, and many thousands of liberals were either arrested or fled 
to Spain and Britain. There followed five years of repression. 



45 



Portugal: A Country Study 



In Brazil, meanwhile, relations between Pedro and Brazil's po- 
litical leaders had become strained. In 1831 Pedro abdicated in favor 
of his son, Pedro II, and sailed for Britain. He organized a mili- 
tary expedition there and then went to the Azores, which were in 
the hands of the liberals, to set up a government in exile in March 
1831 . In July 1832, Pedro occupied Porto, which was subsequent- 
ly besieged by the absolutists. In June 1833, the liberals, still en- 
circled at Porto, sent a force commanded by the duke of Terceira 
to the Algarve. At the same time, a liberal squadron defeated the 
absolutists' fleet near Cabo Sao Vincente. Terceira landed at Faro 
and marched north through the Alentejo to capture Lisbon on July 
24. A stalemate of nine months ensued. The absolutists controlled 
the rural areas, where they were supported by the aristocracy and 
the peasantry. The liberals occupied Portugal's major cities, Lis- 
bon and Porto, where they commanded a sizeable following among 
the middle classes. Finally, the Miguelists lifted their siege of Por- 
to and marched on Lisbon, but they were defeated at Evora-Monte. 
Peace was declared in May 1834, and Miguel, guaranteed an an- 
nual pension, was banished from Portugal, never to return. Pedro 
restored the Constitutional Charter. 

Moderate vs. Radical Liberals 

Pedro survived his victory by less than three months. After his 
death, fifteen-year-old Maria da Gloria was proclaimed queen as 
Maria II (r. 1834-53). Despite their victory over the absolutists, 
the liberals were themselves divided between moderates, who sup- 
ported the principles of the charter, and radicals, who wanted a 
return to the constitution of 1822. Maria's first government was 
made up of moderates headed by the duke of Palmela, whose 
government collapsed in May 1835. He was succeeded by the duke 
of Saldanha, whose government fell in May 1836. In July 1836, 
radicals were elected from Porto by advocating a return to the con- 
stitution of 1822 as a way of resolving Portugal's economic crisis. 
When these deputies arrived in Lisbon, they were met by demon- 
strations supporting their cause. The following day, the moderate 
liberal government collapsed, and, in September, the radicals, led 
by Manuel da Silva Passos, formed a new government. The radi- 
cals nullified the Constitutional Charter and reestablished the con- 
stitution of 1822 until it could be revised by a constituent cortes 
to make it more compatible with changed social and economic cir- 
cumstances. 

The actions of the radicals resulted in a violent reaction from 
the moderates, who saw their power threatened and considered the 
charter the symbol of the liberal victory in the War of Two Brothers. 



46 



Historical Setting 



As a compromise, the Constituent Assembly, convoked in March 
1838, attempted to reconcile the constitution of 1822 and the Con- 
stitutional Charter. In April 1838, Portugal's third constitution was 
approved. The document abolished the royal moderative power 
and returned to liberalism's classical tripartite division of govern- 
ment into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It reaffirmed, 
as did the 1822 constitution, that sovereignty rested with the na- 
tion. It abolished the Chamber of Peers and substituted a Cham- 
ber of Senators, and it established direct election of the Chamber 
of Deputies, although only selected citizens were allowed to vote. 
The monarch's role was enhanced, and the Chamber of Senators 
was restricted to leading citizens, or notables. 

The radicals, now called Septemberists after the September 1836 
revolution, held office until June 1841. On that date, they were 
replaced in a bloodless coup d'etat by moderates, who abolished 
the 1838 constitution and restored the charter. Antonio Bernardo 
da Costa Cabral, who organized and led the revolt, took various 
measures designed to reform Portugal's political, economic, and 
social systems. Some of these measures, especially new sanitary 
regulations that prohibited burials in churchyards, stirred the rural 
countryside, still Miguelist, into active resistance against the liberal 
government in Lisbon. 

The women of the Minho region, who had traditionally played 
an important role in churchyard burials, began to demonstrate 
against the authorities. Supported by the rural nobility and cler- 
gy, the Maria da Fontes, as this movement was called, spread 
throughout the rural north. Unable to suppress it by force, the 
government of Costa Cabral fell on May 20, 1846. The new govern- 
ment, a confusing hodgepodge of radicals and moderates, rescinded 
the cemetery regulations. The government divided when the duke 
of Palmela, who was its prime minister, called for new elections 
in October, hoping to unite the moderates, themselves divided into 
two factions. This development sparked a reaction by the Septem- 
berists, who were particularly strong in Porto, where they rebelled 
and set up a provisional junta. The duke of Saldanha, Palmela' s 
replacement, attempted without success to suppress the Septem- 
berist rebellion, which by now had spread beyond Porto to other 
areas. With the country on the brink of a second civil war, Queen 
Maria sought help from the Quadruple Alliance, consisting of Brit- 
ain and France, as well as Spanish and Portuguese liberal elements. 
After the alliance imposed a naval blockade and sent troops, the 
Septemberists capitulated, Saldanha resigned, and a peace agree- 
ment was signed on June 29, 1847. Costa Cabral returned to power. 



47 



Portugal: A Country Study 
Rotativismo 

In 1851 Saldanha staged a revolt and, supported by the garri- 
son in Porto, gained control of the government and sent Costa 
Cabral into exile. Saldanha and his followers were called Regener- 
ators because they recognized the need to modify the charter to 
make it more compatible with the social and political situation. 
These modifications appeared as amendments, the first of which 
was a new electoral law that made the franchise more acceptable 
to the Septemberists. Gradually, government became stabilized. 
The Septemberists began to be referred to as Historicals and, later, 
Progressives. 

The Regenerators and Progressives were not political parties in 
today's sense of the term. The electorate comprised less than 1 per- 
cent of the population; therefore, the Regenerators and Progres- 
sives were essentially loose coalitions of notables, or leading citizens, 
based on personal loyalties and local interests. Elections were held 
after a change in governing factions to provide the new faction with 
a majority in the legislature. By tacit agreement, one faction would 
govern as long as it was able and then turn over power to the other. 
After 1856 this practice of alternating factions at regular intervals, 
called rotativismo, was all but institutionalized and produced rela- 
tively stable government until the end of the nineteenth century. 

Portuguese Africa 

With the advent of rotativismo and subsequent political stability, 
the attention of Portugal turned toward its colonial possessions in 
Africa. In East Africa, the chief settlement was Mozambique Is- 
land, but there was little control over the estates of the mainland 
where Portuguese of mixed ancestry ruled as feudal potentates. In 
West Africa, the most important settlements were Luanda and Ben- 
guela on the Angolan coast, linked to Brazil by the slave trade con- 
ducted through the African island of Sao Tome. It was during this 
period that the Portuguese began to send expeditions into the in- 
terior. 

In 1852 Antonio Francisco Silva Porto explored the interior of 
Angola. In 1877 a scientific expedition led by Hermenegildo Capelo 
and Roberto Ivens, two naval officers, and Alexandre Serpa Pin- 
to, an army major, departed from Luanda and traveled to the Bie 
region in central Angola, where they separated. Serpa Pinto ex- 
plored the headwaters of the Cuanza River in Angola and followed 
the course of the Zambezi River to Victoria Falls in present-day 
Zimbabwe. Exploring areas now part of South Africa, he crossed 
the Transvaal and arrived in Natal in 1879. In 1884 Capelo and 



48 



Historical Setting 



Ivens departed from Mocamades on the coast of Angola and crossed 
the continent through entirely unexplored territory, arriving at Que- 
limane on the east coast of Mozambique in 1885. In the same year, 
Serpa Pinto and Augusto Cardoso explored the territory around 
Lake Nyassa. Various Portuguese, such as Paiva de Andrade and 
Antonio Maria Cardoso, explored the interior of Mozambique. 

Despite Portugal's historical claim to the Congo region, the 
colonial ambitions of the great powers of the day — Britain, France, 
and Germany — gave rise to disputes about its ownership. Portu- 
gal therefore proposed an international conference to resolve the 
disputed claim to the Congo. This conference, which met in Ber- 
lin in 1884-85, awarded the Congo to the king of Belgium and 
established the principle that in order for a claim to African terri- 
tory to be valid, the claimant had to demonstrate "effective occu- 
pation," not historical rights. The Berlin Conference, as it is known, 
resulted in the partition of Africa among the European powers, 
and awarded Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea to Portugal. 

In 1886 Portugal signed two treaties that delimited the bound- 
aries between Portuguese territories and those of France and Ger- 
many. France and Germany recognized Portugal's right to exercise 
sovereignty in the interior territory between Mozambique and An- 
gola. This claim was represented on a map, annexed to the treaty 
with France, on which the claimed territory was colored red. In 
order to validate this claim, the Portuguese published the "rose- 
colored map" and organized successive expeditions into the interior 
between Mozambique and Angola. Meanwhile, the British were 
also exploring the territory from south to north under the auspices 
of Cecil Rhodes, who had designs on the territory for the construc- 
tion of a railroad that would run from Cape Town through central 
Africa to Cairo. 

Portugal protested against the activities of the British in what 
they considered to be their territory. The British, having signed 
a number of treaties with African chiefs, claimed that the territory 
was under their protection and refused to recognize the rose-colored 
map. Moreover, they said the territory was not Portuguese because 
Portugal had not effectively occupied it as required by the terms 
of the Berlin Conference. Portugal proposed that the conflicting 
claims be resolved through arbitration. Britain refused and sent 
the Portuguese an ultimatum, on January 11, 1890, demanding 
the withdrawal of all Portuguese forces from the disputed territory. 
Portugal, faced with the armed might of the British, complied. 

Republicanism 

The ultimatum of 1890 caused astonishment and indignation in 



49 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Lisbon. As a result, the Progressive government fell and a non- 
party government came to power. The ultimatum was strongly 
denounced by Portugal's growing band of republicans, who had 
organized themselves into a formal party in 1878. The republicans 
based their appeals on crude nationalism and played on the fears 
of many that a continuation of the inept government of the liber- 
als would make Portugal either a British colony or a province of 
Spain. Teachers, journalists, small-business persons, clerks, and 
artisans were drawn to republicanism, with its appeals to nation- 
alism, universal suffrage, separation of church and state, and the 
abolition of the monarchy and nobility, which were seen as irra- 
tional institutions that sapped the strength of Portugal. 

The appeal of republicanism was also enhanced by the collapse 
of rotativismo. After 1890 the system ceased to function smoothly. 
Conflicts between the Regenerators and Historicals, formerly set- 
tled in secret, were brought into the open in an effort to generate 
public support for the system. But open debate proved to be un- 
settling in Portugal's depoliticized society. By 1906 neither faction 
could attain a parliamentary majority. In that year, the republi- 
cans managed to elect from Lisbon four deputies who proceeded 
to create tumultuous scenes in parliament. In May 1907, the situ- 
ation came to a standstill. The king, Carlos I (r. 1889-1908), dis- 
solved parliament and gave to Joao Franco, a conservative reformist 
who had bolted from the Regenerators to form his own party, the 
power to govern by decree. Joao Franco's dictatorship was con- 
demned by all political parties, and the republicans attempted an 
unsuccessful coup d'etat. A crackdown on the republican move- 
ment followed. On February 1, 1908, the king and the royal family 
were attacked by two disgruntled republicans as they crossed the 
Praca do Comercio by open landau. The king and his youngest 
son were killed, and his oldest son, Manuel, survived a bullet wound 
in the arm. Manuel, who was eighteen at the time, became king 
as Manuel II (r. 1908-10). 

In an effort to salvage the monarchy, Joao Franco stepped down 
as prime minister and went into exile. New elections were held, 
but factionalism among the Regenerators and Historicals prevented 
the formation of a stable government even after six attempts. On 
October 1, 1910, the appearance in Portugal of the president of 
the Brazilian republic after a visit to Germany provided a pretext 
for extensive republican demonstrations. On October 3, the army 
refused to put down a mutiny on Portuguese warships anchored 
in the estuary of the Tagus and took up positions around Lisbon. 
On October 4, when two of the warships began to shell the royal 
palace, Manuel II and the royal family fled to Britain. On October 



50 



Manuel II, Portugal's 
last king (r. 1908-10) 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Portugal, Washington 




5, a provisional republican government was organized with the 
writer Teofilo Braga as president. 

The First Republic 

In May 1911, the provisional government held elections for the 
Constituent Assembly, which undertook to write a new constitu- 
tion. This document, which appeared on August 21, abolished the 
monarchy and inaugurated Portugal's first republican government. 
The constitution secularized the state by disestablishing the church, 
forbidding religious instruction in the public schools, and prohibit- 
ing the military from taking part in religious observances. It grant- 
ed workers the right to strike and opened the civil service to merit 
appointments. The blue and white flag of the monarchy was replaced 
with one of red and green, embellished with an armillary sphere 
in gold. 

The constitution vested legislative power in a bicameral Congress 
of the Republic. The upper house, called the Senate, was indirectly 
elected from local governments for six-year terms; the lower house, 
or Chamber of Deputies, was directly elected for three-year terms. 
Executive power was vested in a cabinet and prime minister respon- 
sible to the Congress, which also chose the president of the repub- 
lic, the nominal head of state. The Constituent Assembly became 
the first Congress by electing one- third of its members to the Senate; 
the remaining two-thirds constituted the Chamber of Deputies. 



51 



Portugal: A Country Study 

The Portuguese Republican Party (Partido Republicano 
Portugues — PRP) was Portugal's first political party in the modern 
sense of the term. Although its base of support was primarily ur- 
ban, the PRP had a nationwide organization that extended into 
the rural areas. It did not remain unified, however. In 191 1 moder- 
ate and radical republican deputies divided over the election by 
the Constituent Assembly of the new president of the republic. The 
candidate of the radical republicans, led by Afonso Costa, was 
defeated by the candidate of the moderates, led by Manuel Brito 
Camacho and Antonio Jose de Almeida, who opposed Costa's in- 
transigent republicanism and feared that he would gain control of 
the new government. The split widened at the PRP Congress in 
October 1911 when the moderates where hooted down and left in 
disgust. The moderates then formed the Republican National Union 
(Uniao Nacional Republicana — UNR), the directorate consisting 
of Camacho, Almeida, and Aresta Branco. The UNR was essen- 
tially a personal clique of several moderate leaders whose purpose 
was to get through parliament a program that would mitigate the 
impact of the more radical republican government. After this 
breakup, the PRP became known as the Democratic Party (Partido 
Democratico — PD) . 

In February 1912, the UNR leadership itself split into two repub- 
lican splinter parties. The immediate cause of the rift was disagree- 
ment over the UNR program and rivalry between Camacho and 
Almeida. The rump, led by Camacho, was renamed the Republi- 
can Union (Uniao Republicana — UR), and its members became 
known as Unionists. The other group, led by Almeida, was called 
the Republican Evolutionist Party (Partido Republicano Evolu- 
cionista — PRE), and its followers became known as Evolutionists. 
The program of the PRE was quite similar to that of the UR, but 
it urged a policy of moderation and conciliation and advocated 
proportional representation and revision of intolerant laws. 

The splintering of the original PRP, personalism, and petty 
squabbles produced acute governmental instability during the First 
Republic. In its fifteen years and eight months of existence, there 
were seven elections for the Congress, eight for the presidency, and 
forty-five governments. Instability was also encouraged by the 
government's total dependency upon the Congress, where no sta- 
ble majority could be organized. This political turmoil led to several 
periods of military rule during the First Republic and eventually 
to its overthrow. 

In January 1915, senior military officers, who were becoming 
increasingly alienated from the republic, imposed a period of mili- 
tary rule at President Manuel de Arriaga's request. In May of the 



52 



Historical Setting 



same year, however, prorepublican junior officers and sergeants 
returned the government to civilians and held new elections. The 
PD, led by Afonso Costa, won the day. 

In 1916 Prime Minister Costa, who feared that a German vic- 
tory in World War I would mean the loss of Portugal's African 
colonies of Mozambique and Angola, sent an expeditionary force 
of 40,000 men to fight on the side of the Allies. Poorly trained and 
equipped, the force suffered horrendous casualties in Flanders. This 
debacle, as well as severe food shortages caused by the war mobili- 
zation, paved the way for a second military intervention in De- 
cember 1917, led by Major Sidonio Pais. Pais, who had held a 
diplomatic post in Prussia some years before, was sympathetic to 
Germany and antiliberal. He was an energetic, charismatic in- 
dividual who sought to build a broadly based popular following. 
Gradually, however, he came to rely on upper-class youths, young 
army officers, students, and sons of big landowners, who were anti- 
liberal and traditionalist. In December 1918, Pais was assassinat- 
ed by a radical republican corporal recently returned from the front. 
Portugal's government was returned to civilians. 

Political instability continued under civilian government. A small- 
scale civil war erupted in northern Portugal as monarchists led by 
Henrique Paiva Couciero attempted to restore the monarchy. A 
wave of violence swept the country, and leading republican figures, 
including the prime minister, were murdered. Political instability 
and violence brought economic life to a standstill. The middle class, 
which had initially supported the republic, began to turn toward 
traditional values as liberal and republican ideals were increasing- 
ly discredited. 

By 1925 the republic had become the butt of ridicule and cyni- 
cism. It never satisfactorily resolved its dispute with the church, 
against which some of its first legislation had been directed. Offi- 
cial anticlericism made it impossible for many to accept the republic 
and stimulated the development of a politically involved Catholic 
intelligentsia in opposition to the parliamentary regime. The ap- 
paritions at Fatima in 1917 occurred at the height of Prime Minister 
Costa's anticlerical campaign. Those dissatisfied with the repub- 
lic viewed the authoritarian governments established in Italy (in 
1922) and Spain (in 1923) as attractive alternatives. 

Many military officers, despite their previous negative ex- 
periences in government, thought that only they could save Por- 
tugal from disintegration. Their inclination to intervene once again 
was heightened by grievances over low pay and poor equipment. 
During the last thirteen months of the republic, there were three 
attempts to overturn the regime. The last of these was successful. 



53 



Portugal: A Country Study 



On May 26, 1926, General Manuel Gomes da Costa, the coup 
d'etat's leader selected by the young officers who had organized 
it, announced from Braga his intention to march on Lisbon and 
take power. This announcement was followed by a massive mili- 
tary uprising that met little resistance. On May 28, General Gomes 
da Costa symbolically entered Lisbon, a dramatic gesture emulat- 
ing Benito Mussolini's march on Rome in 1922. Prime Minister 
Antonio Maria da Silva resigned on May 29, and the First Republic 
was ended. 

Military Dictatorship 

The coup d'etat was bloodless because no military units came 
to the aid of the government. On May 30, the president of the 
republic, Bernardino Machado, turned the reins of power over to 
Commander Jose Mendes Cabecadas, a naval officer and staunch 
republican, not to General Gomes da Costa, the titular leader of 
the military uprising. This action resulted in two months of behind- 
the-scenes infighting among various factions of the military. The 
promonarchist tendency within the May 28 Movement, as the coup 
was called, allied itself with right-wing but not necessarily monar- 
chist junior officers who wanted some form of authoritarian state. 
In the hope of preventing the rise of a monarchist or authoritarian 
regime, Mendes Cabecadas formed a joint government with Gomes 
da Costa on June 1. On June 17, Gomes da Costa ousted Mendes 
Cabecadas and his followers from the provisional government. 
General da Costa's supremacy was temporary; he too was ousted 
on July 9. On the same day, General Oscar Fragoso Carmona was 
named head of the military government. 

The military government was now in the hands of monarchists 
and authoritarian officers, and it seemed as if a restoration of the 
monarchy would follow. This was not to be, however, because of 
the reaction that such an outcome could have provoked among a 
substantial number of republicans within the officer corps. Car- 
mona, who was both a republican and a devout Catholic, was ac- 
ceptable to a broad range of views. He carefully preserved a balance 
between pro- and antimonarchists and pro- and anticlerical officers 
in order to ensure that the military regime would survive. On March 
25, 1928, General Carmona was elected to the presidency of the 
republic and appointed Colonel Jose Vicente de Freitas, a staunch 
republican, as prime minister, which virtually assured that the 
monarchy was not going to be restored, at least not during the mili- 
tary dictatorship. 

Carmona named Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, a professor of po- 
litical economy at the University of Coimbra, as minister of finance. 



54 



Historical Setting 



Salazar accepted the post on April 27, 1928, only after he had 
demanded and had been granted complete control over the expen- 
ditures of all government ministries. In his first year at the Minis- 
try of Finance, he not only balanced the budget but achieved a 
surplus, the first since 1913. He accomplished this feat by centraliz- 
ing financial control, improving revenue collection, and cutting 
public expenditures. Salazar remained minister of finance as mili- 
tary prime ministers came and went. From his first successful year 
as minister of finance, Salazar gradually came to embody the finan- 
cial and political solution to the turmoil of the military dictator- 
ship, which had not produced a clear leader. Salazar easily 
overshadowed military prime ministers and gradually gained the 
allegiance of Portugal's young intellectuals and military officers, 
who identified with his authoritarian, antiliberal, anticommunist 
view of the world. Moreover, Salazar' s ascendancy was welcomed 
by the church, which saw in him a savior from the anticlericalism 
of the republicans. It was also welcomed by the upper classes of 
landowners, businessmen, and bankers, who were grateful for his 
success in stabilizing the economy after the financial crisis of the 
First Republic. 

The New State 

As Salazar came to be seen as the civilian mainstay of the mili- 
tary dictatorship, he increasingly took it upon himself to lay out 
the country's political future. He set forth his plans in two key 
speeches, one on May 28, 1930, and the other on July 30 of the 
same year. In the first, he spoke of the need for a new constitution 
that would create a strong authoritarian political order, which he 
dubbed the New State (Estado Novo). In the second, he announced 
his intention to establish such a state. The military approved of 
Salazar' s speeches, and on July 5, 1932, after the collective resig- 
nation of the government of General Julio Domingos de Oliveira, 
which had come to power two years earlier, he was appointed prime 
minister. 

Salazar came from a peasant background. He had studied for 
the priesthood before turning to economics at the University of 
Coimbra, where he received his doctorate in 1918 and afterward 
taught. While a faculty member, he earned a reputation as a scholar 
and a writer, as well as a leader in Catholic intellectual and politi- 
cal movements. After taking up the reins of government, he re- 
tained his professorial style, lecturing the cabinet, his political 
followers, and the nation. Salazar never married and lived asceti- 
cally. A skillful political manipulator with a capacity for ruthless- 
ness, he was a respected rather than a popular figure. 



55 



Portugal: A Country Study 



The period of transition to the authoritarian republic promised 
after the military takeover in 1926 ended in 1933 with the adop- 
tion of a new constitution. The 1933 constitution, dictated by Sala- 
zar, created the New State, in theory a corporate state representing 
interest groups rather than individuals. The constitution provided 
for a president directly elected for a seven-year term and a prime 
minister appointed by and responsible to the president. The rela- 
tionship of the office of prime minister to the presidency was an 
ambiguous one. Salazar, continuing as prime minister, was head 
of government. He exercised executive and legislative functions, 
controlled local administration, police, and patronage, and was lead- 
er of the National Union (Uniao Nacional — UN), an umbrella 
group for supporters of the regime and the only legal political or- 
ganization. 

The legislature, called the National Assembly, was restricted to 
members of the UN. It could initiate legislation but only concern- 
ing matters that did not require government expenditures. The 
parallel Corporative Chamber included representatives of cultur- 
al and professional groups and of the official workers' syndicates 
that replaced free trade unions. 

Women were given the vote for the first time, but literacy and 
property qualifications limited the enfranchised segment of the 
population to about 20 percent, somewhat higher than under the 
parliamentary regime. Elections were held regularly, without op- 
position. 

In 1945 Salazar introduced so-called democratic measures, in- 
cluding an amnesty for political prisoners and a loosening of cen- 
sorship, that were believed by liberals to represent a move toward 
democratic government. In the parliamentary election that year, 
the opposition formed the broadly based Movement of Democrat- 
ic Unity (Movimento de Unidade Democratica — MUD), which 
brought democrats together with fascists and communists. The op- 
position withdrew before the election, however, charging that the 
government intended to manipulate votes. General Norton de Ma- 
tos, a candidate who opposed Carmona in the 1949 presidential 
election, pulled out on the same grounds. In 1958 the eccentric 
General Humberto Delgado ran against the official candidate, 
Admiral Americo Tomas, representing the UN. Delgado point- 
edly campaigned on the issue of replacing Salazar and won 25 per- 
cent of the vote. After the election, the rules were altered to provide 
for the legislature to choose the president. 

Salazar 's was a low-keyed personalist rule. The New State was 
his and not a forum for a party or ideology. Although intensely 
patriotic, he was cynical about the Portuguese national character 



56 



that in his mind made the people easy prey for demagogues. He 
avoided opportunities to politicize public life and appeared uncom- 
fortable with the political groups that were eventually introduced 
to mobilize opinion on the side of the regime's policies. Politics 
in Salazar's Portugal consisted of balancing power blocs within the 
country — the military, business and commerce, landholders, colonial 
interests, and the church. All political parties were banned. The 
UN, officially a civic association, encouraged public apathy rather 
than political involvement. Its leadership was composed of a small 
political and commercial elite, and contacts within ruling circles 
were usually made on an informal, personal basis, rather than 
through official channels. Within the circle, it was possible to dis- 
cuss and criticize policy, but no channels for expression existed out- 
side the circle. 

The UN had no guiding philosophy apart from support for Sala- 
zar. The tenets of the regime were said to be authoritarian govern- 
ment, patriotic unity, Christian morality, and the work ethic. 
Despite a great deal of deference paid to the theory of the corporate 
state, these tenets were essentially the extent of the regime's ideo- 
logical content. Although the regime indulged in rallies and youth 
movements with the trappings of fascist salutes and parapherna- 
lia, it was satisfied to direct public enthusiasm into "fado, Fati- 
ma, and football" — music, religion, and sports. 



57 



Portugal: A Country Study 

A devout Roman Catholic, Salazar sought a rapprochement with 
the church in Portugal. A concordat with the Vatican in 1940 rein- 
troduced state aid to Roman Catholic education, but Salazar resisted 
involving the church — which he called "the great source of our na- 
tional life" — in political questions. His policies were aimed essen- 
tially at healing the divisions caused within Portuguese society by 
generations of anticlericalism. Although the church had consistently 
supported Salazar, the regime came under increasing criticism by 
progressive elements in the clergy in the 1960s. One such incident 
led to the expulsion of the bishop of Porto. 

Whatever may be said of h'is political methods, Salazar had an 
exceptional grasp of the techniques of fiscal management and, 
within the limits that he had set for the regime, his program of 
economic recovery succeeded. Portugal's overriding problem in 
1926 had been its enormous public debt. Salazar's solution was 
to achieve financial solvency by balancing the national budget and 
reducing external debt. This solution required a strong govern- 
ment capable of cutting public expenditures and reducing domes- 
tic consumption by raising taxes and controlling credit and trade. 
In a few years Salazar singlemindedly achieved a solvent curren- 
cy, a favorable balance of trade, and surpluses both in foreign 
reserves and in the national budget. 

The bulk of the Portuguese remained among the poorest people 
in Europe, however. The austerity that Salazar's fiscal and eco- 
nomic policies demanded weighed most heavily on the working class 
and the rural poor, forestalling the development that would raise 
their standards of living. Outside the cities, traditional patterns of 
life persisted, especially in the conservative north, which had been 
stabilized by evenly distributed poverty and was a stronghold of 
support for the regime. To create an atmosphere of rising expec- 
tations without having the means to satisfy them, Salazar argued, 
would return the country to the chaotic conditions Portugal had 
known earlier in the century. 

Stable government and a solvent economy would eventually at- 
tract foreign investment regardless of the attitude abroad to the 
nature of Salazar's regime. Cheap labor and the promise of com- 
petitive prices for Portuguese-made goods provided an incentive 
for investment, particularly in labor-intensive production, which 
was becoming uneconomic in Northern Europe. Priority was given, 
however, to colonial development. Salazar insisted that the over- 
seas territories be made to pay for themselves and also to provide 
the trade surpluses required by Portugal to import the essentials 
that it could not produce itself. In essence, he updated Portuguese 



58 



Historical Setting 



mercantilist policy: colonial goods were sold abroad to create a sur- 
plus at home. 

In the years before World War II, Salazar cultivated good rela- 
tions with all major powers except the Soviet Union. Intent on 
preserving Portuguese neutrality, he had entered into a noninter- 
vention convention with the European powers during the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-39); however, Soviet activity in Spain and the 
leftward course of the Spanish Republic persuaded him to support 
Francisco Franco's nationalists, with whom more than 20,000 Por- 
tuguese volunteers served. The war in Spain also prompted Sala- 
zar to mobilize a political militia, the Portuguese Legion, as a 
counterweight to the army. 

Although he admired Benito Mussolini for his equitable settle- 
ment of Italy's church-state conflict, Salazar found the "pagan" 
elements in German Nazism repugnant. He opposed appeasement, 
protested the German invasion of Poland in 1939, and would ap- 
pear to have been among the first, with Winston Churchill, to ex- 
press confidence in ultimate Allied victory as early as 1940. Portugal 
remained neutral during World War II, but the Anglo-Portuguese 
alliance was kept intact, Britain pledging to protect Portuguese neu- 
trality. The United States and Britain were granted bases in the 
Azores after 1943, and Portuguese colonial products — copper and 
chromium — were funneled into Allied war production. Macau and 
Timor were occupied by Japan from 1941 to 1945. 

Portugal became a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 1949, and in 1971 Lisbon became head- 
quarters for NATO's Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT). 
Portugal also maintained a defensive military alliance (the Iberian 
Pact, also known as the Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression) 
with Spain that dated from 1939. Admission to the United Na- 
tions (UN) was blocked by the Soviet Union until 1955. In 1961 
Indian armed forces invaded and seized Goa, which had been Por- 
tuguese since 1510. 

Into the early twentieth century, the European settler commu- 
nities in Portuguese Africa had virtual autonomy, and colonial 
administrations were perpetually bankrupt. Lisbon's concern in 
Angola and Mozambique was to make good the Portuguese claim 
to those territories, and pacification of the interior was still under- 
way in the 1930s. Control over the colonies was tightened under 
Salazar. 

The Colonial Act of 1930 stated that Portugal and its colonies 
were interdependent entities. The New State insisted on increased 
production and better marketing of colonial goods to make the 
overseas territories self-supporting and to halt the drain on the 



59 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Portuguese treasury for their defense and maintenance. New land 
was opened for settlement, and emigration to the colonies was en- 
couraged. 

Portugal ignored the UN declaration on colonialism in 1960, 
which called on the colonial powers to relinquish control of depen- 
dent territories. Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea were made 
provinces with the same status as those in metropolitan Portugal 
by constitutional amendment in 1951 . Armed resistance to the Por- 
tuguese colonial administration broke out in Angola in 1961 and 
had spread by 1964 to Mozambique and Guinea. By 1974 Portu- 
gal had committed approximately 140,000 troops, or 80 percent 
of its available military forces, to Africa; some 60 percent of these 
were African. Portuguese combat casualties were relatively light, 
and fighting consisted of small-unit action in border areas far from 
population centers. Only in Guinea did rebel troops control sub- 
stantial territory. Portuguese forces appeared to have contained 
the insurgencies, and although large numbers of troops were re- 
quired to hold the territory, Portugal seemed to some observers 
capable of sustaining military activity in Africa indefinitely. These 
same observers considered that, from a military standpoint, the 
wars had been won. 

The wars did not interrupt the colonial production on which Por- 
tuguese economic stability depended. Indeed, they had provided 
a windfall to economic development in Angola and Mozambique, 
both with large settler communities. A large rural development 
project was underway in the Cahora Bassa region of Mozambique, 
as was the exploitation of oil in Cabinda enclave near Angola. More 
colonial income was being diverted into social services for Afri- 
cans and Europeans, and in areas of medicine and education bet- 
ter facilities were thought to be available in Luanda and Lourenco 
Marques (now Maputo) than in Lisbon. However, forced native 
labor remained a factor in the economic development of Portuguese 
Africa into the 1960s. Foreign investment capital often came to 
the colonies from countries whose governments had officially con- 
demned Portuguese colonialism. 

No one except Pombal left so broad a mark on modern Por- 
tuguese history as Salazar. For nearly forty years, he completely 
dominated Portuguese government and politics. He died on July 
27, 1970, more than two years after suffering an incapacitating 
stroke brought on by a freak accident. 

The Social State 

President Tomas appointed Marcello Jose das Neves Caetano 
to succeed Salazar as prime minister, although the regime did not 



60 



Historical Setting 



admit for some time that Salazar would not be returning to pow- 
er. Caetano was a teacher, jurist, and scholar of international repu- 
tation who had been one of the drafters of the 1933 constitution. 
Considered a moderate within the regime, he had taken unpopu- 
lar stands in opposition to Salazar. He had resigned as rector of 
Lisbon University in 1960 in protest over police repression of stu- 
dent demonstrations. Unlike Salazar he came from the upper middle 
class, was ebullient and personable, and sought contact with the 
people. 

It was clear from the start that Caetano was a different sort of 
leader. He spoke of "evolution within continuity," change fast 
enough to keep up with expectations but not so fast as to antagonize 
conservatives. He brought technocrats into the government and 
eased police repression. The elections held in 1969 were the freest 
in decades. He even altered the nomenclature of the regime; the 
New State became the Social State, but it remained essentially an 
authoritarian regime. 

In contrast to Salazar, Caetano advocated an expansionist eco- 
nomic policy and promoted rapid development and increasing 
consumption without, however, supplementing the means of 
production. The consequence of liberalization was the first per- 
ceptible inflation in years, reaching 15 percent on such working- 
class staples as codfish and rice in the early 1970s. 

Prime Minister Caetano had inherited Salazar' s office but not 
his power nor, apparently, his skill as a politician and economist. 
President Tomas, meanwhile, had emerged with greater authority, 
as Salazar' s death put him in a position to exercise the constitu- 
tional authority of the presidency to the fullest. Deeply conserva- 
tive and supported by an entrenched right wing within the official 
political movement, Tomas employed threats of an army coup to 
oppose Caetano 's policy of liberalization. Caetano took a harder 
line on Africa in an effort to head off opposition by the president 
and the officers close to him. 

As the events of spring 1974 were to demonstrate, the regimes 
of Salazar' s New State and Caetano 's Social State had depended 
on personalities. In existence for nearly fifty years, the institutions 
of the corporate state had never put down roots in Portuguese po- 
litical soil. Apathy had not implied support. On April 25, 1974, 
the officers and men of the Armed Forces Movement (Movimen- 
to das Forcas Armadas — MFA) ousted Caetano and Tomas, pav- 
ing the way for a junta under General Antonio de Spmola to take 
command of the Portuguese Republic. 

* * * 



61 



Portugal: A Country Study 

A comprehensive introduction to the history of the Iberian Penin- 
sula is a two- volume study by Stanley G. Payne, A History of Spain 
and Portugal. The best history of Portugal in the English language 
up to the First Republic is H. V. Livermore's A New History of Por- 
tugal. A succinct survey of Portugal's overseas empire is C.R. Box- 
er's Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415-1825. Douglas L. 
Wheeler provides a thorough treatment of the First Republic in 
Republican Portugal. A sympathetic portrait of Antonio de Oliveira 
Salazar can be found in Hugh Kay's Salazar and Modern Portugal. 
Salazar's New State is analyzed by Howard J. Wiarda in Corporatism 
and Development and by Tom Gallagher in Portugal: A Twentieth- 
Century Interpretation. The standard history of Portugal in Africa is 
James Duffy's Portuguese Africa. Walter C. Opello, Jr. covers re- 
cent history in his book, Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



62 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Monsaraz, a medieval village near the Spanish frontier 



AS A RESULT OF CHANGES wrought by the Revolution of 
1974, Portugal in the 1990s would be almost unrecognizable to per- 
sons who knew the country twenty or thirty years ago. The Revo- 
lution of 1974 set loose social and political forces that the country 
had not seen before on such a large scale and which could not be 
entirely controlled. The revolution, in turn, had occurred and had 
such a profound impact because of other, gradual social pressures 
that had been building for decades and even centuries. In the 
mid-1970s, these changes exploded to the surface. In the aftermath 
of the revolution, as Portuguese society continued to modernize 
and the country was admitted as a full member of the European 
Community (EC — see Glossary), social change continued, but not 
so frenetically and dramatically as during the revolutionary 
mid-1970s. 

Before 1974 Portugal was a highly traditional society. It resem- 
bled what historian Barbara Tuchman has called the "Proud Tow- 
er" of pre- World War I European society. Class and social divisions 
were tightly drawn and defined, society was organized on a rigidly 
hierarchical and authoritarian basis, and social relations were often 
stiff and formal. One was born into a certain station in life and 
was expected to stay there and to accept that fact; social mobility 
was limited. Class standing and class relations were clearly delineat- 
ed by criteria of birth, dress, speech, and manner of behavior. 
Visitors often remarked that in Portugal one could still find a 
nineteenth-century society existing within a twentieth-century 
context. 

Even within this rigid, very conservative, and traditionalist 
society, however, considerable change was beginning to occur, 
particularly during the 1960s as economic development accelerat- 
ed. The trade unions had grown in size and assertiveness. The mid- 
dle class was emerging as a numerically larger and sociologically 
more important element than before. A new business-industrial 
class had grown up alongside, and frequently overlapped with, the 
more traditional landed and noble class. In addition, Portugal ex- 
perienced urbanization; at the same time, many Portuguese left 
the country in search of better opportunities abroad. Literacy was 
also rising, though slowly. As modernization and social change be- 
gan to accelerate in the 1960s and early 1970s, discontent with the 
closed and authoritarian regime of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar 
(1928-68) and his successor Marcello Jose das Neves Caetano 



65 



Portugal: A Country Study 

(1968-74) also began to mount. These and other pressures culmi- 
nated in the Revolution of 1974. 

Following the revolution, which led to the establishment of 
democracy in Portugal, societal pressures continued. Pressures for 
education, land, jobs, better health care, housing, social equality, 
and solutions to Portugal's pressing social problems mounted. Por- 
tugal remained, even with the economic growth of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, a poor country compared to West European standards. 
Moreover, rising expectations were threatening to overwhelm the 
democratic regime's capacities for resolving the problems. Portu- 
gal's full economic participation in the EC at the end of 1992, at 
which time it would no longer have the protection of high tariff 
barriers, added to social tensions and uncertainties. Thus, as Por- 
tugal began the 1990s, the promise of a new, stable, democratic 
era of development coexisted with a fear of what the future might 
bring. 

The Physical Environment 

Portugal shares the Iberian Peninsula with Spain, although it 
is only about one-sixth as large as its neighbor. Including the Azores 
(Acores) and Madeira, the country has a total area of 92,080 square 
kilometers. Portugal lies on the westernmost promontory of con- 
tinental Europe. The rugged Pyrenees Mountains separate Iberia 
from the heart of the European continent, and Portugal is even 
farther distant across the vastness of Spain. Distance and isolation 
have created in Portugal a sense that it is a part of Europe geographi- 
cally but apart from it culturally, socially, economically, political- 
ly, and even psychologically. Even in the early 1990s, Lisbon 
(Lisboa) was a two-to-three-day drive from Paris. 

Portugal is bounded on the west and south by the Atlantic Ocean 
and on the north and east by Spain. The country's shape is roughly 
that of a rectangle, with its short sides on the north and south and 
its long sides on the east and west. Portugal's Atlantic coastline 
is 837 kilometers long; its northern and eastern frontiers with Spain 
are 336 and 839 kilometers long, respectively. 

Historically, Portugal emerged as a separate country during cen- 
turies of struggle with the Spanish provinces of Leon and Castile. 
Even hundreds of years after Portugal broke away from Spain for 
the last time in 1640, fears remained in the country that it might 
one day be swallowed up by larger and more powerful Spain, 
perhaps not militarily, but culturally and economically. That sen- 
timent is expressed by the Portuguese proverb that "neither a good 
wind nor a good marriage ever come from Spain." Meanwhile, 
Portugal's long coast had given it an "Atlantic vocation" and 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



propelled its historic ventures of global exploration and coloni- 
zation. 

Portugal is not a homogeneous country geographically. The physi- 
cal environment varies enormously, creating several distinct geo- 
graphic regions that, in turn, have shaped the culture of the people 
and their economy and society. Northern Portugal is a moun- 
tainous, rainy region, characterized by many small farms and vine- 
yards. The Portuguese nation began in this region, fending off Leon 
and Castile while simultaneously driving the Moors south and even- 
tually out of the peninsula. It is a desolate area of rocky hillsides 
where smallholders have eked out a meager existence for hundreds 
of years. This region is also said to be the origin of the strongest 
Portuguese national values of hard work, thrift, traditionalism, Ro- 
man Catholicism, and practicality. It is also an area, however, that 
has lost many of its inhabitants through emigration. 

Central Portugal, between the Rio Douro in the north and the 
Tagus River (Rio Tejo), including the capital city of Lisbon and 
its environs, is less homogeneous. The central coastal region con- 
sists of dunes and pine forests, and many residents of the area earn 
their livelihood from fishing. The central eastern areas, known as 
the Beira, consist mainly of small and medium-sized farms, with 
some mining and light industry. The greater Lisbon area, includ- 
ing both the city and its suburbs, accounts for most of the nation's 
commerce and much of its industry. 

Southern Portugal, known as the Alentejo (literally, ''beyond 
the Tagus") is an area of gently rolling hills and plains dominated 
by extensive estates with large-scale agriculture and grazing. It was 
traditionally also a land of often embittered tenant farmers and 
peasants. In contrast to the conservative north, the Alentejo was 
an area of radical political movements; for a long time, the Por- 
tuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues — PCP) 
was the strongest party in the region. 

The extreme south of Portugal is known as the Algarve. It is 
a dry region of smallholdings, grazing, and fishing, and coastal 
towns. This is the area of Portugal most strongly influenced by 
the Moors; even today Moorish influence is present in the region's 
dialect and architecture. With its warm climate and Mediterrane- 
an sky, the Algarve has also become a center for tourism and a 
home to many foreign retirees. 

Historically, Portugal was divided administratively into six 
provinces that corresponded closely to these natural geographic di- 
visions (see fig. 4). The north consisted of two provinces, the coastal 
Minho and the interior Tras-os-Montes. The center was made up 
of Beira and Estremadura, and the south consisted of the Alentejo 



67 



Portugal: A Country Study 

, : — ■ — — ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ — ■ 




Figure 4. Historical Regions 

and the Algarve. Later these historical provinces were further sub- 
divided for administrative purposes, but the historical names have 
been retained in popular usage (see fig. 1). 

Even though it is a small country, Portugal has a wide variety 
of landforms, climatic conditions, and soils. The major difference 
is between the mountainous regions of the north and, across the 
Tagus River, the great rolling plains of the south. Within these 
two major regions are further subdivisions that reflect the country's 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



vast differences. The Minho and Tras-os-Montes are both moun- 
tainous, but whereas the former is green with abundant rainfall, 
the latter is dry and parched. The Beira Litoral and Estremadura 
are younger geologically and contain sandstone, limestone, and vol- 
canic rock. Beira Alta (Upper Beira) is mountainous and forms 
a barrier across the center of Portugal, but Beira Baixa (Lower 
Beira) is dry and windswept, an extension of the Spanish plateau. 
The Alentejo consists of gentle hills and plains. Because it is one 
of the driest areas in the country, it is not suitable for intensive 
agriculture. The area does support cattle raising, as well as cork 
oak and some grains. It is separated from the Algarve by two moun- 
tain ranges, the Serra de Monchique and the Serra do Caldeirao. 

Geography and topography are also reflected in the climate. The 
mountainous regions of the north are considerably colder than the 
south. Winter snows in the Serra da Estrela (which contains Por- 
tugal's highest peak at 1,986 meters) and the Serra do Geres near 
the northern Spanish border may block roads for a time. The 
weather along the northern coasts and in the center of the country 
is milder; Lisbon has an average high temperature of 14°C in Janu- 
ary and 27°C in August. Southern Portugal is warmer. The ocean 
moderates coastal temperatures, but the interior of the Alentejo 
can be quite warm, with temperatures sometimes above 40 °C dur- 
ing the summer months. Because of its Mediterranean climate, most 
of Portugal's rainfall occurs in the winter, the north receiving much 
more rain than the south. 

Portugal has ten major rivers, five of which have their origins 
in Spain. The Rio Minho begins in Spanish Galicia and for a dis- 
tance of seventy-four kilometers forms the northern Portuguese 
frontier with Spain. The Rio Douro is of great importance to the 
commerce of northern Portugal. It also originates in Spain and flows 
the entire width of Portugal before emptying into the Atlantic at 
Porto, the country's second largest city. The Rio Douro is navigable 
by small craft for its full distance of 198 kilometers in Portugal; 
historically the river was used to transport casks of port wine to 
Porto. Its steep banks are terraced with vineyards, and the valley 
of the Rio Douro is one of the most picturesque in all Portugal. 

The Tagus River is the country's longest river, has the largest 
drainage basin, and is the most important economically. It is naviga- 
ble only eighty kilometers upstream, but that includes the vast es- 
tuary on which Lisbon is located. The Tagus estuary is the best 
natural port on the European continent and able to handle large 
ocean-going vessels. It also contains the Cacilhas drydocks, the 
largest in the world. 



69 



Portugal: A Country Study 

The most important river in the south is the Rio Guadiana, 
which, flowing north to south, forms part of the border with Spain. 
Other important rivers in Portugal include the Rio Lima and the 
Rio Tamega in the north, the Rio Mondego in the center, and 
the Rio Sado and Rio Chanca in the south. 

The soil systems of Portugal are usually sandy, arid, and acid, 
reflecting the soils of the Iberian Peninsula generally. Soil in the 
north can be rocky. Northern Portugal is better suited for agricul- 
ture than the south because of abundant rainfall, but with proper 
irrigation the south could support more intensive agriculture. 

About one-fourth of Portugal is covered by forests (mainly pine 
and deciduous oak); if such cultivated tree crops as olives, cork 
oak, almonds, chestnuts, and citrus are counted, about one-third 
of the country's area is tree covered. In the northern mountains, 
pine, oak, poplar, and elm trees are prevalent. Vegetation is more 
varied in the central region and includes citrus trees and cork oak. 
The warm, dry south contains many areas of rough pasture, as 
well as abundant cork oak. 

In addition to continental Portugal, the country's territory also 
includes the Azores and Madeira islands. The Azores consist of 
nine inhabited islands and several uninhabited rock outcroppings 
1 ,280 kilometers west of the mainland in the Atlantic Ocean. The 
archipelago has an area of 2,278 square kilometers and a popula- 
tion of about 250,000. The Azores produce sufficient foodstuffs for 
internal consumption and some exports, but they remain even poor- 
er than the mainland. The Madeira archipelago, located about 560 
kilometers miles west of North Africa, consists of two inhabited 
and several uninhabited islands. With a total area of 788 square 
kilometers and a population of about 270,000 people, the archipela- 
go is severely overpopulated (see fig. 5). 

Demography 

By the early 1990s, Portugal's population was just over 10 mil- 
lion, a little more than triple the 3.1 million estimated to live in 
the country in 1801. The main causes for this slow growth were 
a high infant mortality rate for much of these two centuries and 
an emigration rate so extreme that in one decade, the 1960s, the 
country's population actually fell. These trends have reversed in 
recent decades. The country's infant mortality rate at the begin- 
ning of the 1990s — 10 per 1,000 in 1992 — remained somewhat 
higher than the European average but was one-fifth of that 
registered two decades earlier. Emigration also slowed markedly 
as prosperity appeared in Portugal in the second half of the 1980s. 
Moreover, in the second half of the 1970s a massive influx of 



70 




QoCfo de Cddiz 



25 



International boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 
Spot elevation in meters 



100 Kilometers 



50 



75 



100 
Miles 



Figure 5. Topography and Drainage 
72 



The Society and Its Environment 



refugees from former Portuguese colonies in Africa caused a popu- 
lation surge. 

Population Size and Structure 

Although population estimates are available for earlier years, the 
first official Portuguese census was taken in 1864. It showed a popu- 
lation of approximately 4.3 million (see table 2, Appendix). There- 
after, the population increased slowly at rates often well under 1 
percent per year. Only during the 1930s and 1940s did the popu- 
lation increase at over 1 percent per year. During the 1960s, the 
population actually fell by over 300,000 and in 1970 amounted to 
about 8.5 million. During the early 1970s, population continued 
to fall or was stagnant. This demographic trend was the result of 
widespread emigration. Many Portuguese left their country in these 
years to find employment abroad or to avoid military service in 
the wars Portugal was fighting in its colonies in Africa. 

In 1974 the country's population showed its first sizeable increase 
and by 1981 reached nearly 9.8 million, 1.2 million more than it 
had been ten years earlier. The settling in Portugal of an estimated 
500,000 to 800,000 refugees from the country's African colonies 
accounted for most of this increase. During the first half of the 1980s, 
the population grew at a rate of about 0.8 percent a year, then 
declined. As of the early 1990s, population growth was estimated 
at 0.4 percent a year. By the beginning of 1992, the population 
of Portugal, including the Azores and Madeira, was estimated at 
nearly 10.5 million. Population specialists projected that if exist- 
ing trends continued, the country's population would peak at 10.8 
million in 2010 and fall to 10.5 in 2025. 

This population is not evenly distributed. As of the late 1980s, 
continental Portugal had an average population density of 109.6 
persons per square kilometer, but some districts were much more 
crowded than others. The eastern districts bordering Spain, with 
the exception of Faro, had the lowest population density, ranging 
between 17.0 per square kilometer in Beja and 35.6 per square 
kilometer in Guarda. Coastal districts from the northern border 
down to and including Setubal registered the highest concentra- 
tions of people. The districts of Lisbon and Porto, with 770.2 and 
697.5 persons per square kilometer, respectively, were as densely 
populated as many urban regions of Northern Europe (see table 
3, Appendix). 

Some of these differences in population density result from to- 
pography. Mountainous regions typically contain fewer people 
than flat coastal regions. But some differences result from migra- 
tion from one area to another within Portugal or from migration 



73 



Portugal: A Country Study 

abroad. During the period 191 1-89, five districts, all of them border- 
ing Spain in the east, lost population: Guarda lost about one-fourth 
of its population, Beja and Castelo Branco lost about one-tenth, 
and Braganga and Portalegre each lost about one-twentieth. The 
only eastern district posting a gain in this period was Evora, which 
grew by about one-sixth. Two inland districts, Vila Real and Viseu, 
showed almost no growth; another inland district, Santarem, with 
significant industrial employment, grew by one-half. All coastal 
districts gained in population during this period. Coimbra and Faro 
grew by one-fourth, Aveiro and Braga doubled their populations, 
the districts of Lisbon and Porto increased by two-and-one-half 
times, and Setubal increased more than three times. The Azores 
showed almost no gain in population, but that of Madeira grew 
by two-thirds. 

The main areas of population growth were urban centers and 
the district capitals. The urban-industrial centers along the coast — 
Lisbon, Porto, and Setubal — took in the largest numbers of new 
immigrants. However, only the cities of Lisbon and Porto had sig- 
nificant populations, approximately 830,000 and 350,000, respec- 
tively, at the end of the 1980s. They were followed by Amadora 
with 96,000 (part of greater Lisbon), Setubal with 78,000, and 
Coimbra with 75,000. At the beginning of the 1990s, therefore, 
some two-thirds of all Portuguese still lived in what were classified 
as rural areas despite the significant growth of some urban areas. 

The Lisbon area was the region of greatest population growth 
in absolute terms, in part because it was the seat of much of the 
country's governmental apparatus, as well as its manufacturing 
and service-sector jobs. Until the 1960s, the area's population in- 
creases were mainly inside the city of Lisbon, but since then the 
suburbs have grown most rapidly. The central city's population 
remained largely stagnant or even declined in some years, whereas 
that of the suburbs surged. High city rents, crowding, the decline 
of old neighborhoods, pollution, and the squeezing out of housing 
by commercial enterprises were among the causes of this new subur- 
banization of Lisbon's outlying districts. 

Government population estimates showed that in the late 1980s 
women outnumbered men by a wide margin and that the number 
of old persons in Portugal was unusually high. The 1864 census 
and every census since has shown that women outnumber men. 
In 1988 this was the case in all but two of the districts of continen- 
tal Portugal, Beja and Braganga. The greatest disproportions were 
found in northern and central areas where male emigration was 
most intense. However, during the 1980s, men formed the majority 
in twenty-two of the country's 305 municipalities. Eighteen of these 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



statistically unusual municipalities were in southern Portugal. 

Portugal has long had an aging population. The percentage of 
the population under age thirty has been decreasing since 1900. 
Moreover, the rate at which the country's population has aged ac- 
celerated as ever more young Portuguese males in their physical 
prime left the country. Between 1960 and 1990, the percentage of 
those under fifteen fell from 29.0 to 20.9, whereas the percentage 
of those sixty-five and older rose from 8.1 to 13.1. The north had 
a disproportionate number of old and very young people, mainly 
those still too young to migrate. In some areas of Portugal where 
employment has been available, this preponderance was not the 
case. Lisbon and the growth areas of Santarem and Setubal had 
a disproportionate share of those of working age, between twenty 
and sixty-five (see fig. 6). 

Emigration 

Portugal has long been a nation whose people emigrated. So- 
cially significant emigration first occurred in the fifteenth century 
and sixteenth century during the great explorations. Although the 
Portuguese established trading posts at many places in Africa and 
Asia, Brazil was the main colony of settlement. Later, numbers 
of Portuguese settled in the African colonies of Angola and Mozam- 
bique. 

Emigration on a massive scale began in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and continued into the 1980s. Between 1886 
and 1966, Portugal lost an estimated 2.6 million people to emigra- 
tion, more than any West European country except Ireland. 
Emigration remained high until 1973 and the first oil shock that 
slowed the economies of West European nations and reduced em- 
ployment opportunities for Portuguese workers. Since then, emigra- 
tion has been moderate, ranging between 12,000 and 17,000 a year 
in the 1980s, a fraction of the emigration that occurred during the 
1960s and early 1970s. 

The main motive for emigration, at least in modern times, was 
economic. Portugal had long been one of the poorest countries in 
Europe. With the countryside able to support only a portion of farm- 
ers' offspring and few opportunities in the manufacturing sector, 
many Portuguese had to go abroad to find work. In northern Por- 
tugal, for example, many young men emigrated because the land 
was divided into "handkerchief- sized" plots. In some periods, Por- 
tuguese emigrated to avoid military service. Thus, emigration in- 
creased during World War I and during the 1960s and early 1970s, 
when Portugal waged a series of wars in an attempt to retain its 
African colonies. 



75 



Portugal: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 



MALES 




FEMALES 



J 1 



5 4 3 2 1 1 

PERCENTAGE 



2 3 4 5 



Source: Based on information from Grande Enciclopedia Portuguesa e Brasileira, 9, Lisbon, 1987, 
408. 



Figure 6. Estimated Population Distribution by Age and Sex, 2000 

For centuries the majority of emigrants were men. Around the 
turn of the century, about 80 percent of emigrants were male. Even 
in the 1980s, male emigrants outnumbered female emigrants two 
to one. Portuguese males traditionally emigrated for several years 
while women and children remained behind. For several decades 
after World War II, however, women made up about 40 percent 
of emigrants. 

The social effects resulting from this extensive and generally male 
emigration included an aging population, a disproportionate num- 
ber of women, and a slower rate of population growth. Childbearing 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



was postponed, and many women were obliged to remain single 
or to spend many years separated from their husbands. In some 
areas where emigration was particularly intense, especially in the 
north, villages resembled ghost towns, and visitors noted that only 
women appeared to be working in the fields. 

Although emigration brought with it untold human suffering, 
it had positive effects, as well. The women who stayed behind be- 
came more independent as they managed the family farm and fend- 
ed for themselves. Emigrants abroad absorbed the more open and 
pluralistic mores of more advanced countries; they also learned 
about independent labor unions and extensive social welfare pro- 
grams. The money that emigrants sent back to Portugal from their 
job earnings abroad became crucial for the functioning of the Por- 
tuguese economy. Quite a number of the Portuguese who had done 
well abroad eventually returned and built houses that were con- 
siderably better than the ones they had left behind years earlier. 

During the latter half of the nineteenth century and during much 
of the twentieth century, the greatest number of emigrants went 
to the Western Hemisphere. The Americas were seen as a New 
World offering hope, jobs, land, and a chance to start fresh. Be- 
tween 1864 and 1974, the Americas received approximately 50 per- 
cent of all Portuguese emigration. 

Brazil was the destination of choice. In addition to the climate, 
ties of history, culture, and language attracted the Portuguese to 
Brazil and enabled them to assimilate easily. Despite occasional 
tensions between them and the Brazilians, the Portuguese saw Brazil 
as a land of the future with abundant land and jobs. Hence, about 
30 percent of Portugal's emigrants settled there between 1864 and 
1973. A final surge of Portuguese emigrants was caused by the 
Revolution of 1974, when an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Portuguese 
associated with the former regime fled or were exiled to Brazil. Ac- 
cording to government estimates, more than 1 million Portuguese 
were living in Brazil in the 1980s. 

Among the other Latin American countries, Venezuela has 
ranked second to Brazil in terms of Portuguese emigration and Ar- 
gentina third. Other Latin American countries have received only 
a few Portuguese immigrants, for the Portuguese, like other peo- 
ples, preferred to go to countries where their fellow countrypeople 
could help them get settled. 

Emigration to North America was also heavy. By the late 1980s, 
it was estimated that more than 1 million Portuguese and persons 
of Portuguese descent lived in the United States and 400,000 lived 
in Canada, most notably in Toronto and Montreal. Significant Por- 
tuguese migration to the United States began in the nineteenth 



77 



Portugal: A Country Study 

century. Early in the twentieth century, substantial Portuguese com- 
munities were established in California, New Jersey, and Mas- 
sachusetts. Since the 1950s, the most intense migration has been 
to the northeast — Rhode Island and Connecticut — and to cities in 
southeastern Massachusetts. 

Portuguese emigration to the United States often involved whole 
families, rather than just the men. For this reason, emigrants to 
the United States settled permanently, unlike Portuguese emigrants 
to Northern Europe, who were mostly men who set out alone with 
the intention of returning home after a few years. Another charac- 
teristic of the Portuguese migration to the United States was that 
many migrants were fishermen from the Azores who came to work 
in areas offshore of New England. Others migrated from Madeira 
and Sao Tome. 

Portugal was never as successful at stimulating emigration to its 
African territories as it wanted to be. For centuries the number 
of Europeans in these territories was small. Faced with competi- 
tion from other European imperialist powers in the nineteenth cen- 
tury, Portugal sought to fill up its vast African spaces with people. 
The state allowed prisoners to work off their sentences by settling 
in Africa, offered land grants and stipends to prospective settlers, 
encouraged its soldiers assigned there to stay, and tried to lure other 
Europeans to settle there to augment the thin Portuguese popula- 
tion. These efforts were not notably successful, however, and Por- 
tuguese emigration to Africa never amounted to more than 4 percent 
of total emigration. 

With mounting opposition in the 1960s to its efforts to retain 
its African territories, Portugal's settlement efforts again reflected 
political, as well as economic, motives. The government tried to 
persuade the unemployed, especially those in the north, to settle 
in Africa rather than emigrate illegally to Europe, but in the long 
run was unsuccessful in these efforts. Even the construction of major 
dams and other infrastructure projects in the territories failed to 
lure significant numbers of settlers. By the mid-1970s, the African 
colonies were lost, and Portugal was flooded with refugees from 
these areas instead of providing emigrants to them. 

Upwards of 1 million Portuguese or persons of Portuguese des- 
cent were living in the country's African colonies in 1974 when 
these colonies gained independence. Most of these settlers left the 
former colonies rather than live under the rule of the Marxist- 
Leninist groups that came to power. Sizeable numbers went to 
South Africa and to Brazil, but an estimated 800,000 returned to 
Portugal, where they increased the already high unemployment 
rate and added to the social and political tensions of the late 1970s. 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



Eventually, however, most of these returnees were assimilated into 
Portuguese society, and some of them achieved notable political 
or financial success. 

During the first half of the twentieth century, most Portuguese 
emigrating from their country went to Portugal's colonies or to 
the Western Hemisphere. This pattern changed dramatically in 
the 1950s when Western Europe began to experience an economic 
boom that lasted at least up to the first oil crisis of 1973. The boom 
created millions of jobs, and Portuguese migrants traveled north 
to fill them. Alongside Italians, Spaniards, Turks, North Africans, 
and others, Portuguese worked in restaurants, in construction, in 
factories, and in many other areas. Although much of the work 
was menial and poorly paid, such employment provided signifi- 
cant economic advancement for many Portuguese. By the late 
1960s, an estimated 80 percent of Portuguese emigrants went to 
Europe. Many of these emigrants did so illegally, without the re- 
quired documents, because the lure of Europe's prosperity was too 
strong to be resisted. 

France was the most popular destination. By the early 1970s, 
it was estimated that 8 percent of Portugal's population lived there. 
The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had the next 
largest contingent. There were also sizeable Portuguese commu- 
nities in Switzerland, Belgium, Britain, and the Netherlands. 
Chaotic economic and social conditions resulting from the Revo- 
lution of 1974 caused a slight surge of emigration in the later 1970s, 
but it never again reached the levels of the 1960s and early 1970s. 

During the 1980s, the rate of emigration slowed as revolution- 
ary turmoil subsided and the economy began to grow. Greater 
governmental efficiency and membership in the EC attracted much 
foreign investment and created jobs. Portuguese no longer had to 
go abroad to find economic opportunity. 

Family and Kinship Relations 

The deep-reaching political, economic, and social changes that 
Portugal has experienced in the last few decades have left their mark 
on the family, women's place within society, and the role of kin- 
ship relations. Women were the most affected, for a modernizing 
economy offered them a greater range of choices than they had 
in previous times, and the radical reforms enacted after the Revo- 
lution of 1974 gave them much greater rights. Kinship relations, 
whether based on biology or social relationships, were perhaps the 
least affected, for they remained vitally important in how Portuguese 
lived and worked with one another. 



79 



Portugal: A Country Study 
Family 

The patriarchal and nuclear family traditionally has served as 
the norm and the ideal in Portugal. Until the constitution of 1976 
was promulgated, the father was seen as the head of the family, 
and his wife and children were obliged to recognize his authority. 
He, in turn, was obliged by law to support and protect his family. 
The men worked outside the home, and women were expected to 
care for the children and manage household affairs. Marriage was 
considered permanent; divorce was virtually unknown. During the 
period of Salazar's rule from 1928 to 1968, the family was even 
seen as the primary institution of politics. Voting was organized 
under the regime, the New State (Estado Novo), on a family 
basis — only "heads of households" (usually men but sometimes 
women) could vote. 

Although the nuclear and patriarchal family was the ideal, the 
cultural patterns varied considerably depending on class status and 
region. Upper- and middle-class families corresponded most closely 
to the ideal. Women remained at home tending the children and 
rarely ventured out unaccompanied, and husbands managed their 
businesses or followed their professions. Peasant and working-class 
families were marked by greater variation. In northern Portugal, 
for example, names and property were often passed on through 
the mother because of the absence abroad of male heads of house- 
holds for long periods. The fact that women could inherit land in 
Portugal gave women in rural areas some independence, and many 
of them managed their own farms, took their produce to market, 
and did much heavy work elsewhere seen as suitable for men. The 
absence of men because of emigration meant that many women 
never married and also resulted in a higher rate of illegitimacy than 
in other Mediterranean countries. 

The slow modernization of the Portuguese economy, the increas- 
ing employment of women outside the home, and the emigration 
of many women, as well as the spread of new ideas about the place 
of women and the nature of marriage, gradually changed the na- 
ture of the Portuguese family, despite the attempts of Salazar's Es- 
tado Novo to preserve the male-dominated nuclear family. The 
Revolution of 1974 responded to these long pent-up social pressures. 

The reforms enacted after the revolution established in the civil 
code that men and women are equals in marriage, with the same 
rights to make family decisions. Divorce became much easier, and 
the number of divorces increased from 1,552 in 1975 to 5,874 in 
1980 and 9,657 in 1989. The number of separations, formerly the 
main method of ending a marriage, fell from 670 in 1975 to 70 



80 




81 



Portugal: A Country Study 

in 1980 but climbed to 195 in 1989. Illegitimacy was no longer 
to be mentioned in official documents because such mention was 
regarded as discriminatory; the frequency of births out of wedlock 
rose from 7.2 percent to 14.5 percent between 1975 and 1989. Abor- 
tion under certain conditions became legal in 1984. Maternal leave 
with full pay for ninety days was established for working mothers 
in 1976. A small family allowance program was also instituted that 
made payments at the birth of a child and all through his or her 
childhood. Family planning also became an integral part of Por- 
tugal's social welfare program; the number of children born per 
woman fell from 2.2 in 1980 to 1.7 in 1985 and 1.5 in 1988. 

Relations within the family came to resemble more closely those 
of the rest of Western Europe. Children were less respectful to their 
parents, dating without chaperones was the rule, and outings in 
mixed gender groups or as couples were taken for granted — all things 
that would not have happened during much of the Salazar era. 

Still, some characteristics of Portuguese family life have remained 
constant. Marriage and kinship networks in Portugal are often based 
on social and political criteria as much as on love or natural at- 
traction. To a degree that often surprises outsiders, many Por- 
tuguese marriages are arranged, even in the early 1990s. For the 
peasant class, considerations of land are often most important in 
determining marriage candidates. Marriages might be arranged 
to consolidate property holdings or to tie two families together rather 
than as a result of the affection two people might feel for one 
another. Middle-class families often have status and prestige con- 
siderations in mind when they marry. Among the upper classes, 
marriage might be for the purposes of joining two businesses, two 
landholdings, or two political clans. 

Women 

The constitution of 1976 guaranteed Portuguese women full 
equality for the first time in Portuguese history. Until the reforms 
made possible by the Revolution of 1974, Portuguese women had 
notably fewer political, economic, or personal rights than the women 
of other European countries. In family matters, they were subor- 
dinate to their husbands, having to defer to male decisions about 
how the children should be reared and educated. It was only in 
1969 that all married women obtained the right to obtain a pass- 
port or leave Portugal without their husbands' consent. 

Equality for women was not attained through steady progress, 
but rather after reverses and defeats. For centuries, Portuguese 
women were obliged by law and custom to be subservient to men. 
Women had few rights of either a legal or a financial nature and 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



were forced to rely on the benevolence of their male relatives. Late 
in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth century, some 
educated persons saw the need for women's equality and emanci- 
pation. A small Portuguese suffragette movement formed, and some 
young women began to receive higher educations. Shortly after 
the proclamation of the First Republic in the fall of 1910, laws were 
enacted establishing legal equality in marriage, requiring civil mar- 
riages, freeing women of the obligation to remain with their hus- 
bands, and permitting divorce. However, women were still not 
allowed to manage property or to vote. 

Salazar's New State meant the end to these advances. The con- 
stitution of 1933 proclaimed everyone equal before the law "ex- 
cept for women, the differences resulting from their nature and 
for the good of the family." Although the regime allowed women 
with a secondary education to vote (men needed only to read and 
write), it once again obliged women to remain with their husbands. 
The Concordat of 1940 between the Portuguese government and 
the Roman Catholic Church gave legal validity to marriages 
within the church and forbade divorce in such marriages. Later 
amendments to the civil code, even in the 1960s, cemented the hus- 
band's dominance in marriage. 

The constitution of 1976 brought Portuguese women full legal 
equality. Anyone eighteen or over was granted the right to vote, 
and full equality in marriage was guaranteed. A state entity, the 
Commission on the Status of Women, was established and from 
1977 on was attached to the prime minister's office. Its task was 
to improve the position of women in Portugal and to oversee the 
protection of their rights. This entity was renamed the Commis- 
sion for Equality and Women's Rights (Comissao para a Igual- 
dade e Direitos das Mulheres) in 1991. 

The position of women improved as a result of these legal re- 
forms. By the early 1990s, women were prominent in many profes- 
sions. Thirty-seven percent of all physicians were women, as were 
many lawyers. Slighdy more than half of those enrolled in higher 
education were women. Working-class women also made gains. 
A modernizing economy meant that many women could find em- 
ployment in offices and factories and that they had a better stan- 
dard of living than their mothers. 

Despite these significant gains, however, Portuguese women still 
have not achieved full social and economic equality. They remain 
underrepresented in most upper-level positions, whether public or 
private. Women usually hold less than 10 percent of the seats 
in the country's parliament. Women are also rarely cabinet mem- 
bers or judges. In the main trade unions, women's occupancy of 



83 



Portugal: A Country Study 

leadership positions is proportionally only half their total union 
membership, and, on the whole, working-class women earned less 
than their male counterparts. 

The Extended Family and Kinship Relations 

The extended family and kinship relations, including ritual kin- 
ship, are also important. The role of the godparent, for example, 
has an importance in Portugal that it lacks in the United States. 
Being a godparent implied certain lifetime obligations, such as help- 
ing a godchild in trouble, arranging admission to a school, find- 
ing employment, or furthering a professional or political career. 
The godchild, in turn, owes loyalty and service to the godparent. 
The system is one of patronage based on mutual obligation. 

Political kinship networks can consist of several hundred per- 
sons. Such extended networks are especially prevalent among the 
elite. Members of the elite are bound not only by marriage and 
family, but also by business partnerships, friendships, political ties, 
university or military academy bonds, and common loyalties. It 
has long been the practice to have such family connections in the 
government so as to be able to extract favors and contracts. The 
elite and middle-class families also try to have a "cousin," real 
or ritual, in all political parties so that their interests are protected 
no matter which party is in power. Sometimes the parties or in- 
terest groups are just "fronts" for these family groupings. These 
extended families also try to have members in different sectors of 
the economy, both to enhance profits and to enable each sector 
to support and reinforce the others. Although these extended family 
networks are difficult for outsiders to penetrate, some observers 
regard them as the country's most important political and economic 
institutions, of greater real consequence than political parties, in- 
terest organizations, or government institutions. 

The poor and working class lack the extended family networks 
of the middle class and the wealthy. Kin relations outside the nuclear 
family are weak. Little premium is placed on building economic 
alliances through an extended family network because there is lit- 
tle wealth to be shared or gained. Similarly, there is no reason to 
build strong political connections because the poor lack political 
power. However, a poor person might succeed in persuading a lo- 
cal landowner or village notable to serve as godfather to his chil- 
dren. In that way, the individual becomes part of a larger network, 
expecting favors in return for loyalty and service. If that network 
becomes wealthy or achieved political prominence, then the poor 
person attached to it might also expect to benefit — perhaps by ob- 
taining a low-level government job. But if it falls, the individual 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



also falls. The entire Portuguese local and national system is based 
on these extended family and patronage ties, which are often as 
important as formal institutions. 

Social Structure and Social Classes 

For centuries the most distinctive feature of Portugal's social 
structure was its remarkable stability. Portuguese society was long 
cast in an almost premodern, quasifeudal mold. It was based on 
strong considerations of rank, place, and class. The system con- 
sisted of a small elite at the top, a huge mass of peasants at the 
bottom, and almost no one in between. Because Portugal's indus- 
trialization arrived late, the country did not experience until late 
in the nineteenth century some of the class changes associated with 
rapid economic development in other nations. When industriali- 
zation finally did come, Salazar's dictatorship held its sociopoliti- 
cal effects in check almost to the very end. Then these pent-up 
changes exploded in the Revolution of 1974. 

Historically, Portuguese society consisted of two main classes: 
nobility and peasants. Social prestige, political power, and economic 
prosperity were based on the ownership of land. The land was con- 
centrated in large estates owned by a small elite that had obtained 
lands and titles during the reconquest of the peninsula from the 
Moors. As the Portuguese armies drove the Moors farther and far- 
ther south, their leaders acquired rights to the use and eventually 
ownership of the lands they had conquered. These titles were con- 
firmed by the king in return for the landowners' loyalty and ser- 
vice. It was, in its origins, a classical feudal contract but derived 
in the Portuguese case from warfare and territorial conquest. The 
Roman Catholic Church also held vast lands. From the very birth 
of Portugal, then, landed, governmental, military, and religious 
authority were closely bound. 

The rest of the population counted for very little in this social 
order. The small traditional middle class, consisting of soldiers, 
merchants, artisans, and low-level bureaucrats, lacked any solidarity 
as a class or sufficient numbers to give it political power. The re- 
maining 90 percent of the population eked out meager existences 
as tenant farmers, serfs, and peasants. Little social mobility existed. 
Instead, one accepted one's station in life and did not rebel against 
it; rebelling was not only forbidden but also seen as an affront to 
God's immutable laws. Generation after generation, down through 
the centuries, this rigid, unyielding, hierarchical social structure 
persisted. 

It was not unusual that from the twelfth century through the four- 
teenth century, Portugal's formative years as a nation, the country 



85 



Portugal: A Country Study 

was organized in this two-class system and on a feudal basis; such 
organization was the norm in Europe. What was surprising was 
that this class system and all its rigidities lasted through the seven- 
teenth century, when the system became even more consolidated, 
and beyond. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a 
"new rich" class emerged that was based on commerce and in- 
vestment, but members of this class bought land, intermarried with 
the old elite, and thus perpetuated the two-class system. 

Even in the twentieth century, despite the onset of moderniza- 
tion, this structure persisted. With economic stimulus, a new middle 
class began to emerge. But it largely imitated upper-class ways — 
disdaining manual labor, cultivating genteel virtues, and distanc- 
ing itself from the lower classes — and was coopted into the elite's 
way of thinking and behaving. In addition, an industrial work force 
began to grow up alongside the traditional peasantry. However, 
under Salazar its labor unions were kept under control, and the 
workers had no independent bargaining power. Just as the emerging 
middle class joined the elite, the emerging working class was kept 
down as a sort of urban "peasantry." In this way, the essentially 
conservative and two-class system of Portugal was perpetuated even 
into the era of industrialization. 

Under Salazar the regime did little to ameliorate the social ine- 
qualities that had long existed in Portugal. Salazar recognized that 
his strength lay with the conservative, traditional elements, espe- 
cially the strongly Catholic peasantry of the north, so he did little 
to increase literacy or improve the road system that would lead 
to increased mobility, urbanization, and the eventual undermin- 
ing of his power. He also tried consciously to keep Portugal isolated 
from the modernizing and culture-changing currents of the rest 
of Europe. His corporative system brought some benefits to the 
workers, but it also kept them under the strict control of the re- 
gime. Moreover, during Salazar' s rule, Portugal lagged even further 
behind other nations in terms of housing, education, and health 
care. 

Several sociological studies carried out in the 1960s confirmed 
that Portugal's ossified, hierarchical social structure continued even 
into modern times. One study found four social categories: an up- 
per class of industrialists, proprietors, and high government offi- 
cials accounting for 3.8 percent of the population; a middle stratum 
of rural proprietors, military officers, teachers, and small-scale en- 
trepreneurs constituting 6.9 percent; a lower-middle stratum of 
clerks, low-level civil servants, military enlisted men, and rural shop- 
keepers adding up to 27.2 percent; and a majority — 62.1 percent — 
consisting of workers, both rural and urban. Another study located 



86 



Obidos, a small town in the region of Estremadura 
Street scene in Alfama, the oldest quarter of Lisbon 

Courtesy Daniele Kohler 



87 



Portugal: A Country Study 



1 to 2 percent of the population in the upper class, 15 to 20 per- 
cent in the middle class, and 75 percent in the lower class. Both 
studies, carried out independentiy, arrived at strikingly similar con- 
clusions. 

Yet, even with all this rigidity, class change was beginning to 
occur as a result of the slow modernization of the economy. Some 
groups were losing their traditional status and social power and 
were being displaced by groups better able to function in the evolv- 
ing economy. These changes can be shown through a closer ex- 
amination of the various groups that made up the country's elite, 
middle, and lower classes. 

The Elite 

Before the Revolution of 1974, Portugal's elite could be divided 
into five groups; the nobility, the large landowners, the heads of 
large businesses, the members of learned professions, and high- 
ranking military officers. These elites were closely connected and 
intertwined in numerous complex ways. 

The oldest group historically was the nobility. It generally traced 
its origins to the formative period of Portuguese history. The monar- 
chy had frequently granted noble titles to the elite in return for 
loyalty and service. In modern times, this nobility continued fre- 
quently to use the titles of duke, count, or marquis. A title was 
a symbol of status and was often eagerly sought, although the young- 
er, more liberal generation frequently scoffed at such titles. Some 
of the titled nobility went into the learned professions or high 
government service. In the modern age, a titled nobility seemed 
anachronistic, but in Portugal this elite lingered on. 

A second group, often overlapping with the first, consisted of 
large landowners, or latifundidrios . They were chiefly concentrated 
in the Alentejo, but other areas of Portugal, such as the Beira and 
Ribatejo, also contained large estates. Increasingly, this landholding 
element had become absentee landlords, settling in Lisbon and leav- 
ing their estates in the hands of managers. In Lisbon, the landed 
elites frequently diversified into business and industry but kept their 
estates, sometimes as profit-making enterprises, but most often as 
symbols of status. This elite was also in the process of being eclipsed 
when the Revolution of 1974 occurred. 

More important than either of these first two groups were busi- 
ness people and industrialists. These elements had come to promi- 
nence in Portugal in the 1960s and early 1970s as Portuguese 
economic growth accelerated and the country industrialized. The 
business elite was often well educated and had emerged from the 
middle class. It filled the ranks of managers, administrators, and 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



company presidents. Quite a number married, or their children 
married, into the nobility or the landed class. As Portugal continued 
to develop economically, the business groups gained in influence, 
particularly as the survival of the regime came to depend on a 
prosperous economy. 

A fourth group among the elite consisted of the learned profes- 
sions, including university professors. Medicine as a profession had 
traditionally enjoyed particular prestige in Portugal. Lawyers simi- 
larly enjoyed prestige; many of them went into government service 
or became managers of banks and major companies. University 
professors were also valued: Salazar and Caetano were both univer- 
sity dons, and their cabinets often included several professors. The 
high prestige stemmed in part from the fact that university educa- 
tion was so rare in Portugal and a professor far rarer still; it also 
stemmed from the need for technical expertise in the government. 
Because of the large number of university professors, Salazar' s re- 
gime was often referred to as a catedratocracia, a term derived from 
the Portuguese word for university chair, cdtedra. 

The fifth elite was the military officer corps. These were men, 
often from middle- or lower middle-class ranks, who had made it 
to the top in a very important institution: the armed forces. Edu- 
cation and the military, in fact, were among the few means open 
to ambitious middle-class youth to rise in the social scale in highly 
class-conscious Portugal. The military officers did not always mingle 
well with the upper-class civilians, but the power and importance 
of the armed forces meant they had to be paid serious attention. 
In addition, many of the banks, large businesses, and elite family 
groups, as a way of protecting their interests, placed military officers 
on their payrolls. 

These elites were closely interrelated. A landowner living in the 
city might go into business or banking; a wealthy business person 
or industrialist might buy land. They themselves or their children 
would acquire an education and enter the learned professions. Busi- 
ness elites formed groups in which they owned diverse holdings: 
typically, insurance, hotels, construction, banking, real estate, and 
newspapers. They hired university professors and military officers 
to help administer these holdings — or as an "insurance policy." 
Some members of the group held government positions — often car- 
rying out private and public activities simultaneously. These groups 
were tightly inbred and often overlapping, with powerful political- 
economic-military connections. 

The Revolution of 1974 largely destroyed this oligarchic system. 
Many of the old political elites associated with the regime were 
forced into exile, and others had their businesses confiscated. Almost 



89 



Portugal: A Country Study 

all lost their positions and many of their holdings as a result of the 
revolution. Many members of the old elite eventually found their 
way back to Portugal and some began again to prosper in the late 
1980s. But the strength of the elite was nowhere near so great as 
it was before 1974 and may have been ended permanently. 

The Middle Class 

The middle class in Portugal had long been growing in size but 
grew more rapidly beginning in the early 1960s as economic growth 
quickened. Depending on the criteria used, at the beginning of the 
1990s Portugal's middle class could account for 25 to 30 percent 
of the population. 

The traditional principle of political science states that the growth 
of a middle class brings greater social stability and better chances 
for the flourishing of democracy. However, the correlation of 
middle-class stability and democracy does not necessarily hold in 
Portugal. The reason for this lack of correlation stems from the 
fact that "middle class" in Portugal has two definitions. One defi- 
nition is based on social and cultural criteria and the other on eco- 
nomics. The definition using economic criteria is the easiest to state: 
everyone above a certain income level but below another income 
level is middle class. This criterion includes some less wealthy profes- 
sionals, business people, soldiers, government workers, small farm- 
ers who own their own lands, clerks, and better-off industrial 
workers. This list includes a large variety of persons of diverse oc- 
cupations with little connecting them in terms of education, fami- 
ly background, or political values. 

According to the socio-cultural definition of middle class, per- 
sons belonging to the middle class do not engage in manual labor, 
disdain it, and tend to feel a sense of superiority to those below 
them in the social hierarchy. The social-cultural definition regards 
professionals, business and commercial elements, military officers, 
and government workers as middle class, but not enlisted mem- 
bers of the military, farmers, or industrial workers, no matter what 
their earnings. This latter definition of middle class results in a 
smaller group, more homogeneous in outlook than that resulting 
from purely economic criteria. 

If the older, more traditional variety of middle class with its es- 
sentially aristocratic values (disdain for manual labor, for exam- 
ple) proved to be the prevailing model even in the 1990s, Portugal 
would remain essentially a two-class society divided between those 
who work with their hands and those who do not. A two-class so- 
ciety increases chances for division, class conflict, and even civil 
war. By contrast, the emergence of a large and independent middle 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



class defined by economic categories rather than socio-cultural traits 
favors the growth of social pluralism and political stability. As both 
definitions of the middle class are employed in Portugal, predict- 
ing the country's future is more difficult than elsewhere in Western 
Europe. 

An indication that economic criteria have greater validity than 
in the past is that Portugal's middle class, traditionally deeply divid- 
ed on a host of social and political issues, increasingly votes for 
the moderate, centrist Social Democrat Party (Partido Social 
Democrata — PSD). The PSD has come to be seen by its foes, as 
well as its supporters, as a "bourgeois" party. The Portuguese 
working class, in contrast, has voted increasingly for the Socialist 
Party (Partido Socialista — PS), although the Portuguese Com- 
munist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues — PCP) also has won 
some of its votes. 

The Lower Class 

Portuguese have long used the all-encompassing term o povo to 
describe the l^wer class. povo means "the people," but the term 
has a class connotation, as well. Analysts of Portuguese society have 
postulated that o povo encompasses perhaps four main groups, in- 
cluding agricultural workers who either own or do not own land 
and organized and unorganized labor in urban areas. 

Ownership of land is the main criterion for subdividing the poor 
in rural areas. There is a strong regional difference in ownership. 
Portugal's north is noted for its small farms and self-employed small 
farmers. Farmers who own land tend to be independent, rather 
conservative, and strongly Catholic in their beliefs. They tend to 
vote for the center and center-right political parties. Within this 
class of smallholders, some are better off than others. Some are 
obliged to work part-time on other farms. Many offspring of small- 
holders migrate to the cities or emigrate abroad. Their female rela- 
tives often remain behind to till the land. 

The rural poor of the south in the Alentejo, like those of the north, 
are often referred to as "peasants," but that catchall term obscures 
important regional differences between these two groups. Relatively 
few of the o povo in the Alentejo own their own land. Instead, they 
work on the region's large estates, some full-time, others perhaps 
only two days a week. Their politics are often radical, and, in con- 
trast to the smallholders of the north, they tend to vote for socialist 
and communist parties. The Alentejo was the area most strongly 
affected by the Revolution of 1974, and many of the large estates 
were nationalized and designated for agrarian reform or were taken 
over in a land seizure by their workers. 



91 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Urban areas also have two major groups of the working class, 
mainly defined in terms of whether or not they are politically 
organized. The unorganized lumpen proletariat, usually recent 
arrivals from the countryside, are often unemployed or under- 
employed. Members of the urban working class who belong to labor 
unions are considerably better off and could be regarded as the 
"elite" of Portugal's lower classes. 

The lumpen proletariat live in urban slums, the most extensive 
of which are in Lisbon. Migrants from the countryside, they are 
often illiterate and not members of a labor union. Many can find 
no regular work but are employed in menial jobs on a part-time 
basis. The slums they live in are often partly hidden from view 
behind walls or fences and even in the early 1990s frequently lacked 
electricity, water, and sewerage systems. The housing in these slums 
is often fabricated from any available materials, including fiber 
glass, cardboard, and tin; hence, these areas are called in Portuguese 
bairros de lata — neighborhoods of tin. In addition to physical hard- 
ships, slum dwellers have to contend with violence and crime. Por- 
tugal's increasing prosperity since the second half of the 1980s has 
not yet been sufficient to efface these districts, which look as if they 
are part of the Third World. 

Portugal's organized working class has a better standard of liv- 
ing than does the unskilled and unorganized poor. Their salaries 
are relatively high, and they are strongly entrenched in Portugal's 
key industries. Portugal has a long history of urban trade unions. 
Under Salazar's corporative system, they were strictly controlled, 
but after the Revolution of 1974 they became major actors in the 
political system and managed to secure decent wages for their mem- 
bership. 

A New Portugal? 

Portugal was long a closed, hierarchical, elitist, rigidly structured 
society whose social institutions seemed to be more nineteenth cen- 
tury than twentieth. Portugal was called a "society of uniforms" 
because people could be identified and their class rank determined 
by the clothes they wore, their manner of speech, and how they 
walked and carried themselves. Social structure was seen as im- 
mutable, and persons were expected to accept their station in life. 
Other than a few slots in the university or the military officer corps, 
few opportunities existed for upward mobility. 

The Revolution of 1974 destroyed, undermined, or at least 
precipitated the toppling of many of these hierarchical institutions. 
In the years since then, Portuguese society has become more flexi- 
ble. More opportunities for social mobility have appeared, and old 



92 



A fishing boat at Aveiro in Northern Portugal 
A fisherman uses cattle to draw in fishing boats at Aveiro. 

Courtesy Daniele Kohler 



93 



Portugal: A Country Study 



categories of place and position have became blurred. Portuguese 
society has become more egalitarian, pluralist, and democratic, and 
there was more of what the Portuguese liked to call movimento 
(change, dynamism, or movement). 

In the years following the mid-1970s, the country's middle class 
grew in size and solidarity, the working class enjoyed a rising stan- 
dard of living, and the number of entrepreneurs and technicians 
increased markedly. The most significant of these changes was the 
growth of a sizeable and more stable middle class that offered the 
hope for a more stable and democratic country. The middle class 
largely replaced the old elite and came to dominate most Portuguese 
social and political institutions: the political parties, the church, 
business, the military officer corps, government and bureaucra- 
cy, and even union leadership. Thus, a major class shift occurred. 
It has begun earlier in the century, continued through the Salazar 
era, and by the early 1990s appeared to have been consolidated. 
This shift from upper- to middle-class leadership could give Por- 
tugal the basis for stable, democratic rule that it lacked before. 

Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups 

Portugal's population is remarkably homogeneous and has been 
so for all of its history. This lack of ethnic variety helped it become 
the first unified nation- state in Western Europe. For centuries Por- 
tugal had virtually no ethnic, tribal, racial, religious, or cultural 
minorities. Almost all Portuguese speak the national language, 
almost all are Roman Catholic, and almost all identify with Por- 
tuguese culture and the nation of Portugal. Whereas neighboring 
Spain was deeply divided along ethnic, linguistic, and regional lines 
all through its history, Portugal, which historically represented but 
one of the Iberian Peninsula's many regional entities, was united. 
In Portugal, ethnic unity and homogeneity were the rule, rather 
than the exception. 

Although Portugal lacks socially significant ethnic differences, 
some regional differences exist. The north is generally more con- 
servative and Catholic than the south and is said to be less "taint- 
ed" by Moorish or Islamic influences. Regional dances, dress, 
festivals, and customs were once very distinctive, but modern com- 
munications and transportation have opened up and connected 
formerly closed regions and produced a greater homogeneity. The 
Portuguese language still exhibits regional differences, and linguists 
can often pinpoint a person's geographic origin from his speech, 
but these differences are not extreme enough to impede understand- 
ing among Portuguese. 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



Protestants live in Portugal, but they are largely confined to the 
communities of foreigners residing in the country. The small but 
growing Muslim population from North Africa, mainly guest work- 
ers attracted by Portugal's new prosperity, is concentrated in the 
Algarve and in Lisbon. The Jewish population in Portugal is very 
small (from 500 to 1 ,000) and, like the Protestant population, mainly 
limited to foreign residents. 

Portugal has a sizeable Gypsy population, perhaps as many as 
100,000, most of whom live in the Algarve. Despite government 
efforts to integrate them into the larger society, Gypsies remain 
a group apart, seminomadic, earning their living by begging, 
fortune-telling, handicrafts, and trading. 

Portugal's foreign community numbered about 90,000 in 1987. 
It consists mainly of Africans (about 40 percent), Spaniards, Brit- 
ish, Americans, French, and Germans, most of whom live in Por- 
to, Lisbon, the area around Cascais, the Algarve, and the Azores 
and Madeira. These communities are not large and generally do 
not become involved in Portuguese life. 

Portugal's long colonial history, more than half a millennium, 
has left some traces of ethnic diversity. In the early 1990s, the in- 
digenous residents of the former colonies were found mainly in Lis- 
bon, particularly after the colonies were granted independence in 
the mid-1970s. Groups of Angolans, Mozambicans, Sao Tomans, 
Timorese, Goans, and Macaoans have settled in the capital city, 
and, along with Brazilian immigrants, ended Portugal's traditional 
ethnic homogeneity. 

The Goans come from the Indian subcontinent and are usually 
educated, Roman Catholic, and Portuguese speaking. They are 
better assimilated than most other groups. The Macaoans are gener- 
ally of Chinese descent, and many had opened businesses. An- 
other group from Asia, the Timorese, are not as well educated as 
the other eastern groups. A population of varying size of black im- 
migrants from Portugal's African colonies often lives together in 
small ghettos in Lisbon and does not generally assimilate. Many 
of these minorities use Portugal as a stopping-off point en route 
to more prosperous countries in Western Europe, but as the Por- 
tuguese economy began to improve in the second half of the 1980s, 
more chose to stay permanently. These ethnic minorities from the 
former colonies are not fully assimilated and often face, to a vary- 
ing degree, racial and cultural prejudice. The small size of these 
diverse ethnic groups, however, prevents their apartness from being 
a serious social problem. 

The only group from the former colonies that is fully assimilat- 
ed, despite some cultural and adjustment problems, is the group 



95 



Portugal: A Country Study 

coming from the former colonies in Africa who are of Portuguese 
descent. They have much the same racial and cultural background 
as the Portuguese themselves. Some of them, like some of the 
Brazilians, did very well in their cultural homeland and even be- 
came wealthy. 

Religion and the Role of the Roman Catholic Church 

Portugal is profoundly Roman Catholic. According to a com- 
mon saying, "To be Portuguese is to be Catholic"; in the early 
1990s, approximately 97 percent of the population considered it- 
self Roman Catholic — the highest percentage in Western Europe. 
Only about one-third of the population attends mass and takes the 
sacraments regularly, but nearly all Portuguese wish to be bap- 
tized and married in the church and to receive its last rites. 

Portugal is Roman Catholic not only in a religious sense, but 
also socially and culturally. Although church and state were for- 
mally separated during the First Republic (1910-26), a separation 
reiterated in the constitution of 1976, the two still form a seamless 
web in many areas of life. Catholic precepts historically undergird 
the society as well as the polity. The traditional notions of authority, 
hierarchy, and accepting one's station in life all stem from Roman 
Catholic teachings. Many Portuguese holidays and festivals have 
religious origins, and the country's moral and legal codes derive 
from Roman Catholic precepts. The educational and health care 
systems have long been the church's preserve, and whenever a 
building, bridge, or highway is opened, it receives the blessing of 
the clergy. Hence, although church and state are formally sepa- 
rated, absolute separation is not possible in practice. 

History 

Portugal was first Christianized while part of the Roman Em- 
pire. Christianity was solidified when the Visigoths, a Germanic 
tribe already Christianized, came into the Iberian Peninsula in the 
fifth century (see Germanic Invasions, ch. 1). Christianity was near- 
ly extinguished in southern Portugal during Moorish rule, but in 
the north it provided the cultural and religious cement that helped 
hold Portugal together as a distinctive entity (see Muslim Domi- 
nation, ch. 1). By the same token, Christianity was the rallying 
cry of those who rose up against the Moors and sought to drive 
them out (see Christian Reconquest, ch. 1). Hence, Christianity 
and the Roman Catholic Church predated the establishment of the 
Portuguese nation, a point that shaped relations between the two. 

Under Afonso Henriques (r. 1 139-85), the first king of Portugal 
and the founder of the Portuguese state, church and state were 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



unified into a lasting and mutually beneficial partnership (see For- 
mation of the Monarchy, ch. 1). To secure papal recognition of 
his country, Afonso declared Portugal a vassal state of the pope. 
The king found the church to be a useful ally as he drove the Moors 
toward the south and out of Portuguese territory. For its support 
of his policies, Afonso richly rewarded the church by granting it 
vast lands and privileges in the territories conquered from the 
Moors. The church became the country's largest landowner, and 
its power came to be equal to that of the nobility, the military ord- 
ers, and even, for a time, the crown. But Afonso also asserted his 
supremacy over the church, a supremacy that — with various ups 
and downs — was maintained. 

Although relations between the Portuguese state and the Roman 
Catholic Church were generally amiable and stable, their relative 
power fluctuated. In the thirteenth century and fourteenth centu- 
ry, the church enjoyed both riches and power stemming from its 
role in the reconquest and its close identification with early Por- 
tuguese nationalism. For a time the church's position vis-a-vis the 
state diminished until the growth of the Portuguese overseas em- 
pire made its missionaries important agents of colonization. 

In 1497, reflecting events that had occurred five years earlier 
in Spain, Portugal expelled the Jews and the remaining Moors — 
or forced them to convert. In 1536 the pope gave King Joao III 
(r. 1521-57) permission to establish the Inquisition in Portugal to 
enforce the purity of the faith (see Counter- Reformation and Over- 
seas Evangelization, ch. 1). Earlier the country had been rather 
tolerant, but now orthodoxy and intolerance reigned. The Jesuit 
order was placed in charge of all education. 

In the eighteenth century, antichurch sentiment became strong. 
The Marques de Pombal (r. 1750-77) expelled the Jesuits in 1759, 
broke relations with Rome, and brought education under the state's 
control (see Absolutism, ch. 1). Pombal was eventually removed 
from his office, and many of his reforms were undone, but anti- 
clericalism remained a force in Portuguese society. In 1821 the In- 
quisition was abolished, religious orders were banned, and the 
church lost much of its property. Relations between church and 
state improved in the second half of the nineteenth century, but 
a new wave of anticlericalism emerged with the establishment of 
the First Republic in 1910 (see The First Republic, ch. 1). Not 
only were church properties seized and education secularized, but 
the republic went so far as to ban the ringing of church bells, the 
wearing of clerical garb on the streets, and the holding of many 
popular, religious festivals. These radical steps antagonized many 
deeply religious Portuguese, cost the republic popular support, and 



97 



Portugal: A Country Study 

paved the way for its overthrow and the establishment of a conser- 
vative right-wing regime. 

The Salazar Regime 

Under the dictatorship of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (r. 
1928-68), the church experienced a revival (see The New State, 
ch, 1). Salazar was himself deeply religious and infused with Ro- 
man Catholic precepts. Before studying law he had been a semi- 
narian; his roommate at the University of Coimbra, Manuel 
Gongalves Cerejeira, later became cardinal patriarch of Lisbon. 
In addition, Salazar' s corporative principles and his constitution 
and labor statute of 1933 were infused with Roman Catholic 
precepts from the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quad- 
ragesimo Anno (1931). 

Salazar' s state was established on the principles of traditional 
Roman Catholicism, with an emphasis on order, discipline, and 
authority. Class relations were supposed to be based on harmony 
rather than the Marxist concept of conflict. The family, the par- 
ish, and Christianity were said to be the foundations of the state. 
Salazar went considerably beyond these principles, however, and 
established a full-fledged dictatorship. His corporative state con- 
tinued about equal blends of Roman Catholic principles and 
Mussolini-like fascism. 

In 1940 a concordat governing church-state relations was signed 
between Portugal and the Vatican. The church was to be 
"separate" from the state but to enjoy a special position. The Con- 
cordat of 1 940 reversed many of the anticlerical policies undertaken 
during the republic, and the Roman Catholic Church was given 
exclusive control over religious instruction in the public schools. 
Only Catholic clergy could serve as chaplains in the armed forces. 
Divorce, which had been legalized by the republic, was again made 
illegal for those married in a church service. The church was given 
formal "juridical personality," enabling it to incorporate and hold 
property. 

Under Salazar, church and state in Portugal maintained a com- 
fortable and mutually reinforcing relationship. While assisting the 
church in many ways, however, Salazar insisted that it stay out 
of politics — unless it praised his regime. Dissent and criticism were 
forbidden; those clergy who stepped out of line — an occasional par- 
ish priest and once the bishop of Porto — were silenced or forced 
to leave the country. 

Changes after the Revolution of 1974 

In the Portuguese constitution of 1976, church and state were 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



again formally separated. The church continues to have a special 
place in Portugal, but for the most part it has been disestablished. 
Other religions are now free to organize and practice their beliefs. 

In addition to undergoing constitutional changes, Portugal be- 
came a more secular society. Traditional Roman Catholicism 
flourished while Portugal was overwhelmingly poor, rural, and il- 
literate, but as the country became more urban, literate, and secular 
the practice of religion declined. The number of men becoming 
priests fell, as did charitable offerings and attendance at mass. By 
the early 1990s, most Portuguese still considered themselves Ro- 
man Catholic in a vaguely cultural and religious sense, but only 
about one-third of them attended mass regularly. Indifference to 
religion was most likely among men and young people. Regular 
churchgoers were most often women and young children. 

The church no longer has its former social influence. During 
the nineteenth century and on into the Salazar regime, the church 
was one of the most powerful institutions in the country — along 
with the army and the economic elite. In fact, military, economic, 
governmental, and religious influences in Portugal were closely in- 
tertwined and interrelated, often literally so. Traditionally, the first 
son of elite families inherited land, the second went into the army, 
and the third became a bishop. By the early 1990s, however, the 
Roman Catholic Church no longer enjoyed this preeminence and 
had fallen to seventh or eighth place in power among Portuguese 
interest groups. 

During the height of the revolutionary turmoil in the mid-1970s, 
the church had urged its communicants to vote for centrist and 
conservative candidates and to repudiate communists, especially 
in northern Portugal, but after that period the church refrained 
from such an overt political role. The church was not able to pre- 
vent the enactment of the constitution of 1976, which separated 
church and state, nor could it block legislation liberalizing divorce 
and abortion, issues it regarded as moral issues within the realm 
of its responsibility. By the 1980s, the church seldom tried to in- 
fluence how Portuguese voted, knowing such attempts would prob- 
ably backfire. 

Religious Practices 

The practice of religion in Portugal shows striking regional differ- 
ences. Even in the early 1990s, 60 to 70 percent of the population 
in the traditionally Roman Catholic north regularly attended reli- 
gious services, compared with 10 to 15 percent in the historically 
anticlerical south. In the greater Lisbon area, about 30 percent were 
regular churchgoers. 



99 



Portugal: A Country Study 



The traditional importance of Roman Catholicism in the lives 
of the Portuguese is evident in the physical organization of almost 
every village in Portugal. The village churches are usually in promi- 
nent locations, either on the main square or on a hilltop overlook- 
ing the villages. Many of the churches and chapels were built in 
the sixteenth century at the height of Portugal's colonial expan- 
sion and might and were often decorated with wood and gold leaf 
from the conquests. In recent decades, however, they have often 
been in disrepair, for there are not enough priests to tend them. 
Many are used only rarely to honor the patron saints of the vil- 
lages. 

Much of the country's religious life has traditionally taken place 
outside the formal structure and official domain of the Roman 
Catholic Church. This is especially true in rural areas where the 
celebration of saints' days and religious festivals are popular. The 
most famous of Portuguese religious events is the supposed appa- 
rition of the Virgin Mary to three children in 1917 in the village 
of Fatima in the province of Santarem. Hundreds of thousands 
of pilgrims have visited the shrine at Fatima in the belief that the 
pilgrimage could bring about healing. 

Rural Portuguese often seek to establish a close and personal 
relationship with their saints. Believing God to be a remote and 
inaccessible figure, they petition patron saints to act as inter- 
mediaries. This system of patronage resembles that operating 
in the secular realm. To win their saint's goodwill, believers pre- 
sent the saint with gifts, gave alms to the poor, and demonstrate 
upright behavior, hoping that the saint might intercede on their 
behalf with God. 

Women tend to practice their religion more than men do, as 
evidenced by church attendance. In addition, the Virgin Mary, 
who is the most popular of the spiritual mediators, is often 
revered more than Jesus and serves as the patron of religious pro- 
cessions. The image of the Virgin, as well as that of Christ, is 
commonly displayed, even in labor union offices or on signs in 
demonstrations. 

The Roman Catholic Church sometimes criticizes religious folk 
practices for dividing people from their God. The church cannot 
monitor all folk customs, however, and such practices continue even 
in the 1990s. Moreover, the church recognizes that many Por- 
tuguese feel at least as much loyalty to their saints and customary 
religious practices as they do to the more formal church. For these 
reasons, it is not unusual that the church tolerates and sometimes 
even encourages these practices as a way of maintaining popular 
adherence to Roman Catholicism. 



100 



Streetcar in Lisbon 
Children playing in a Lisbon courtyard 
Courtesy Daniele Kbhler 



101 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Other aspects of Portuguese folk religion, including witchcraft, 
magic, and sorcery, are not approved by the official church. For- 
mal religion, folk beliefs, and superstition are frequently jumbled 
together, and in the popular mind all are part of being Roman 
Catholic. Particularly in the isolated villages of northern Portu- 
gal, belief in witches, witchcraft, and evil spirits is widespread. Some 
persons believe in the concept of the "evil eye" and fear those who 
supposedly possess it. Again, women are the main practitioners. 
Almost every village has its "seers," practitioners of magic, and 
"healers." Evil spirits and even werewolves are thought to inhabit 
the mountains and byways, and it is believed that people must be 
protected from them. Children and young women are thought to 
be particularly vulnerable to the "evil eye." 

As people became better educated and moved to the city, they 
lost some of these folk beliefs. But in the city and among educated 
persons alike, superstition can still be found, even in the early 1990s. 
Sorcerers, palm readers, and readers of cards have shops, particu- 
larly in poorer neighborhoods, but not exclusively so. In short, a 
strong undercurrent of superstition still remains in Portugal. The 
formal church disapproves of superstitious practices but is power- 
less to do much about them. 

In contrast to the Catholicism found in Spain, Portuguese 
Catholicism is softer and less intense. The widespread use of folk 
practices and the humanization of religion made for a loving though 
remote God, in contrast to the harshness of the Spanish vision. 
In Portugal, unlike in Spain, God and his saints are imagined as 
forgiving and serene. In Spain the expressions depicted on the faces 
of saints and martyrs are painful and anguished; in Portugal they 
are complacent, calm, and pleasant. 

Non-Catholic Religious Groups 

For most of Portugal's history, few non-Catholics lived in the 
country; those who did could not practice their religion freely. Until 
the constitution of 1976 was enacted, laws restricted the activities 
of non-Catholics. By the early 1990s, only some 50,000 to 60,000 
Protestants lived in Portugal, about 1 percent of the total popula- 
tion. They had been kept out of the country for three centuries 
by the Inquisition. However, the British who began settling in Por- 
tugal in the nineteenth century brought their religions with them. 
Most belonged to the Church of England, but others were 
Methodists, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Presbyterians. Pro- 
testantism remained largely confined to the foreign communities. 
The 1950s and 1960s saw the arrival of Pentecostals, Mormons, 
and Jehovah's Witnesses, all of whom increased in numbers more 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



rapidly than the earlier arrivals did. All groups, however, were ham- 
pered by prohibitions and restrictions against the free exercise of 
their religions, especially missionary activities. 

These restrictions were lifted after the Revolution of 1974. The 
constitution of 1976 guarantees all religions the right to practice 
their faith. Protestant groups have been recognized as legal enti- 
ties with the right to assemble. In addition, Portuguese who are 
both Protestant and conscientious objectors have the right to ap- 
ply for alternative military service. The Roman Catholic Church, 
however, still seeks to place barriers in the way of Protestant mis- 
sionary activities. 

The Jewish community in Portugal numbered between 500 and 
1 ,000 as of the early 1990s. The community is concentrated in Lis- 
bon, and many of its members are foreigners. The persecution of 
Portuguese Jewry had been so intense that until recent decades Por- 
tugal had no synagogue or even regular Jewish religious services. 
The few Jewish Portuguese were hence isolated from the main cur- 
rents of Judaism. Their community began to revive when larger 
numbers of foreign Jews (embassy personnel, business people, and 
technicians) began coming to Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s. In 
northern Portugal, there are a few villages of Marranos, descen- 
dants of Jews who converted to Christianity to avoid persecution 
and whose religion is a mixture of Judaism and Christianity. Por- 
tugal's Muslim community consists of a small number of im- 
migrants from Portugal's former colonies in Southern Africa and 
larger numbers of recent immigrant workers from Northern Afri- 
ca, mainly Morocco. 

Education 

Even before Portugal emerged as an independent country in the 
twelfth century, it had monastic, cathedral, and parish schools. The 
education provided by these schools was based on the teachings 
of the Roman Catholic Church, rote memorization, and a deduc- 
tive system of reasoning. The educational system expanded through 
the founding of primary and secondary schools in larger settlements 
and the establishment in 1290 of the University of Coimbra, one 
of the oldest universities in the world. The system was infused with 
the principles of authority, hierarchy, and discipline. Although local 
authorities, both municipal and ecclesiastical, had some say about 
the management of local schools, officials in Lisbon, most of them 
clerics, determined the curriculum and selected textbooks and in- 
structors. Education was thus firmly under the control of the church 
and civil authorities. The introduction of the Inquisition in the 1530s 



103 



Portugal: A Country Study 

served to further "purify" teaching; in 1555 the Jesuits were given 
much control over education. 

A reaction against church- and Jesuit-dominated education set 
in during the eighteenth century. Reformers such as Luis Anto- 
nio Verney sought to infuse Portuguese education with the ideals 
of the Enlightenment. The reforms were carried out by the Mar- 
ques de Pombal, prime minister from 1750 to 1777, who expelled 
the Jesuits in 1759, created the basis for public and secular primary 
and secondary schools, introduced vocational training, created 
hundreds of new teaching posts, added departments of mathemat- 
ics and natural sciences to the University of Coimbra, and in- 
troduced new taxes to pay for these reforms. 

During the nineteenth century, educational reform was slow and 
halting. Reforms initiated in 1822, 1835, and 1844 were left un- 
completed and largely unimplemented. However, at the beginning 
of the century, the first schools for girls were opened in Lisbon. 
Other new schools included the Agricultural Institute, poly techni- 
cal schools in Lisbon and Porto, new medical schools in the same 
two cities, and a new department of liberal arts in Lisbon. The 
educational system remained highly elitist, however, with illitera- 
cy rates of over 80 percent and higher education reserved for a small 
percentage of the population. When the First Republic was estab- 
lished in 1910, efforts were made to overcome these problems. New 
universities were created in Lisbon and Porto, new teacher train- 
ing colleges were opened, and a separate Ministry of Public In- 
struction was established. The republican government sought to 
reduce illiteracy, reintroduce (as with Pombal) a more secular con- 
tent to education, and to bring more scientific and empirical 
methods into the curriculum. But these reforms largely stopped 
when the republic was overthrown in 1926 and the military and 
Salazar came to power. 

Salazar authorized the creation of a new technical university in 
Lisbon in 1930. But for the next three decades, educational inno- 
vation lagged, illiteracy remained high, vocational training was 
almost nonexistent, and Portugal reverted to a situation of quasi- 
feudalism characterized by the most backward economy and edu- 
cation in Western Europe. Only in the mid-1960s did the country 
make public education available for all children between the ages 
of six and twelve. The government enacted laws to equalize educa- 
tional opportunities, but implementation lagged behind. However, 
more elementary and preparatory schools were opened, and univer- 
sities were established in Lisbon and other regional centers. 

The Revolution of 1974 and the overthrow of the Salazar re- 
gime disrupted the education system. Students challenged teachers, 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



and all groups challenged administrators. For a time after the revo- 
lution, faculty and curriculum were highly politicized as socialist, 
communist, and other groups vied for control of the schools and 
the school system. During the 1980s, however, as Portuguese pol- 
itics quieted and returned to the center, the education system also 
became less frenetic, greater emphasis was placed on learning, and 
efforts were made to raise the level of the country's schools closer 
to that of the rest of Europe. 

The Portuguese educational system is governed by the consti- 
tution of 1976. The constitution guarantees the right to create pri- 
vate schools. It proposes to eliminate illiteracy, to provide special 
education to those children who need it, and to preserve the au- 
tonomy of the universities. It guarantees the rights of teachers and 
students to take part in the democratic administration of the schools. 
In addition to the overall guidance provided by the constitution, 
Portuguese education is governed by decree-laws promulgated by 
the executive branch, some of which date from the eighteenth 
century. 

As of the early 1990s, preschool education in Portugal was limit- 
ed. Most preschools were private, but government regulation and 
involvement in preschool education was increasing. Primary edu- 
cation consisted of four years in the primary cycle and two years 
in the preparatory, or second, cycle (see fig. 7). Most primary 
schools were public. Many Portuguese living in rural areas received 
only the primary cycle of schooling. The preparatory cycle (fifth 
and sixth grades) was intended mainly for children going on to 
secondary education. Provision was also made for attendance by 
older students who might already be working. 

Secondary education was roughly equivalent to junior and senior 
high schools in the United States. It consisted of three years of a 
unified course curriculum, followed by a two-year complementary 
course (tenth and eleventh grades). A twelfth-grade course prepared 
students to take the university and technical college entrance ex- 
aminations. 

Portuguese primary school enrollments were close to 100 per- 
cent in the early 1990s, and immense strides had been made in 
eliminating illiteracy, especially among the young; an estimated 
literacy rate of 85 percent was achieved among those over age fifteen 
in 1990. After primary school, however, school enrollments dropped 
off sharply. Only 30 percent of children attended secondary schools, 
and only 20 percent were enrolled in the twelfth grade. 

A new vocational education program was introduced in 1983. 
By the late 1980s, it was training 10,000 to 12,000 young people 
a year, about 6 to 7 percent of an age-group. The program was 



105 



Portugal: A Country Study 



GRADUATE STUDY 



School Year 

18 
17 
16 
15 
14 
13 

12 
11 
10 

9 

8 

7 

6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 



UNIVERSITY 



J 



J 



TWELFTH YEAR 
COMPLEMENTARY COURSE 



UNIFIED COURSE 



PREPARATORY CYCLE 



PRIMARY CYCLE 



H 
I 

G 
H 
E 
R 




P 
R 
I 

M 
A 
R 
Y 



PRESCHOOL 



Figure 7. Structure of the Education System, 1992 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



conceived as a three-year course that would permit students to enter 
the work force with a set of skills after the eleventh grade. 

In the early 1990s, higher education included four older univer- 
sities (Lisbon, Coimbra, Porto, and the Technical University of 
Lisbon), as well as six newer universities (Nova University in Lis- 
bon and others in Minho, Aveiro, Evora, in the Algarve, and in 
the Azores). The university sector also included the private Catholic 
University and the Free University, both in Lisbon. In addition, 
there were special postsecondary institutes, schools, and academies 
such as the Institute of Applied Psychology, the social welfare in- 
stitutes of Lisbon and Porto, the engineering institutes of Lisbon, 
Porto, and Coimbra, an agricultural college at Coimbra, techni- 
cal colleges in Santarem and in the Algarve, and a school of edu- 
cation at Viseu. 

Admission to the university is a highly competitive process, 
although it can be waived if a student obtains a high score in the 
final examinations from secondary school. Only about 10 percent 
of college-age students attend one of the country's universities or 
postsecondary institutes, compared with 50 percent in the United 
States. Thus, higher education is by no means universal but rather 
oriented toward a small elite. This elite, in turn, tends to dominate 
government, big business, and the professions. 

The average length of study at the university level is five years 
and leads to the awarding of a licentiate, although some schools 
have two-year programs and others offer a bachelor's degree. Doc- 
torates are awarded in some departments after further advanced 
studies, an oral examination, and the defense of a thesis. 

The faculties had four ranks as of the early 1990s: full profes- 
sors, associate professors, lecturers, and assistants. Full professors 
could be appointed directly, or their appointments might come 
through competitive examinations. Full professors receive life ap- 
pointments; persons of other ranks are under contract. University 
staffs, including faculty, are part of the civil service and receive 
pay and pensions like other civil servants. 

The Portuguese educational system is highly centralized. Despite 
some efforts at decentralization in the constitution of 1976, the 
Ministry of Education and Culture in Lisbon sets education policy 
for the entire nation. Local or regional districts have litde indepen- 
dent authority to tax, with the result that funds, curriculum, policy, 
and other matters are set at the national level. 

As of the early 1990s, Portugal still had an illiteracy rate that 
ranged between 14 and 20 percent according to various studies and 
estimates, although many of those who could not read were older 
people. Another serious problem was low school enrollment after 



107 



Portugal: A Country Study 

the primary cycle, especially in rural areas, where many children 
begin work at an early age. As of 1987, 87.4 percent of Portuguese 
completed less than the upper level of secondary school, a rate that 
had improved only slightly in recent decades and was much in- 
ferior to the EC average of 54 percent. Facilities and equipment 
at all levels are often outdated and in short supply. Although the 
number of school teachers has increased greatly in recent years, 
teachers are poorly paid, and their overall morale is poor. Many 
specialists hold that the curriculum at the secondary level needs 
to be revised to make it more relevant in preparing young people 
for their working lives. In addition to more modern facilities, the 
universities need to increase their enrollments and support research 
more strongly. 

Social Welfare 

On most indices of social modernization, Portugal ranks at or 
near the bottom for all of Western Europe. Even in the early 1990s, 
despite some significant economic growth in the second half of the 
1980s, Portugal remains relatively poor by West European stan- 
dards. Although its range of public welfare programs is extensive, 
it lacks the funds to fully implement them and to pay substantial 
benefits. 

Charity and alms-giving were traditionally thought to be the 
responsibility of the church. It provided welfare to the poor and 
took care of the sick, widows, and orphans. In addition, landown- 
ers and employers fulfilled their obligations of Christian charity 
by aiding the less fortunate through gifts, assistance, patronage, 
and benefits. The charitable institution established by Queen 
Leonor in the late fifteen century, Santa Casa de Misericordia, had, 
even in the early 1990s, offices all through Portugal. Its charitable 
operations were financed by the national lottery. This system of char- 
ity provided by the church and the elite probably worked tolerably 
well through the 1920s, as long as Portugal remained a rural and 
Roman Catholic society. But urbanization, secularism, and large- 
scale impersonal organizations rendered the old system inadequate. 

Salazar's corporative system attempted to fill the void but did 
so poorly. Only in the 1960s, far later than in other countries, were 
the first steps taken toward a modern state-run welfare system. As 
could be expected, the services this system provided were incom- 
plete, irregular, and woefully underfunded. Urban centers received 
some benefits, but almost none went to the countryside. During 
the revolutionary 1970s, numerous health and social welfare pro- 
grams were established, but only in the 1980s did Portugal have 
the stability and the resources to begin their implementation. 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



Social Welfare Programs 

As of the early 1990s, Portugal had a fairly elaborate social wel- 
fare system, including programs that provided benefits for the elder- 
ly and the seriously ill or disabled. However, the benefits paid by 
these programs were still quite low, and an estimated 3 million Por- 
tuguese lived below the EC poverty line. 

The programs' benefits were financed by employee and employer 
contributions (roughly 10 and 25 percent, respectively). Most of 
the programs were the responsibility of the Ministry of Employ- 
ment and Social Security and were administered by regional so- 
cial security centers. The Ministry of Health was involved in 
programs concerned with medical care. 

As of the early 1990s, men and women could retire at sixty-five 
and sixty-two years of age, respectively, and be eligible for old- 
age pensions. Miners were eligible for retirement at fifty and mer- 
chant sailors at fifty-five years of age. Benefits ranged from 30 to 
80 percent of recent average wages. Permanent disability and sur- 
vivor benefits were also paid. Unemployment benefits could be paid 
over a period of from ten to thirty months and amounted to 65 
percent of earnings, with a maximum of three times the national 
minimum wage of about US$300 a month. 

As of 1991, maternity benefits amounted to 100 percent of the 
mother's pay for a period of three months, one month before and 
two months after the birth. Sickness benefits amounted to 65 per- 
cent of wages for up to 1,095 days; after this period, the benefit 
was converted to a permanent disability benefit. Accidents at work 
were covered by private insurance carried by employers; payments 
could amount to two-thirds of basic earnings. Small family al- 
lowances were paid to help rear children until they reached the age 
of fifteen or the age of twenty-five if they were students. 

Health Care 

Health conditions in Portugal have long been among the poor- 
est in Western Europe. Although recent decades have seen substan- 
tial improvements, Portugal still lags behind most of the continent 
in some categories of health care. Portuguese life expectancy at 
birth rose from sixty-two years for men and sixty-seven for wom- 
en in 1960 to seventy-one and seventy-eight, respectively, in 1992. 
The country's infant mortality rate in 1970 was 58 deaths per 
1,000 — one of the highest in Europe and close to Third World 
levels — but by 1992 it had dropped to 10 per 1 ,000. However, the 
chief causes of death among the young are infectious and parasitic 
diseases and diseases of the respiratory system, a Third World 



109 



Portugal: A Country Study 

pattern found in rural areas and in city slums. Malnutrition and 
related diseases are also widespread. The chief cause of deaths 
among adults is thrombosis, followed by cancer. About 400 Por- 
tuguese die each year from tuberculosis. 

The number of doctors, dentists, and nurses increased greatly 
between 1960 and the early 1990s. At 26,400 in 1987, the number 
of physicians actively practicing medicine in Portugal represented 
a fourfold increase over the total in 1960. The number of dentists 
expanded even more dramatically, from 120 in 1960 to 5,700 in 
1986. As of 1987, the number of medical personnel per occupied 
hospital bed was 1.7, compared with 0.24 in 1960. By 1990 there 
were 2.9 doctors per 1,000 Portuguese, a ratio higher than that 
found in most West European countries. However, most medical 
personnel are concentrated in urban centers, to the detriment of 
those needing health care in rural areas. In the latter areas, folk 
health practitioners are not uncommon, even in the early 1990s. 
Their medical practices are often fused with magical, religious, and 
superstitious elements. 

Portuguese are able to take advantage of a national health sys- 
tem that, since the second half of the 1970s, had paid 100 percent 
of most medical and pharmaceutical expenses. The system, man- 
aged by the Ministry of Health, offers care at large urban hospi- 
tals, several dozen regional hospitals, and numerous health centers. 
The health centers specialize in providing primary care. Care 
provided by the national system ranges from the most sophisticated 
to basic preventive medicine. 

The national health system's overriding problems are the long 
waits, frequently months in duration, for medical care, that result 
from shortages of financial resources, lack of personnel, and in- 
adequate facilities. Medical facilities in Portugal range from those 
of centuries past to the ultramodern. Partly as a result of these in- 
adequacies, there is a substantial private medical sector that offers 
better care. Many doctors and other medical personnel work in 
both the public and private system, often because of the low salar- 
ies paid by the national system. 

Housing 

Much Portuguese housing is substandard, both in rural and in 
urban areas. Many rural villages were not electrified even by the 
early 1990s, and villagers often had to carry water from a com- 
mon source. The influx of rural migrants to urban centers in re- 
cent decades intensified demand on an already inadequate housing 
supply. Although 60 percent of Portuguese rent their houses (80 
percent in Lisbon and Porto), rigid rent control laws in effect 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



between 1948 and 1985 had discouraged the construction of apart- 
ments, as did a sluggish bureaucracy. As a result, in the late 1980s 
an estimated 700,000 illegally constructed dwellings existed in Por- 
tugal, 200,000 of which were located in the Lisbon area. Some were 
built on public or unused private lands. The resulting urban 
shantytowns (bairros da lata) often lacked electricity, running water, 
or sewage systems. 

In Lisbon's suburbs, gigantic apartment houses were built for 
the more affluent new city-dwellers, but the supply of decent, af- 
fordable housing lagged far behind the demand, estimated at 
800,000 dwellings for the entire country. A succession of Portuguese 
governments recognized this severe housing problem and sought 
to do something about it. For example, the National Housing In- 
stitute planned to build 70,000 dwellings a year during the 1990s, 
and various programs to help people become homeowners had been 
put into practice. 

* * * 

Portugal was long the most understudied country in Western 
Europe. The authoritarian nature of the Salazar regime made so- 
cial science research on contemporary issues all but impossible to 
carry out; Portuguese social sciences also lagged behind. Despite 
these obstacles, some very good studies were done. Among them 
were works by Joyce Firstenberg Riegelhaupt in anthropology, Joao 
Baptista Nunes Pereira Neto and Aderito Sedas Nunes in sociolo- 
gy, and Jose Cutileiro's pioneering^ Portuguese Rural Society. Har- 
ry M. Makler broke new ground in his investigations of Portugal's 
business elite, as did Massimo Livi Bacci in his demographic study, 
A Century of Portuguese Fertility. 

Social science scholarship has flourished in Portugal since the 
Revolution of 1974, as specialists there have looked into many 
unexplored aspects of their society. Readers needing sociological 
analyses in English will profit from the survey edited by Lawrence 
S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler, In Search of Modern Portugal, 
and the study edited by Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Ma- 
kler, Contemporary Portugal. Economic and social data are also found 
in the historical surveys Contemporary Portugal by Richard Alan Hodg- 
son Robinson and Portugal: A Twentieth Century Interpretation by Tom 
Gallagher. 

Among the best political-sociological studies are Nancy Bermeo's 
The Revolution Within the Revolution, which deals with revolution in 
the countryside, and Caroline Brettel's Men Who Migrate, Women 
Who Wait, an excellent study of Portuguese emigration. Thomas 



111 



Portugal: A Country Study 



C. Bruneau, Victor M.P. Da Rosa, and Alex Macleod provide 
much useful information in their Portugal in Development. Rainer Eis- 
feld's "Portugal and Western Europe," in Portugal in the 1980s, 
edited by Kenneth Maxwell, is also helpful. Finally, Marion 
Kaplan's 1991 book, The Portuguese: The Land and Its People, although 
not aimed at a scholarly audience, is often highly informative about 
contemporary Portuguese society. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



112 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Tending wine casks 



PORTUGAL'S POLITICAL ECONOMY holds our interest for 
a number of reasons. First, Portugal, a founding member both of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Euro- 
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA— see Glossary), is one of the 
newest members (along with Spain) of the European Community 
(EC — see Glossary). Second, scholars interested in revolutionary 
change and the associated economic consequences can compare the 
Portuguese experience with that of other nations that have under- 
gone rapid systemic transformation. Third, Portugal's recent ex- 
periment with nationalization of the means of production is of 
particular interest to students of industrial organization and pub- 
lic enterprise economics. 

As a fledgling member of the EC , Portugal was required to adopt 
the EC's Common External Tariff on imports from nonmember 
countries and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Portugal 
also was required to eliminate all barriers to the movement of goods, 
services, and capital between itself and the other members of the 
European Economic Community (EEC — see Glossary), as well as 
to phase out fiscal subsidies that distort competition. During a tran- 
sition period ending in 1993, Portugal was a net recipient of 
EC funds to assist in the restructuring of its relatively backward 
economy. 

At the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal's economy was classi- 
fied by the World Bank (see Glossary) as an upper-middle-income 
economy. Its 1990 gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) 
on a purchasing power parity basis was US$82 billion, and its per 
capita GDP was estimated at US$8,364. With a per capita GDP 
growth rate of 5.4 percent in 1989, Portugal moved ahead of Greece 
to eleventh place among the twelve members of the EC. 

Several distinctive features characterized Portugal's economy at 
the time of its accession to the EC . One of the most striking was 
its dependence on foreign "invisible" income. This income, con- 
sisting of tourism receipts and emigrant worker remittances, 
financed the country's large merchandise trade deficit. The growth 
and magnitude of tourism together with the explosive rise of govern- 
ment services largely explain the expansion of the services sector 
to nearly 56 percent of GDP in 1990 from 39 percent of GDP in 
1973. One of every three Portuguese workers in the active labor 
force was engaged in temporary work in high-income countries, 
mainly France. These emigrant workers, numbering about 2 



115 



Portugal: A Country Study 

million, contributed significantly to Portugal's foreign exchange 
income, as well as to the country's household savings. Although 
less educated and technically less proficient than their EC coun- 
terparts, Portuguese workers are recognized for their strong work 
ethic and frugality. 

Another distinguishing feature is Portugal's anachronistic agricul- 
tural sector, whose overall performance is unfavorable when con- 
sidered in the context of the country's natural resources and climatic 
conditions. In the mid-1980s, agricultural productivity was half that 
of the levels in Greece and Spain and a quarter of the EC average. 
The land tenure system was polarized between two extremes: small 
and fragmented family farms in the north and large collective farms 
in the south that proved incapable of modernizing. The decollec- 
tivization of agriculture, which began in modest form in the late 
1970s and accelerated in the late 1980s, promised to increase the 
efficiency of human and land resources in the south during the 
1990s. 

A third economic distinction is the scale and sectoral spread of 
Portugal's public enterprises. Before the Revolution of 1974, pri- 
vate enterprise ownership dominated the Portuguese economy to a 
degree unmatched in other West European countries; in 1982 the 
relative size of Portugal's public enterprise sector (based on an aver- 
age of value added, employment, and gross capital formation) sub- 
stantially exceeded that of the other West European economies. 

The dispossession of the family-based financial-industrial groups, 
together with the " antifascist" purges of the mid-1970s, inflicted 
a serious "brain drain" on Portugal through the exile of entrepre- 
neurs and professional managers. Recent Portuguese governments 
have recognized the highly politicized public enterprise sector as a 
major obstacle to the resolution of macroeconomic problems, such 
as large fiscal deficits, inflation, and burdensome external debt. 

Portugal's commodity trade increasingly has become dominat- 
ed by the EC , and since the accession of both Iberian countries 
to the organization in 1986, Spain has suddenly emerged as a sig- 
nificant trading partner for Portugal. The latter' s major commodity 
exports at the beginning of the 1990s included textiles, clothing 
and footwear, machinery and transport equipment, forest products 
(including pulp and paper and cork products), and agricultural 
products (mainly wine). With the rising participation of multi- 
national firms, Portugal also is gaining competitive strength in the 
export of higher technology automotive and electronic components 
and parts. 

Privatization, economic deregulation, debt reduction, and supply- 
side tax reform became the salient concerns of government as 



116 



The Economy 



Portugal prepared itself for the challenges and opportunities of full 
participation in the EC's single market in the 1990s. These market- 
driven policies deserved much of the credit for Portugal's economic 
resurgence. Led by expanding exports and robust capital forma- 
tion, Portugal's GDP grew by an annual rate of 4.6 percent from 
1986 to 1990. During this five-year period, only Japan among the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD — 
see Glossary) countries exceeded Portugal's economic performance. 

Economic Growth and Structural Change 

Portugal's First Republic (1910-26) became, in the words of 
historian Douglas L. Wheeler, "midwife to Europe's longest sur- 
viving authoritarian system." Under the sixteen-year parliamen- 
tary regime of the republic with its forty-five governments, growing 
fiscal deficits financed by money creation and foreign borrowing 
climaxed in hyper-inflation and a moratorium on Portugal's ex- 
ternal debt service. The cost of living around 1926 was thirty times 
what it had been in 1914. Fiscal imprudence and accelerating in- 
flation gave way to massive capital flight, crippling domestic in- 
vestment. Burgeoning public-sector employment during the First 
Republic was accompanied by a perverse shrinkage in the share 
of the industrial labor force in total employment. Although some 
headway was made toward increasing the level of literacy under 
the parliamentary regime, 68.1 percent of Portugal's population 
was still classified as illiterate by the 1930 census. 

The Economy of the Salazar Regime 

The First Republic was ended by a military coup in May 1926, 
but the newly installed government failed to solve the nation's 
precarious financial situation. Instead, President Oscar Fragoso 
Carmona invited Antonio de Oliveira Salazar to head the Minis- 
try of Finance, and the latter agreed to accept the position provid- 
ed he would have veto power over all fiscal expenditures. At the 
time of his appointment as minister of finance in 1928, Salazar 
held the Chair of Economics at the University of Coimbra and was 
considered by his peers to be Portugal's most distinguished authority 
on inflation. For forty years, first as minister of finance (1928-32) 
and then as prime minister (1932-68), Salazar' s political and eco- 
nomic doctrines were to shape the Portuguese destiny (see The New 
State, ch. 1). 

From the perspective of the financial chaos of the republican peri- 
od, it was not surprising that Salazar considered the principles of 
a balanced budget and monetary stability as categorical impera- 
tives. By restoring equilibrium both in the fiscal budget and in the 



117 



Portugal: A Country Study 



balance of international payments, Salazar succeeded in restoring 
Portugal's credit worthiness at home and abroad. Because Portu- 
gal's fiscal accounts from the 1930s until the early 1960s almost 
always had a surplus in the current account, the state had the where- 
withal to finance public infrastructure projects without resorting 
either to inflationary financing or to borrowing abroad. 

At the height of the Great Depression, Premier Salazar laid the 
foundations for his Estado Novo, the "New State." Neither capi- 
talist nor communist, Portugal's economy was cast into a quasi- 
traditional mold. The corporative framework within which the 
Portuguese economy evolved combined two salient characteristics: 
extensive state regulation and predominantly private ownership of 
the means of production. Leading financiers and industrialists 
accepted extensive bureaucratic controls in return for assurances 
of minimal public ownership of economic enterprises and certain 
monopolistic (or restricted-competition) privileges. 

Within this framework, the state exercised extensive de facto 
authority regarding private investment decisions and the level of 
wages. A system of industrial licensing (condicionamento industrial), 
introduced by law in 1931, required prior authorization from the 
state for setting up or relocating an industrial plant. Investment 
in machinery and equipment designed to increase the capacity of 
an existing firm also required government approval. Although the 
political system was ostensibly corporatist, as political scientist 
Howard J. Wiarda makes clear, "In reality both labor and 
capital — and indeed the entire corporate institutional network — 
were subordinate to the central state apparatus." 

Under the old regime, Portugal's private sector was dominated 
by some forty great families. These industrial dynasties were al- 
lied by marriage with the large, traditional landowning families 
of the nobility, who held most of the arable land in the southern 
part of the country in great estates. Many of these dynasties had 
business interests in Portuguese Africa. Within this elite group, 
the top ten families owned all the important commercial banks, 
which in turn controlled a disproportionate share of the national 
economy. Because bank officials were often members of the boards 
of directors of borrowing firms in whose stock the banks partici- 
pated, the influence of the large banks extended to a host of com- 
mercial, industrial, and service enterprises. 

Portugal's shift toward a moderately outward-looking trade and 
financial strategy, initiated in the late 1950s, gained momentum 
during the early 1960s. A growing number of industrialists, as well 
as government technocrats, favored greater Portuguese integration 
with the industrial countries to the north as a badly needed stimulus 



118 



The Economy 



to Portugal's economy. The rising influence of the Europe-oriented 
technocrats within Salazar's cabinet was confirmed by the substan- 
tial increase in the foreign investment component in projected cap- 
ital formation between the first (1953-58) and second (1959-64) 
economic development plans. The first plan called for a foreign 
investment component of less than 6 percent, but the plan for the 
1959-64 period envisioned a 25-percent contribution. The newly 
influential Europe-oriented industrial and technical groups persuad- 
ed Salazar that Portugal should become a charter member of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) when it was organized 
in 1959. In the following year, Portugal also added its member- 
ship in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), and the World 
Bank. 

In 1958 when the Portuguese government announced the 
1959-64 Six-Year Plan for National Development, a decision had 
been reached to accelerate the country's rate of economic growth — a 
decision whose urgency grew with the outbreak of guerrilla warfare 
in Angola in 1961 and in Portugal's other African territories there- 
after. Salazar and his policy advisers recognized that additional 
claims by the state on national output for military expenditures, 
as well as for increased transfers of official investment to the "over- 
seas provinces," could only be met by a sharp rise in the coun- 
try's productive capacity. Salazar's commitment to preserving 
Portugal's "multiracial, pluricontinental" state led him reluctantly 
to seek external credits beginning in 1962, an action from which 
the Portuguese treasury had abstained for several decades. 

Beyond military measures, the official Portuguese response to 
the "winds of change" in the African colonies was to integrate them 
administratively and economically more closely with Portugal 
through population and capital transfers, trade liberalization, and 
the creation of a common currency — the so-called Escudo Area. 
The integration program established in 1961 provided for the 
removal of Portugal's duties on imports from its overseas territo- 
ries by January 1964. The latter, on the other hand, were permit- 
ted to continue to levy duties on goods imported from Portugal 
but at a preferential rate, in most cases 50 percent of the normal 
duties levied by the territories on goods originating outside the Es- 
cudo Area. The effect of this two- tier tariff system was to give Por- 
tugal's exports preferential access to its colonial markets. 

Despite the opposition of protectionist interests, the Portuguese 
government succeeded in bringing about some liberalization of the 
industrial licensing system, as well as in reducing trade barriers 
to conform with EFTA and GATT agreements. The last years of 



119 



Portugal: A Country Study 

the Salazar era witnessed the creation of important privately or- 
ganized ventures, including an integrated iron and steel mill, a 
modern ship repair and shipbuilding complex, vehicle assembly 
plants, oil refineries, petrochemical plants, pulp and paper mills, 
and electronic plants. As economist Valentina Xavier Pintado ob- 
served, ''Behind the facade of an aged Salazar, Portugal knew deep 
and lasting changes during the 1960s." 

The liberalization of the Portuguese economy continued under 
Salazar' s successor, Prime Minister Marcello Jose das Neves 
Caetano (1968-74), whose administration abolished industrial 
licensing requirements for firms in most sectors and in 1972 signed 
a free-trade agreement with the newly enlarged EC. Under the 
agreement, which took effect at the beginning of 1973, Portugal 
was given until 1980 to abolish its restrictions on most community 
goods and until 1985 on certain sensitive products amounting to 
some 10 percent of the EC's total exports to Portugal. EFTA mem- 
bership and a growing foreign investor presence contributed to Por- 
tugal's industrial modernization and export diversification between 
1960 and 1973. 

Notwithstanding the concentration of the means of production 
in the hands of a small number of family based financial-industrial 
groups, Portuguese business culture permitted a surprising upward 
mobility of university-educated individuals with middle-class back- 
grounds into professional management careers. Before the revo- 
lution, the largest, most technologically advanced (and most recently 
organized) firms offered the greatest opportunity for management 
careers based on merit rather than on accident of birth. 

Changing Structure of the Economy 

The Portuguese economy had changed significantly by 1973, 
compared with its position in 1961. Total output (GDP at factor 
cost) grew by 120 percent in real terms. The industrial sector was 
three times greater, and the size of the services sector doubled; but 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing advanced by only 16 percent. 
Manufacturing, the major component of the secondary sector, was 
three times as large at the end of the period. Industrial expansion 
was concentrated in large-scale enterprises using modern tech- 
nology. 

The composition of GDP also changed markedly from 1961 to 
1973. The share of the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and 
fishing) in GDP shrank from 23 percent in 1961 to 16.8 percent 
in 1973, and the contribution of the secondary (or industrial) sec- 
tor (manufacturing, construction, mining, and electricity, gas and 
water) increased from 37 percent to 44 percent during the period. 



120 



The Economy 



The services sector's share in GDP remained constant at 39.4 per- 
cent between 1961 and 1973. Within the industrial sector, the con- 
tribution of manufacturing advanced from 30 percent to 35 percent 
and that of construction from 4.6 percent to 6.4 percent. 

The progressive "opening" of Portugal to the world economy 
was reflected in the growing shares of exports and imports (both 
visible and invisible) in national output and income. Further, the 
composition of Portugal's balance of international payments altered 
substantially. From 1960 to 1973, the merchandise trade deficit 
widened, but owing to a growing surplus on invisibles — including 
tourist receipts and emigrant worker remittances — the deficit in 
the current account gave way to a surplus from 1965 onward. Be- 
ginning with that year, the long-term capital account typically 
registered a deficit, the counterpart of the current account surplus. 
Even though the nation attracted a rising level of capital from abroad 
(both direct investments and loans), official and private Portuguese 
investments in the "overseas territories" were greater still — hence 
the net outflow on the long-term capital account. 

The growth rate of Portuguese merchandise exports during the 
period 1959 to 1973 was 11 percent per annum. In 1960 the bulk 
of exports was accounted for by a few products — canned fish, raw 
and manufactured cork, cotton textiles, and wine. By contrast, in 
the early 1970s, Portugal's export list reflected significant product 
diversification, including both consumer and capital goods. Several 
branches of Portuguese industry became export-oriented, and in 
1973 over one-fifth of Portuguese manufactured output was ex- 
ported. 

The radical nationalization-expropriation measures in the 
mid-1970s were initially accompanied by a policy-induced redis- 
tribution of national income from property owners, entrepreneurs, 
and private managers and professionals to industrial and agricul- 
tural workers. This wage explosion favoring workers with a high 
propensity to consume had a dramatic impact on the nation's eco- 
nomic growth and pattern of expenditures. Private and public con- 
sumption combined rose from 81 percent of domestic expenditure 
in 1973 to nearly 102 percent in 1975. The counterpart of over- 
consumption in the face of declining national output was a con- 
traction in both savings and fixed capital formation, depletion of 
stocks, and a huge balance-of-payments deficit. The rapid increase 
in production costs associated with the surge in unit labor costs 
between 1973 and 1975 contributed significantly to the decline in 
Portugal's ability to compete in foreign markets. Real exports fell 
between 1973 and 1976, and their share in total expenditures 
declined from nearly 26 percent to 16.5 percent. 



121 



Portugal: A Country Study 

The economic dislocations of metropolitan Portugal associated 
with the income leveling and nationalization-expropriation mea- 
sures were exacerbated by the sudden loss of the nation's African 
colonies in 1974 and 1975 and the reabsorption of overseas set- 
tlers (the so-called retornados), the global recession, and, as well, 
the international energy crisis. 

Over the longer period, 1973-90, the composition of Portugal's 
GDP at factor cost changed significantly. The contribution of 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing as a share of total production con- 
tinued its inexorable decline, to 6.1 percent in 1990 from 12.2 per- 
cent in 1973. In contrast to the prerevolutionary period, 1961-73, 
when the industrial sector grew by 9 percent annually and its con- 
tribution to GDP expanded, industry's share narrowed to 38.4 per- 
cent of GDP in 1990 from 44 percent in 1973. Manufacturing, the 
major component of the industrial sector, contributed relatively 
less to GDP in 1990 (28 percent) than in 1973 (35 percent). Most 
striking was the 16-percentage-point increase in the participation 
of the services sector from 39 percent of GDP in 1973 to 55.5 per- 
cent in 1990. Most of this growth reflected the proliferation of civil 
service employment and the associated cost of public administra- 
tion, together with the dynamic contribution of tourism services 
during the 1980s. 

Economic Growth, 1960-73 and 1981-90 

There was a striking contrast between the economic growth and 
levels of capital formation in the 1960-73 period and in the 1980s 
decade (see table 4, Appendix). Clearly, the pre-revolutionary peri- 
od was characterized by robust annual growth rates for GDP (6.9 
percent), industrial production (9 percent), private consumption 
(6.5 percent), and gross fixed capital formation (7.8 percent). By 
way of contrast, the 1980s exhibited a pattern of slow-to-moderate 
annual growth rates for GDP (2.7 percent), industrial production 
(4.8 percent), private consumption (2.7 percent), and fixed capital 
formation (3.1 percent). As a result of worker emigration and the 
military draft, employment declined during the earlier period by a 
half percent annually, but increased by 1.4 percent annually during 
the 1980s. Significandy, labor productivity (GDP growth/employ- 
ment growth) grew by a sluggish rate of 1.3 percent annually in 
the recent period compared with the extremely rapid annual growth 
rate of 7.4 percent earlier. Inflation, as measured by the GDP defla- 
tor, averaged a modest 4 percent a year before the revolution com- 
pared with nearly 18 percent annually during the 1980s. 

Although the investment coefficients were roughly similar (24 
percent of GDP allocated to fixed capital formation in the earlier 



122 




The Bridge of April 25, Lisbon 
Courtesy General Directorate of Mass Communication, Lisbon 



period; 26.7 percent during the 1980s), the overall investment 
productivity or efficiency (GDP growth rate/investment coefficient) 
was nearly three times greater (28.6 percent) before the revolu- 
tion than in the 1980s (10.1 percent). 

How did Portugal's per capita GDP compare with the average 
of the twelve members of the EC, the European Twelve (EC- 12), 
during the past three decades? In 1960, at the initiation of Sala- 
zar's more outward-looking economic policy, Portugal's per capi- 
ta GDP was only 38 percent of the EC- 12 average; by the end of 
the Salazar period, in 1968, it had risen to 48 percent; and in 1973, 
on the eve of the revolution, Portugal's per capita GDP had reached 
56.4 percent of the EC- 12 average. In 1975, the year of maximum 
revolutionary turmoil, Portugal's per capita GDP declined to 52.3 
percent of the EC- 12 average. 

Convergence of real GDP growth toward the EC average oc- 
curred as a result of Portugal's economic resurgence since 1985. 
In 1991 Portugal's per capita GDP climbed to 54.9 percent of the 
EC average, gradually approaching the level attained just before 
the Revolution of 1974. 

Revolutionary Change 

The military coup of April 1974, which ousted the long-lived 



123 



Portugal: A Country Study 

authoritarian Salazar-Caetano regime, was rapidly transformed into 
a social revolution that profoundly recast Portugal's political and 
economic systems (see Spmola and Revolution, ch. 4). The revolu- 
tionary leadership undercut the old elite's economic base by na- 
tionalizing the banks and most of the country's heavy and 
medium-sized industries; expropriating landed estates in the cen- 
tral and southern regions; and giving independence to Angola, 
Mozambique, and other colonies. The last action dismantled the 
web of economic relationships, known as the Escudo Area, through 
which metropolitan Portugal was linked to its "overseas provinces." 

In the brief period between the collapse of the old regime in April 
1974 and the abortive leftist coup of November 1975, a variety of 
economic models were proposed for Portugal by the provisional 
Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas Armadas — 
MFA) governments, including the West European, Yugoslav, and 
Albanian models. In the early months following the military coup, 
the new Portuguese government's economic orientation could be 
described as moderate- reformist. The regime's Economic and So- 
cial Program published on May 15, 1974, made no provision for 
large-scale nationalization of industry or agriculture. The program 
simply provided for the "adoption of new measures of government 
intervention in the basic sectors of the economy and particularly 
in the sectors of national interest, without prejudice to the legiti- 
mate interest of private enterprise"; argued for "reform of the tax 
system so as to rationalize it and ease the tax burden on less well- 
off groups, with a view of a fairer distribution of income"; recom- 
mended measures "to stimulate agriculture and gradually reform 
the land tenure system"; and, within the sphere of social policy, 
favored introduction of "a minimum wage to be progressively ex- 
tended to all sectors of activity." 

The initial moderate-reformist policies reflected the views of 
General Antonio de Spmola, who was chosen by the MFA to lead 
the coup and to serve as the country's president. Spmola, the 
celebrated war hero, favored the establishment of civil liberties and 
the creation of democratic institutions. He also advocated rapid 
improvement of living standards, a modernized financial structure, 
and eventual Portuguese participation in the EC — objectives laid 
down in an economic plan he commissioned from Erik Lundberg 
of the World Bank. Spmola' s view on the economy and the pace 
of decolonization diverged from those of the Coordinating Com- 
mittee of the MFA, most of whose members were prepared to end 
completely the Portuguese presence in Africa and to expand sub- 
stantially the scope of the public sector. By the early autumn of 
1974, events both within and outside Portugal favored the course 



124 



The Economy 



chosen by the MFA coordinating committee. Unable to stop the 
leftward drift of the country, Spmola resigned in September 1974. 

Nationalization 

The reorganization of the MFA coordinating committee in March 
1975 brought into prominence a group of Marxist-oriented officers 
who, in league with the General Confederation of Portuguese 
Workers-National Intersindical (Confederagao Geral dos Tra- 
balhadores Portugueses-Intersindical Nacional — CGTP-IN), the 
communist-dominated trade union confederation known as Inter- 
sindical prior to 1977, sought the radical transformation of the 
nation's social system and political economy. Abandoning its 
moderate-reformist posture, the MFA leadership set out on a course 
of sweeping nationalizations and land expropriations. During the 
balance of that year, the government nationalized all Portuguese- 
owned capital in the banking, insurance, petrochemical, fertilizer, 
tobacco, cement, and wood pulp sectors of the economy, as well 
as the Portuguese iron and steel company, the major breweries, 
the large shipping lines, most public transport, two of the three 
principal shipyards, core companies of the Companhia Uniao Fabril 
(CUF) conglomerate, the radio and TV networks (except that of 
the Roman Catholic Church), and important companies in the 
glass, mining, fishing, and agricultural sectors. Because of the key 
role of the domestic banks as holders of stock, the government 
indirectly acquired equity positions in hundreds of other firms. An 
Institute for State Participation was created to deal with the many 
disparate (often tiny) enterprises in which the state had thus ob- 
tained a majority shareholding. Another 300 small to medium 
enterprises came under public management as the government "in- 
tervened' ' to rescue them from bankruptcy following their takeover 
by workers or abandonment by management. 

Although foreign direct investment was statutorily exempted from 
nationalization, many foreign-controlled enterprises curtailed or 
ceased operation because of costly forced labor settiements or worker 
takeovers. The combination of revolutionary policies and negative 
business climate brought about a sharp reversal in the trend of direct 
investment inflows from abroad. 

A study by the economists Maria Belmira Martins and Jose 
Chaves Rosa showed that a total of 244 private enterprises were 
directly nationalized during the sixteen-month interval from March 
14, 1975 to July 29, 1976. Nationalization was followed by the con- 
solidation of the several private firms in each industry into state 
monopolies. As an example, Quimigal, the chemical and fertilizer 
entity, represented a merger of five firms. Four large companies 



125 



Portugal: A Country Study 

were integrated to form the national oil company, Petroleos de Por- 
tugal (Petrogal). Portucel brought together five pulp and paper com- 
panies. The fourteen private electric power enterprises were joined 
into a single power generation and transmission monopoly, Elec- 
tricidade de Portugal (EDP). With the nationalization and amal- 
gamation of the three tobacco firms under Tabaqueira, the state 
gained complete control of this industry. The several breweries and 
beer distribution companies were integrated into two state firms, 
Central de Cervejas (Centralcer) and Unicer; and a single state 
enterprise, Rodoviaria, was created by joining the ninety-three na- 
tionalized trucking and bus lines. The forty-seven cement plants, 
formerly controlled by the Champalimaud interests, were integrated 
into Cimentos de Portugal (Cimpor). The government also acquired 
a dominant position in the export-oriented shipbuilding and ship 
repair industry. Former private monopolies retained their compa- 
ny designations following nationalization. Included among these 
were the iron and steel company, Siderurgia Nacional; the rail- 
way, Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses (CP); and the national airline, 
Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP). 

Unlike other sectors, where existing private firms were typical- 
ly consolidated into state monopolies, the commercial banking sys- 
tem and insurance industry were left with a degree of competition. 
By 1979 the number of domestic commercial banks was reduced 
from fifteen to nine. Notwithstanding their public status, the re- 
maining banks competed with each other and retained their in- 
dividual identities and certain differences in their activities. 

Before the revolution, private enterprise ownership dominated 
the Portuguese economy to a degree unmatched in other West Eu- 
ropean countries. Only a handful of wholly owned or majority 
owned state entities existed; these included the post office, the ar- 
maments industry, and the ports, as well as the National Develop- 
ment Bank and Caixa Geral de Depositos, the largest savings bank. 
The Portuguese government held minority interests in TAP, the 
national airline; in Siderurgia Nacional, the integrated steel mill; 
and in oil refining and oil marketing firms. The railroads, two 
colonial banks, and the Bank of Portugal were majority privately 
owned but publicly administered. Finally, although privately 
owned, the tobacco companies and Radio Marconi were operated 
under government concessions. 

Two years after the military coup, the enlarged public sector ac- 
counted for 47 percent of the country's gross fixed capital forma- 
tion (GFCF), 30 percent of total value added (VA), and 24 percent 
of employment. These shares should be compared with 10 percent 
of GFCF, 9 percent of VA, and 13 percent of employment for the 



126 



The Economy 



traditional public sector of 1973. Expansion of the public sector 
since the revolution was particularly noteworthy in heavy manufac- 
turing; in public services, including electricity, gas, transport and 
communications; and in banking and insurance. Further, accord- 
ing to the Institute for State Participation, these figures did not 
include private enterprises under temporary state intervention, pri- 
vate enterprises with minority state participation (less than 50 per- 
cent of the common stock), or worker-managed firms and 
agricultural collectives. 

The Brain Drain 

Compounding the problem of massive nationalizations was the 
heavy drain of managerial and technical expertise away from the 
public enterprises. The income-leveling measures of the MFA 
revolutionary regime, together with the " antifascist" purges in fac- 
tories, offices, and large agricultural estates, induced an exodus 
of human capital, mainly to Brazil. This loss of managers, techni- 
cians, and business people inspired a popular Lisbon saying, "Por- 
tugal used to send its legs to Brazil, but now we are sending our 
heads." 

Notwithstanding the concentration of the means of production 
in the hands of a small number of family-based financial-industrial 
groups, Portuguese business culture permitted a surprising upward 
mobility of educated individuals with middle-class backgrounds into 
professional management careers. Before the Revolution of 1974, 
the largest, most technologically advanced (and most recently or- 
ganized) firms offered the greatest opportunity for management 
careers based on merit. 

A detailed analysis of Portugal's loss of managerial resources is 
contained in Harry M. Makler's follow-up surveys of 306 enter- 
prises, conducted in July 1976, and again in June 1977. His study 
makes clear that nationalization was greater in the modern, large, 
technically advanced industries than in the traditional industries 
such as textiles, apparel, and construction. In small enterprises (fifty 
to ninety-nine employees), only 15 percent of the industrialists had 
quit as compared with 43 percent in the larger. In the giant firms 
(1 ,000 or more employees), more than half had quit. Makler's cal- 
culations show that the higher the socioeconomic class origin, the 
greater the likelihood that the industrialist had left the firm. He 
also notes that "the more upwardly mobile also were more likely 
to have quit than those who were downwardly socially mobile." 
Significantly, a much larger percentage of professional mana- 
gers (52 percent) compared with owners of production (i.e., 



127 



Portugal: A Country Study 

founders — 18 percent, heirs — 21 percent, and owner-managers — 32 
percent) had left their enterprises. 

The constitution of 1976 confirmed the large and interventionist 
role of the state in the economy. Its Marxist character before the 
1989 revisions was revealed in a number of its articles, which point- 
ed to a "classless society" and the "socialization of the means of 
production" and proclaimed all nationalizations made after April 
25, 1974, as "irreversible conquests of the working classes." The 
constitution also defined new power relationships between labor 
and management, with a strong bias in labor's favor. All regula- 
tions with reference to layoffs, including collective redundancy, were 
circumscribed by Article 53. 

Role of the Consolidated Public Sector 

After the revolution, the Portuguese economy experienced a 
rapid, and often uncontrollable, expansion of public expenditures — 
both in the general government and in public enterprises. The lag 
in public- sector receipts resulted in large public enterprise and 
general government deficits. In 1982 the borrowing requirement 
of the consolidated public sector reached 24 percent of GDP, its 
peak level; it was subsequendy reduced to 9 percent of GDP in 1990. 

To rein in domestic demand growth, the Portuguese government 
was obliged to pursue IMF-monitored stabilization programs in 
1977-78 and 1983-85. The large negative savings of the public sec- 
tor (including the state-owned enterprises) became a structural fea- 
ture of Portugal's political economy after the revolution. Other 
official impediments to rapid economic growth after 1974 includ- 
ed all-pervasive price regulation, as well as heavy-handed inter- 
vention in factor markets and the distribution of income. 

In 1989 Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva succeeded in 
mobilizing the required two-thirds vote in the Assembly of the 
Republic to amend the constitution, thereby permitting the dena- 
tionalization of the state-owned banks and other public enterprises. 
Privatization, economic deregulation, and tax reform became the 
salient concerns of public policy as Portugal prepared itself for the 
challenges and opportunities of membership in the EC's single mar- 
ket in the 1990s. 

The Nonfinancial Public Enterprises 

Following the sweeping nationalizations of the mid-1970s, pub- 
lic enterprises became a major component of Portugal's consoli- 
dated public sector. Portugal's nationalized sector in 1980 included 
a core of fifty nonfinancial enterprises, entirely government owned. 
This so-called public nonfinancial enterprise group included the 



128 



The Economy 



Institute of State Participation, a holding company with investments 
in some seventy subsidiary enterprises; a number of state-owned 
entities manufacturing or selling goods and services grouped with 
nationalized enterprises for national accounts purposes (arms, 
agriculture, and public infrastructure, such as ports); and a large 
number of over 50-percent state-owned subsidiaries operating un- 
der private law. Altogether these public enterprises accounted for 
25 percent of VA in GDP, 52 percent of GFCF, and 12 percent 
of Portugal's total employment. In terms of VA and GFCF, the 
relative scale of Portugal's public entities exceeded that of the other 
West European economies, including the EC member countries. 

Although the nationalizations broke up the concentration of eco- 
nomic power in the hands of the financial-industrial groups, the 
subsequent merger of several private firms into single publicly 
owned enterprises left domestic markets even more subject to mo- 
nopoly. Apart from special cases, as in iron and steel, where the 
economies of scale are optimal for very large firms, there was some 
question as to the desirability of establishing national monopolies. 
The elimination of competition following the official takeover of 
such industries as cement, chemicals, and trucking probably 
reduced managerial incentives for cost reduction and technical 
advance. 

As hybrid institutions, public enterprises find it difficult to 
separate market choices from political considerations. Their poor- 
er economic performance may partially be explained by public 
management's frustration at attempting to reconcile impossible 
goals: on the one side, a concern for the "bottom line"; on the 
other, coping with the distributional struggles of interest groups. 
Special interest groups that shape the policies of state-owned firms 
include "elite" public enterprise unions aspiring to guarantee em- 
ployment and above-market wages; consumer groups desiring goods 
and services at below user cost or market price; oversight minis- 
tries intent upon expanding their authority; and politicians, includ- 
ing chiefs of state, seeking to expand patronage opportunities. As 
a vehicle for redistribution, public enterprise often becomes the ser- 
vant of special interest groups — those who are politically con- 
nected — rather than a guardian of the public or general interest. 

It was not surprising that numerous nationalized enterprises ex- 
perienced severe operating and financial difficulties. State opera- 
tions faced considerable uncertainty as to the goals of public 
enterprises, with negative implications for decision making, often 
at odds with market criteria. In many instances, managers of public 
firms were less able than their private- sector counterparts to resist 
strong wage demands from militant unions. Further, public firm 



129 



Portugal: A Country Study 



managers were required for reasons of political expediency to main- 
tain a redundant labor force and freeze prices or utility rates for 
long periods in the face of rising costs. Overstaffing was particu- 
larly flagrant at Petrogal, the national petroleum monopoly, and 
Estaleiros Navais de Setubal (Setenave), the wholly state-owned 
shipbuilding and repairing enterprise. The failure of the public 
transportation firms to raise fares during a time of accelerating in- 
flation resulted in substantial operating losses and even obsoles- 
cence of the sector's capital stock. 

As a group, the public enterprises performed poorly financially 
and relied excessively on debt financing from both domestic and 
foreign commercial banks. The operating and financial problems 
of the public enterprise sector were revealed in a study by the Bank 
of Portugal covering the years 1978-80. Based upon a survey of 
fifty-one enterprises, which represented 92 percent of the sector's 
VA, the analysis confirmed the debilitated financial condition of 
the public enterprises, i.e., their inadequate equity and liquidity 
ratios. The consolidated losses of the firms included in the survey 
increased from 18.3 million contos (for value of the conto — see Glos- 
sary) in 1978 to 40.3 million contos in 1980, or 4.6 percent to 6.1 
percent of net worth, respectively. Losses were concentrated in 
transportation and to a lesser extent in transport equipment and 
materials (principally shipbuilding and ship repair). The bud- 
getary burden of the public enterprises as a result of their overall 
weak performance was substantial: enterprise transfers to the Por- 
tuguese government (mainly taxes) fell short of government receipts 
in the forms of subsidies and capital transfers. The largest non- 
fmancial state enterprises recorded (inflation-discounted) losses in 
the seven-year period from 1977 to 1983 equivalent to 11 percent 
on capital employed. Notwithstanding their substantial operating 
losses and weak capital structure, these large enterprises financed 
86 percent of their capital investments from 1977 to 1983 through 
increases in debt, of which two- thirds was foreign. The rapid 
buildup of Portugal's external debt from 1978 to 1985 was largely 
associated with the public enterprises. 

The General Government 

The share of general government expenditure (including capi- 
tal outlays) in GDP rose from 23 percent in 1973 to 46 percent 
in 1990 (see table 5, Appendix). On the revenue side, the upward 
trend was less pronounced: the share increased from nearly 23 per- 
cent in 1973 to 39.2 percent in 1990. From a modest surplus be- 
fore the revolution in 1973, the government balance swung to a 
wide deficit of 12 percent of GDP in 1984, declining thereafter to 



130 



The Economy 



around 5.4 percent of GDP in 1990. Significantly, both current 
expenditures and capital expenditures roughly doubled their shares 
of GDP between 1973 and 1990: government current outlays rose 
from 19.5 percent to 40.2 percent, capital outlays from 3.2 per- 
cent to 5.7 percent. 

Apart from the growing investment effort, which included capi- 
tal transfers to the public enterprises, government expenditure pat- 
terns since the revolution reflected rapid expansion in the number 
of civil servants and pressure to redistribute income, mainly through 
current transfers and subsidies, as well as burgeoning interest ob- 
ligations. The category "current transfers" nearly tripled its share 
of GDP between 1973 and 1990, from under 5 percent to 13.4 per- 
cent, reflecting the explosive growth of the social security system, 
both with respect to the number of persons covered and the up- 
grading of benefits. Escalating interest payments on the public debt 
from less than half a percent of GDP in 1973 to 8.2 percent of GDP 
in 1990 were the result of both a rise in the debt itself and higher 
real effective interest rates. 

The narrowing of the government deficit since the mid-1980s 
and the associated easing of the borrowing requirement was caused 
both by a small increase in the share of receipts (by two percen- 
tage points) and by the relatively sharper contraction of current 
subsidies, from 7.6 percent of GDP in 1984 to 1.5 percent of GDP 
in 1990. This reduction was a direct consequence of the gradual 
abandonment by the government of its policy of curbs on rises in 
public utility rates and food prices, against which it paid subsidies 
to public enterprises. 

Tax reform — comprising both direct and indirect taxation — was 
a major element in a more comprehensive effort to modernize the 
economy in the late 1980s. The key objective of these reforms was 
to promote more efficient and market-oriented economic perfor- 
mance. Beyond considerations of efficiency, a good tax system also 
should be simple (i.e., easy to administer), fair, and transparent. 

Prior to the reform, about 90 percent of the personal tax base 
consisted of labor income. Statutory marginal tax rates on labor 
income were very high, even at relatively low income levels, espe- 
cially after the revolution. The large number of tax exemptions 
and fiscal benefits, together with high marginal tax rates, entailed 
the progressive erosion of the tax base through tax avoidance and 
evasion. Furthermore, Portuguese membership in the EC created 
the imperative for a number of changes in the tax system, espe- 
cially the introduction of the value-added tax (VAT — see Glossary). 

Reform proceeded in two major installments: the VAT was in- 
troduced in 1986; the income tax reform, for both personal and 



131 



Portugal: A Country Study 



corporate income, became effective in 1989. The VAT, whose nor- 
mal rate was 17 percent, replaced all indirect taxes, such as the 
transactions tax, railroad tax, and tourism tax. Marginal tax rates 
on both personal and corporate income were substantially cut, and 
in the case of individual taxes, the number of brackets was reduced 
to five. The basic rate of corporate tax was 36.5 percent, and the 
top marginal tax rate on personal income was cut from 80 percent 
to 40 percent. A 25 percent capital gains tax was levied on direct 
and portfolio investment. Business proceeds invested in develop- 
ment projects were exempt from capital gains tax if the assets were 
retained for at least two years. 

Preliminary estimates indicated that part of the observed increase 
in direct tax revenue in 1989-90 was of a permanent nature, the 
consequence of a redefinition of taxable income, a reduction in al- 
lowed deductions, and the termination of most fiscal benefits for 
corporations. The resulting broadening of the income tax base per- 
mitted a lowering of marginal tax rates, greatly reducing the dis- 
incentive effects to labor and saving. 

Macroeconomic Disequilibria and Public Debt 

Between 1973 and 1988, the general government debt/GDP ra- 
tio quadrupled, reaching a peak of 74 percent in 1988. This growth 
in the absolute and relative debt was only partially attributable to 
the accumulation of government deficits. It also reflected the reor- 
ganization of various public funds and enterprises, the separation 
of their accounts from those of the government, and their fiscal 
consolidation. The rising trend of the general government debt/ 
GDP ratio was reversed in 1989, as a surge in tax revenues linked 
to the tax reform and the shrinking public enterprise deficits reduced 
the public-sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) relative to GDP. 
After falling to 67 percent in 1990, the general government 
debt/GDP ratio is expected to continue to decline, reflecting fiscal 
restraint and increased proceeds from privatization. 

The financing structure of the public deficits has changed since 
the mid-1980s under the effect of two factors. First, the easing of 
the PSBR and the government's determination to reduce the for- 
eign debt/GDP ratio led to a sharp reduction in borrowing abroad. 
Second, since 1985 the share of nonmonetary financing has in- 
creased steeply, not only in the form of public issues of Treasury 
bills but also, since 1987-88, in the form of medium-term Trea- 
sury bonds. 

The magnitude of the public-sector deficit (including that of the 
public enterprises) had a crowding-out effect on private investment. 
The nationalized banks were obliged by law to increase their holding 



132 



The Economy 



of government paper bearing negative real interest rates. This mas- 
sive absorption of funds by the public sector was largely at the ex- 
pense of private enterprises whose financing was often constrained 
by quantitative credit controls. 

Portugal's membership in the EC resulted in substantial net 
transfers averaging 1.5 percent of annual GDP during 1987-90. 
The bulk of these transfers was "structural" funds that were used 
for infrastructure developments and professional training. Addi- 
tional EC funds, also allocated through the public sector, were 
designed for the development of Portugal's agricultural and indus- 
trial sectors. 

After 1985 the PSBR began to show a substantial decline, largely 
as a result of the improved financial position of public enterprises. 
Favorable exogenous factors (lower oil prices, lower interest rates, 
and depreciation of the dollar) helped to moderate operating costs. 
More important, however, was the shift in government policy. Pub- 
lic enterprise managers were given greater autonomy with respect 
to investment, labor, and product pricing. Significantly, the com- 
bined deficit of the nonfmancial public enterprises fell to below 2 
percent of GDP on average in 1987-88 from 8 percent of GDP 
in 1985-86. In 1989 the borrowing requirements of those enter- 
prises fell further to 1 percent of GDP. 

In April 1990, legislation concerning privatization was enacted 
following an amendment to the constitution in June 1989 that 
provided the basis for complete (100 percent) divestiture of nation- 
alized enterprises. Among the stated objectives of privatization were 
to modernize economic units, increase their competitiveness, and 
contribute to sectoral restructuring; to reduce the role of the state 
in the economy; to contribute to the development of capital mar- 
kets; and to widen the participation of Portuguese citizens in the 
ownership of enterprises, giving particular attention to the work- 
ers of the enterprises and to small shareholders. 

The Portuguese government is concerned about the strength of 
foreign investment in privatizations and wants to reserve the right 
to veto some transactions. But as a member of the EC, Portugal 
eventually will have to accept investment from other member coun- 
tries on an equal footing with investment of its nationals. Signifi- 
cantly, government proceeds from privatization of nationalized 
enterprises will primarily be used to reduce public debt; and to 
the extent that profits will rise after privatization, tax revenues will 
expand. In 1991 proceeds from privatization were expected to 
amount to 2.5 percent of GDP. 



133 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Human Resources and Income Distribution 

One of the striking characteristics of the Portuguese people is 
their propensity to emigrate (see Emigration, ch.2). In the late 
1980s, an estimated 3.5 to 4.0 million Portuguese passport holders 
were living in foreign lands, equal to over a third of the popula- 
tion residing in Portugal. Emigration, which was once a reflection 
of Portugal's international importance as a maritime and colonial 
power, became in the twentieth century, according to Thomas G. 
Sanders, "a reflection of its poverty and economic weakness." As 
a consequence of this population diaspora, large numbers of Por- 
tuguese migrants lived in Latin America (mainly Brazil and 
Venezuela), industrial Western Europe (mainly France and Ger- 
many), Africa (predominantly the Republic of South Africa), and 
North America (the United States and Canada). The Portuguese 
emigrants to the EC countries, numbering over 1 million, differed 
in several ways from those who went overseas: most of them were 
temporary workers who planned to return to their homeland, and 
most originated from the mainland rather than Madeira and the 
Azores (Acores). 

Portugal's comparative poverty within the EC is closely associated 
with lower per capita investment in human and physical capital. 
On the other hand, Portuguese workers are recognized for their 
strong work ethic, adaptability, and frugality. Among middle- 
income countries, few can match Portugal for its high family sav- 
ings rate. Real wage rates over extended time periods closely reflect 
labor productivity, which in turn is correlated with the factors men- 
tioned above. Although government intervention can temporarily 
alter the distribution of income in favor of labor through the 
manipulation of wage rates and consumer prices — as indeed hap- 
pened in the mid-1970s — labor productivity eventually determines 
labor's earnings. 

Employment and Sectoral Composition of the Labor Force 

From 1960 to 1973, Portuguese policy measures supported a shift 
of resources, including labor, from low-productivity toward high- 
productivity uses, especially export-oriented industries. Rapid and 
accelerated economic growth was reflected in the profound altera- 
tion of the sectoral composition of the work force. Between 1960 
(the year after Portugal became a charter member of EFT A) and 
1973, the share of the civilian labor force engaged in agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing fell from nearly 44 percent to just under 28 
percent, whereas the share of labor engaged in industry (includ- 
ing construction) increased from slightly less than 29 percent to 



134 



Fruit vendor, Porto 
Courtesy Andrea Matles Savada 
Portuguese fishermen unload their catch. 
Courtesy Portuguese National Tourist Office, New York 



135 



Portugal: A Country Study 

almost 36 percent, and in the services sector (including transport 
and communications) from nearly 28 percent to slightly more than 
36 percent. The shift of labor out of agriculture involved a reduc- 
tion of the number engaged in that sector (a decline of about 550,000 
workers between 1960 and 1973), as well as in the proportion of 
farmers in the total labor force. 

Because of heavy emigration, the working population of con- 
tinental Portugal shrank from more than 3.1 million in 1960 to 
just 2.9 million in 1973, and employment fell by an annual rate 
averaging 0.5 percent. The rapid shrinkage in the number of work- 
ers in agriculture was not accompanied by an equal or greater rise 
in the industrial and services sectors. Nearly two out of every three 
Portuguese taking up nonagricultural employment during this peri- 
od did so in another West European country. France was, even 
at the beginning of the 1990s, host to about 80 percent of the 
emigrant workers, most of whom worked at unskilled or semi-skilled 
jobs. The 110,000 Portuguese in Germany, by contrast, had found 
higher- skilled work, with some two-thirds employed in industry 
in 1977. Consequently, net emigration between 1960 and 1973 ex- 
ceeded 1 million, a number greater than the natural increase in 
the Portuguese population. In the thirteen years of war, from 1961 
to 1974, 1.5 million Portuguese had seen military service in Afri- 
ca, and during 1974 one in every four adult males was in the armed 
forces. During this period, unemployment was kept down to about 
4 percent (and to less than 3 percent in the early 1970s), largely 
because of massive labor emigration to industrialized Western Eu- 
rope and the military draft. 

After the revolution, the demobilization of the military draftees 
and the return of Portuguese nationals from Africa produced im- 
portant additions to the mainland population and labor force. From 
a combined strength of 220,000 at the beginning of 1974, the armed 
forces demobilized some 95,000 persons in that year and 60,000 
in 1975. Furthermore, an estimated 500,000 returnees (retornados) 
were repatriated, mainly from Angola and Mozambique, and most 
of them were totally without resources, having had to leave the for- 
mer colonies with only the barest essentials. Initially, their former 
occupations made them difficult to integrate into the metropolitan 
economy: 67 percent had held service jobs (as public employees 
or office workers), whereas only 20 percent had been engaged in 
industry and 4 percent in agriculture. Consequently, the Portuguese 
government had to shoulder an extremely heavy burden in the form 
of the various benefits granted to the returnees, including cash sub- 
sidies, provision of hotel accommodations, and assistance with pur- 
chases of essential goods. The sum of these benefits was estimated 



136 



The Economy 



at 14 billion escudos (for value of the escudo — see Glossary) in 1976, 
or about 1 1 percent of total government spending. In all, the in- 
crease in the civilian population from 1974 to 1976 was probably 
about 900,000, i.e., 10 percent of the total population in 1973. 

Following this brief population burst in the number of main- 
land residents, Portugal's population and labor force resumed their 
natural rates of growth; for example, in the 1980-89 decade, the 
annual percentage increases were 0.5 percent and 1.4 percent, 
respectively. Between 1973 and 1990, Portugal's labor force grew 
by more than 1.8 million (see table 6, Appendix), of which more 
than half was absorbed in the services sector and over a third in 
the industrial sector. Although the share of the work force in agricul- 
ture, forestry, and fishing resumed its historical relative decline 
(from nearly 28 percent of the total in 1973 to almost 18 percent 
in 1990), the absolute number of workers in that sector increased 
slightly. Industry's share in the labor force remained virtually un- 
changed between 1973 and 1990 (at about 35 percent), but the ser- 
vices sector added nearly 1.2 million employees, its share in the 
total rising from over 36 percent in 1973 to 47.4 percent in 1990. 
A major explanation for this growth of almost 1 1 percent was the 
explosive increase of civil service employment after the Revolu- 
tion of 1974. 

Wages and the Distribution of Income 

Two approaches are used to determine how income is divided 
among citizens of a country. The first approach, involving the size 
of distribution of income, compares the household income shares 
received by the richest 20 percent of the population, the poorest 
20 percent, and the three quintiles between these extremes. This 
approach yields an income concentration, or Gini ratio: the higher 
the ratio, the greater the degree of inequality. Gini ratios can be 
useful in comparing the degree of income inequality within a coun- 
try over time or among countries during the same time frame. The 
International Labour Organisation estimates for Portugal indicate 
that the Gini ratio changed little between 1967-68 (0.423) and 
1973-74 (0.431), corresponding to the end of the Salazar and 
Caetano administrations, respectively. By comparison, in the early 
1970s, France's Gini ratio was 0.416, Germany's 0.376, and 
Sweden's 0.346. It may also be useful to compare the household 
income share received by the poorest 40 percent of the population 
with the share received by the richest 20 percent. According to this 
indicator (richest 20 percent and poorest 40 percent), Portugal's 
income distribution profile at the end of the Caetano period (3.5) 
reveals by comparison relatively greater equality in Spain (2.4) and 



137 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Italy (3.0) but greater relative inequality in Costa Rica (4.6), Mexico 
(5.3), and Brazil (9.5). Portugal's income concentration profile, 
on the other hand, was similar to that of France (3.3) and Argen- 
tina (3.6) during the early 1970s. 

The second, or functional, approach to income distribution mea- 
sures the shares going to the various productive factors — en- 
trepreneurship, land, capital, and labor. Wages and salaries or 
compensation of employees are concepts that normally show the 
proportion of national income or national product going to labor. 
In the aftermath of the 1974 military coup, from mid- 1974 to 
November 1975, the newly formed labor unions within the General 
Confederation of Portuguese Workers-National Intersindical (Con- 
federacao Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-Intersindical 
Nacional — CGTP-IN) greatly increased their strength. The unions 
focused on expansion of the public sector, employment guaran- 
tees, and income redistribution. In response to labor's demands, 
the government instituted income-leveling policies that included 
a large increase in the minimum wage for a substantial proportion 
of the work force, a freeze on rents, a highly graduated income 
tax, and a ceiling on salaries. As a consequence of official measures 
affecting wages and salaries (including the US$800 a month ceil- 
ing on the maximum salary), the average pay gap between unskilled 
workers and managers shrank from 1:7 in 1973 to 1:4 in 1975. 
To protect increases in nominal wages, prices of essential commodi- 
ties, particularly food, were fixed at below market levels. Real wages 
increased 25 percent between 1973 and 1975, and the share of the 
wage bill in national income rose explosively from 52 percent in 
1973 to 69 percent in 1975. At the same time, the proportion of 
national income flowing to capital and entrepreneurship (includ- 
ing income of artisans and other self-employed workers) was 
sharply eroded. 

Official policies were also reflected in the distribution of income. 
Average wage income of the lowest quintile almost doubled in real 
terms between 1972 and 1976; the second and third quintiles ob- 
tained an increase of 59 percent and 45 percent, respectively; but 
the real remuneration of the top 5 percent declined by 19 percent 
from 1972 to 1976. 

In January 1979, the General Union of Workers (Uniao Geral 
dos Trabalhadores — UGT) was organized. The UGT was viewed 
as a viable, democratic alternative to the CGTP-IN, which, as of 
the beginning of the 1990s, continued to be communist dominat- 
ed, as it had been since its formation. By 1990 these two union 
confederations were roughly equal in size, and 30 percent of the 
labor force was unionized. 



138 



The Economy 



How has the working class fared since the revolution? Follow- 
ing the short-lived, government-induced wage explosion in 1975-76, 
the share of employee compensation in national income (52.9 per- 
cent in 1979) was again much the same as in 1973 (51.6 percent), 
and from 1979 to 1989 that share was on a downward trend. Real 
wages per capita increased only 10 percent between 1973 and 1989, 
a reflection both of slow labor productivity growth (20 percent) dur- 
ing this sixteen-year postrevolutionary period and the widening "tax 
wedge," i.e., the higher social security taxes contributed by both 
the employer and the employee. Real wages per capita moved on 
a downward trend from their peak level in 1976 to their lowest point 
(below their level in 1973) in 1984. From 1984 to 1990, real wages 
rose each year in response to the brisk demand for labor associat- 
ed with Portugal's economic recovery. The rate of unemployment 
fell to 4.7 percent in 1990, the lowest level since the mid-1970s. 
This rate brought the cumulative decline since the unemployment 
peak of 1985 (8.5 percent) to 3.8 percentage points. An estimated 
250,000 new jobs were added between 1985 and 1990. 

The Portuguese government submitted legislation in 1988 to abol- 
ish the restrictive individual and collective dismissal regulations 
that had been in effect since 1976. Although approved by parlia- 
ment, the law was declared unconstitutional by the courts. In the 
following year, however, the government gained court approval 
of less sweeping labor reforms: dismissal procedures were simpli- 
fied and the conditions eased regarding both the termination of 
individual contracts and collective layoffs. Under this law, older 
unemployed workers were permitted reduction of the early retire- 
ment age from sixty- two to sixty. Until the 1989 labor reform, un- 
employment rigidity was coupled with a high degree of real wage 
flexibility. Consequently, adjustment to external shocks, such as 
the sudden price explosion of imported oil between 1979 and 1980, 
was effected by reducing real wages rather than the numbers of 
employed. 

As a result of its EC membership, Portugal received transfers 
from the European Social Fund in support of training programs 
managed by private firms. The fund's contribution to the Por- 
tuguese labor market amounted to 1 percent of GDP in both 1987 
and 1988, of which two-thirds was invested in training an estimat- 
ed 160,000 young persons. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing employed 17.8 percent of Por- 
tugal's labor force but accounted for only 6.2 percent of GDP 
in 1990. With the principal exception of the alluvial soils of the 



139 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Tagus River (Rio Tejo) valley and the irrigated sections of the 
Alentejo, crop yields and animal productivity remained well be- 
low those of the other EC members. Portugal's agro-food deficit 
(attributable mainly to grain, oilseed, and meat imports) represented 
about 2.5 percent of GDP, but its surplus on forestry products 
(wood, cork, and paper pulp) offset its food deficit. 

Portugal's overall agricultural performance is unfavorable when 
viewed in the context of the country's natural resources and cli- 
matic conditions. Agricultural productivity (gross farm output per 
person employed) was well below that of the other West European 
countries in 1985, at half of the levels in Greece and Spain and 
a quarter of the EC average. 

A number of factors contribute to Portugal's poor agricultural 
performance. First, the level of investment in agriculture was tradi- 
tionally very low. The number of tractors and the quantity of fer- 
tilizer used per hectare were one-third the EC average in the 
mid-1980s. Second, farms in the north are small and fragmented; 
half of them are less than one hectare in size and 86 percent, less 
than five hectares. Third, the collective farms set up in the south 
after the 1974-75 expropriations proved incapable of modern- 
izing, and their efficiency declined. Fourth, poor productivity is 
associated with the low level of education of farmers. Finally, dis- 
tribution channels and economic infrastructure are inadequate in 
parts of the country. 

Agricultural Zones 

Portugal is made up of the mainland and the Azores and Madeira 
islands, which altogether amount to a land area of 91,640 square 
kilometers, about the size of Indiana. The mainland's land area 
of slightly more than 9.2 million hectares is classified as follows 
(in thousands of hectares): 2,755 arable land and permanent crops 
(including 710 in permanent crops), 530 permanent pasture, 3,640 
forest and woodland, and 2,270 other land. 

A useful categorization divides the mainland into three distinct 
topographical and climatic zones: the south (the Alentejo and the 
Algarve), the center (the Tagus River Valley and coastal areas), 
and the north (the area between the Rio Douro and the Rio Min- 
ho, Tras-os-Montes, and the Beira region). 

The north is mountainous, with a rainy, moderately cool cli- 
mate. This zone contains about 2 million hectares of cultivated land 
and is dominated by small-scale, intensive agriculture. High popu- 
lation density, particularly in the northwest, has contributed to a 
pattern of tiny, fragmented farms that produce mainly for family 
consumption interspersed with larger and often mechanized farms 



140 



The Economy 



that specialize in commercial production of a variety of crops. On 
the average, northern levels of technology and labor productivity 
are among the lowest in Western Europe. Extreme underemploy- 
ment of agricultural workers accounts for the north being the prin- 
cipal and enduring source of Portuguese emigrant labor. 

The center is a diverse zone of about 75,000 hectares that in- 
cludes rolling hills suitable primarily for tree crops, poor dryland 
soils, and the fertile alluvial soils of the banks of the Tagus River. 
A variety of crops are grown on the productive areas under irriga- 
tion: grains, mainly wheat and corn, oilseeds (including sunflow- 
ers), and irrigated rice. Farms located in the Tagus Valley typically 
are 100 hectares in size. 

The south is dominated by the Alentejo, a vast, rolling plain 
with a hot, arid climate. The Alentejo occupies an area of approx- 
imately 2.6 million hectares, about 30 percent of the total area of 
mainland Portugal, and produces about 75 percent of the coun- 
try's wheat. Although much of the area is classified as arable land, 
poor soils dominate most of the area, and consequendy yields of 
dryland crops and pasture are low by West European standards. 
The Alentejo is also known for its large stands of cork oak and its 
olive groves. The Algarve, less than a third the area of the Alente- 
jo, occupies the extreme southern part of Portugal. This dryland 
area is characterized by smallholdings where animal grazing and 
fishing are the principal occupations of the inhabitants. 

Crops and Livestock 

In 1990 wheat was the leading Portuguese grain crop, followed 
by corn, which was grown mainly on the small farms of the north. 
Rice, although occupying less than one-tenth of the area of either 
wheat or corn, was a significant grain crop. Potatoes and corn silage 
were found throughout the north. 

Portugal's leading edible tree crop in the early 1990s was olive 
oil. In spite of the importance of olive oil for the economy and the 
increasing production of other edible oilseeds, such as safflower 
and sunflower, Portugal was a net importer of vegetable fats and 
oils. The country produced a variety of horticultural crops, some 
of which were exported. As an example, Portugal was a leading 
world exporter of tomato paste. 

In the mid-1980s, over 300,000 hectares were in vineyards. Por- 
tugal is one of Western Europe's major producers and exporters 
of wines. The most important vineyards are located in the north- 
ern valleys of the Rio Douro, Rio Mondego, and Rio Lima, 
but vineyards are also found in the Algarve and the Setubal Pen- 
insula. Portugal's dessert wines — port and muscatel — and rose 



141 



Portugal: A Country Study 

wines, notably Mateus, are well known abroad. Portuguese red 
and white table wines are less well known outside of the country, 
but their export and reputation are gradually increasing. 

Crop yields, as noted above, and animal productivity remained 
well below those of Portugal's European counterparts as of the early 
1990s. Yields of dryland crops and pastures are low by EC stan- 
dards, but yields on irrigated land and in the alluvial soil areas 
of the Ribatejo are comparable with EC member countries. Por- 
tuguese grain-crop yields (kilograms per hectare) are less than a 
third of those in Germany and France and about 60 percent of those 
in Greece (see table 7, Appendix). Portugal's wheat, corn, and 
barley yields compare unfavorably with its European counterparts. 
Portuguese rice, grown on irrigated land, shows yields only about 
14 percent below those of France and about 25 percent below those 
of Spain and Greece. 

Although pastureland is scarce, livestock constitutes a signifi- 
cant share of total agricultural production. Because of growing 
domestic demand for animal products and low livestock produc- 
tivity, Portugal has to import about 10 percent of its meat require- 
ments. Three-fourths of the mainland's milk is produced in the 
northwest's coastal areas. 

The mainland's livestock numbers in 1990 included over 1 .3 mil- 
lion head of cattle, over 5 million sheep, about 2.5 million pigs, 
and 860,000 goats. About 18 million chickens supplied the coun- 
try's poultry industry that year. 

Forestry and Fishing 

As of the early 1990s, over a third of the mainland was forest 
and woodlands, and commercially valuable timber stands includ- 
ed pine, cork oak, and eucalyptus. Pine is used not only for tim- 
ber but also for resin, pitch, and turpentine. Eucalyptus, a fast 
growing import from Australia, has become a major source of pulp 
and paper. Cork oak, found mostly in the Alentejo, is the source 
of processed cork, a traditional Portuguese export commodity ac- 
counting for about 60 percent of world sales. 

The country's long coastline and seafaring tradition make fish- 
ing a significant, but declining, source of income and jobs. Lis- 
bon, Setubal, Matosinhos, and Portimao are Portugal's main 
fishing ports and centers of commercial fish processing. Of the more 
than 200 edible species caught in Portuguese coastal waters and 
off West Africa, the most valuable is the sardine, an important 
source of domestic food supply and, in canned form, a traditional 
manufactured export product. 



142 



The Economy 



Notwithstanding Portugal's maritime tradition, the country's 
fishing industry in terms of fish catches in 1990 (322,000 tons) com- 
pared unfavorably with those of other small European countries, 
notably Norway (1,747,000 tons), and Denmark (1,517,000 tons). 

Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform 

The system of land tenure on the eve of the revolution was 
anachronistic. Very large estates in the south-central region coex- 
isted with peasant farming in minute, fragmented plots in the north. 
The small farms typically were owner-operated, with the proprie- 
tors' families clustering in villages. Absentee landownership charac- 
terized the latifundio system with day-to-day operations in the hands 
of estate managers. Because of the high concentration of owner- 
ship in the south-central provinces, nearly half of the country's 
agricultural labor force in 1973 consisted of landless wage-earning 
rural workers whose standard of living was extremely low. 

Holdings of over 200 hectares (about 0.3 percent of the total num- 
ber) accounted for 39 percent of all farm land, whereas at the other 
end of the scale holdings of less than one hectare (about 39 percent 
of the total) represented no more than 2.5 percent of total Por- 
tuguese farm land. 

The Agrarian Reform Law of July 29, 1975, which laid down 
the principles for the expropriation of land, validated de facto land 
seizures by rural workers that actually had begun five months earli- 
er. The law provided that expropriation should apply to rural es- 
tates in the "intervention zone" south of the Tagus River. Lands 
that could have been expropriated under the provisions of the Agrar- 
ian Reform Law amounted to 1 ,640,000 hectares, but the area oc- 
cupied by the rural workers reached only 1,140,800 hectares, or 
about one-fifth of the country's total farm land. On the occupied 
land, 449 "collective production units" were set up, bringing var- 
ious estates of the former owners under a single peasant directorate. 
Major expropriations took place in the districts of Evora, Beja, Por- 
talegre, Setubal, and Santarem (see table 8, Appendix). Very large 
collective farms were formed in Portalegre and Beja (averaging be- 
tween about 3,500 and 4,200 hectares); smaller units were created 
in Santarem and Setubal (averaging between about 860 and 1,180 
hectares). 

As Portugal shifted toward moderation and the political center, 
collectivized agriculture increasingly was perceived as a counter- 
productive approach to the problems of the rural south. By the mid- 
dle of 1990, only one-tenth (104,000 hectares) of the more than 
1,080,000 hectares taken from the original landowners was still 
in possession of the remaining 30 collective farms. The gradual 



143 



Portugal: A Country Study 

decollectivization of agriculture, which began in modest form in 
the late 1970s, culminated in a reformed agrarian law enacted by 
parliament in late 1988. Under its provisions, the maximum size 
of properties eligible for reprivatization was increased, and land 
could be divided among the heirs to an estate. Many collective farm 
members agreed to accept cash payments from the original owners 
in order to facilitate change of ownership or received individual 
titles to small shares of the former collective production units. 

Agricultural Policy and the European Community 

Portuguese agricultural markets, both inputs and outputs, were 
subjected to substantial policy intervention, particularly after the 
revolution. Under the old regime, agricultural pricing policy was 
largely oriented toward the provision of low-priced foodstuffs to 
urban areas, which required extensive controls over imports and 
marketing. Three state marketing enterprises were organized after 
1974, primarily to manage trade in their respective commodity 
groups — cereals, oilseeds, and sugar and alcohol — in pursuit of price 
control objectives. Public assistance to farmers and ranchers in- 
volved subsidizing intermediate inputs, primarily fuels, fertilizers, 
and mixed feeds. These subsidies, however, were largely removed 
in June 1983. After the revolution, de facto credit subsidies for farm- 
ers (often associated with negative real interest rates) entailed very 
high transaction costs. As a result, only large farmers had access 
to the formal credit system. 

As a condition of EC membership, Portugal adopted the Com- 
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP), a basic instrument of the com- 
munity's integration since 1962. The CAP is based on the principles 
of common pricing, EC preference, and joint financing. As Por- 
tugal adopted the transitional arrangements leading to full com- 
pliance with the CAP, both the locus of agricultural decision making 
and the level of incentives given by the system of price supports 
shifted from the nation to the EC . Portuguese prices of some com- 
modities at the time of entry into the community were well above 
the EC levels. Cereal and dairy sectors will experience the most 
serious declines in real prices because they benefited most from 
price increases in the early 1980s and because they produce the 
commodities in chronic surplus in the EC. The Alentejo wheat and 
livestock systems, both based on poor soils, will likely become un- 
profitable during the transition to EC price levels. On the other 
hand, the prospects for rice, tomatoes, sunflowers, and potatoes, 
as well as Portugal's higher quality wine systems, appear to be 
favorable under the CAP regime. 



144 



Lisnave docks near Lisbon 
Courtesy General Directorate of Mass Communication, Lisbon 

The Industrial Sector 

The growth of Portugal's industrial sector since the revolution 
was less dynamic than in the 1960-73 period. In this later period, 
growth was strongly affected by a number of major events, both 
domestic and external: the two oil price hikes, the nationalizations 
of 1975-76, and the country's accession to the EC. Nevertheless, 
Portugal's industrial production grew at a respectable 4.8 percent 
annual rate during the 1980-89 decade, leading GDP growth (2.7 
percent annually). The overall industrial index advanced 43 per- 
cent between 1980 and 1989, with significant divergence in the 
growth rates among the subsectors of manufacturing (39 percent); 
electricity, gas, and water (74 percent); and mining (74 percent). 
Mining output was stagnant from 1980 to 1988, but in the follow- 
ing year it surged by 74 percent as the Neves Corvo copper mine 
went into operation. Manufacturing, the largest component of the 
industrial sector, also showed marked growth differences among 
the several branches. Lumber and cork products, a traditional rural- 
based industry, declined by 26 percent during the decade; on the 
other hand, paper (75 percent), chemicals and plastics products 
(97 percent), and nonmetallic mineral products (65 percent) led 
the advance in manufacturing. 



145 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Industrial Regions 

Manufacturing is concentrated in two major industrial regions: 
Lisbon-Setubal in the south-central region and Porto-Aveiro-Braga 
in the north. Together they account for about three-fourths of Por- 
tugal's net industrial output. The Lisbon area includes such major 
industries as iron and steel; shipbuilding and repair; oil refining, 
machinery, chemicals, cement, and electronics; and food and bever- 
ages. Setubal, about eighty kilometers to the southeast of Lisbon, 
also has a large shipyard and automobile assembly and machine 
industry plants, as well as cement, woodpulp, cork, and fish process- 
ing. Sines, located about 140 kilometers south of Lisbon, is the 
site of a major deepwater port and heavy industrial complex. Be- 
gun during the Caetano administration, Sines includes an oil 
refinery, petrochemical plants, and a 1 ,200-megawatt coal-fired 
power plant. 

Porto is primarily a center of light industry, including textiles, 
footwear, furniture, wine, and food processing. Porto is also the 
location of the nation's largest petroleum refinery; the other is lo- 
cated at Lisbon. Portimao is a center for fishing. Aveiro special- 
izes in woodpulp and other wood products but also produces 
footwear and machinery. Braga specializes in textiles and cloth- 
ing, cutlery, furniture, and electronics. Covilha is also an active 
textiles area. 

The two premier industrial regions offer the greatest concentra- 
tions of population, thereby stimulating market-oriented manu- 
facturing operations. Furthermore, because of the dependence of 
modern industry on imports of raw materials, machinery, and fuel, 
the location of processing plants near the two major ports minimizes 
their operating costs (see fig. 8). 

Industrial Organization 

Industrial organization in Portugal reflects three major owner- 
ship patterns: private domestic firms are concentrated in traditional, 
light industries and in construction; public enterprises dominate 
mining and major heavy industries, mainly iron and steel, 
petrochemicals, shipbuilding, petroleum refining, and electricity; 
and subsidiaries of multinational corporations dominate the tech- 
nically more advanced electronics, automotive, pharmaceutical, and 
electrical machinery industries. The foreign investor presence is 
also important in the pulp and paper, chemical, food products, and 
clothing industries. 

In general, the traditional light industries — textiles, clothing and 
footwear, food and beverages, cork products, and furniture — are 



146 



The Economy 



labor intensive and technologically backward. Within this group, 
however, the medium-sized establishments (between 100 and 200 
employees) enjoy superior management capabilities and higher lev- 
els of productivity. 

The Portuguese construction industry, which was largely un- 
affected by the 1975 nationalizations, emerged in the late 1980s 
from several years of recession. Since the mid-1980s, EC and lo- 
cal counterpart funds have financed a variety of infrastructure 
projects, including roads, bridges, and sewage and water treatment 
plants. Commercial building and house construction was also on 
an upward trend after that time. 

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, of the twenty-five 
largest industrial firms ranked by sales in 1986, ten were public 
enterprises (including nine of the largest ten), and nine were sub- 
sidiaries of foreign-owned firms. Significantly, by the mid-1980s, 
over one-fifth of Portuguese manufacturing sales were by subsidi- 
aries of multinational firms, with their export share even higher. 
Seven of the ten largest manufacturing export-oriented firms were 
controlled by foreign investors. 

By the mid-1980s, the large industrial public enterprises faced 
extremely difficult financial problems associated with earlier er- 
rors in investment and pricing policies. After the second oil shock, 
many of these enterprises borrowed heavily abroad to finance in- 
vestment projects, which often were poorly conceived and poorly 
managed. In 1986 operating losses of Quimigal (chemicals), Side- 
rurgia Nacional (steel), and the shipbuilding company Estaleiros 
Navais de Setubal (Setenave) totaled 29 billion escudos, or 30 per- 
cent of total public enterprise losses. 

As a result of their excessive dependence on debt financing, 
Quimigal and Setenave, as well as Companhia Nacional de Petro- 
qufmica (CNP), a state-owned petrochemical enterprise, had a 
negative equity or net worth position (i.e., their debts exceeded 
their assets). Many of these firms in the mid-1980s were overstaffed 
and had concluded wage settlements that were generally higher than 
in the private sector. 

The major state-owned industrial enterprises are candidates for 
ultimate privatization. In anticipation of their divestiture, they un- 
derwent financial and managerial restructuring in the late 1980s. 
As an example, loss-making enterprises such as CNP and Setenave 
had been operating under private management contracts to make 
them viable for privatization. Two major privatizations were an- 
nounced at the end of 1990: Siderurgia Nacional and Petrogal (the 
largest state-owned petrochemical firm). To assure that the national 
steel company can operate successfully within the EC's single 



147 



Portugal: A Country Study 





— International boundary 


(a? 


National capital 


• 


Populated place 


m 


Cork 


^< 


Fish processing 


a 


Footwear 




Heavy industry 




Light industry 


n 


Petrochemical industry 




Textiles 


CQ5 Wine-producing areas 




Wood products 




Coal 


Cr 


Chromium Si! Tin 


Cu 


Copper U Uranium 


Fe 


Iron ore W Tungsten 





25 50 Kilometers 


r 




25 50 Miles 




Porto 



Aveiro 



Co vi I ha 1 



M [antic 
Ocean 



A 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 




SPAIN 



Figure 8. Economic Activity, 1992 



market, the Portuguese government was considering selling Side- 
rurgia Nacional to a leading European steelmaker, preferably linked 
to a Portuguese minority partner. 

Energy and Mineral Resources 

Portugal produces less than a quarter of its primary energy re- 
quirements and depends heavily on imported hydrocarbon fuels, 
mainly petroleum. Although efforts were made to locate domestic 



148 



The Economy 



petroleum deposits in the early 1970s, none were found. Coal ac- 
counts for less than 5 percent of Portugal's primary energy use. 
Apparent consumption in 1988 is around 2.9 million tons, of which 
240,000 tons were mined domestically. Portugal's low-grade an- 
thracite coal, the production of which has stagnated since the 
mid-1970s, is mined near Porto. The United States has emerged 
as Portugal's main supplier of metallurgical and steam coal. A 
5 -million- ton-per-year capacity coal terminal, capable of handling 
150,000 deadweight-ton vessels, was scheduled to be completed at 
Sines early in the 1990s. Because Portugal has no known natural 
gas reserves, the government has plans to build a liquified natural 
gas terminal at Setubal and a gas distribution network. Portugal's 
hydroelectric potential is well developed and provides nearly half 
of the economy's electricity requirements. 

As a result of Portugal's accession to the EC, the country's energy 
sector is rapidly being deregulated and diversified. The state elec- 
tric power company, Electricidade de Portugal (EDP), planned to 
invest US$700 million between 1990 and 1995 on dams and hydro- 
electric equipment. In 1990 EDP completed its second coal-burning 
power plant station to reduce its dependency on imported oil. In 
addition, coal consumption in the cement industry was forecast to 
grow as more facilities converted to coal from fuel oil. 

Portugal's metallic mineral resources are more impressive for their 
variety than for their contribution to GDP. The most important 
mines are in the north, in the mountains of Beira, where tung- 
sten, tin, chromium, and other alloy minerals are mined in commer- 
cial quantities. Iron ore is mined in Moncorvo in the upper Douro 
Valley; formerly exported in its entirety, the Moncorvo mine 
production came to supply the government's integrated iron and 
steel works at Seixal near Lisbon and its Maia electric steel plant 
near Porto. Portugal is a significant world source of tungsten con- 
centrate, most of which is exported. The mine has an annual 
production capacity of 1,400 tons of tungsten concentrate. 

Portugal's metallic mineral production was greatly enhanced 
upon the completion of the US$200 million Neves Corvo copper 
mine near Castro Verde in southern Portugal — the largest non- 
coal mining development project in Western Europe. An estimat- 
ed 33 million tons of 7.8 percent copper were proven at the site 
as of 1986. The concentrator initially will process one million tons 
of ore annually, yielding 400,000 tons of concentrate containing 
nearly 150,000 tons of copper. The Neves Corvo operating com- 
pany is owned 51 percent by the government and 49 percent by 
RTZ Metals Group of Britain. 



149 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Services 

Portugal's services sector dwarfs agriculture and industry, both 
as a contributor to GDP and as a source of employment. In 1973 
services accounted for 39 percent of GDP; by 1990, that share had 
risen to nearly 56 percent. In 1973 services employed slightly over 
36 percent of the total labor force, and in 1990 that share reached 
more than 47 percent. In the latter year, government employed 
14.5 percent of the Portuguese labor force, followed by commerce 
(11.7 percent), transportation (4.3 percent), financial services (3.2 
percent), and other services (12.3 percent). 

Commerce and Tourism 

Portuguese domestic commerce is dominated by numerous small, 
family-owned firms concentrated in the major urban areas. Retail 
outlets, around 80,000 in the late 1980s, are declining in numbers 
as supermarkets increase their market share. At the same time, 
upscale but smaller sales outlets are growing in number, replacing 
traditional retail shops. In both retailing and wholesaling, foreign 
investor participation is helping to accelerate the modernization 
of Portugal's domestic trade. 

Foreign tourism is an important component of Portugal's ser- 
vices sector. Foreign exchange receipts from tourism income 
amounted to US$3.58 billion in 1990, compared with US$0.55 bil- 
lion in 1973 and US$1.15 billion in 1980. This service industry 
directiy employed an estimated 150,000 persons, equivalent to near- 
ly 4 percent of the active labor force that year, but indirectly had 
strong secondary impacts, particularly on construction. From 1973 
to 1990, tourism income as a share of GDP was roughly stable, 
fluctuating between 5 and 6 percent. The mid-1970s proved to be 
an exception: the brief period of radical politics combined with the 
global recession led to a halving of foreign arrivals to 2 million in 
1975 from over 4 million in 1973 and to a sharp reduction in the 
receipts/GDP ratio to 2 percent from 5 percent in the earlier year. 
There were 7.3 million foreign arrivals in 1981, 16.5 million in 
1989, and 19.6 million in 1991. 

Of the 16.5 million recorded foreign visitors in 1989, 93 per- 
cent were from Western Europe. Spaniards, not surprisingly, con- 
stituted three-fourths of all visitors, although most of them were 
excursionists, that is, visitors staying for a period of less than twenty- 
four hours. Visitors from Britain, although only 7 percent of the 
total, contributed about 30 percent of tourism earnings. 

Portugal offers many attractions to vacationers from northern 



150 



Petroleum refinery near Lisbon 
Cement factory in the Estremadura region 
Courtesy General Directorate of Mass Communication, Lisbon 



151 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Europe and the United States: medieval castles and other architec- 
tural landmarks, a number of which serve as government-operated 
inns; more than 100 beaches along the southern coast of the Al- 
garve; and a resort area stretching westward from Lisbon at the 
mouth of the Tagus River, notably the famed resorts of Cascais 
and Estoril. Other attractions include Portugal's mild climate and 
its relatively low cost. 

The major goals of the Portuguese government for this signifi- 
cant export industry are to improve the quality of tourism services, 
to attract visitors to northern locations, to safeguard the environ- 
ment, and to encourage investment in tourism facilities. 

Transportation and Communications 

Portugal's transportation system in the late 1980s comprised 
73,660 kilometers of roads, of which 61 ,000 kilometers were paved; 
a railroad network of 3,630 kilometers; and 820 kilometers of 
navigable inland waterways. Lisbon, on the Tagus estuary, and 
the two other major ports at Leixoes, near Porto, and Sines are 
fully equipped and have adequate warehousing facilities. Lisbon's 
Portela Airport is a major European air terminal and transit point 
for some eighteen airlines. Porto and the Algarve, as well as the 
Azores and Madeira islands, are also served by international air- 
ports. Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP), the national airline, 
operates flights within the country and also serves major Europe- 
an cities and several large cities in the United States, South America, 
and Africa (see fig. 9). 

Much of Portugal's transportation infrastructure — the nation- 
alized railroad, airline, merchant fleet, and trucking and bus 
lines — is to be restructured and/or privatized in the early 1990s. 
For example, Caminhos de Ferro Portuguese (CP), the national 
railroad, approved a 1988 plan that called for a US$1.5 billion in- 
vestment to modernize the rail system by 1994. The plan includes 
high-speed "super trains" to connect Portugal's major cities and 
Lisbon to Madrid. In addition, in the second half of the 1980s the 
EC began to give substantial assistance for improving the trans- 
portation infrastructure. 

Portugal is following an ambitious program to modernize its 
communications system. The Assembly of the Republic approved 
in July 1989 the deregulation/liberalization of some telecommuni- 
cations activities, which will allow private firms to operate com- 
plementary services, such as cellular phones, videotex, and highly 
value-added services such as fax, audiotex, and voicemail. Radio 
and television are also opening to private participation, and recep- 
tion of satellite television is expanding rapidly. 



152 



The Economy 



Banking and Finance 

The importance of the financial system to the economy dwarfs 
its direct impact on employment and income. A well-functioning 
financial system serves not only to increase the mobilization of sav- 
ing but also, more importantly, to direct capital resources toward 
their most productive uses. Since the mid-1980s, when commer- 
cial banking and insurance were reopened to private initiative, the 
Portuguese financial system has evolved toward greater liberali- 
zation, diversification, and internationalization. 

Although the private financial sector has grown rapidly, the 
eleven nationalized banks and eight public insurance companies 
still accounted for 80 percent and 60 percent of their respective mar- 
kets in 1989. Notwithstanding their improved operating conditions 
and higher solvency ratios, the profitability of most nationalized 
banks is depressed by their large holdings of low-interest-bearing 
public debt. Bad and doubtful loans continue to burden several 
state-owned banks. The nationalized banks are also plagued by 
undercapitalization, overstaffing, and an excessive branching struc- 
ture. Many of these banks have large pension liabilities, which, 
being unfunded, are not reflected in their balance sheets. The con- 
tinuing structural problems of the state banks date back to the late 
1970s and early 1980s when the Portuguese government followed 
a "soft budget" policy that emphasized social or political objec- 
tives over market criteria. Banks were required by law to extend 
preferential credit, usually at negative real interest rates, to the large 
nonfinancial public enterprises, as well as to the general govern- 
ment. Relaxation of the normal banking sanctions against trou- 
bled or failing public enterprises threatened the capital of the banks 
and their own financial viability. The Bank of Portugal's quan- 
titative credit controls served mainly to facilitate commercial bank 
financing of the large deficits of the consolidated public sector. The 
administrative control of credit penalized private small and medium- 
sized enterprises, in particular. 

Portuguese financial markets experienced accelerated change after 
the country joined the EC in 1986. Deposit and lending rates were 
freed, new money market instruments were introduced, and in 
1990, the Bank of Portugal removed credit ceilings on commercial 
banks. The Lisbon Stock Exchange was modernized with more 
stringent rules governing the disclosure of financial information; 
precautions were also taken against insider trading. 

Enabling legislation in 1984 allowed private banks and insur- 
ance firms to be organized. By the late 1980s, six new foreign bank 
branches had been established: Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 



153 




Figure 9. Transportation System, 1992 



Chase Manhattan, Barclays, Banque Nationale de Paris, Citicorp, 
and Generale de Banque of Belgium. Four majority Portuguese 
private banks were also set up: Banco de Comercio e Industria 
(BCI), Banco Internacional de Credito (BIC), Banco Portugues 
de Investimento (BPI), and Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP). 
By December 1990, BCP had become Portugal's leading and fastest 
growing private commercial bank with total assets of nearly US$6 
billion. A number of private investment (para-banking) institutions 



154 



The Economy 



and venture capital funds have also become part of the financial 
picture since the mid-1980s. 

During the first phase of ' 'partial" privatization — in 1988 before 
the 1989 constitutional amendment — the government selected a 
medium-sized bank (Banco Totta e Agores) and two public insur- 
ance companies (Alianca Seguradora and Companhia de Seguros 
Tranquilidade) as the first to be privatized. Share issues for 49 per- 
cent of these companies were substantially oversubscribed in 1989. 
After passage of the Reprivatization Law in April 1990, the sale 
of the remaining 5 1 percent of both Tranquilidade and Alianca 
shares took place later that year, and an additional 31 percent of 
Banco Totta e Acores shares were also sold. Other 100 percent 
privatizations of financial firms envisaged for 1991 included the 
Banco Portugues do Atlantico, the country's largest commercial 
bank. 

Significantly, the late 1980s saw the reemergence of some of the 
prerevolutionary family groups in Portugal's economic landscape, 
particularly in the financial sector. As an example, the Espiritu 
Santo family became the majority shareholder in BIC and in the 
Espiritu Santo Sociedade de Investimento and was reported to be 
attempting to retake control of the Tranquilidade insurance com- 
pany. The return of some of these dispossessed family groups to 
Portugal reflects a turnaround in confidence in Portugal's future, 
as well as the prospect for reinvestment of large sums of flight 
capital. 

Notwithstanding the privatization trend, the Portuguese govern- 
ment intends to maintain an important position in the financial 
system in addition to its control over central banking through the 
Bank of Portugal. The two major financial groups reserved for the 
state include, first, the Caixa Geral de Depositos, the largest sav- 
ings bank; the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (a commercial bank); 
and Fidelidade (an insurance company). The second group deals 
with international trade and export promotion and consists of Banco 
de Fomento e Exterior (an investment bank); Banco Borges e Ir- 
mao (a commercial bank); and an external credit insurance com- 
pany, Companhia de Seguros de Creditos (Cosec). Together, these 
two financial groups accounted for about 40 percent of Portugal's 
banking transactions in 1990. 

Foreign Economic Relations 

After becoming a charter member of EFTA in 1959, Portugal 
became increasingly open to the rest of the world through interna- 
tional trade and other payment flows. In 1990 exports of goods 
and services accounted for about 37 percent of Portugal's GDP, 



155 



Portugal: A Country Study 

and imports of goods and services represented about 47 percent 
of GDP. The accession of Portugal to the EC on January 1, 1986, 
required fundamental changes in the country's commercial and for- 
eign investment policies. A seven-year transition period ending in 
1993 would eliminate most barriers to trade, capital flows, and labor 
mobility among the twelve EC member countries. During this peri- 
od, Portugal was a net recipient of EC financial transfers to help 
modernize its agricultural and industrial sectors for competition 
in the single market. 

To rein in domestic demand growth — mainly the result of the 
public sector deficits after 1973 — the Portuguese government was 
obliged to pursue IMF-monitored stabilization programs in 1977-78 
and 1983-84 to help achieve a return to current account equilibri- 
um in the balance of international payments. Building on the 
1983-85 stabilization program and in the context of Portugal's ac- 
cession to the EC, the Council of Ministers introduced in March 
1987 the Program for the Structural Adjustment of the Foreign 
Deficit and Unemployment (Piano de Correccao Estrutural do 
Deficit Externo e Desemprego — PCEDED), a medium-term pro- 
gram aimed at a lasting correction of structural imbalances — 
inflation, fiscal deficit, external deficit, and unemployment. The 
program's macroeconomic approach included a set of articulated 
measures involving fiscal, monetary, exchange, and incomes poli- 
cy. As an instrument of the government's "controlled development 
strategy," this program was to be implemented in two stages cover- 
ing the periods 1987-90 and 1991-94 and is designed to reduce 
Portugal's susceptibility to external shocks by strengthening espe- 
cially the energy and agricultural sectors. 

Composition and Direction of Trade 

Portugal's rising share of manufactured goods in total merchan- 
dise exports, which reached 80 percent in 1989, is indicative of the 
country's newly industrialized status. Between 1980 and 1988, ex- 
ports of manufactured goods increased by 10 percent per year by 
volume, which was double the rate of its European neighbors, and 
Portugal gained market share. The country's major commodity 
exports in 1990 included textiles, clothing, and footwear (accounting 
for 37 percent of total export value); machinery and transport equip- 
ment (20 percent); forest products (10 percent, including pulp and 
paper and cork products); agricultural products (8 percent, main- 
ly wine and tomato paste); chemicals and plastic products (5 
percent); and energy products (about 4 percent). Portugal's com- 
parative advantage appears to lie with high forestry resources con- 
tent (wood and cork products, including pulp and paper) and 



156 



The Economy 



labor-intensive products (textiles, clothing, and footwear). With 
the participation of multinational firms, Portugal is also gaining 
competitive strength in the export of automobiles and automotive 
components and electrical and electronic machinery. 

When compared with the other EC member countries and the 
United States, Portugal has a strong competitive advantage because 
of its low wage scale. As an example, 1989 hourly labor costs in 
Portuguese manufacturing (in United States dollars) averaged ap- 
proximately half those of Greece (a country with a similar per capita 
GDP), a third those of Spain, and about a fifth of most other West 
European countries and the United States. 

Manufactured goods (notably machinery, transportation equip- 
ment, and chemicals) accounted for about 75 percent of merchan- 
dise imports in 1989, food and beverages for about 10 percent, and 
raw materials (mainly crude petroleum) for about 16 percent. Por- 
tugal imported about 60 million barrels of oil yearly during the 
late 1980s, but the share of crude petroleum varied between 8 and 
20 percent of total imports depending on fluctuations in world oil 
prices. 

Portugal's commodity trade is increasingly dominated by the EC 
(see table 9, Appendix). In 1990 the EC member countries pur- 
chased nearly 74 percent of Portugal's exports and supplied over 
69 percent of its imports; in 1985, the year prior to Portugal's mem- 
bership in the EC , the EC member countries purchased about 63 
percent of Portugal's exports and supplied nearly 46 percent of Por- 
tugal's imports. Within the EC, the former West Germany, France, 
and Britain were Portugal's leading trading partners. But after the 
accession of both Iberian countries to the EC in 1986 (and the 
dismantling of trade restrictions between them), Spain suddenly 
emerged as a significant trading partner, taking over 13 percent 
of Portugal's exports in 1990 and providing 14.4 percent of the 
latter 's imports. Thus, Spain ranked with West Germany as Por- 
tugal's premier national supplier in 1990, ahead of France, Brit- 
ain, and Italy. 

The relative position of the United States in Portugal's import 
trade declined sharply from nearly 10 percent of the total in 1985 
to 3.9 percent in 1990. Because Portugal heavily imported grain, 
soybeans, and animal feedstuffs, its adoption of the CAP led to 
costly trade diversion from former, more efficient sources, mainly 
the United States, to higher-cost continental EC member coun- 
tries. On the other hand, Portugal's full membership in the EC 
will permit its manufacturers to capture a larger share of exports 
to EC member countries at the expense of lower-cost exporters from 
Latin America and East Asia; similarly, Portuguese producers of 



157 



Portugal: A Country Study 

quality wine are expected to gain market share at the expense of 
wine producers in Mediterranean countries that were not fully in- 
tegrated into the EC. In both these cases, trade diversion will favor 
Portuguese entrepreneurs. 

Portugal's trade with the previous Escudo Area (its former Afri- 
can colonies) has fallen sharply since the revolution. Still, a re- 
structured Angola under a competent, non-Marxist regime could 
once more offer Portugal significant opportunities for two-way trade 
in the late 1990s. The share of Portuguese imports supplied by the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which 
amounted to over 17 percent in 1985 (the year before the collapse 
of world oil prices), shrank to below 7 percent in 1990. 

The Balance of International Payments 

The balance of payments reveals much about how the residents 
of a nation- state earn their livelihood by providing goods and ser- 
vices to foreigners in exchange for goods and services produced 
abroad. It may also reveal indirectly whether the country is a net 
creditor or net debtor in its dealings with the rest of the world. 
The Portuguese international balance is characterized by a pro- 
tracted and large merchandise trade deficit that is largely offset 
(financed) by annual surpluses on invisibles, mainly emigrant work- 
er remittances and tourism income. But because of its international 
debtor position (including a growing stock of private foreign in- 
vestment in the country), Portugal annually remits substantial in- 
terest and dividend payments to foreigners. Portuguese traders rely 
predominantly on foreign carriers and insurance firms; as a result, 
the current account registers annual net payments (debits) for these 
services. 

From 1974 to 1984, Portugal's current external deficits were 
financed by a combination of foreign reserve drawdowns and offi- 
cial external borrowing, mainly the latter. In the five-year period 
1985-89, three years of current account surpluses (for 1985-87, 
totaling nearly US$2 billion) more than offset two years of current 
deficits (for 1988-89, totaling US$1.6 billion). Following Portu- 
gal's accession to the EC, large and growing inflows of private 
capital — direct investment, portfolio investment, and repatriation 
of flight capital — resulted in substantial accumulation of foreign 
reserves by the Bank of Portugal. 

The 1989 balance of international payments was fairly represen- 
tative of Portugal's position in the late 1980s. The merchandise 
trade deficit of US$5.1 billion was more than covered by the joint 
income from tourism (US$2.6 billion) and emigrant remittances 
(US$3.4 billion). The Portuguese paid exporters and importers 



158 



The beach at Nazare 
Courtesy Alan J. Savada 



US$832 million (net) for the use of foreign carrier and insurance 
services and remitted US$800 million in net investment income 
of interest and dividends (US$1,323 million in payments and 
US$521 million in receipts). Although unilateral transfers (which 
do not give rise to claims) comprised mainly emigrant worker remit- 
tances, net public remittances of US$824 million in favor of Por- 
tugal, a recent component of the balance of payments, reflected 
mainly EC assistance to Portugal in support of economic restruc- 
turing. 

The algebraic addition of the current account balance ( -US$551 
million) and the medium- and long-term capital account (US$2,560 
million) netted a "basic balance" of around US$2 billion in 1989. 

Tourism and Unilateral Transfers 

Measured in terms of arrivals and foreign exchange receipts, Por- 
tuguese tourism has grown at a phenomenal rate since the early 
1980s. Foreign arrivals, which averaged about 7.3 million in 1981- 
1982, expanded sharply each year thereafter, stabilized at between 
16 and 17 million during 1987-89, and then increased to an esti- 
mated 18.4 million in 1990. Receipts from tourism rose from 
US$1.15 billion in 1980 to US$3.58 billion in 1990. 

In 1990 unilateral transfers reached US$6.5 billion (22 percent 
of Portugal's current account receipts), of which 73 percent were 
private, mainly emigrant remittances. About three-fourths of the 



159 



Portugal: A Country Study 



emigrant remittances originated in Western Europe (mainly France) 
and one-fifth in North America (mainly the United States). These 
private inflows not only contributed to the country's foreign ex- 
change earnings, but also represented a significant component of 
Portuguese household savings. 

Gross public transfers in favor of Portugal amounted to US$1 ,740 
million in 1990, of which nearly half (US$837 million) represented 
structural funds from the EC in support of the country's economic 
and social modernization. The European Social Fund assisted in 
vocational and professional training; other funds participated in 
the Specific Plan for the Development of Portuguese Agriculture 
(Piano Economico para o Desenvolvimento da Agricultura Portu- 
guesa — PEDAP) and the Specific Plan for the Development of Por- 
tuguese Industry (Piano Economico para o Desenvolvimento da 
Industria Portuguesa — PEDIP). The Portuguese government was 
required to cofinance projects funded by these EC transfers. 
Although Portugal no longer was a member of EFTA, the latter 
continued to assist the former member country in its economic re- 
structuring efforts. Finally, included in the category of official 
unilateral transfers were United States government military and 
economic grants that totaled some US$160 million annually for 
the use of the large United States Air Force base in the Azores. 

Foreign Direct Investment 

Foreign direct investment increased at an extraordinary pace after 
Portugal's accession to the EC. From a modest commitment of 
around US$166 million in 1986, the annual inflow of investment 
controlled and managed by foreigners rose sharply in the follow- 
ing years, reaching US$2.7 billion in 1991 . At the end of that year, 
the accumulated stock of direct foreign investment exceeded US$8 
billion, or eight times its value at the end of 1986. 

From the perspective of multinational firms, Portugal is a strong 
export base to the emerging single market of 327 million high- 
income consumers, and since the mid-1980s the country has be- 
come especially competitive in attracting foreign investment. These 
attractions include political stability and a hospitable investment 
climate that includes EC investment subsidies, the lowest wage scale 
among the EC- 12, and programs of economic deregulation and 
privatization, as well as robust national economic and export 
growth. 

The participation of EC -based investors in the annual invest- 
ment flow to Portugal increased from less than half of the total in 
1985-86 to about 70 percent from 1987 to 1990, Britain being the 
principal country source. Interesting trends in the composition of 



160 



The Economy 



this investment could be discerned. Britain was the leading coun- 
try of origin throughout this period, but the United States share 
fell sharply from 18 percent of the total investment in 1985-86 to 
less than 3 percent in 1989-90. Within the recently enlarged EC, 
Spain emerged as a significant direct investor, increasing its share 
from only 3 percent of Portuguese new investment in 1985-1986 
to over 13 percent in 1989-90. Brazilian investors, whose share 
was negligible in 1985-86, increased their participation to around 
7 percent in 1989-90. 

Manufacturing, the destination of just under half of foreign in- 
vestment inflow in 1985-86, received only 27 percent of the total 
in 1988-89; by contrast, the services sector's share in total invest- 
ment flow rose from 45 percent in 1985-86 to over 60 percent in 
1988-89. Within that sector, banking and insurance increased their 
participation, although investment in wholesale and retail trade 
and in hotels and restaurants continued to be significant, reflect- 
ing foreign investor participation in Portugal's booming tourism 
industry. Several new investment projects in the automotive in- 
dustry were being considered in 1991, including participation by 
Japanese and South Korean firms. None, however, approach in 
scale the Ford- Volkswagen commitment to organize an automo- 
tive complex at Sines. This joint venture capitalized at US$3.2 bil- 
lion is to manufacture a new European minivan. 

Portugal, unlike many other middle-income countries, is remark- 
ably hospitable to foreign investment (foreign-owned enterprises 
were legally exempted from nationalization during 1975-76). The 
growing pace of privatization since 1988, however, gave rise to de- 
bate regarding the ultimate ownership and control of major state 
firms being divested. One school of thought anticipated that privati- 
zation would "de-Portugalize" vital sectors of the economy. To 
some degree, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva shared this anxiety: "At 
the same time, we shall have to foster economic groups in Portu- 
gal. These were destroyed at the time of the revolution with na- 
tionalization. We need them, as otherwise foreigners will come in 
and take over our enterprises and economic strategy will be deter- 
mined from abroad. Thus we are supporting the new entrepreneurs 
in industry and agriculture." 

Despite the formation of new Portuguese groups able to com- 
pete against foreign-based multinational companies, it is doubtful 
that these national firms are sufficient in number, risk capital, and 
managerial-technical know-how to absorb most of the large enter- 
prises scheduled for divestiture. 

Although the government has succeeded in limiting foreign par- 
ticipation in a number of key enterprises, including the withholding 



161 



Portugal: A Country Study 

of a temporary "golden share" for the state, such limits on for- 
eign direct investment are to become illegal in 1995, when Portu- 
gal's capital movement regulations will come fully into compliance 
with those of the rest of the EC members. 

Consequently, the prospect of losing national control over large 
branches of the economy appears to be the inevitable price of secur- 
ing Portugal's economic future and closing the income gap between 
the Portuguese and their more prosperous neighbors. 

External Public Debt 

Portugal's external public debt was on a steeply rising trend from 
1976 onward, reaching nearly US$18.5 billion at the end of 1987, 
its peak dollar magnitude. After that year, early repayments of prin- 
cipal slightly reduced outstanding debt to slightly over US$18.4 
billion in 1990. As the proceeds from privatization of nationalized 
enterprises are applied to debt reduction, Portugal's external public 
obligations will continue to diminish. 

Debt- service indicators reveal much about the relative burden 
of Portugal's foreign indebtedness, as well as the capacity of the 
economy to service this debt (see table 10, Appendix). More rele- 
vant than the dollar value of the debt is the ratio of public external 
debt to GDP, which increased inexorably from 1980 to 1985 (from 
more than 36 percent to more than 80 percent, its highest level) 
and then abruptly fell to just under 29 percent in 1990. Total debt 
service (scheduled amortization and interest payments) as a share 
of current account credits (foreign exchange income from export- 
ing goods and services, as well as from unilateral remittances) rose 
from over 15 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in 1985 and thereafter 
fell to 16.7 percent in 1990. Portugal's success in reducing its rela- 
tive external debt-servicing burden by about half between 1985 and 
1990 was largely the result of burgeoning export receipts, notably 
manufactured goods and tourism income, although growing emi- 
grant worker remittances and transfers from the EC also played 
a role. 

The interest/GDP ratio, which measures the net burden on the 
Portuguese economy, more than doubled from 3 percent in 1980 
to 6.5 percent in 1985 before falling back to 2.9 percent in 1990. 
The external debt/reserves indicator, which compares Portugal's 
foreign/public obligations (mainly the stock of long- and medium- 
term debt) with its gross foreign assets (mainly liquid foreign ex- 
change holdings of the Bank of Portugal and the Treasury, with 
gold valued at market prices) almost tripled between 1980 and 1985, 
when the country's external debt exceeded its official reserves by 
67 percent. As a consequence of the rapid buildup of Portugal's 



162 



Amoreiras shopping and 
office complex in Lisbon 
Courtesy Alan J. Savada 




official reserves from 1985 onward, the external debt/reserves in- 
dicator was reduced to just over 72 percent in 1990. This massive 
accumulation of foreign assets at the disposal of official institutions 
reflects not only Portugal's export drive, but also its success in at- 
tracting direct investments from its EC partners. 



The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
annual economic surveys give an authoritative and readily availa- 
ble exposition of the country's economy with a strong policy orien- 
tation. The quarterly Country Report: Portugal and the annual Country 
Profile: Portugal from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) pro- 
vide current economic coverage, and Mark Hudson's Portugal to 
1993: Investing in a European Future, also published by EIU, is par- 
ticularly useful for analysis of Portugal's economy in the context 
of that country's accession to the EC. For additional current in- 
formation on Portugal's private and public sector economic activi- 
ties, special supplements of the Economist and Financial Times, both 
published in London, offer well- written coverage for the non- 
specialist. From time to time, Euromoney publishes special reports 
on up-to-date banking and financial developments in Portugal. The 
Bank of Portugal's annual reports provide detailed information, 
including copious statistical tables, on the Portuguese economy. 



163 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Valentina Xavier Pintado's Structure and Growth of the Portuguese 
Economy, published by the European Free Trade Association, is the 
definitive study of the economy during the early Salazar period. 
Eric N. Baklanoff s The Economic Transformation of Spain and Portu- 
gal is a comparative analysis of accelerating economic growth in 
the two Iberian countries in response to the new, more open, 
market-oriented economic policies initiated in 1959 by the Franco 
and Salazar regimes. 

Among the more useful books on the postrevolutionary period 
in English are Rodney J. Morrison's Portugal: Revolutionary Change 
in an Open Economy; the World Bank's Portugal: Current and Prospec- 
tive Trends, a report based on the findings of a mission to Portugal 
in 1978; and Portugal: Ancient Country, Young Democracy, edited by 
Kenneth Maxwell and Michael H. Haltzel. This work includes 
three chapters on the economy. 

Two comparative technical studies that illuminate Portugal's in- 
tegration with the European Community are Juergen B. Donges, 
The Second Enlargement of the European Community and European In- 
tegration and the Iberian Economies, edited by George N. Yannopolous. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



164 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Newspaper vendor 



ON APRIL 25, 1974, the Portuguese armed forces overthrew the 
ruling corporative government in a virtually bloodless coup d'etat. 
The coup ended a dictatorial regime established by Antonio de Oli- 
veira Salazar in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and carried on by 
his successor, Marcello Jose das Neves Caetano, after 1968. What 
began, however, as a simple attempt by the Armed Forces Move- 
ment (Movimento das Forcas Armadas — MFA) to replace the 
government in power and change its policies quickly became not 
only a political event of historic proportions, but also a full-scale 
social revolution. 

The Revolution of 1974, as it came to be known, soon involved 
hundreds of thousands of Portuguese who took to the streets. The 
highly organized Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista 
Portugues — PCP), emerging from exile and the underground, soon 
joined forces with the MFA. Many far-left groups also participat- 
ed in the upheaval, as did the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista — 
PS). Many members of the country's middle class joined the 
process, organizing in a matter of months political parties not per- 
mitted under the old regime. 

On the social side, the events that began in the spring of 1974 
drew on the deep frustrations of a society and people emerging from 
half a century of dictatorship, isolation, and backwardness. Chil- 
dren rebelled against their parents, enlisted men against officers, 
employees against employers, workers against factory owners, and 
tenant farmers against absentee landlords. 

There were, in short, two revolutions in Portugal: one was a 
process of political change that grew from a coup d'etat that aimed 
only at changing the governmental structure at the top into a move- 
ment that touched every political relationship; the other was a pro- 
found social transformation that seemed bent on toppling all existing 
social relationships. 

Portugal's opening to democracy attracted worldwide attention 
and was closely scrutinized. Portugal was, after all, not a remote 
Third World state, but part of Western Europe. It belonged to the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA — see Glossary) and was 
a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). A full-scale revolution on European soil and the possi- 
bility of a strong communist party in power made the United States 
and West European countries uneasy. 



167 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Eventually, however, the Portuguese revolution played itself out, 
and moderate forces came to direct the country's affairs. Elections 
for the Constituent Assembly in 1975 gave mainstream democratic 
political parties most of the body's seats and allowed the fashion- 
ing of the constitution of 1976. That constitution established 
parliamentary democracy while preserving many of the revolution's 
radical achievements and pledging a transition to socialism. 

Constitutional amendments in 1982 strengthened the powers of 
the parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, and the prime 
minister, weakened those of the president, and placed the military 
under civilian control. Further amendments to the constitution in 
1989 erased much of the document's ideological commitment to 
socialism and permitted the privatization of many of the economic 
assets nationalized in 1974 and 1975. 

Seven national elections between 1976 and 1991 consolidated 
the place of the new system of democratic government, often called 
the Second Republic. In addition to the PCP and the PS, two other 
parties emerged as significant political forces: the Party of the So- 
cial Democratic Center (Partido do Centro Democratico Social — 
CDS), a right-wing Christian democratic party, and the Social 
Democrat Party (Partido Social Democrata — PSD), a center-right 
group. Until the national election of 1987, when the PSD won a 
majority in the Assembly of the Republic, the parties to the right 
of the PCP had usually formed coalition governments. None of 
these governments, however, was strong enough to serve out a four- 
year legislative period until the PSD government did so in the 
1987-91 period. Under the forceful and able leadership of Anibal 
Cavaco Silva as prime minister, the single-party PSD cabinet was 
able to meet the challenges posed by Portugal's membership in the 
European Community (EC — see Glossary). Cavaco Silva led his 
party to a second majority in the October 1991 parliamentary elec- 
tions and formed another PSD government, an indication perhaps 
that the new democracy was taking root. 

The country's first president elected according to the terms of 
the constitution also contributed significantly to the establishment 
of parliamentary democracy. President Antonio dos Santos Ramal- 
ho Eanes (1976-86), although of military background, abided by 
the new constitution and submitted to amendments that reduced 
his powers and returned the military to the barracks. These ac- 
tions served the fledgling democracy perhaps even more than his 
extinguishing the coup of November 1975, the last attempt of the 
revolutionary left to seize political control. Mario Alberto Nobre 
Lopez Soares, the leader of the PS, succeeded Eanes in 1986 and 
became the country's first civilian president in five decades. Soares 



168 



Government and Politics 



was an effective and popular president and easily won a second 
five-year term in January 1991. 

At the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal's democracy was only 
a decade and a half old, but the transition to democracy seemed 
to have been highly successful. Although the country had many 
social and economic problems to solve, the economy had improved 
noticeably and political stability had been achieved. A free press 
served the public, a marked contrast to the censorship of the Sala- 
zar regime. These developments were testaments that Portugal had 
at last found a place in the community of Western democratic na- 
tions, a remarkable transition from the long dictatorship and the 
subsequent periods of revolutionary upheaval and government 
weakness and instability. 

The Revolution of 1974 and the Transition to 
Democracy 

Portugal's experience with democracy before the Revolution of 
1974 had not been particularly successful. Its First Republic last- 
ed only sixteen years, from 1910 to 1926 (see The First Republic, 
ch. 1). Under the republic, parliamentary institutions worked poorly 
and were soon discredited. Corruption and economic mismanage- 
ment were widespread. When a military coup d'etat ended the 
republic in 1926, few lamented its passing. 

The Salazar-Caetano Era 

The republic was replaced by a military dictatorship that 
promised order, authority, and discipline. The military regime 
abolished political parties, took steps against the small but vocal 
Marxist groups, and did away with republican institutions. In 1928 
it invited University of Coimbra professor Antonio de Oliveira Sala- 
zar to serve as minister of finance. In 1932 he became prime 
minister. That year marked the beginning of his regime, the New 
State (Estado Novo; see The New State, ch. 1). 

Under Salazar (1932-68), Portugal became, at least formally, 
a corporative state. The new constitution of 1933 embodied the 
corporatist theory, under which government was to be formed of 
economic entities organized according to their function, rather than 
by individual representation. Employers were to form one group, 
labor another, and they and other groups were to deal with one 
another through their representative organizations. 

In reality, however, Salazar headed an autocratic dictator- 
ship with the help of an efficient secret police. Strict censorship 
was introduced, the politically suspect were monitored, and the 



169 



Portugal: A Country Study 

regime's opponents were jailed, sent into exile, and occasionally 
killed. 

Portugal drifted and floundered under this repressive regime for 
several decades. Economic conditions improved slightly in the 
1950s, when Salazar instituted the first of two five-year economic 
plans. These plans stimulated some growth, and living standards 
began to rise. 

The 1960s, however, were crisis years for Portugal. Guerrilla 
movements emerged in the Portuguese African colonies of Ango- 
la, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea) 
that aimed at liberating those territories from "the last colonial 
empire." Fighting three guerrilla movements for more than a de- 
cade proved to be enormously draining for a small, poor country 
in terms of labor and financial resources. At the same time, social 
changes brought about by urbanization, emigration, the growth 
of the working class, and the emergence of a sizeable middle class 
put new pressures on the political system to liberalize. Instead, Sala- 
zar increased repression, and the regime became even more rigid 
and ossified. 

When Salazar was incapacitated in an accident in 1968, the 
Council of State, a high-level advisory body created by the consti- 
tution of 1933, chose Marcello Caetano (1968-74) to succeed him. 
Caetano, though a Salazar protege, tried to modernize and liber- 
alize the old Salazar system. He was opposed, however, by a group 
widely referred to as "the bunker," the old Salazaristas. These 
included the country's president, Admiral Americo Tomas, the 
senior officers of the armed forces, and the heads of some of the 
country's largest financial groups. The bunker was powerful enough 
that any fundamental change would certainly have led to Caetano 's 
immediate overthrow. 

As Caetano promised reform but fell into indecision, the sense 
began to grow among all groups — the armed forces, the opposi- 
tion, and liberals within the regime — that only a revolution could 
produce the changes that Portugal sorely needed. Contributing to 
this feeling were a number of growing tensions on the political and 
social scene. 

The continuing economic drain caused by the military campaigns 
in Africa was exacerbated by the first great oil "shock" of 1973. 
Politically, the desire for democracy, or at least a greater opening 
up of the political system, was increasing. Social tensions mount- 
ed, as well, because of the slow pace of change and the absence 
of opportunities for advancement. 

The decisive ingredient in these tensions was dissension within 
the military itself, long a bulwark of the regime. Younger military 



170 



Government and Politics 

academy graduates resented a program introduced by Caetano 
whereby university graduates who completed a brief training pro- 
gram could be commissioned at the same rank as academy gradu- 
ates. Caetano had begun the program because it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to recruit new officers as casualties from the 
African wars mounted (see The Military Takeover of 1974, ch. 5). 

Spfnola and Revolution 

A key catalytic event in the process toward revolution was the 
publication in 1973 General Antonio de Spfnola' s book, Portugal 
and the Future, which criticized the conduct of the war and offered 
a far-ranging program for Portugal's recovery. The general's work 
sent shock waves through the political establishment in Lisbon. As 
the first major and public challenge to the regime by a high-ranking 
figure from within the system, Spfnola' s experience in the African 
campaigns gave his opinions added weight. The book was widely 
seen — a correct assessment as it turned out — as the opening salvo 
in Spfnola' s ambitious campaign to become president. 

On April 25, 1974, a group of younger officers belonging to an 
underground organization, the Armed Forces Movement (Movi- 
mento das Forcas Armadas — MFA), overthrew the Caetano re- 
gime, and Spfnola emerged as at least the titular head of the new 
government. The coup succeeded in hours with virtually no 
bloodshed. Caetano and other high-ranking officials of the old re- 
gime were arrested and exiled, many to Brazil. The military seized 
control of all important installations. 

Spfnola regarded the military's action as a simple military coup 
d'etat aimed at reorganizing the political structure with himself as 
the head, a renovaqao (renovation) in his words. Within days, 
however, it became clear that the coup had released long pent-up 
frustrations when thousands, and then tens of thousands, of Por- 
tuguese poured into the streets celebrating the downfall of the re- 
gime and demanding further change. The coercive apparatus of 
the dictatorship — secret police, Republican Guard, official party, 
censorship — was overwhelmed and abolished. Workers began tak- 
ing over shops from owners, peasants seized private lands, low- 
level employees took over hospitals from doctors and administra- 
tors, and government offices were occupied by workers who sacked 
the old management and demanded a thorough housecleaning. 

Very early on, the demonstrations began to be manipulated by 
organized political elements, principally the PCP and other groups 
farther to the left. Radical labor and peasant leaders emerged from 
the underground where they had been operating for many years. 
Soares, the leader of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista — PS) 



171 



Portugal: A Country Study 

and Alvaro Cunhal, head of the Portuguese Communist Party (Par- 
tido Comunista Portugues — PCP) returned from exile to Portu- 
gal within days of the revolt and received heroes' welcomes. 

Who actually ruled Portugal during this revolutionary period 
was not always clear, and various bodies vied for dominance. Spi- 
nola became the first interim president of the new regime in May 
1974, and he chose the first of six provisional governments that 
were to govern the country until two years later when the first con- 
stitutional government was formed. Headed by a prime minister, 
the moderate civilian Adelino da Palma Carlos, the government 
consisted of the moderate Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popu- 
lar Democrata — PPD), the PS, the PCP, five independents, and 
one military officers. 

Beneath this formal structure, several other groups wielded con- 
siderable power. In the first weeks of the revolution, a key group 
was the Junta of National Salvation, composed entirely of high- 
ranking, politically moderate military officers. Working alongside 
it was a seven-member coordinating committee made up of politi- 
cally radical junior officers who had managed the coup. By the end 
of May 1974, these two bodies worked together with other mem- 
bers in the Council of State, the nation's highest governing body. 

Gradually, however, the MFA emerged as the most power- 
ful single group in Portugal as it overruled Spmola in several 
major decisions. Members of the MFA formed the Continental 
Operations Command (Comando Operacional do Continente — 
COPCON) composed of 5,000 elite troops with Major (later 
Brigadier General) Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho as its commander. 
Known universally by his unusual first name Otelo, Carvalho had 
directed the April 25 coup. Because the regular police had with- 
drawn from the public sector during the time of revolutionary tur- 
moil and the military was somewhat divided, COPCON became 
the most important force for order in the country and was firmly 
under the control of radical left-wing officers. 

Spmola formed a second provisional government in mid-July 
with army Colonel (later General) Vasco Goncalves as prime 
minister and eight military officers, along with members of the PS, 
PCP, and PPD. Spmola chose Goncalves because he was a moder- 
ate, but he was to move increasingly to the left as he headed four 
provisional governments between July 1974 and September 1975. 
Spmola' s position further weakened when he was obliged to con- 
sent to the independence of Portugal's African colonies, rather than 
achieving the federal solution he had outlined in his book. Guinea- 
Bissau gained independence in early September, and talks were 
underway on the liberation of the other colonies. Spmola attempted 



172 



Street demonstration during the Revolution of 1974 
Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington 

to seize full power in late September but was blocked by COP- 
CON and resigned from office. His replacement was the moder- 
ate General Francisco de Costa Gomes. Goncalves formed a third 
provisional government with heavy MFA membership, nine mili- 
tary officers in all, and members of the PS, PCP, and PPD. 

In the next year, Portuguese politics moved steadily leftward. 
The PCP was highly successful in placing its members in many 
national and local political and administrative offices, and it was 
consolidating its hold on the country's labor unions. The MFA came 
ever more under the control of its radical wing, and some of its 
members came under the influence of the PCP. In addition, smaller, 
more radical left-wing groups joined with the PCP in staging huge 
demonstrations that brought about the increasing adoption of leftist 
policies, including nationalizations of private companies. 

An attempted coup by Spmola in early March 1975 failed, and 
he fled the country. In response to this attack from the right, radi- 
cal elements of the military abolished the Junta of National Salva- 
tion and formed the Council of the Revolution as the country's 
most powerful governing body. The council was made responsi- 
ble to a 240-member radical military parliament, the Assembly of 
the Armed Forces. A fourth provisional government was formed, 
more radical than its predecessor, and was headed by Goncalves, 



173 



Portugal: A Country Study 



with eight military officers and members of the PS, PCP, PPD, 
and Portuguese Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrati- 
co Portugues — MDP), a party close to the PCP. 

The new government began a wave of nationalizations of banks 
and large businesses (see Nationalization, ch. 3). Because the banks 
were often holding companies, the government came after a time 
to own almost all the country's newspapers, insurance companies, 
hotels, construction companies and many other kinds of business- 
es, so that its share of the country's gross national product (GNP — 
see Glossary) amounted to 70 percent. 

The Transition to Civilian Rule 

Elections were held on April 25, 1975, for the Constituent As- 
sembly that was to draft a constitution. The PS won nearly 38 per- 
cent the vote, and the PPD took 26.4 percent. The PCP, which 
opposed the elections because its leadership expected to do poor- 
ly, won less than 13 percent of the vote. A democratic right-wing 
party, the Party of the Social Democratic Center (Partido do Cen- 
tro Democratico Social — CDS), came in fourth with less than 8 
percent (see table 11, Appendix). Despite the fact that the elec- 
tions took place in a period of revolutionary ferment, most Por- 
tuguese voted for middle-class parties committed to pluralistic 
democracy. 

Many Portuguese regarded the elections as a sign that democracy 
was being effectively established. In addition, most members of 
the military welcomed the beginning of a transition to civilian 
democracy. Some elements of the MFA, however, had opposed 
the elections, agreeing to them only after working out an agree- 
ment with political parties that the MFA's policies would be car- 
ried out regardless of election results. 

Following the elections came the "hot summer" of 1975 when 
the revolution made itself felt in the countryside. Landless agricul- 
tural laborers in the south seized the large farms on which they 
worked. Many estates in the Alentejo were confiscated — over 1 mil- 
lion hectares in all — and transformed into collective farms (see Land 
Tenure and Agrarian Reform, ch. 3). In the north, where most 
farms were small and owned by those who worked them, such ac- 
tions did not occur. The north's small farmers, conservative 
property-owners, violently repulsed the attempts of radical elements 
and the PCP to collectivize their land. Some farmers formed right- 
wing organizations in defense of private landownership, a rever- 
sal of the region's early welcoming of the revolution. 

Other revolutionary actions were met with hostility, as well. In 
mid-July, the PS and the PPD withdrew from the fourth provisional 



174 



Government and Politics 



government to protest antidemocratic actions by radical military 
and leftist political forces. The PS newspaper Republica had been 
closed by radical workers, causing a storm of protest both domes- 
tically and abroad. The PS and other democratic parties were also 
faced with a potentially lethal threat to the new freedom posed by 
the PCP's open contempt for parliamentary democracy and its 
dominance in Portugal's main trade union, Intersindical, or as it 
came to be known in 1977, the General Confederation of Portuguese 
Workers- National Intersindical (Confederacao Geral dos Trabal- 
hadores Portugueses-Intersindical Nacional — CGTP-IN). 

The United States and many West European countries expressed 
considerable alarm at the prospect of a Marxist-Leninist takeover 
in a NATO country. United States Secretary of State Henry Kis- 
singer told PS leader Soares that he would probably be the 
"Kerensky [the Russian social-democratic leader whose short-lived 
rule was the prelude to a Bolshevik takeover] of Portugal." The 
result of these concerns was an influx of foreign financial aid into 
Portugal to shore up groups committed to pluralist parliamentary 
democracy. 

By the time of the "hot summer" of 1975, several currents could 
be seen within the MFA. A moderate group, the Group of Nine, 
issued a manifesto in August that advocated nonaligned socialism 
along the lines of Scandinavian social democracy. Another group 
published a manifesto that criticized both the Group of Nine and 
those who had drawn close to the PCP and singled out Prime 
Minister Goncalves for his links to the Communists. These differ- 
ences of opinion signaled the end of the fifth provisional govern- 
ment, in power only a month, under Goncalves in early September. 
Goncalves was subsequently expelled from the Council of the Revo- 
lution as this body became more moderate. The sixth provisional 
government was formed, headed by Admiral Jose Baptista Pin- 
heiro de Azevedo; it included the leader of the Group of Nine and 
members of the PS, the PPD, and PCP. This government, which 
was to remain in power until July 1976, when the first constitu- 
tional government was formed, was pledged to adhere to the poli- 
cies advocated by MFA moderates. 

Evolving political stability did not reflect the country as a whole, 
which was on the verge of anarchy. Even the command structure 
of the military broke down. Political parties to the right of the PCP 
became more confident and increasingly fought for order, as did 
many in the military. The granting of independence to Mozam- 
bique in September 1975, to East Timor in October, and to An- 
gola in November meant that the colonial wars had ended. The 
attainment of peace, the main aim of the military during all these 



175 



Portugal: A Country Study 

months of political upheaval, was thus achieved, and the military 
could begin the transition to civilian rule. The polling results of 
the April 1975 constituent assembly elections legitimized the popular 
support given to the parties that could manage and would welcome 
this transition. 

An attempted coup by radical military units in November 1975 
marked the last serious leftist effort to seize power. The leftists were 
blocked, however, on November 25 when Colonel Antonio dos San- 
tos Ramalho Eanes declared a state of emergency. The revolution- 
ary units were quickly surrounded and forced to surrender; about 
200 extreme leftists were arrested and COPCON was abolished. 
The glamour of revolutionary goals had faded somewhat, and peo- 
ple returned to their jobs and daily routines after eighteen months 
of political and social turmoil. A degree of compromise was reached 
among competing political visions of how the new state should be 
organized, and the constitution of 1976 was proclaimed on April 
2, 1976. Several weeks later, on April 25, elections for the new 
parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, were held. 

These elections could be said to be the definitive end of a period 
of revolution. Moderate democratic parties received most of the 
vote. Revolutionary achievements were not discarded, however. 
The constitution pledged the country to realize socialism. Further- 
more, the constitution declared the extensive nationalizations and 
land seizures of 1975 irreversible. The military supported these com- 
mitments through a pact with the main political parties; the pact 
guaranteed the military guardian rights over the new democracy 
for four more years. 

Consolidation of Democracy 

The PS won the first elections for the new parliament, the As- 
sembly of the Republic. The PS took 36.7 percent of the vote, com- 
pared with 25.2 percent for the PDP, 16.7 percent for the CDS, 
and 15.2 percent for the PCP. Elections for the presidency were 
held in June and won easily by General Eanes, who enjoyed the 
backing of parties to the right of the communists, the PS, the PPD, 
and the CDS. 

Although the PS did not have a majority in the Assembly of the 
Republic, Eanes allowed it to form the first constitutional govern- 
ment with Soares as prime minister. The PS governed from July 
23, 1976, to January 30, 1978. A second government, formed from 
a coalition with the CDS, lasted from January to August of 1978 
and was also led by Soares. The PS governments faced enormous 
economic and social problems, including runaway inflation, high 
unemployment, falling wages, and an enormous influx of Portuguese 



176 



Antonio dos Santos Ramalho 
Eanes, president, 1976-86 



Anibal Cavaco Silva, 
prime minister, 1985- 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Portugal, Washington 



settlers from Africa. The government's failure to fix the economy, 
even after adopting a painful austerity program imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary), ultimately 
forced the PS to relinquish power. The party could be judged suc- 
cessful, however: it had governed Portugal democratically for two 
years and helped thereby to consolidate the new political system. 
After the collapse of the PS-CDS coalition government in July 1978, 
President Eanes formed a number of caretaker governments in the 
hope that they would rule until the parliamentary elections man- 
dated by the constitution could be held in 1980. There were, there- 
fore, three short-lived governments appointed by President Eanes. 
These governments were led by Prime Minister Alfred Nobre da 
Costa from August 28 to November 21, 1978; Carlos Mota Pinto 
from November 21, 1978, to July 31, 1979; and Maria de Lourdes 
Pintasilgo (Portugal's first woman prime minister) from July 31, 
1979, to January 3, 1980. 

The weakness of these governments and the failure of the PS 
and the PPD, now renamed the Social Democrat Party (Partido 



177 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Social Democrata — PSD), to form a coalition government forced 
President Eanes to call for interim elections to be held in Decem- 
ber 1979. Francisco Sa Carneiro, the dynamic leader of the PSD 
and a fierce personal rival of Soares, put together a coalition of 
his own PSD, the CDS, the Popular Monarchist Party (Partido 
Popular Monarquico — PPM), and another small party to form the 
Democratic Alliance (Alianca Democratica — AD). The AD down- 
played its intentions to revise the constitution to reverse the na- 
tionalizations and land seizures of the mid-1970s and advocated 
a moderate economic policy. The coalition won 45.2 percent of 
the vote in the elections, or 128 seats, for a majority of 3 in the 
250-seat assembly. The PS, which had also formed an electoral coa- 
lition with several small left-wing groups, suffered a drubbing and 
won only 27.4 percent, a large drop compared with 1976 results. 
The PCP, in coalition with another left-wing party, gained slightly. 

Sa Carneiro became prime minister in January 1980, and the 
tenor of parliamentary politics moved to the right as the govern- 
ment attempted to undo some of the revolution's radical reforms. 
The powers conferred on the presidency by the constitution of 1976 
enabled President Eanes to block the AD's centrist economic poli- 
cies, however. For this reason, the AD concentrated on winning 
enough seats in the October 1980 elections to reach the two-thirds 
majority necessary to effect constitutional change and on electing 
someone other than Eanes in the presidential elections of Decem- 
ber 1980. 

Portuguese voters approved of the movement to the right. In 
the parliamentary elections, the AD coalition increased the num- 
ber of its seats to 134, the PS held steady at 74 seats, and the PCP 
lost 6 seats for a total of 41. The AD's win was not complete, 
however, because President Eanes was easily reelected in Decem- 
ber. In contrast to the election of 1976, when Eanes was support- 
ed by the PS and parties to its right, he was backed in 1980 by 
the PS, the PCP, and other left-wing parties. Voters admired Eanes 
for his integrity and obvious devotion to democracy. His election, 
however, made constitutional change less certain because the AD 
did not have by itself the required two-thirds majority. The AD 
also suffered a serious loss when its dynamic leader, Sa Carneiro, 
died in a plane crash just two days before the presidential election. 
His successor was Franciso Pinto Balsemao, the founder and edi- 
tor of the Expresso newspaper. 

The AD coalition remained in power until mid- 1983, forming two 
governments with Balsemao as prime minister. In combination with 
the PS, which also desired fundamental changes in the political sys- 
tem, the AD was able to revise the constitution. Amendments were 



178 



Government and Politics 



passed that enhanced the power of the prime minister and the 
Assembly of the Republic at the expense of the president and the 
military (see Constitutional Development, this ch.). The revised 
constitution was promulgated in September 1982. 

Although the AD government had achieved its main objective 
of amending the constitution, the country's economic problems 
worsened, and the coalition gradually lost popular support. Balse- 
mao also tired of the constant political skirmishing needed to hold 
the AD together and resigned in December 1982. Unable to choose 
a successor, the AD broke apart. Parliamentary elections in April 
1983 gave the PS a stunning victory that increased its parliamen- 
tary seats to 101. After long negotiations, the PS joined with the 
PSD to form a governing coalition, the Central Bloc (Bloco Cen- 
tral), with Soares as prime minister. 

The Central Bloc government was fragile from its beginning and 
lasted only two years. Faced with serious and worsening economic 
problems, the government had to adopt an unpopular austerity poli- 
cy. Administrative and personality difficulties made relations within 
the government tense and resulted in bitter parliamentary maneu- 
vers. Overshadowing these difficulties was the upcoming presiden- 
tial election in early 1986. Soares made clear his ambition to succeed 
Eanes, who, according to the constitution, was not allowed to seek 
a third consecutive term. A split within the PSD over its presiden- 
tial candidate ended the coalition government in June 1985. 

In new assembly elections held in October 1985, the PS, blamed 
by the public for the country's severe economic problems, such 
as a 10 percent fall in wages since 1983, suffered serious losses and 
lost almost half its seats in the Assembly of the Republic. The PCP's 
electoral coalition lost six seats; the PSD won thirteen more seats 
because of new leadership; and the CDS lost almost a third of its 
seats. The big winner was a party formed by supporters of Presi- 
dent Eanes, the Party of Democratic Renovation (Partido Reno- 
vador Democratico — PRD), which, although only months old, won 
nearly 18 percent of the vote and forty-five seats. The party's vic- 
tory stemmed from the high regard Portuguese voters had for Presi- 
dent Eanes. 

No party emerged from the October 1985 elections with any- 
thing even close to an absolute majority. Hence, the 1985-87 period 
was unstable politically. The new head of the PSD, economist 
Anibal Cavaco Silva, as prime minister headed a minority PSD 
government that managed to survive for only seventeen months. 
Its success was attributed partly to support from the PRD, which 
as a young party wished to establish itself, although it was a motion 



179 



Portugal: A Country Study 



of censure presented by this party in the spring of 1987 that even- 
tually brought the government down. Cavaco Silva also benefited 
from the internal dissension of other parties. 

The presidential election of 1986 did not yield a winner in the 
first round. The candidate of the CDS and the PSD, Diogo Frei- 
tas do Amaral, won 46.3 percent of the vote compared with 25.4 
percent for Mario Soares. Freitas do Amaral, the candidate of a 
united right, profited from the left's mounting of three candidates. 
In the two-candidate runoff election in mid-February, Soares won 
with 51.3 percent of the vote, getting the support of most left-wing 
voters. The PCP supported him as the lesser of two evils, even 
though Soares repeatedly reminded voters that he, perhaps more 
than anyone else, had prevented the Communists from coming to 
power in the mid-1970s. 

Cavaco Silva came to have full control of his party, the PSD. 
As prime minister, he governed boldly and pushed, through his 
influence in the parliament, for a liberalization of the economy. 
He was fortunate in that external economic trends and the infu- 
sion of funds from the European Community (EC — see Glossary) 
after Portugal became a member in 1986 enlivened the country's 
economy and began to bring an unaccustomed prosperity to Por- 
tuguese wage earners. Confident therefore that his party could win 
in parliamentary elections, Cavaco Silva maneuvered his political 
opponents into passing a vote of censure against his government 
in April 1987. Instead of asking for a new government composed 
of a variety of parties on the left, President Soares called for elec- 
tions in July. 

Cavaco Silva had judged the political situation correctly. The 
PSD won just over 50 percent of the vote, which gave it an abso- 
lute majority in the parliament, the first single-party majority since 
the restoration of democracy in 1974. The strong mandate ena- 
bled Cavaco Silva to put forward a more clearly defined program 
and perhaps to govern more effectively than his predecessors. The 
emergence of a single-party government supported by a parliamen- 
tary majority was for many observers the coming of age of Por- 
tuguese democracy. 

The Governmental System 

Portugal made remarkable political progress after 1974. It 
replaced the authoritarian-corporatist regime of Salazar, and, as 
of the early 1990s, the country appeared to have successfully made 
the transition to democracy. Although political and governmental 
problems remained, the government was popularly elected, it func- 
tioned according to the constitution, and, since the mid-1980s, had 



180 



Government and Politics 



done so with notable stability. The successful transition to democracy 
in the Iberian Peninsula since the mid-1970s (in Spain, as well as 
in Portugal) may be thought of as one of the most significant politi- 
cal transformations of the late twentieth century. 

Constitutional Development 

Portugal is governed under the constitution of 1976 whose prelimi- 
nary drafting was largely completed in 1975, then finished and offi- 
cially promulgated in early 1976. At the time the constitution was 
being drafted, a democratic outcome was still uncertain because the 
country was in the midst of a revolution. Even after a leftist coup 
had been put down in November 1975, it was not known if the armed 
forces would respect the assembly and allow work on the constitu- 
tion to go forward. The MFA and leftist groups pressured and ca- 
joled the assembly, and there was much discussion of establishing 
a revolutionary and socialist system of government. Moreover, not 
all of the assembly's members were committed to parliamentary 
democracy. The membership was intensely partisan, with some 60 
percent of the seats occupied by the left. 

After great struggle, the Constituent Assembly eventually adopted 
a constitution that provided for a democratic, parliamentary sys- 
tem with political parties, elections, a parliament, and a prime mini- 
ster. The document also established an independent judiciary and 
listed a number of human rights. Noteworthy features of the con- 
stitution include its ideological content, its provision for the role of 
the military, and its dual presidential-parliamentary system. 

The constitution was a highly charged ideological document that 
included numerous references to socialism, the rights of workers, 
and the desirability of a socialist economy. It severely restricted pri- 
vate investment and business activity. Many of these articles were 
advanced by PCP representatives in the Constituent Assembly, but 
they were also advocated by members of the PS, who at that time, 
for electoral reasons, were seeking to be as revolutionary as the far 
left. The resulting document proclaimed that the object of the republic 
was "to ensure the transition to socialism." The constitution also 
urged the state to "socialize the means of production and abolish 
the exploitation of man by man," phrases that echoed Marx's 
Communist Manifesto. Workers' Committees were given the right to 
supervise the management of enterprises and to have their represen- 
tatives elected to the boards of state-owned firms. The government, 
among many admonitions along the same vein, was to "direct its 
work toward the socialization of medicine and the medico- 
pharmaceutical sectors. ' ' 



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Portugal: A Country Study 



The constitution gave the military great political power through 
the role given to the M FA- controlled Council of the Revolution 
that, in effect, made the MFA a separate and almost co-equal 
branch of government. The council was to be an advisory body 
to the president (who was at first likely to come from the military 
itself) and would function as a sort of constitutional court to en- 
sure that the laws passed by parliament were in accord with the 
MFA's desires and did not undermine the achievements of the revo- 
lution. The council was also to serve as a high-level decision-making 
body for the armed forces themselves. The council was a conces- 
sion to the MFA for allowing the Constituent Assembly to sit and 
promulgate a new "basic law." Some members of the Portuguese 
left, especially the PCP, supported the council in the hope that they 
would continue to enjoy MFA support even if they lost ground with 
the electorate. 

The final innovative feature of the constitution was its provi- 
sion for a system of government that was both presidential and 
parliamentarian. The Constituent Assembly favored two centers 
of power in order to avoid both the dangers of an excessively strong 
executive, as was the case during the Salazar period, and the weak- 
nesses of parliamentary instability, as was the case in the First 
Republic. 

The constitution was controversial from the start. It was widely 
seen in political circles as a compromise document because all par- 
ticipants in its drafting had been able to incorporate in it provi- 
sions they found vital. The constitution's parliamentary sections 
had the support of the PS, the PSD, and the CDS; its socialistic 
content had the support of the PCP and its allies and the PS. 

Even before the constitution became law, politicians had agreed 
to change some provisions after the five-year period in which 
changes were prohibited had elapsed. Objections to the document 
centered on its ideological content, its economic restrictions, and 
its recognition of a military role in the governance of the country. 
The CDS, the party furthest to the right among the groups that 
had participated in the document's drafting, refused to ratify it. 
The CDS did agree to abide by the constitution in the interim, 
however. 

By the early 1980s, the political climate was ripe for constitu- 
tional reform. The center-right coalition AD, formed by the PSD, 
the CDS, and the monarchist party, the PPM, was in power; the 
PS had been voted out of office, and the PCP was politically iso- 
lated. The first amendments, enacted in 1982, dealt with the con- 
stitution's political arrangements. Although many of the economic 
provisions of the constitution had been not been implemented and 



182 



Government and Politics 



were, in effect, being ignored, there were not yet enough votes to 
reach the required two-thirds majority needed to amend them. 

The 1982 amendments were enacted through the combined votes 
of the AD and the PS. This combination of center-right and center- 
left political forces managed to end the military's control of Por- 
tuguese politics (see The Armed Forces in Political Life after 1974, 
ch. 5). It abolished the Council of the Revolution, controlled by 
the military, and replaced it with two consultative bodies. One of 
these, the Higher Council of National Defense, was limited to com- 
menting on military matters. The other, the Council of State, was 
broadly representative of the entire country and did not have the 
power to prevent government and parliamentary actions by declar- 
ing them unconstitutional. Another amendment created a Con- 
stitutional Court to review the constitutionality of legislation. 
Because ten of its thirteen judges were chosen by the Assembly of 
the Republic, the court was under parliamentary control. Another 
important change reduced the president's power by restricting 
presidential ability to dismiss the government, dissolve parliament, 
or veto legislation. 

Despite these amendments, centrists and conservatives continued 
to criticize the constitution as too ideological and economically re- 
strictive. Hence, the constitution was amended again in 1989. Many 
economic restrictions were removed and much ideological language 
eliminated, while governmental structures remained unchanged. 
The most important change enabled the state to privatize much 
of the property and many of the enterprises nationalized during 
the mid-1970s. 

Further amendments were to become possible in 1994. Political 
scientists speculated that the electoral system might be amended 
so that Portuguese living abroad could vote in presidential elec- 
tions, a change that had long been sought. Another change could 
be the introduction of the concept of the "constructive vote of no 
confidence" used in Germany to help shore up minority govern- 
ments. This parliamentary provision would permit a government 
to remain in place despite a vote of no confidence if the parlia- 
ment could not form an alternative government and would pre- 
vent purely negative majorities from destroying a government. As 
of the early 1990s, a Portuguese government that received a vote 
of no confidence had to resign. 

The Presidency 

Although Portugal's government includes a parliament, an as- 
sembly, and a cabinet needing parliamentary support, its presi- 
dent has considerable power. As noted above, this dual system was 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

a response to the Portugal's experiences with parliamentary insta- 
bility and dictatorship. Yet, the extent of the president's power, 
even after the 1982 revision of the constitution, was not always clear. 
As a result, at times the relationships among the main institutions 
of the Portuguese system remained somewhat ambiguous. 

The president is elected by majority vote in nationwide ballot- 
ing. The term of office is five years, and no president may serve 
more than two consecutive terms. Real power is vested in the office 
of the president, who is not merely a symbol of national unity, but 
rather the chief of state. In times of national crisis, presidents can 
make or unmake governments, and even in situations when, for 
example, the government is weak and no party has a majority, they 
can exercise considerable influence behind the scenes. 

According to the terms of the 1989 revised edition of the consti- 
tution, the president's powers and duties include acting as supreme 
commander of the armed forces, promulgating laws, declaring a 
state of siege, granting pardons, submitting legislation to the Con- 
stitutional Court for approval, making many high appointments, 
and, when needed, removing high officials from their posts. The 
president also calls elections, convenes special sessions of the As- 
sembly of the Republic, dissolves this body in accordance with law, 
and appoints the prime minister. 

The 1982 amendments to the constitution reduced the powers 
of the presidency somewhat, mainly by specifying the periods in 
which presidents may not dissolve the assembly (during the first 
six months after the assembly's election, in the last six months of 
a president's term, and during a state of siege or an emergency) 
and stipulating when they may dismiss a government ("only when 
this becomes necessary to secure the regular functioning of the 
democratic institutions"). The presidential veto power was reduced 
in that a simple majority in the assembly can override presidential 
vetoes. The power of pocket veto was also abolished. According 
to the 1982 amendments, the president must either accept legisla- 
tion or reject it. 

The presidency is intended for a national figure of great pres- 
tige and ideally one above partisan politics. As of the early 1990s, 
Portugal had had only two presidents since the constitution was 
promulgated in 1976. General Eanes was elected in 1976 and eas- 
ily reelected to a second term in 1980. In 1986 PS leader Soares 
was elected to the presidency, but only in the runoff election after 
he had gained the support of the PCP and the PSD. In January 
1991, he easily won reelection for a second term. 

These two men were genuinely popular presidents because of 
their statesmanlike qualities and their obvious devotion to their 



184 



Government and Politics 



country's welfare. General Eanes was widely regarded as the man 
who made possible Portugal's transition to centrist democracy af- 
ter the tumult of the revolution. He was politically moderate and 
a conciliator who remained apart from the country's contending 
factions. In Portugal's democratic transition, Soares was also seen 
as a heroic figure who had fought tenaciously, first against the Sala- 
zar regime, enduring both imprisonment and exile, and later against 
Communist rule. He was also the country's first civilian president 
since the First Republic. 

The Council of State 

The Council of State, which in the 1982 constitutional reform 
replaced the Council of the Revolution, functions as a high-level 
advisory body to the president. Its members consist of the presi- 
dent of the Assembly of the Republic, the prime minister, the presi- 
dent of the Constitutional Court, the ombudsman, the chairpersons 
of the regional governments, former presidents, five citizens ap- 
pointed by the president, and five persons elected by the Assem- 
bly of the Republic. 

The council is a broadly consultative group with deep roots in 
Portuguese history. It is a kind of throwback to an earlier Portuguese 
concept of corporative, regional, or functional representation. 
However, it has no executive power and in recent times has been 
called into its advisory capacity only rarely. As a result, member- 
ship on it has come to be mainly honorary. 

The Prime Minister 

The prime minister of Portugal heads the government and 
manages the nation's affairs on a daily basis. The prime minister 
chooses or approves cabinet ministers and directs or coordinates 
their actions. The office thus differs from that in Britain, where 
the prime minister is the first among equals. Moreover, the entire 
cabinet bears responsibility for its actions, not the prime minister 
alone. The prime minister also directs the operations of the armed 
forces, although the president is formally the commander in chief. 
In other matters as well, the prime minister is autonomous, and 
the president has no right to direct the prime minister's policies. 

Unlike the president, the prime minister is elected indirectly. 
As in other parliamentary systems, the prime minister is the lead- 
er of the largest party in the parliament or the head of a coalition 
of parties. The prime minister's term may last for up to four years, 
through an entire legislative period, after which time new elections 
are held. However, the prime minister may call earlier elections. 
The prime minister may ask for a vote of confidence from the 



185 



Portugal: A Country Study 

parliament, but he can also be ousted by a vote of no confidence 
or through a leadership change in his own party. If a prime minister 
proves incompetent, loses support, or fails to provide needed na- 
tional direction, the president may also request that a new govern- 
ment be formed. 

In the ten years following the Revolution of 1974, Portugal was 
governed by nearly a dozen weak and short-lived governments; 
the number of prime ministers was not large, however, because 
all but two of them headed more than one cabinet. After mid- 1985, 
the political system attained a greater stability when Anibal Cava- 
co Silva, head of the Social Democrat Party (Partido Social - 
Democrata — PSD), formed first a minority government and then 
a majority government that lasted the entire 1987-91 legislative 
period. After his party won 50.4 percent of the vote in the 1991 
national elections, Cavaco Silva formed another government that 
enjoyed an absolute parliamentary majority. 

The Council of Ministers 

The Council of Ministers, or cabinet, is the state's highest ex- 
ecutive institution. The council consists of the prime minister and 
fifteen to eighteen cabinet ministers. Most ministers come from 
the parliament, but they are not required to do so. In coalition 
cabinets, the majority of ministers usually belongs to the coalition's 
largest party, that of the prime minister, and the remaining 
ministers come from other coalition parties. Once in the cabinet, 
a member of parliament has to relinquish, at least temporarily, 
his or her seat in that body. 

The Council of Ministers has both administrative and policy- 
making functions, is responsible for national security and defense 
affairs, and is in charge of the day-to-day implementation of govern- 
ment policy. In addition, Portugal's cabinet has extensive legisla- 
tive powers by virtue of its power to pass decree-laws within areas 
of its responsibility. It can also be granted the right by the Assem- 
bly of the Republic to pass legislation in areas of responsibility usual- 
ly reserved to parliament, its "relatively reserved legislative 
powers." Because getting a bill through the assembly was often 
a slow process, the Council of Ministers often made use of this right. 
The council is responsible both individually and collectively for its 
actions, first to the prime minister and ultimately to the parliament. 

In Portugal, the minister with the greatest power is the minister 
of finance, who prepares the budget and oversees the finances of 
the other ministries. Ministers are assisted by politically appointed 
secretaries of state, who vacate their positions when their minis- 
ters leave the council. As allowed by Article 203 of the 1989 revised 



186 




Assembly of the Republic, Lisbon 
Courtesy Andrea Matles Savada 

constitution, a number of ministers sometimes meet together and 
form what the constitution terms "councils of specialized minis- 
ters" to work on matters of mutual concern. They can call on their 
secretaries of state and civil servants for assistance and can submit 
the results of their collaboration to the entire cabinet for review. 

Additional bodies were later created to assist individual ministers 
on the council as a whole. In 1984 the Office of Techno-Legislative 
Support, under the minister of justice, was formed to assist the coun- 
cil in drafting legislation. A number of superior councils assist 
ministers with studies and planning. Examples of this kind of body 
are the Superior Council of Finance and the National Board of Edu- 
cation. In addition to advising ministers, these bodies meet with 
groups affected by government decisions. 

The Assembly of the Republic 

According to the Portuguese constitution, the country's unicameral 
parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, "is the representative 
assembly of all Portuguese citizens." The constitution names the 
assembly as one of the country's organs of supreme authority and, 
in Article 114 of the 1989 revised constitution, charges it to exer- 
cise its powers both separately and interdependently with the presi- 
dent, the government, and the courts. 



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Portugal: A Country Study 



The assembly's power derives from its power to dismiss a govern- 
ment through a vote of no confidence, to impeach the president, 
to change the country's laws, and to amend the constitution. In 
addition to these key powers, the constitution grants to the Assembly 
of the Republic extensive legislative powers and substantial con- 
trol over the budget, the right to authorize the government to raise 
taxes and grant loans, the power to ratify treaties and other kinds 
of international agreements, and the duty to approve or reject de- 
cisions by the president of the republic to declare war and make 
peace. The assembly also appoints many members of important 
state institutions, such as ten of the thirteen members of the Con- 
stitutional Court and seven of the sixteen members of the Higher 
Council of the Bench. 

The constitution requires the assembly to quickly review and 
approve an incoming government's program. Parliamentary rules 
allow the assembly to call for committees of inquiry to examine 
the government's actions. Political opposition represented in the 
assembly has the power to review the cabinet's actions, even though 
it is unlikely that the actions can be reversed. For example, as few 
as ten members can request that the assembly ratify the govern- 
ment's decree-laws not belonging to the cabinet's exclusive juris- 
diction. As little as one-fifth of the assembly can call for a motion 
of censure, although an absolute majority of the assembly is re- 
quired to sustain the censure. Party groups can also call for inter- 
pellations that require debates about specific government policies. 

The assembly consisted at first of 250 members, but the con- 
stitutional reforms of 1989 reduced its number to between 230 and 
235. Members are elected by popular vote for legislative terms of 
four years from the country's constituencies (eighteen in mainland 
Portugal, one each for the autonomous regions of the Azores 
(Acores) and Madeira, one for Portuguese living in Western Eu- 
rope, and one for those living in the rest of the world). The num- 
ber of voters registered in a constituency determines the number 
of its members in the assembly. Constituencies vary greatly in size. 
As of the early 1990s, as many as three dozen representatives came 
from the Lisbon district and as few as three from some inland dis- 
tricts. The autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira each 
sent five members to the assembly. 

According to the constitution, members of the assembly represent 
the entire country, not the constituency from which they are elected. 
This directive was reinforced hi practice by the strong role of po- 
litical parties in regard to members of the assembly. As of the early 
1990s, party leadership, for example, determined in which areas 
candidates were to run for office, thus often weakening members' 



188 



Government and Politics 



ties to their constituencies. Moreover, members of the assembly 
were expected to vote with their party and to work within parliamen- 
tary groups based on party membership. Party discipline was 
strong, and insubordinate members could be coerced through a 
variety of means. A further obstacle to members' independence 
was that their bills first had to be submitted to the parliamentary 
groups, and it was these group leaders who set the assembly's agen- 
da. The leader of the assembly, its president, was selected from 
the group leaders. 

Assembly sessions are scheduled to run from mid-October to mid- 
June, but often extend beyond this period because of uncomplet- 
ed business. When the body is not in session, it is represented by 
its Standing Committee, headed by the president of the as- 
sembly and composed of assembly members chosen to reflect the 
larger body's political composition. The committee monitors the 
president and the government and can call for meetings of the en- 
tire assembly if necessary. 

Much of the assembly's work is done in committees, both per- 
manent and ad hoc. Committee membership is to reflect the as- 
sembly party makeup, and members are usually not allowed to serve 
on more than two committees. The committees examine legisla- 
tive proposals, most of which come from the government rather 
than from the assembly itself after a first reading in the assembly. 
Appropriate witnesses and expert testimony can be called; for cer- 
tain types of legislation, labor legislation for example, concerned 
parties have to be heard. Once a committee approves a bill, the 
bill can receive a second reading and a plenary vote. 

The Portuguese parliament did not enjoy much prestige initially. 
Its efficacy was impeded by the absence of adequate resources and 
staff and the lack of an efficient infrastructure of committees and 
subcommittees. This institutional inadequacy buttressed the tradi- 
tional lack of respect the Portuguese felt for their governing insti- 
tutions. To the public, the assembly personified democracy's defects 
in that it was inefficient, quarrelsome, splintered, and patronage- 
dominated. Its members were frequently seen as putting partisan 
interests ahead of the interests of the nation or of using their 
parliamentary positions to enhance their private careers and for- 
tunes. In newspaper editorials and cartoons, parliament members 
were often portrayed as buffoonish, silly, and irrelevant. Polls in 
1978 and 1984 found that the Portuguese saw parliament as less 
important than the president, the prime minister, or the cabinet. 
It was thus not surprising that at times Portuguese democracy 
seemed insufficiently rooted. Yet, democracy had survived the un- 
stable period after the revolution, and, despite all its problems, many 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

Portuguese had come to see the Assembly of the Republic as 
indispensable to its preservation. In addition, reforms of the parlia- 
ment's organization and practices, as well as increased numbers 
of skilled and experienced staffers, had improved the body's effi- 
ciency. 

The Judiciary 

The constitution provides for the Constitutional Court; the 
Supreme Court of Justice and the Supreme Administrative Court, 
both of which have subordinate courts; and a variety of special 
courts, including a military court system. It states that the courts 
are the "organs of supreme authority competent to administer 
justice in the name of the people." The courts are also designated 
as "independent and subject only to the law." 

The Constitutional Court, called into existence by the constitu- 
tional reform of 1982, judges whether legislative acts are legal and 
constitutional. Among other duties, this court also ascertains the 
physical ability of the president to carry out presidential functions 
and examines international agreements for their constitutionality. 
Ten of its thirteen members are chosen by the Assembly of the 
Republic. 

The Supreme Court of Justice is designated the "highest court 
of law," but "without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Constitu- 
tional Court," and heads the court system that deals with civil and 
criminal cases. The courts of first instance (the first courts to try 
a case) are the municipal and district courts; the courts of second 
instance are, as a rule, courts of appeal. As of the early 1990s, there 
were four of these latter courts. The Supreme Court of Justice may 
serve as a court of first instance in some cases and as an appeals 
court in others. 

The Supreme Court of Administration examines the fiscal and 
administrative conduct of government institutions. It is not con- 
cerned with the state's political decisions or legislation. One sec- 
tion of this court deals with administrative disputes; below it are 
three courts of first instance. Another section deals with tax dis- 
putes and is supported by courts of first and second instance. In 
addition to these courts, there is a Court of Audit situated in the 
Ministry of Finance. 

Overseeing the nominations, training, promotions, transfers, and 
professional conduct of Portugal's judges are the Higher Council 
of the Bench and the Superior Council of the Administrative and 
Fiscal Courts. These bodies have the right to discipline judges whose 
conduct does not comply with the law. Also looking after the rights 
of the citizens is the ombudsman, elected by the Assembly of the 



190 



Government and Politics 



Republic for a four-year term. In the early 1990s, this official 
received some 3,000 complaints a year from Portuguese who felt 
they had been improperly dealt with by state institutions. 

The Portuguese legal and judicial system is based on Roman 
civil law and was heavily influenced by the French system. It differs 
from the United States or British legal systems in that a complete 
body of law is found in the codes. As a result, judicial reasoning 
is deductive, and prior cases or precedent play little role. A judge 
is therefore seen mainly as a civil servant whose role is to discover 
and apply the appropriate law from the codes, not to interpret it 
or to apply new sociological findings. Hence, judges enjoy less pres- 
tige than in a system based on common law. In addition, law is 
seen as more fixed and immutable than in the United States, al- 
though over time it does change. The historically authoritarian na- 
ture of Portugal's system of government is often attributed to this 
centralized and hierarchical legal system. 

Portugal's legal system is considered relatively fair and impar- 
tial. During the Salazar regime, the courts were loyal servants of 
the New State, and high officials of the regime were all but im- 
mune from judicial proceedings. After the Revolution of 1974, 
Salazar-appointed judges were largely removed in favor of revolu- 
tionary ones, and certain groups — such as workers and peasants — 
were often favored over owners and employers before the law. With 
time, however, the courts have come to function with greater im- 
partiality. Most criticism centers on the fact that the courts are slow 
and overburdened. Long periods of time are often required for the 
legal system to deal with even routine matters, nor have the courts 
adequately kept pace with new judicial issues, such as drugs and 
white-collar crime. 

Civil Service 

According to Article 266 of the revised constitution, public ad- 
ministrative authorities shall "seek to promote the public interest, 
while observing those rights and interests of citizens that are pro- 
tected by law. " Furthermore, the next article states that the struc- 
ture of public administration shall be such as to avoid bureaucracy, 
to bring the state's services close to the people, and to involve the 
people in decision making. Citizens are entitled to be informed of 
proceedings in which they are directly concerned and of decisions 
affecting them. 

These provisions were a reaction to Portuguese administrative 
traditions and to the abuses and favoritism of the Salazar era. As 
of the early 1990s, however, opinions remained divided about 
whether the Portuguese state was less "bureaucratic" than it had 



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Portugal: A Country Study 



been in the past. The 1970s saw a tremendous increase in the num- 
ber of persons employed by central and local governments (from 
205,000 in 1968 to 550,000 in 1986) and the issuance of many regu- 
lations that slowed public administration. To counter these trends, 
numerous reforms were enacted in the 1980s to streamline govern- 
ment services and make public employees more responsive to the 
public's needs. For example, civil servants were encouraged to see 
themselves as servants of the public rather than as wielders of state 
power. Moreover, many trivial but time-consuming and otherwise 
onerous bureaucratic regulations were revoked. An example of this 
kind of reform was that photocopies rather than original documents 
could be used when dealing with government offices. Portugal's 
entry into the EC was also forcing a modernization of the public 
sector. 

Portugal's public employees are classified as either public func- 
tionaries, those employed by the national government, or as ad- 
ministrative functionaries, those employed by local authorities. In 
1986 national government employees accounted for 83 percent of 
government employees. Some 70 percent of these government work- 
ers were employed by the Ministry of Education and Culture and 
the Ministry of Health. As part of a concerted effort to reduce Por- 
tugal's traditional centralization of government, Lisbon's share of 
public employees of all kinds was reduced from 52.7 percent in 
1978 to 44 percent in 1986. 

The civil service's cumbersome and unfair classification and pay 
structures were also reformed during the 1980s. The pay of public 
employees came to be taxed more than it had been in the past. 
Career structures were simplified. Care was taken, however, that 
no public employee receive less pay than under the old system. 

The recruitment of new public employees is also newly regu- 
lated. Candidates vie for state positions in public competitions. 
Juries select candidates in a way that guarantees fairness. Public 
employees are also allowed to be members of the main Portuguese 
labor unions. 

Local Government 

Portugal has long been a centralized political system not only 
in terms of its legal system, but also in terms of its system of pub- 
lic administration. The pattern, like the legal system, derives from 
Roman law and the French Napoleonic Code. The result was that 
Portugal's central authorities kept most powers for themselves and 
administered the country from Lisbon. Local government remained 
underdeveloped and passive. 



192 



Government and Politics 



The framers of the constitution of 1976 sought to change this 
pattern of centralization. Article 238 of the 1989 revised constitu- 
tion states that "local authorities on the mainland shall be the par- 
ishes, municipal authorities and the administrative regions." A plan 
for dividing Portugal into seven administrative regions (five based 
on the country's major river basins, and one each for the Porto 
and Lisbon metropolitan areas) had been worked out in the mid- 
1970s, but in the early 1990s its implementation had not yet been 
effected. Fear of officials in the capital that they would lose power 
to local authorities was seen as a principal reason for this delay. 

Article 291 of the revised constitution of 1989 states that until 
the administrative regions have been created, the highest level of 
subnational government will be the mainland's eighteen districts, 
administrative divisions established in the nineteenth century. In 
the early 1990s, these eighteen districts (each bearing the name 
of its capital) constituted the layer of government between the na- 
tional government and local government. Portugal is not a federal 
state, and the districts have no legislative powers. District officials 
conduct elections, maintain public order, and exercise what the 
Portuguese term "administrative tutelage" by monitoring the per- 
formance of local government. Each district is directed by a civil 
governor, who is a political appointee. 

The districts do not function as administrative bodies. As a result, 
most of the national government's activities are carried out by the 
ministries within territorial divisions that they establish and that 
do not necessarily correspond with those of the districts. The dis- 
trict governor is not seen as occupying a higher position than min- 
isterial officials. 

Because the administrative regions envisioned in the constitu- 
tion had not been established as of the early 1990s, Portugal's lo- 
cal government at that time consisted of 305 municipalities, further 
subdivided into about 4,000 parishes. Despite its name, a parish 
has no ecclesiastical functions but merely provides social assistance 
and maintains voter registration lists. An elected parish assembly 
meets four times a year and chooses the parish board, which serves 
as the parish's government. The board draws up the parish's bud- 
get, executes the parish assembly's laws, and manages its public 
business. The size of these bodies is determined by the population 
of the parish. 

Municipalities, like parishes, are classified as urban or rural, 
except for those of Lisbon and Porto, which are classified as met- 
ropolitan areas. A municipality is governed by a municipal as- 
sembly, half of whose members are elected every four years and 
half of whom are the presidents of parish boards operating within 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

the municipality. A municipal assembly meets five times a year, 
and its members are unpaid. A municipality's executive body is 
the municipal chamber. Its members (aldermen) are elected, serve 
year-round, and are paid. The chamber is headed by a president 
(mayor). The president of a municipal chamber is the candidate 
for that body who received the most votes. Each chamber has a 
council, composed of representatives from a variety of organiza- 
tions, which serves as a consultative body. The size of these munici- 
pal bodies is determined by the number of registered voters within 
a municipality. 

The many tasks managed by a municipality are carried out 
both by city employees and private firms considered part of the 
municipal government. Funds to pay for these tasks come both from 
the national government and local sources (taxes, licensing fees, 
etc). The constitution stipulates that these local authorities should 
be financially independent, and plans exist to establish by law 
a system of local finance that will arrange the "fair apportion- 
ment" of public funds between the state and local authorities. As 
of the early 1990s, however, over 90 percent of the funds used by 
local government were still national in origin. In addition, the na- 
tional government was obliged to see that these funds were spent 
properly, thereby reducing even further the independence of local 
authorities. 

Autonomous Regions and Macau 

The archipelagoes of the Azores and Madeira had long enjoyed 
a substantial degree of administrative autonomy when in 1976 the 
new constitution established them as autonomous political regions. 
According to the constitution, political autonomy was granted in 
response to the islands' geographical, economic, social, and cul- 
tural characteristics and because of "the historic aspirations of the 
peoples of the islands to autonomy." This autonomy, however, 
"shall in no way affect the [Portuguese] State's full sovereignty 
and shall be exercised within the limits of the Constitution." 

The constitution grants the autonomous regions a number of 
powers, among them the power to legislate in areas relating spe- 
cifically to them, execute laws, tax, supervise local public institu- 
tions, and participate in drafting international agreements that affect 
them. This last provision has meant that Azorean officials have 
participated in talks between the United States and Portugal about 
military bases located on their islands. 

The national government is represented by the minister of the 
republic, who functions in much the same manner as the president 



194 



Government and Politics 



of the republic does on the mainland. The minister has veto pow- 
ers similar to those of the president. If the autonomous regions' 
governing organs have acted contrary to the dictates of the consti- 
tution, they may be dissolved by the president of the republic. 

Each autonomous region has a legislative assembly elected for 
four-year terms. The d'Hondt method (see Glossary) is used to 
determine voting results. A president heads a regional government 
composed of regional secretaries, which reflects the party compo- 
sition of the regional assembly. This government is politically 
responsible to the regional assembly in the same manner that the 
national government is responsible to the Assembly of the Republic. 

Among other powers, the regional assembly has the right to in- 
itiate legislation, review the regional government's budget, and vote 
motions of censure. A regional government has powers similar to 
those of the national government, and its members direct a num- 
ber of regional secretariats that correspond to the mainland's minis- 
tries. Local government in the autonomous regions corresponds 
to the mainland's municipalities and parishes. 

Macau consists of a peninsula attached to the Chinese mainland 
and two islands with a total area of about seventeen square kilo- 
meters. In 1987 its population is estimated at 435,000 persons. 
Portuguese explorers first reached Macau in the early sixteenth cen- 
tury; it became a Portuguese colony in 1557. According to an agree- 
ment in 1987 between Portugal and China, Macau is to become 
a "special administrative region" of China on January 20, 1999. 
Even after this date, however, Macau will be allowed to maintain 
its capitalist economy, and Portuguese will remain its official lan- 
guage. Until 1999 Macau will remain a Special Territory of Portu- 
gal. Although the territory's highest executive official is a governor 
appointed by the president of Portugal, Macau enjoys a substantial 
degree of autonomy and has its own legislative assembly. 

The Electoral System 

The constitution states that the people exercise political power 
through universal, equal, direct, secret, and periodic elections. All 
citizens over the age of eighteen have the right to vote, and those 
over the age of twenty-one have the right to hold public office, un- 
der conditions of equality and freedom. Portuguese citizens are 
obliged to register to vote, but voting itself is voluntary. Freedom 
of association is guaranteed and is defined to include the right to 
establish or join political parties and "through them to work 
democratically to give form to the will of the people and to organize 
political power." 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

Elections for the president's term of five years in Portugal's semi- 
presidential system are by popular vote. If a candidate fails to receive 
an absolute majority on the first ballot, a runoff election between 
the two leading candidates is to be held within two weeks. 

Elections for the four-year legislative terms of the Assembly of 
the Republic are by proportional representation in each constituen- 
cy. Portugal uses the d'Hondt method of proportional represen- 
tation, which is based on the highest average method and favors 
large parties by awarding them a greater percentage of assembly 
seats than the percentage of votes they won. Small parties are pro- 
tected in that there is no minimum percentage of votes they must 
receive to gain a seat in the assembly. Nonetheless, unless these 
parties are members of a coalition, they rarely win a seat in the 
assembly. The d'Hondt method was adopted because it leads to 
stronger, more stable governments in countries that are deeply 
divided and have multiple parties. 

Municipal elections, which serve as a barometer of public opin- 
ion on the national government, are held every four years. In con- 
trast to national elections, this schedule is maintained because local 
governments do not fall. The national parties participate in these 
elections. 

Political Dynamics 

In the early 1990s, Portuguese politics operated at several differ- 
ent levels. The constitution and the laws constituted the first level. 
This formal structure of government often appears rigid, legal- 
istic, and impenetrable, especially to outsiders. Yet, these legal 
and constitutional structures are more obvious and more easily 
understood than the other levels of the Portuguese system of gov- 
ernment. 

The second level consists of political parties and interest groups. 
Because of its legalistic tradition, a strict separation exists in Por- 
tugal between the formal governmental system and the sphere 
of political parties and interest groups. Portuguese tend to respect 
their formal system of government but to denigrate political par- 
ties and interest groups. As Portuguese democracy flourished 
through the 1980s, however, political parties and interest groups 
gained greater acceptance as an integral part of the system of gov- 
ernment. 

Unlike these first two levels, the third level of Portuguese poli- 
tics is largely invisible and is the most difficult for outsiders to 
penetrate and comprehend. This level consists of the informal con- 
nections, family relationships, interpersonal ties, kinships, and 



196 



Government and Politics 



patronage networks that are so much the heart of the Portuguese 
political system. Seldom spoken of or described by the Portuguese, 
these relationships enable the Portuguese system to function and 
to cut through vast layers of red tape. 

Many of the informal networks that had long steered Portuguese 
affairs were severely disrupted by the Revolution of 1974 when 
many families and extended clans lost their property and their 
positions. However, many of these networks were rebuilt in sub- 
sequent years, and others were formed by the forging of new po- 
litical and economic relationships. Knowledge of this third level 
of Portuguese politics is crucial for a full understanding of the for- 
mal and the informal dynamics within the Portuguese political 
system. 

Political Parties 

As Portugal became democratic after 1974, it also developed a 
political party system with a full spectrum of parties that ranged 
from the far left to the far right. During the Salazar-Caetano re- 
gime, only one party was legal, the National Union (Uniao 
Nacional — UN), later renamed the National Popular Action (Ac- 
cao Nacional Popular — ANP). The UN/ANP was dissolved in the 
first weeks of the revolution, and a great variety of new parties soon 
replaced it. 

Some political parties emerged very quickly because they already 
existed in preliminary form. Several factions of the old UN/ANP, 
for example, became separate political parties after the revolu- 
tion. The socialists and, to a far greater extent, the Communists 
already had underground groups operating in Portugal, as well 
as organizations in exile. Finally, some opposition elements had 
formed "study groups" that served as the basis of later political 
parties. 

The party system increased in importance during the Second 
Republic. Large, strong parties were fostered under the d'Hondt 
method of proportional representation, and parties soon began to 
receive state subsidies. The parties' strength was also bolstered by 
their exclusive right to nominate political candidates and by the 
strict party discipline they enforced on successful candidates once 
they entered parliament. By the beginning of the early 1990s, only 
four parties regularly won seats in the parliament, and two were 
so much stronger than the others that Portugal seemed on the way 
to an essentially two-party system. 

Far Left 

Far-left groups, most importantly the Portuguese Democratic 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

Movement (Movimento Democratico Portugues — MDP), had con- 
siderable influence in the early part of the revolution. Consisting 
mostly of students and intellectuals, these groups were augmented 
by leftists from all over the world who flocked to Portugal to wit- 
ness and participate in the revolution. They often engaged in guer- 
rilla tactics, street demonstrations, and takeovers of private lands 
and industries. On their own, these groups could mount major 
demonstrations; in alliance with the PCP, they could be even more 
formidable. Since the heady revolutionary days of the mid-1970s, 
however, most of these groups have been absorbed into the larger 
parties or dissolved. As of the beginning of 1990s, some far-left 
groups were still active at the universities and in intellectual cir- 
cles, but they were seen as a fringe phenomenon and lacked their 
former disruptive capacity. 

Portuguese Communist Party 

The main party on the revolutionary left in Portugal was for de- 
cades the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista 
Portugues — PCP). The PCP had a long history of defiance to the 
Salazar dictatorship, and many of the party's leaders had spent 
long years in jail or in exile. Party members who remained in Por- 
tugal worked underground where they formed associations and or- 
ganized the labor union Intersindical. The party was strongly 
Stalinist and Moscow-oriented. 

Returning from exile in 1974, the PCP's leaders, many of whom 
were reputed to be capable and formidable politicians, tried to seize 
power by means of a coup, allying themselves with revolutionary 
elements in the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas 
Armadas — MFA). The party came close to seizing power in 1975 
but failed because moderate elements within the armed forces and 
the political parties to the right of it were committed to Western 
democracy. Extensive financial aid from Western countries to these 
parties also contributed to the PCP's ultimate defeat. 

The PCP, along with its far-left allies, got 17 percent of the vote 
in the first democratic election in Portugal in 1975, and for sever- 
al elections after that it held its position at approximately 12 to 19 
percent of the vote. But during the 1980s, as Portugal moved away 
from the radical politics of the mid-1970s and began to prosper 
economically, the PCP's popularity declined to less than 10 per- 
cent of the vote. The party remained strong in the trade unions, 
but younger members of the party challenged the old leadership 
and questioned the party's hard-line Stalinist positions. Some of 
these young challengers were expelled from the party. The collapse 



198 



Government and Politics 



of communism in Europe, the aging of the party's leadership (the 
party had been headed by Alvaro Cunhal since 1941) and of its 
membership, and the party's poor showing in elections indicate 
that the party either will have to transform itself fundamentally 
or fade away as a political force. 

Socialist Party 

The history of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista — PS) in Por- 
tugal dates back to the late nineteenth century. Like the PCP, it 
was persecuted and forced into exile by Salazar. The party was 
reestablished in 1973 in the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) under the leadership of Mario Soares, who had opposed 
the regime as a young man and had been imprisoned for his politi- 
cal activities. Soares returned to Portugal a few days after the coup 
of April 25, 1974, and the PS began to function openly as a politi- 
cal party. It had both a moderate and a militant wing, but its 
militancy was tempered by the articulate and politically shrewd 
Soares. 

The PS, as one of the two largest parties in Portugal, has often 
formed governments. During the revolutionary situation in 
1974-75, the socialists were looked on as the most viable moder- 
ate opposition to the PCP. The PS therefore received considera- 
ble foreign support, as well as domestic votes, that it might not 
otherwise have had. It regularly received about 28 to 35 percent 
of the vote; it was in power from 1976 to 1978 and in a governing 
coalition with the PSD from 1983 to 1985. 

In power the PS followed a moderate, centrist program. As the 
Portuguese electorate became more conservative in the 1980s, 
however, the party lost support. In the 1985 election, it got only 
20.8 percent of the vote, although this percentage improved slightly 
in the 1987 national elections. The party won the 1989 municipal 
elections, but despite an impressive improvement in the 1991 na- 
tional election when it polled 29.3 percent of the vote, it still lagged 
far behind the PSD. Persistent leadership problems dating from 
when Soares left the party in 1986 when he was elected president 
and inept campaigns were seen as causes of the party's secondary 
position in Portuguese politics. At times the disputes between the 
moderate and Marxist factions were renewed, but the party as a 
whole had moved far enough to the right that in the 1991 national 
election the PS had difficulty distinguishing itself from the PSD 
on most major issues. 

Social Democrat Party 

The Social Democrat Party (Partido Social Democrata — PSD) 



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Portugal: A Country Study 



emerged as the somewhat open and tolerated opposition under 
Caetano in the early 1970s. For a time, the PSD, then known as 
the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrata — PPD), 
adopted the reformist political doctrines popular during the revolu- 
tionary period of the mid-1970s. It was soon overtaken, however, 
by the PS as the main opposition party, and it moved toward the 
democratic center. The radical constitution of 1976 was drafted 
and promulgated with its help, but even then the PSD was com- 
mitted to its revision. 

The PSD's fortunes generally improved as revolutionary fervor 
waned. In the earliest postrevolutionary elections, the PSD got 
about 24 to 27 percent of the vote, second to the PS. It had scored 
well in the conservative north of Portugal but not in the revolu- 
tionary south. As the party began to occupy the broad center of 
the political spectrum under the dynamic leadership of Francisco 
Sa. Carneiro, the PSD's electoral support grew. In 1978 the PSD 
formed an electoral coalition, the Democratic Alliance (Alianca 
Democratica — AD), with two other parties and came to power in 
early 1980 with Sa Carneiro as prime minister. After the forma- 
tion of this government, the PSD remained in government through- 
out the 1980s and into the first half of the 1990s, either as part 
of a coalition, in a minority single-party cabinet, or as a majority 
single-party government. 

The AD won the parliamentary election of October 1980, but 
the coalition's forward movement slowed somewhat after the death 
of Sa Carneiro in a plane crash in December 1980. His successor, 
Expresso founder and editor Francisco Pinto Balsemao, lacked Sa 
Carneiro 's forcefulness and charisma. The party formed an elec- 
toral coalition, the Central Bloc, with the PS in 1983 and was in 
government until 1985 when the coalition ended. For two years, 
the PSD formed a minority government with its new leader, Anibal 
Cavaco Silva, as prime minister. In the 1987 national elections, 
the PSD won the Second Republic's first absolute parliamentary 
majority, a feat the party repeated in the 1991 elections. By con- 
sistently favoring free-market policies, the PSD benefited from Por- 
tugal's improved economy after the country joined the EC in 1986 
and the electorate returned to a more conservative position after 
the radical politics of the mid-1970s. 

Party of the Social Democratic Center 

The Party of the Social Democratic Center (Partido do Centro 
Democratico Social — CDS) is a Christian democratic party to the 
right of the political spectrum. Although not officially a religious 



200 



Government and Politics 



party, the CDS is mainly linked to conservative Portuguese Catholi- 
cism and most of its officials and followers are Roman Catholic. 
Unlike some other Christian democratic parties, the conservative 
CDS does not advocate liberation theology (see Glossary). The party 
was founded in 1975 by Diogo Freitas do Amaral, a respected poli- 
tician and a professor of administrative law. 

The CDS won 15.9 percent of the vote in the 1976 elections and 
for a time formed a government with the PS. It increased its pow- 
er when it formed an electoral coalition with the PSD in 1979 and 
was in power until the coalition ended in 1983. Since then the party 
has lost much of its electoral support, gaining only a little more 
than 4 percent of the vote in the 1987 and 1991 parliamentary elec- 
tions. The strength of the PSD at the polls meant that the CDS 
was no longer needed to form center-right governments. A decline 
of the PSD seems the only opportunity for the CDS to return to 
power, either with the PSD or with the PS. 

Far Right 

As of the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal had not had a strong 
far-right party since the fall of the Salazar-Caetano regime. Most 
of those associated with the old regime were driven into exile dur- 
ing the revolution, and all far-right parties were declared illegal. 
Some of the prohibitions against right-wing political activities still 
remained law, although in the 1980s many of those associated with 
the former regime had returned to the country and a handful had 
reentered politics. Rather than establishing new right-wing par- 
ties, conservatives and supporters of the old regime were most likely 
to be active politically through the PSD or the CDS. 

Popular Monarchist Party 

The Popular Monarchist Party (Partido Popular Monarquico — 
PPM) favors the restoration of the Braganca royal family, over- 
thrown in 1910. Their program is complicated, however, by the 
existence of several competing Braganca pretenders to the throne. 
The PPM stands for a constitutional and limited monarchy simi- 
lar to the one in Spain. This would mean that the monarch is a 
ceremonial chief of state, not a ruling head of government. The 
PPM has argued that a monarchy would help unify the govern- 
ment, promote stability, and give the country a single, if mainly 
symbolic, head. In addition, the PPM campaigned for ecological 
concerns. Only once, in the 1987 elections for the EC, did the PPM 
win even 3 percent of the vote. Generally it won less than 1 per- 
cent. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the PPM was 



201 



Portugal: A Country Study 

was part of the AD governing coalition, which consisted mainly 
of the CDS and the PSD. 

Other Parties 

Portugal has a number of other, largely personalistic parties that 
rally around a single leading personality rather than an issue or 
program. Most of these are small parties, frequently rising and fall- 
ing quickly, and they command little electoral strength. These per- 
sonalistic parties are often used as bargaining chips in the larger 
political arena, where their modest support might be traded for 
a cabinet post or other position. An exception to some of these rules 
is the Party of Democratic Renovation (Partido Renovador Demo- 
cratico — PRD), made up of supporters of President Eanes. In the 
national elections of 1985, the PRD received 17.9 percent of the 
vote and seemed poised to emerge as a major electoral contender. 
In the national elections of 1987, however, it got just under 5 per- 
cent of the vote. After Eanes himself withdrew from politics, the 
party faded away, winning only 0.6 percent of the vote in the 1991 
elections. 

Interest Groups 

Despite the flourishing of democracy since 1974, interest groups 
are not a significant force in Portugal. Portuguese politics are plu- 
ralist but to a lesser degree than in many other countries, espe- 
cially when compared with the United States. Whereas the United 
States had over 50,000 interest groups functioning in Washington 
alone as of the early 1990s, the number functioning in Portugal 
was probably less than 100. 

Armed Forces 

The armed forces in Portugal trace their origins to the armies 
and military orders of medieval times. The orders were often au- 
tonomous from the state, and, because they were formed during 
the reconquest, may have predated it. Hence, the armed forces 
came to be thought of — and thought of themselves — as a separate 
unit in society, independent of any civil authority and perhaps above 
it. Even at the beginning of the 1990s, the military still had to some 
extent this sense of aloofness and of ideals of a higher order. 

Up until the 1980s, the military had been the ultimate arbiter 
of Portuguese national politics. In the nineteenth century, the armed 
forces participated in chaotic, man-on-horseback politics. Mili- 
tary cum civilian factions "rotated" (rotativismo) in and out of power 
with frequent regularity. The armed forces helped usher in the 



202 



Government and Politics 



Portuguese Republic in 1910 and ended it in 1926. The military 
brought Salazar to power and served as an indispensable prop of 
his dictatorship. 

It was the armed forces that overthrew Caetano in 1974, and 
the MFA that launched the revolution. The MFA took pains to 
retain special powers by creating the Council of the Revolution, 
which guaranteed the armed forces the power to prohibit legisla- 
tion that they saw as harmful to the revolution's democratic achieve- 
ments. The military agreed, however, that these powers were to 
be of limited duration. 

During the 1980s, the political and social roles of the armed forces 
diminished. The 1982 constitutional amendments reduced the mili- 
tary's political power by abolishing the Council of the Revolution, 
thereby ending the military's guardianship over Portuguese politics. 
The National Defense Law of 1982 put the military completely 
under civilian control. In addition, the armed forces were signifi- 
cantly reduced in size and budget. On the other hand, Portuguese 
officers became better educated, more technologically sophisticated, 
and more professional. 

By the beginning of the 1990s, the Portuguese armed forces 
had a social role similar to that of armed forces in other West 
European countries. Only extreme events could possibly pull Por- 
tugal's soldiers back into politics, although like any other interest 
group they did lobby to protect their interests, benefits, budget, 
and position in society. 

Roman Catholic Church 

Like the armed forces, the Roman Catholic Church in Portugal 
also declined in influence during the 1980s. The church, along with 
the military, had been one of the historical corporate units in soci- 
ety, predating the state and then existing parallel to it. As a result, 
Portugal was historically a Roman Catholic nation. Roman Catholi- 
cism not only was the sole religion of the country, but also per- 
meated the culture, the legal system, the society, and the polity. 
Salazar derived many of his corporatist beliefs from the papal en- 
cyclicals, and during his long rule the church served as an indispens- 
able pillar of the regime. 

In recent decades, however, as society has become more secular- 
ized, the church has come to play a lesser role in people's lives. Dur- 
ing the 1974-76 period, the church helped turn the population 
away from the appeals of communism and radicalism, but since 
those tumultuous years the church has been quiescent politically. 
The church has, however, expressed itself on some issues, such as 



203 



Portugal: A Country Study 

the legalization of abortion, on which it feels morally obliged to 
take a public stance. Polls of Portuguese show that the church's 
ranking among main interest groups has fallen from second- or 
third-most influential to seventh- or eighth-most influential. 

Economic Elites 

The "oligarchy" was the third of the historical triumvirate of 
power in Portugal (armed forces, church, and oligarchy) to be in 
decline. Many of the old oligarchical families trace their origins 
to the Reconquest. They acquired their land, position, and titles, 
and eventually peasants and cattle, as the Reconquest drove the 
Moors farther south, opening up new territories for settlement. 

This oligarchy, armed with titles of nobility granted it by the 
royal family in return for loyalty, dominated Portuguese politics 
for centuries. But over time, its character changed. In the south 
of Portugal, the Alentejo, the landowning class became increas- 
ingly absentee landlords, leaving managers in charge of its estates 
and moving to Lisbon. In the north, where smallholdings predomi- 
nated, many members of the oligarchy became impoverished — or 
went into businesses like wine making. During the reign of Sala- 
zar, members of the elite went into banking, insurance, construc- 
tion, and similar fields in which they could establish oligopolies 
and monopolies based on their close ties with the government. 

After the Revolution of 1974, this economic elite was stripped 
of power. Its properties were confiscated, many from the elite were 
jailed or sent into exile, and the group lost all political power. In 
addition, members of the elite were barred from participating in 
politics or from forming political movements of their own because 
of laws forbidding far-right political activity. 

As of the early 1990s, most of the exiles had been permitted to 
return to Portugal, and those who had spent time in jail were freed. 
Some of the elite managed to regain their power by taking advan- 
tage of the economy's need for financial expertise, but the elite as 
a whole did not regain its old financial position. Its political in- 
fluence remained limited, as well, and only one member of the old 
Salazar regime had been elected to parliament. 

Organized Labor 

Portuguese trade unionism has a history of militancy and radical- 
ism. Its roots go back to the late nineteenth century when modern 
industry first appeared. The unions grew during the period of the 
First Republic, 1910-26, when they enjoyed freedom to organize. 
It was in this period that Marxist, Bolshevik, Trotskyite, anarchist, 



204 



Government and Politics 



and syndicalist ideas were discussed and disseminated. Although 
the labor movement was small, a reflection of the low level of Por- 
tuguese industrialization, it was active and vocal. 

During the Salazar-Caetano era, militant unions were abolished, 
and the labor movement was forcibly subordinated to corporatist 
controls. Many labor leaders were jailed or sent into exile. Some 
cooperated with the new corporative system; others organized a 
militant, Communist-controlled underground labor organization. 
With time this union, Intersindical, was well enough established 
that the government actually dealt with it almost as if it were a 
legal bargaining agent. 

During the Revolution of 1974, Intersindical, or as it came to 
be known in 1977, the General Confederation of Portuguese 
Workers-National Intersindical (Confederacao Geral dos Trabal- 
hadores Portugueses-Intersindical Nacional — CGTP-IN), was at 
last able to function as a legal labor organization, and it expanded 
rapidly. Controlled by the Communists, the CGTP-IN was closely 
associated with the PCP's bid for power and for a time was the 
only union permitted to function. Soon, however, it faced opposi- 
tion from the Socialist labor organization, the General Union of Work- 
ers (Uniao Geral dos Trabalhadores — UGT). For a time, the 
Communist labor group was overwhelmingly dominant, but dur- 
ing the 1980s the UGT grew in size, especially in the service sec- 
tor, and by the end of the decade its overall membership was about 
half that of the CGTP-IN. Many other small unions were active 
at the beginning of the 1990s, most notably those representing highly 
specialized professions such as airline pilots. There was also a Chris- 
tian democratic trade union movement. 

After 1974 organized labor emerged as a powerful force in Por- 
tuguese politics, although its influence waned somewhat after the 
revolutionary period. Union membership was not high, and as of 
the early 1990s only about 30 percent of the work force was union- 
ized. The Communist-led unions were not able to block the con- 
stitutional amendments of 1982 and 1989, which reduced the 
radical legacy of the revolution. Moreover, some unions backed 
away from the intense ideological unionism of the 1970s in favor 
of more limited and practical objectives. 

Middle Class 

Portugal had long been an essentially two-class society consist- 
ing of elites and peasants between which existed a small class of 
artisans, soldiers, and tradespeople. With the acceleration of in- 
dustrialization and economic development after the 1950s, this mid- 
dle class began to grow. As it came to prefer democracy and a more 



205 



Portugal: A Country Study 

open West European society, it provided the strongest opposition 
to the Salazar-Caetano regime. As a result, the middle class par- 
ticipated strongly in the Revolution of 1974 and the political maneu- 
vering that followed. In the following decade, after the old elites 
were shunted aside by the revolution and labor organizations lost 
power, the middle class emerged as Portugal's most important class. 

At the beginning of the 1990s, the middle class constituted some 
25 to 30 percent of the population. The most important Portuguese 
institutions were dominated by the middle class: the military officer 
corps, the Roman Catholic Church, political parties, public ad- 
ministration, the universities, and commerce and industry. 

The middle class remained divided on many social and political 
issues, however. For example, political leadership in Portugal was 
solidly middle class and spanned all parties from the far left to the 
far right. The success of the PSD under Cavaco Silva both in parlia- 
ment and in the election of 1987 was perhaps an indication, 
however, that Portugal's new socially significant middle class was 
developing a degree of social cohesion. 

The commercial segment of the middle class defended its interests 
through the PSD and the CDS and also through some large repre- 
sentative organizations. The leading organizations of this type were 
the Portuguese Industrial Association (Associagao Industrial Por- 
tuguesa — AIP), founded in 1860, the much larger Confederation 
of Portuguese Industry (Confederacao da Industria Portuguesa — 
CIP), founded in 1974, and the Portuguese Confederation of Com- 
merce (Confederacao do Comercio Portugues — CCP), founded in 
1977. These organizations, and others like them, met with impor- 
tant labor groups and with government officials and lobbied be- 
hind the scenes to better the conditions under which Portugal's new 
middle class had to work. 

Students and Intellectuals 

Students and intellectuals in Portugal had long been influential 
out of proportion to their numbers. This influence was a conse- 
quence of higher education's exclusivity. The small percentage of 
the population who passed the difficult university entrance exams 
was widely respected, and Portugal's lower classes looked up to 
educated persons as their intellectual and political mentors. 

Intellectuals and students were among the leading advocates of 
a republic in 1910. Although hostile to the republic, Salazar was 
also an intellectual and recruited so many of his fellow university 
colleagues into his administration that it was sometimes called a 
"regime of professors." Much of the opposition to Salazar and 
Caetano, however, was made up of intellectuals and students who 



206 



Government and Politics 



formed the "study groups" that served as the nuclei for what later 
became political parties. Intellectuals and students were very ac- 
tive in the Revolution of 1974, and, as of the beginning of the 1990s, 
many intellectuals served in high positions in government and the 
political parties. 

Universities in Portugal were traditionally heavily politicized, 
especially during the revolutionary upheavals of the 1970s. Socialist, 
Communist, and other far-left groups competed for dominance on 
the campuses (mainly at the historical universities in Lisbon and 
Coimbra) and in publishing houses, newspapers, and study centers 
where intellectuals congregated. 

Rising enrollment pressures, the competition of new regional 
universities and technical institutes, and the desire to find good 
jobs in the more affluent Portugal of the 1980s sapped the students' 
enthusiasm for political action. Many preferred to finish their 
courses and degrees and secure a rewarding professional position 
rather than to engage in constant political activity. As a result, Por- 
tugal's institutions of higher learning became calmer politically; 
they also became better, more serious universities. 

Peasants 

Peasants were long the neglected and forgotten people of Por- 
tuguese politics. Although the largest group numerically, they were 
the weakest politically. Nonparticipation was encouraged by Sala- 
zar's strategy of keeping the peasants illiterate and apathetic. 

The peasants comprised a variety of groups. A basic distinction 
exists between the conservative peasants of the north who own their 
small plots of land and the peasants of the south who have no land, 
live under conditions of tenancy, and have been receptive to the 
appeals of radical political groups. The PCP, for example, had 
quietly organized southern peasants under its banner even during 
the Salazar era. During and after the Revolution of 1974, the south, 
especially the Alentejo, was a hotbed of land seizures, radical po- 
litical action, and strong voting preferences for the PCP. 

Since the revolution, however, both the PS and the PSD have 
made electoral inroads into what were PCP strongholds in the south. 
The rural areas were once again to some degree de-politicized, 
although the countryside would never return to the quiescence of 
decades past, despite the large numbers of farmers and agrarian 
laborers who migrated to urban areas or went abroad. 

Political Events since 1987 

The parliamentary election of July 1987 was a milestone in the 
consolidation of Portuguese democracy: for the first time in the 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

Second Republic, it gave a single party, the PSD, an absolute 
majority in the Assembly of the Republic and permitted the for- 
mation of a strong single-party government. The party's leader, 
Anibal Cavaco Silva, ran an efficient campaign that stressed the 
PSD's competence and pragmatism and avoided the ideological 
arguments common to Portuguese politics. The party won a com- 
fortable majority of 148 seats in the assembly when 50.2 percent 
of the voters, a stunning increase over the 29.9 percent who voted 
for it in the 1985 elections, decided Portugal needed to continue 
the PSD's program of reducing the government's role in the econ- 
omy. Most of the PSD's increased share of the votes came from 
the virtual collapse of the PRD and the severe losses of the CDS. 
The PS improved significantly its performance compared to 1985, 
whereas the PCP continued its decline toward political marginality. 

An improving economy contributed to the PSD victory, but also 
essential to its success was the party's leader since 1985, Anfoal 
Cavaco Silva. He captured the imagination of many Portuguese, 
who saw him as a welcome alternative to traditional Portuguese 
politicians. Cavaco Silva differed from Portugal's narrow govern- 
ing elite in many respects. He was not from Lisbon but came from 
a lower-middle class southern family. He was not a lawyer but an 
economist who had earned his doctorate from the University of 
York in Britain and subsequently had taught economics in Lisbon. 
Although for a time minister of finance in the early 1980s, he did 
not favor political games and intrigues but publically disdained these 
aspects of party politics. Observers frequently characterized Cavaco 
Silva as somewhat aloof and arrogant, more interested in compe- 
tence than connections. Through hard work and intelligence, he 
was able to thwart even powerful members of his own party who 
resisted reform and modernization. These qualities won Cavaco 
Silva the votes of many younger people and members of the mid- 
dle class. 

Supported by a majority in parliament, Cavaco Silva' s govern- 
ment, in which he served as prime minister, aimed at a liberaliza- 
tion of the Portuguese economy. A principal goal was to further 
revise the constitution by removing much of its ideological language. 
The two-thirds majority this undertaking required was achieved 
with help from the PS. Another goal was a reform of the constitu- 
tion's provisions relating to the dismissal of employees; these pro- 
visions were so strict that firings were very difficult. Some relaxation 
of labor law was achieved but not nearly that which had been en- 
visaged. A general strike in early 1988 and a judgment from the 
Constitutional Court that the government's proposals were uncon- 
stitutional prevented radical reform in this area (see Wages and 



208 



Mario Soares, 
president, 
1986- 

Courtesy Embassy of 
Portugal, Washington 



the Distribution of Income, Ch. 3). The Cavaco Silva government 
had much more success in privatizing land and businesses nation- 
alized in 1975 (see Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform, ch, 3; In- 
dustrial Organization, ch. 3). By the end of 1991 , many of the largest 
companies seized by the state had been returned in whole or in part 
to the private sector, and further privatizations were scheduled. 

A presidential election was held in January 1991, at the end of 
Mario Soares 's five-year term. Faced with only token opposition, 
Soares won reelection easily, taking 70 percent of the vote. Such 
was the expectation of his victory that the PSD did not even field 
a candidate. Despite his reputation as a highly partisan leader of 
the PS and the narrowness of his victory in 1986, Soares had quickly 
become a very popular president. In general, he and Cavaco Silva 
got along well with one another as they carried out the duties of 
their respective offices. Soares interfered only rarely in the work- 
ing of the cabinet and legislature, and when confronted with difficult 
political issues he called upon the Constitutional Court for a deci- 
sion. He instituted a practice of informal town meetings through- 
out Portugal where he learned of the concerns of the average citizen. 
An articulate speaker, he was later able to voice these concerns him- 
self and plead publicly for the betterment of social conditions. Soares 
also represented his country ably abroad. 

Parliamentary elections were held in October 1991 after the Cava- 
co Silva government had completed the four-year legislative term, 



209 



Portugal: A Country Study 

the first government to do so in the Second Republic. Although 
the PSD was expected to win a majority, few expected it to better 
its results of 1987. It did so, however, by a tiny margin and once 
again achieved an absolute parliamentary majority. An economy 
that had performed better than the EC average, thanks in part to 
the billions of dollars the organization had transferred to Portugal 
since 1986, helped Cavaco Silva achieve his second triumph, but 
his own popularity also played a role. He conducted a highly ef- 
fective campaign centered on his capabilities as prime minister. 
Assurances from Cavaco Silva that he would not serve in a PSD 
government that did not have a clear majority probably caused 
many voters to favor his party. As in 1987, the PSD did well in 
all parts of the country. It failed to come in first in only one dis- 
trict, compared to three in 1987, an indication that the old region- 
al cleavages were disappearing as the country modernized and 
became more prosperous. 

The PSD's main opponent in the 1991 election was the PS, which 
polled 29.3 percent of the vote, a significant improvement over the 
results of 1987 and 1985. The PS's success, despite a poorly run 
campaign and long-standing leadership problems since Soares had 
relinquished his role, indicated that Portugal was perhaps moving 
toward an essentially two-party system. Although the PS trailed 
the PSD badly in this election, it had won the local elections of 
1989. The PS and the PSD seemed to be the only parties in Portu- 
gal able to increase their votes. They had also come to resemble 
one another so closely that their differences on main issues had be- 
come marginal. 

The PRD, which had scored such a success in the 1985 elec- 
tions, failed to win a single seat. The PCP received only 8.8 per- 
cent of the votes cast, a result that showed the party to be in a steady 
and steep decline. It remained tied to old orthodoxies, approving 
the reactionary coup in Moscow in August 1991 , for example. The 
CDS won 4.4 percent of the votes for five seats in parliament. It 
did not seem likely to be politically significant in the future, ex- 
cept perhaps as a coalition partner with one of the two largest 
parties. 

The Media 

During the long Salazar regime, the media operated under strict 
authoritarian control. The press was heavily censored, radio and 
television were government-controlled, and writers who violated 
the regime's guidelines were subject to severe sanctions. Even the 
lists of books requested by readers from the National Library in 
Lisbon were reviewed by secret police officials. Foreign magazines 



210 



Government and Politics 



were similarly inspected before being put on the newsstands; some- 
times whole stories were blotted out. The controls and censorship 
were stifling and led to a pervasive and boring conformity in the 
media. 

Under Caetano the rules were relaxed somewhat. Some novelists 
and essayists were able to publish critical and controversial works 
without punishment. The press occasionally spoke out indirectly, 
providing long analyses of elections in Chile or West Germany, 
for example, that everyone understood to be a commentary on the 
absence of free elections in Portugal. Only the weekly newspaper 
Expresso was strong enough to test the regime's tolerance with vir- 
tually every issue. 

After the coup of April 25, 1974, the mass communications me- 
dia underwent a radical transformation. One of the first acts of 
the revolutionary government was to abolish censorship. But as 
the revolution veered to the left, some portions of the media were 
seized by opponents of the views they expressed. Two of the most 
celebrated cases involved the closing of the Socialist Party newspaper 
Republica and the Roman Catholic Church's Radio Renascenca. 

Government involvement in the media greatly increased when 
the banks were nationalized. Because most banks owned at least 
one newspaper, the state found itself the owner of many newspapers. 
With time, however, the government divested itself of these proper- 
ties. By the beginning of the 1990s, no newspapers in Portugal were 
government owned, and the country had a completely free press. 
Although the state still operated radio and television broadcasting 
systems, the constitution states that they are to provide equal ac- 
cess to political parties, in or out of power. Large interest groups 
are also to have access to the state-owned electronic media. 

At the beginning of the 1990s, about thirty newspapers were pub- 
lished daily in Portugal. They ranged from excellent newspapers 
like Publico, an independent, and the historic Didrio de Noticias, a 
newspaper of record, to sensationalistic crowd-pleasers such as Cor- 
reio da Manha. Publico, founded in 1990, had sections dealing with 
both Lisbon and Porto and provided perhaps the most national 
news. Two excellent weekly newspapers filled the place taken in 
the United States by Time and Newsweek: Expresso, which had fought 
bravely for press freedom before the revolution, and Independente, 
founded in 1988, which included pages enlivened by wicked sa- 
tires of public figures. In addition to these publications, Portugal 
had a variety of specialized magazines. 

In 1975 all commercial broadcasting facilities except those be- 
longing to the Roman Catholic Church were nationalized. As of 
the beginning of the 1990s, however, hundreds of private radio 



211 



Portugal: A Country Study 

stations were in operation, in addition to the large Roman Catholic 
radio system Radio Renascenca. The state broadcasting system was 
named Radiodifusao Portuguesa (RDP). Television service was 
furnished by the state system, Radiotelevisao Portuguesa (RTP), 
which broadcast on two channels. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
however, plans were being made to establish privately owned tele- 
vision in Portugal. 

Portugal's film industry is very small. It produces mainly short 
films and documentaries for local television. Few full-length films 
are made in Portugal, and those that are have not found a market 
abroad. However, a few Portuguese directors, the veteran Manoel 
de Oliveira and Paolo Rocha, for example, are highly esteemed 
by film cognoscenti the world over. 

Book publishing is more prosperous, within the limits of the lo- 
cal market. Portugal has more than fifty publishing houses. They 
publish books by Portuguese authors but also do a major business 
in translations of foreign authors. During the mid-1970s, works 
by Marx, Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and other writers on the left 
dominated the bestseller lists. In the period since then, Portuguese 
readers have turned to a greater diversity of authors. The coun- 
try's relatively high illiteracy rate of about 15 percent and the fact 
that most Portuguese read littie make for a small market. As a result, 
books are expensive, and printings of even bestselling books are 
usually limited to 2,000 to 3,000 copies. 

Foreign Relations 

The Revolution of 1974 did not merely transform Portugal's 
domestic politics; it led to a transformation of its foreign relations, 
as well. For centuries Portugal's foreign relations were directed away 
from Europe, first down the South Atlantic and to Africa, then 
to Brazil and the Orient. Lisbon's relations with Europe were limit- 
ed to an alliance dating from 1386 with Britain, another Atlantic 
country, that was intended to protect it from Spain and any other 
European power that might threaten Portugal's independence and 
its vast empire. Over the centuries, much of this empire was lost. 
Preserving what remained of this empire, the country's African 
colonies and a few other small entities, became the core of Por- 
tuguese foreign policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Moreover, the Portuguese saw themselves as a people with an "At- 
lantic vocation" rather than as an integral part of Europe. 

Postwar developments for a time buttressed the traditional atti- 
tude that Portugal's true concerns and interests lay in the South 
Atlantic and beyond and away from Europe. Portugal became a 
founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 



212 



Government and Politics 



(NATO) not for what its army could do in Central Europe but 
for the importance of the Azores as a site for military bases. Other 
than permitting the United States access to these islands, Portu- 
gal's contribution to the alliance was negligible. 

The wave of anticolonialism that swept through the Third World 
after World War II sparked rebellion in Portugal's African colo- 
nies. Lisbon's great efforts to quell these struggles for independence 
intensified the metropole's traditional interest in Africa. In the end, 
however, Portugal was not strong enough to put down the wars 
of independence. In fact, the great expenditure of manpower and 
revenue in the African wars was the main cause of the Revolution 
of 1974. The revolution brought to power members of the mili- 
tary who were determined to end the fighting, and within a matter 
of eighteen months Portugal's empire was gone. 

Shorn of its colonies, Portugal was forced to concede that its fu- 
ture lay in Europe, a revolutionary change in the country's view 
of its place in the world. It became a member of the EC in 1986 
and enjoyed the benefits and endured the change that this mem- 
bership entailed. Portugal's most important foreign relationship, 
its relationship with the United States, changed only in degree, 
not in kind. In other respects, however, Portugal began a whole 
new era in its foreign policy. 

Africa 

During the 1960s and early 1970s, Portugal waged three colonial 
wars simultaneously on the African continent (see The Role of the 
Armed Forces in Africa, ch. 5). These campaigns hurt the economy, 
drained morale, and gradually became politically unpopular. The 
end of the wars in Africa brought independence to the colonies 
almost immediately. The manner in which independence was grant- 
ed, however, and the results that were produced proved to be highly 
controversial. 

In his unsettling book, Portugal and the Future, General Antonio 
de Spmola had proposed stopping the wars, finding a peaceful reso- 
lution, and granting independence to the colonies. But he wanted 
to maintain good relations with the colonies and to link them with 
Portugal and possibly Brazil through a Portuguese- speaking Lu- 
sitanian confederation of nations that would resemble the British 
Commonwealth. This proposal was rejected by the radical and more 
impatient members of the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento 
das Forcas Armadas — MFA). 

In Guinea-Bissau, after brief negotiations and a cease-fire, Por- 
tugal granted independence to its former colony and turned pow- 
er over to the Marxist African Party for the Independence of Guinea 



213 



Portugal: A Country Study 

and Cape Verde (Partido Africano pela Independencia de Guine 
e Cabo Verde — PAIGC). Cape Verde also became independent 
but did not become part of Guinea-Bissau. In the much larger ter- 
ritory of Mozambique, Portugal turned over the reins of govern- 
ment to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de 
Libertacao de Mozambique — FRELIMO), another Marxist- 
Leninist guerrilla group. And in Angola, Portugal's most valua- 
ble African colony, power was given to the similarly Marxist- 
Leninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola — MPLA) which, 
among the three factions fighting for independence, was the only 
one allied with the Soviet Union. The smaller colony of Sao Tome 
and Principe also became independent. 

The haste with which independence was granted and the simple 
turning of power over to the very Marxist-Leninist elements Por- 
tugal had been fighting, without any further guarantees, had a num- 
ber of serious consequences. Hundreds of thousands of Portuguese 
settlers were stranded, many of whom had lived in the colonies 
for generations. They lost their homes, land, and positions. Most 
of them returned to Portugal, where many lived in squalid condi- 
tions and added to the country's unemployment problems. Their 
departure left the African colonies without the teachers, educators, 
managers, and other trained personnel needed to make a success- 
ful transition to independence. Plagued by continuing civil wars 
and violence, political conditions and living standards in the new- 
ly independent states deteriorated. 

Portugal's relations with these former colonies long remained 
strained, for they felt they had been abandoned by the mother coun- 
try. With time, however, relations improved, trade resumed, Por- 
tuguese educators and technicians were welcomed back, and new 
ties among the Portuguese-speaking nations began to be forged. 
Portugal served as a useful intermediary in arranging agreements 
to reduce conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. In 1984, for ex- 
ample, Portugal sponsored the Nkomati Accords between Mozam- 
bique and South Africa by which the two latter countries agreed 
to stop supporting guerrilla groups in each other's territory. The 
three countries later agreed to manage the giant Cahora Bassa 
hydroelectric power plant for the benefit of all. Although Portugal 
will no longer play a large role in Africa, its special relationship 
with the continent's Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) countries 
make it likely that it will play a role of some importance. 

Western Europe 

At the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal's relations with Western 



214 



Government and Politics 



Europe were closer than ever before. Historically, Portugal had 
remained aloof from Europe, its main link to the continent being 
a long-standing alliance with Britain. In 1949 Portugal became a 
founding member of NATO, in 1955 it joined the United Nations 
(UN), in 1960 it became a part of the European Free Trade As- 
sociation (EFTA), and the following year joined the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD — see Glos- 
sary). Portugal signed a free-trade agreement with the European 
Economic Community (EEC — see Glossary) in 1972 and gained 
admittance to the Council of Europe (see Glossary) in 1976. In 
1988 Portugal became a member of the Western European Union 
(WEU— see Glossary). 

Portugal's application to the EC in 1977 marked a major change 
in its relationship with Europe. After years of negotiations, it was 
granted admission on January 1, 1986. Becoming part of the EC 
affected not only the country's economy but also government and 
society (see Foreign Economic Relations, ch. 3). As the poorest 
member of the EC , Portugal would receive large grants from the 
EC bodies to bring the country's infrastructure, living conditions, 
and education up to the level of the community's other members. 
The formation of the EC ' s single market in 1 993 would be another 
step toward Portugal's integration into Europe. 

As a result of these and many other international ties, tradition- 
al issues of whether Portugal would be First, Second, or Third 
World, socialist or capitalist, European or South Atlanticist were 
no longer issues at the beginning of the 1990s. Portugal had be- 
come part of the community of Western, European, democratic 
states. Nevertheless, Portuguese worry at times whether their coun- 
try's identity may be lost in this larger community and whether 
its industry and commerce will be able to compete in the large tariff- 
free single market. Although it has prospered since it joined the 
EC in 1986, the real economic challenges will come in the 1990s. 

EC membership has meant that Portugal has close voluntary re- 
lations with Spain for the first time in its history. Until then Por- 
tugal had maintained a wary distance from its large neighbor, 
although once, against its will, it had actually been a part of Spain 
for sixty years (1580-1640). For the most part, however, Portugal 
has looked to its alliance with Britain for support in remaining in- 
dependent. Although the Portuguese no longer believe that Spain 
poses a military threat, they are concerned that the stronger Spanish 
economy could gradually absorb them. 

After the revolution, relations between the two countries were 
tense at times. As a means of tempering disputes, a treaty of 1977 



215 



Portugal: A Country Study 

set up a Luso-Iberian Council to promote cooperation. In addi- 
tion, the countries' prime ministers have held occasional summit 
meetings since 1983. The most serious disagreements have cen- 
tered on the access of Spain's modern fishing fleet to Portuguese 
waters. Spain won on this issue but made some economic conces- 
sions to Portugal in return. 

Some of the tensions between Portugal and Spain during the 
1980s had a military origin, however. When Spain joined NATO 
in 1982, the Portuguese feared that an Iberian Command would 
be created with the result that Portuguese forces would come un- 
der the control of Madrid. Portuguese objections to this proposal 
ended when Spain was included under the Supreme Allied Com- 
mander Europe (SACEUR). Portugal kept its long-standing role 
under NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) 
(see Portugal and NATO, ch. 5). 

Portuguese ties with Britain, also an Atlantic power, date from 
the signing in 1386 of the Treaty of Windsor, the longest-lasting 
alliance in the Western world. The two countries had long secured 
mutual benefits from this treaty. Portugal sought British protec- 
tion against Spain and later France; Britain saw Portugal as its 
point of access on the European continent when other avenues were 
closed. This was the case at times during the Napoleonic period 
and during World War II when Britain was allowed to use the 
Azores for military purposes. Also binding the countries together 
was substantial British investment over the centuries, most nota- 
bly in Portugal's wine and port industries. 

Portugal traditionally has maintained good relations with France, 
mainly to balance Spain's power. Portugal also has strong feelings 
of affinity with France, and French intellectual trends have had 
a steady following in Lisbon. French influence is seen in the Por- 
tuguese legal system and administrative system. Until recently, 
when it was displaced by English, French was the second language 
of educated Portuguese. Many working-class Portuguese also have 
links with France. During the 1950s and 1960s, some three-quarters 
of a million Portuguese emigrated to that country in search of work. 

United States 

The United States and Portugal traditionally have considered 
each other friends and allies. These sentiments were reinforced by 
the large number of Portuguese immigrants to the United States 
and the growing economic and political importance of this Por- 
tuguese community. Since 1943, when the United States built the 
Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island in the Azores, American interests 
in Portugal have been mainly strategic and military. In return for 



216 



Government and Politics 



the use of this vitally important base, the United States gave mili- 
tary aid to Portugal. Portugal also benefited from the European 
Recovery Program (ERP), more commonly known as the Mar- 
shall Plan. During the 1960s and early 1970s, however, relations 
between the two countries were sometimes strained because the 
United States took an anticolonial stand with regard to Portuguese 
Africa. 

United States officials were not worried initially by the Revolu- 
tion of 1974. They assumed that General Spinola, a military man 
and a conservative, would maintain control. As the revolution 
moved sharply to the left, however, and it appeared possible the 
PCP might come to power, United States officials became uneasy. 
Frank Carlucci, the United States ambassador in Lisbon, directed 
a campaign to aid democratic groups. The United States and its 
NATO allies provided assistance to the Socialists and Socialist trade 
unions because they were viewed as the best alternative to a Com- 
munist takeover. The United States also sought to rally the moder- 
ate elements within the military and in Portugal generally. The 
campaign paid off as Portugal remained democratic. 

United States assistance, presence, and involvement remained 
high during the late 1970s. But as Portuguese politics came to resem- 
ble those of other West European nations during the 1980s, United 
States assistance declined. In 1983 the base agreement was 
renegotiated, but Portuguese officials were subsequendy disappoint- 
ed by a reduction in American military aid. As part of the base 
agreement, the Luso- American Development Foundation was creat- 
ed to promote economic and cultural ties between the two coun- 
tries. The next base negotiations, scheduled for the early 1990s, 
are certain to be onerous as the two countries each seek to realize 
their respective aims. The United States will continue to have a 
keen interest in the Lajes Air Base, the only such base available, 
while Portugal, less dependent on the United States as it becomes 
integrated into Europe, will have a strong hand at the negotiating 
table (see Bilateral Military Relations with Other Countries, Ch. 5). 

Other Countries and Areas 

At the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal still retained a special 
interest in its former colony Brazil, although the Portuguese con- 
tinued to occasionally look down on Brazilians as "people from 
the tropics," just as Brazilians had their own jokes about the Por- 
tuguese. Relations between the two countries were shaped by 
Brazil's much greater size and more powerful economy. For this 
reason, Brazilian investment in Portugal in the 1970s and 1980s 
was considerably greater than Portuguese investment in Brazil. 



217 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Brazilian telenovelas (soap operas) also dominated Portuguese tele- 
vision, leading to additional resentments. In general, however, 
relations between the two countries are good, although as of the 
early 1990s, any "special" relationship was now largely histor- 
ical, cultural, and nostalgic, rather than a reflection of concrete 
interests. 

Portugal also seeks to maintain good relations with North Afri- 
can and Middle Eastern countries, in part because of geography 
and in part because Portugal depends entirely on imported oil. Its 
"tilt" toward the Islamic countries sometimes produced strains in 
United States-Portuguese relations, particularly when the Middle 
East was in turmoil and the United States wished to use its bases 
in the Azores in pursuit of its own Middle Eastern policies. 

East Timor, Portugal's former colony on the eastern half of the 
island of Timor in Indonesia, remained a concern for Lisbon in 
the early 1990s. Portuguese setders first came to the island in 1520, 
but it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that 
Portugal had control of the territory. In 1975 war broke out be- 
tween rival groups striving for independence from Portugal. Late 
in the year, Indonesian troops invaded to stop the fighting, and 
in 1976 East Timor was declared part of Indonesia. As of the early 
1990s, continuing resistance on the part of Timorese guerrillas 
against Indonesian rule had claimed the lives of as many as 100,000 
people. 

As of the early 1990s, the UN continued to regard Portugal as 
the administering authority in East Timor. Portuguese officials, 
for their part, believed that their country had a moral obligation 
to remain involved in the affairs of its former colony. Through a 
variety of diplomatic moves, Lisbon attempted to move the Indone- 
sian government to arrange a settlement that could bring peace 
and even independence to East Timor. Indonesia refused to loosen 
its hold on the territory because it feared such an action might em- 
bolden other areas restive under its control, such as West Irian, 
to seek independence. 

* * * 

During the Salazar era, the authoritarian nature of the regime 
made it difficult to carry out serious, scholarly research; in the im- 
mediate aftermath of the Revolution of 1974, some of the research 
was partisan and ideological. More recently, a wealth of scholar- 
ship has begun to emerge. 

The Salazar era is covered in Antonio de Figueiredo's Portugal: 
Fifty Years of Dictatorship; Hugh Kay's Salazar and Modern Portugal; 



218 



Government and Politics 



and Howard J. Wiarda's Corporatism and Development. Richard Alan 
Hodgson Robinson's Contemporary Portugal and Tom Gallagher's 
Portugal: A Twentieth Century Interpretation are thoughtful and ana- 
lytical introductions to Portuguese affairs. Especially valuable are 
the edited volume by Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Mak- 
ler, Contemporary Portugal, and that by Graham and Douglas L. 
Wheeler, In Search of Modern Portugal, incorporating papers from 
the meetings of the Conference Group on Modern Portugal. 

The revolutionary period of the mid-1970s is covered well in Ken- 
neth Maxwell's articles in Foreign Affairs and the New York Review 
of Books, and in Douglas Porch's The Portuguese Armed Forces and the 
Revolution. A more specialized account is Nancy Bermeo's The Revo- 
lution Within the Revolution. 

Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz's Constitution of the Coun- 
tries of the World provides a text and commentary on the constitu- 
tional changes of the post-Salazar period. Good treatments of 
political events and of the main forces involved are in Thomas C . 
Bruneau's Politics and Nationhood, Bruneau and Alex Macleod's Pol- 
itics in Contemporary Portugal, Walter C. Opello's Portugal's Political 
Development, and Portugal in the 1980s, edited by Kenneth Maxwell. 
A skeptical view of Portuguese developments is provided in Howard 
J. Wiarda's The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal; a more 
hopeful perspective by the same author is Politics in Iberia. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



219 



Chapter 5. National Security 



Afonso Henriques, patron of the Portuguese Armed Forces, 
at the Battle of Ourique in 1139 



IN THE SEVENTEEN YEARS following the Revolution of 1974 
that restored democratic rule to Portugal, the armed forces under- 
went striking changes. The counterinsurgency warfare of 1961-74 
in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea (present-day 
Guinea-Bissau) brought an expansion of the personnel strength of 
the armed forces to 250,000. By early 1992, however, military forces 
were down to about 61 ,000. The army, reduced to scarcely 20 per- 
cent of its peak strength, suffered by far the greatest cut. 

The drastic contraction of the armed forces was accompanied 
by a redefinition of the nation's security policies. Until 1974, the 
resources of all three services were dedicated to suppressing the 
independence movements of the African territories. Although Por- 
tugal was one of the original members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), its principal contribution was in the form 
of strategic facilities, notably the United States base in the Azores 
(Agores), which was viewed as indispensable for reinforcing the 
alliance in the event of conflict with the Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
forces. Portugal did maintain two army divisions at home, one 
committed to NATO and the other to the defense of the Iberian 
Peninsula under the terms of a long-standing treaty with Spain, 
the Iberian Pact (also known as Treaty of Friendship and Non- 
aggression). Both divisions were staffed far below their author- 
ized strengths. 

After the restoration of elective government in 1976, Portugal 
adopted a more active role with respect to NATO. Determined 
to offer more than basing facilities, it committed itself to maintain 
a modern army unit, the First Composite Brigade, for potential 
deployment in northeastern Italy under NATO command. A Spe- 
cial Forces Brigade and a number of thinly staffed and under- 
equipped infantry and artillery regiments were responsible for the 
defense of continental Portugal and the Azores and Madeira ar- 
chipelagoes. The navy and air force were reorganized to empha- 
size defense against potential maritime threat in the waters within 
the Portugal-Madeira-Azores triangle (also known as the strategic 
triangle). 

The equipment of the three services was, however, approach- 
ing obsolescence, and they were ill-prepared to handle the new 
defense obligations. Portugal depended on assistance from the 
United States and other NATO allies for its major weaponry, but 
the rate of delivery fell short of essential requirements. Nonetheless, 



223 



Portugal: A Country Study 

the United States had supplied maritime reconnaissance aircraft 
and had agreed to furnish F-16 interceptor aircraft, air defense 
missile systems, and a variety of helicopters, including combat 
helicopters needed by the First Composite Brigade. Germany had 
provided three new frigates, giving the Portuguese Navy a limited 
but up-to-date antisubmarine capability. 

The military-led revolution of April 1974 dismantled the repres- 
sive system established by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and main- 
tained by his successor, Mar cello Jose das Neves Caetano. For two 
years after the 1974 coup, the armed forces were the dominant ele- 
ment in the political system, although the military leadership it- 
self was torn into bitterly competing factions. Under the constitution 
of 1976, a politico-military body — the Council of the Revolution — 
retained review powers over the actions of the civilian government. 
This transition stage ended in 1982 when the constitution was 
amended to subordinate the military to the elective political forces. 
The National Defense Law, passed in the same year, limited the 
mission of the armed forces to defense of the country against ex- 
ternal threat, contrary to the traditional view of senior officers that 
the armed forces were also responsible for safeguarding the nation's 
internal security and the stability of its institutions. Although the 
military remained involved in defense policy matters, its weight 
in civilian political affairs had declined with the reduction in the 
size of the armed forces and the shrinking military threat in Europe. 

Historical Background 

The military has played a major role in the development of Por- 
tugal throughout the country's history. During the Middle Ages, 
the armed forces drove the Moors out of the country and resisted 
Spanish attempts to end Portugal's newly won independence. Dur- 
ing the Renaissance, Portuguese navigators and explorers estab- 
lished settlements and trade routes around the world, and the armed 
forces played an important role in establishing and maintaining 
the greatest empire then known (see Maritime Expansion, ch. 1). 

The glories of conquest and riches of trade were short-lived. A 
military disaster took place when King Sebastiao led his poorly pre- 
pared army to defeat against the Moors in Morocco in 1578. Por- 
tugal was left leaderless without a legitimate heir, and the country 
soon came under the rule of Philip II of Spain, who had a valid 
claim to the throne. Although Spain did not actually occupy Por- 
tugal, it involved Portugal in its numerous dynastic and religious 
wars. As a result, Portugal lost most of its navy when it joined the 
Spanish Armada against Portugal's former ally, England. Portugal 



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National Security 



also lost much of its empire in the Far East to the Dutch (see Im- 
perial Decline, ch. 1). 

After Portugal threw off Spanish domination in 1640, it created 
a permanent army of 4,000 cavalrymen and 20,000 infantrymen, 
based on a conscription system covering all able-bodied men. Por- 
tugal renewed its alliance with England and was subsequently drawn 
into many European wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- 
turies. Portugal was occupied by Napoleon's troops in 1807. Brit- 
ish forces came to Portugal's aid, driving the French out of the 
country and then, using Portugal as a base of operations, out of 
Spain in 1813. During the middle and late nineteenth century, the 
army was instrumental in the exploration and effective occupation 
of Angola and Mozambique. 

A military revolt ended the Portuguese monarchy in 1910. Por- 
tugal attempted to maintain neutrality during World War I but 
was drawn into the conflict both in Europe and in Africa and fought 
on the side of the Allies. After Germany declared war on Portugal 
in March 1916, some 200,000 men were conscripted. An expedi- 
tionary force of two divisions saw service in France, sustaining heavy 
casualties at the Battle of Lys in April 1918. Other troops clashed 
with the German East African colonial army in Mozambique. 

The First Republic (1910-26) had a precarious existence marked 
by a rapid turnover of governments, coup attempts, and plots. 
Eventually, in 1926, the mounting social disorder and discontent 
over the civilian governments' interference in military matters 
precipitated an unopposed military takeover. Disagreement among 
the military factions over the goals of their intervention brought 
only further instability. By 1928, however, anew military-civilian 
cabinet was in place under a nonpartisan president, General Os- 
car Fragoso Carmona. The civilian minister of finance, Auconio 
de Oliveira Salazar, became the most powerful figure in the govern- 
ment. In 1932, Salazar was appointed prime minister, bringing 
the military dictatorship to an end. 

The Military in the Salazar Era 

The new prime minister was able to counteract anti-Salazar sen- 
timent in the military by publicly flattering the armed forces and 
by exempting them at first from ruthless cuts in government spend- 
ing. Although the backward state of the army's weaponry had by 
1935 become acute, Salazar refused to address the need for modern- 
ization until the army reduced its overstaffing. In 1936, he appoint- 
ed himself minister of war and in the following year introduced 
a major reorganization, including the pensioning of many senior 
officers to clear the way for younger, more dynamic officers. Officer 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

pay remained low; marriages had to be approved, and officers were 
pressured to choose wives from the wealthier classes so they would 
have an alternative source of income. The effect was to perpetuate 
familial links between the higher military and the economic elites. 

Salazar also formed several paramilitary organizations to offset 
the army's monopoly of armed strength. The most notable of these 
was the Portuguese Legion. Its members were the most loyal par- 
tisans of Salazar' s regime, the New State (Estado Novo). At its 
peak, the legion had 20,000 personnel trained and commanded by 
active or retired army officers. It was subject to military control 
when called upon to cooperate with the regular armed forces. 
Although not formally abolished until 1974, it was never more than 
a militia at the service of the regime and presented no threat to 
the power of the orthodox military establishment. 

Fearing that the success of the Spanish republican forces during 
the Spanish Civil War would lead to communist domination of the 
Iberian Peninsula, Salazar gave material and diplomatic aid to 
Francisco Franco's nationalist forces while maintaining a formal 
neutrality. A special volunteer force of 18,000 led by regular army 
officers was recruited to fight as part of Franco's army. When the 
civil war ended in 1939, Portugal and Spain negotiated the Treaty 
of Friendship and Nonaggression (Iberian Pact). The pact com- 
mitted the two countries to defend the Iberian Peninsula against 
any power that attacked either country and helped to ensure Iberian 
neutrality during World War II. 

The Azores were considered to be of prime strategic importance 
in the war. The Allies feared a possible German move to occupy 
the islands and needed their naval and air bases to combat Nazi 
submarine attacks against Allied shipping and to support trans- 
atlantic air links. In 1943, mindful of German defeats and Portu- 
gal's treaties with Britain, Salazar acceded to Britain's request for 
facilities in the Azores. Later, the United States was also permit- 
ted to establish bases in the islands. Portugal recognized the Ameri- 
can need for transit facilities to support its continued military 
presence in Western Europe after the war, and it authorized con- 
tinued use of the Lajes Air Base in the Azores until the arrange- 
ment was formalized in the bilateral Defense Agreement of 1951 
(see Bilateral Military Relations with Other Countries, this ch.). 

Portugal became one of the twelve charter members of NATO 
in 1949. Although the organization's collective security provisions 
did not apply to Portugal's overseas possessions, membership in 
NATO enabled the armed forces to acquire sophisticated weaponry 
and training from the United States and other NATO member 
countries. However, Portugal's colonial policies after fighting began 



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National Security 



in Africa in 1961 formed an obstacle to its full participation in the 
NATO system. 

The Role of the Armed Forces in Africa 

The Portuguese presence in Africa dates from the sixteenth cen- 
tury when fuel and water stations were established for ships en- 
route to the spice market of Goa. Portugal neglected these outposts 
for a time after the pepper trade declined. British and German 
colonial ambitions after 1885, however, led the Portuguese to un- 
dertake a series of military campaigns to control the interior of An- 
gola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. The effort to subdue 
the African colonies was a slow process that was not completed until 
1915. The costly campaigns were pursued by the Lisbon authori- 
ties to maintain prestige and to keep the oversized military estab- 
lishment gainfully occupied. 

Salazar strongly rejected pressures from the European powers 
to decolonize after World War II. He was grimly determined to 
maintain Portugal's overseas empire. Salazar's successor in 1968, 
Marcello Caetano, continued the struggle against the African in- 
dependence movements in spite of its drain on resources and 
manpower. 

Angola 

The first uprising against Portuguese rule in Africa occurred in 
Angola in March 1961, when primitively armed Bakongo tribal 
nationalists in the extreme north of the province attacked several 
coffee plantations, massacring white Portuguese owners and their 
families, as well as black African workers who refused to cooper- 
ate. Bloody retribution followed at the hands of local whites and 
blacks who had suffered at the hands of the insurgents. The revenge 
killings abated only in May 1961, when 10,000 troops arrived to 
reinforce the 6,000 white soldiers and a similar number of locally 
conscripted Africans already in Angola. Under the leadership of 
Holden Roberto, the insurgents found sanctuary across Angola's 
northern and northeastern borders in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (present-day Zaire). Roberto's group eventually became 
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional 
de Libertacao de Angola — FNLA), one of the three major anti- 
Portuguese guerrilla forces. Portuguese units, relying heavily on 
aerial bombardment and strafing attacks, managed to stabilize the 
military situation in the north. They brought large segments of the 
population into aldeamentos (controlled villages), similar to the stra- 
tegic hamlets used during the Vietnam conflict. 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

The intermittent warfare dragged on into the mid-1960s, and 
as many as 70,000 troops (40,000 of them European) were involved 
in the Angolan conflict. By 1966, two rival insurgent groups gradu- 
ally superseded the FNLA. One was the Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de 
Angola — MPLA), a communist-oriented group supported militarily 
by the Soviet Union and other communist countries. The other 
was the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola — UNIT A), 
based among the Ovimbundu in the south. 

From the mid-1960s until the April 1974 coup, Portuguese 
government forces were generally in control. Insurgency continued, 
however, as long as the guerrilla movements could obtain sanctu- 
ary in neighboring states. The long years of conflict increasingly 
damaged the morale of both the military and a large segment of 
the Portuguese people. A few months after the revolutionary govern- 
ment came to power in Lisbon in 1974, it began negotiations with 
the Angolan factions. Full independence was granted on Novem- 
ber 1 1 , 1975. Portugal officially announced its losses in Angola as 
1 ,526 killed in action and 1 ,465 noncombat deaths. Other sources 
estimated a much higher mortality figure. 

Portuguese Guinea 

In Portuguese Guinea (present-day Guinea-Bissau), the strug- 
gle against Portuguese rule began officially in January 1963, 
although there had been earlier acts of sabotage by members of 
the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Ver- 
de (Partido Africano pela Independencia de Guine e Cabo Verde — 
PAIGC). PAIGC was a Marxist movement guided by the Maoist 
concept of achieving revolution through the rural peasantry. By 
1968 PAIGC claimed control of nearly 70 percent of the territory 
and half the population of the province, the Portuguese being con- 
fined largely to the towns and major villages of the coastal area. 
Under a vigorous new governor, General Antonio de Spinola, regu- 
lar forces numbering 33,000 (about half Africans) were supplement- 
ed by local armed militia based in strategic villages. PAIGC 
nevertheless kept up its pressure by guerrilla raids mounted from 
neighboring Senegal and the Republic of Guinea. The military sit- 
uation was already deteriorating in 1973 when Soviet surface-to- 
air missiles (SAMs) were introduced and a number of Portuguese 
planes were shot down. Portuguese pilots became reluctant to fly, 
and as a result Portugal had to curtail the air attacks that had been 
highly effective against guerrilla operations. 



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National Security 



After Spinola returned to Lisbon in 1973, military morale erod- 
ed because the soldiers felt that they were fighting an unwinnable 
war in a territory of little value. A few months later, the revolu- 
tionary government that had recently come to power in Portugal 
began negotiations for withdrawing Portuguese troops from the 
province. Portugal recognized Guinea-Bissau as an independent 
state in September 1974. Portuguese losses in Portuguese Guinea 
were reported to be 1,656 killed in action and 696 noncombat 
deaths. 

Mozambique 

The insurgency in Mozambique began in the extreme northern 
areas of the province in 1964 and was led by guerrilla forces of 
the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Liberta- 
cao de Mozambique— FRELIMO). FRELIMO was well armed 
by various communist countries, and its fighters were trained by 
the Chinese. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, Portugal 
had about 16,000 troops in the province, all deployed in the north 
where the FRELIMO attacks were concentrated. For several years, 
Portuguese forces were able to prevent the guerrillas from moving 
southward. They could not end the warfare, however, because the 
guerrillas had a sanctuary to which they could retreat and a con- 
stant source of arms. Eventually the guerrillas were able to skirt 
the Portuguese strength in the north and mount incursions into 
the relatively unprotected center. 

Of the 60,000 government troops ultimately involved in Mozam- 
bique, 35,000 were black Africans, 10,000 were white Africans, 
and the remaining 15,000 were from Portugal. This relatively large 
force faced approximately 8,000 insurgents. Despite this numeri- 
cal superiority, the Portuguese government was unable to counter 
the guerrillas' tactics, which included ambushes, selective terrorism, 
and severing road and rail links. By September 1975, when the 
former province became independent as the People's Republic of 
Mozambique, Portuguese losses were officially reported as 1,606 
killed in action and 724 noncombat deaths. 

Role of the Military in Portuguese Political Life 

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Portuguese military 
played a prominent role in national life. Although the army was 
itself divided ideologically, it often acted as a liberal influence among 
the political groupings striving for power. During the events lead- 
ing up to the revolution of 1910, the military remained on the side- 
lines, lending strong backing neither to the monarchy nor to the 
republican politicians. When the revolt broke out, loyalist units 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

were of little help to the monarchy because of the republican sym- 
pathies of junior officers and sergeants. 

During the highly unstable First Republic (1910-26), military 
power seekers frequently dominated the political scene. The army 
itself became severely factionalized as a result of its involvement 
in domestic political disputes. The junior officers who carried out 
the coup of May 28, 1926, were united in little more than their 
disdain for the civilian politicians. Their actions were also inspired 
by the government's failure to deal with their grievances over pay, 
equipment, discipline, and professional status. Political turmoil con- 
tinued unabated; a countercoup in 1927 was put down with much 
bloodshed and harsh punishment of the troops involved. Salazar, 
then a civilian university professor, was appointed minister of 
finance by the military government and given sweeping powers 
to curb loose spending policies. 

Although military dissent surfaced several times after Salazar' s 
elevation to prime minister in 1932, he was able to keep rebellious 
officers under control without depriving the many officers with liber- 
al convictions of their careers. Nevertheless, political reliability 
rather than professional competence was likely to determine the 
rate of promotion. Disillusioned senior officers entered hopeless 
presidential contests against the official candidates, who were also 
high military figures. In 1958, a previously solid supporter of the 
regime, General Humberto Delgado, defied Salazar by running 
against the official candidate, Admiral Americo Tomas. Delgado 
was easily defeated, but he received a quarter of the vote, con- 
sidered a credible showing. In 1961 Salazar' s unyielding colonial 
policy touched off a major conspiracy in the senior ranks of the 
military. Salazar succeeded, however, in rallying the army and 
paramilitary forces loyal to him to bring about a rapid collapse of 
the coup attempt. Dissent within the military did not vanish, 
however, and the regime remained wary. In 1965, for example, 
it felt sufficiently threatened by the presence of Delgado in neigh- 
boring Spain that its intelligence agents assassinated him. 

The Military Takeover of 1974 

As the inconclusive colonial wars of the 1960s and early 1970s 
dragged on, support for them turned to indifference at home. Sepa- 
rated from home and family during repeated twenty-four-month 
tours of duty, military professionals felt increasingly estranged and 
demoralized. White officers, especially those commanding black 
troops, were often hostile to the white settlers over their treatment 
of blacks and in many cases were sympathetic to black aspirations 
for freedom. The mounting antiwar sentiment in Portugal was 



230 



National Security 



reflected in a growing rate of desertion and failures of conscripts 
to report for duty. Evasion of combat by unenthusiastic conscripts 
and university graduates commissioned as junior officers (milicianos) 
became increasingly common. Many of the milicianos formed a rad- 
ical element that agitated against Portugal's involvement in over- 
seas wars. 

Traditionally, the officer corps had been the preserve of young- 
er sons of wealthy families and sons of officers who could afford 
the tuition charged by the Military Academy. Military careers were 
sought by wealthy candidates more for prestige than reward be- 
cause pay was relatively poor compared with that of other profes- 
sions. The low salaries of senior officers, however, were often 
augmented by remunerative sinecures as corporation board mem- 
bers. Extended periods of leave to work in the private sector were 
not unusual. 

In 1958 the Military Academy, failing to attract sufficient num- 
bers of cadets needed for the army, ended its tuition requirements, 
and henceforth the student body was dominated by sons of shop- 
keepers, smallholders, and lower-level provincial bureaucrats who 
could not have afforded a university education earlier. This new 
class of cadets expected that after graduation they would enter the 
peaceful garrison life at home or in the colonies that the Portuguese 
army had known for generations. Instead, they were thrown directiy 
into the colonial wars and eventually became the disgruntled cap- 
tains who instigated the revolution. 

A number of events in the 1960s and 1970s helped to coalesce 
revolutionary sentiment in the military. One such event was the loss 
of Portuguese Goa. In 1961 the Portuguese enclave of Goa on the 
coast of India was threatened by an Indian invasion force of some 
30,000. The 3,000 Portuguese troops in Goa were badly equipped 
and unprepared to put up more than token resistance. In spite of 
Salazar's insistence that the colony should be defended, it was quickly 
overrun. Salazar punished the army for its failure to make a stand 
by ordering a number of dismissals and other penalties. The army, 
in turn, blamed the Goan debacle on Salazar and resented the 
punishments that they felt humiliated the entire officer corps. 

Further undermining the loyalty of career officers was Decree 
Law 353-73, issued by the government of Prime Minister Marcel- 
lo Caetano. The decree law stated that nonregular officers, in most 
cases milicianos commissioned after a short army course, would be 
permitted to convert to a regular commission at their conscript rank 
and to receive the same consideration for promotion as those who 
had graduated from the Military Academy. Career officers felt that 
the decree undermined their status in the army, as well as in society. 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

The growing dissatisfaction, based largely among junior career 
officers, led to the formation in 1973 of the Captains' Movement. 
This ad hoc committee of career officers — mostiy captains — initially 
banded together to give voice to their professional grievances. In 
a short time, the captains found that their grievances were shared 
by career officers of the navy and the air force, as well as noncareer 
officers of all services. The Captains' Movement became the Armed 
Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas Armadas — MFA) and 
emerged in November 1973 as a full-blown dissident group whose 
clandestine membership ranged across the political spectrum. In 
addition to the question of professional status, officers were dis- 
contented over their low pay and long postings abroad under harsh 
conditions. They were also disturbed over the lack of modern equip- 
ment to match the arms furnished to the African insurgents by the 
Soviet Union, the East European countries, and China. The United 
States and several other NATO countries had imposed an embar- 
go on the shipment of arms to Portugal that might be employed 
against the African liberation movements. 

Dissatisfaction among senior officers with the government's con- 
duct of the colonial wars was centered in two groups. The right 
wing was associated with General Kaulza de Arriaga, the former 
commander in chief in Mozambique, who conspired to seize power 
to enforce a military solution to the wars in Africa. More moder- 
ate officers, such as Chief of Staff General Francisco de Costa 
Gomes and General Spinola, who had been named deputy chief 
of staff, favored negotiation with the liberation movements. Spi- 
nola' s influential book, Portugal and the Future, advocating a loose 
confederation with the African colonies because military victory 
was impossible, hardened the resolve of the increasingly radical 
MFA plotters. 

In March 1974, when Spinola and Costa Gomes failed to ap- 
pear at a public ceremony in which they were to endorse existing 
policy in Africa, Caetano fired both of them. A premature coup 
attempt followed Spinola' s dismissal, but loyal troops turned back 
a column marching on Lisbon. No shots were fired, but many 
officers were arrested or transferred. Five weeks later, on April 25, 
1974, the main group of MFA conspirators deposed the Caetano 
government without resistance by the loyalist forces. The chief ar- 
chitect of the meticulously planned coup was the leftist Major (later 
Brigadier General) Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. 

The MFA quickly appointed a board of seven officers — the Junta 
of National Salvation — with General Spinola at its head to govern 
the country according to the MFA program. Assuming power for 
the first time in almost fifty years, the military pledged that authority 



232 



National Security 



would be transferred to a new government when constitutional in- 
stitutions freely chosen by the people had been established. 

Friction developed almost immediately between the then- 
anonymous leadership of the MFA and President Spinola' s junta 
over the issue of the pace and direction of decolonization. The MFA 
favored immediate dissolution of the links with the colonies and 
withdrawal of Portuguese forces, whereas Spinola favored a gradual 
solution leading to limited autonomy within a Portuguese federa- 
tion. Most conscript officers and men were anxious to abandon 
the struggle in Africa and return home. Although Spinola had wide 
popular appeal, his position was shaky because he was viewed as 
insufficiendy committed to the revolution by radicals controlling 
the MFA. A powerful weapon in the hands of the MFA was an 
elite military organization — Continental Operations Command 
(Comando Operacional do Continente — COPCON) — with Car- 
valho at its head. Formed in July 1974 of paratroopers, marines, 
and army commandos, its mission was to control rising political 
and labor violence at a time when the police were reluctant to ap- 
pear on the streets to enforce the law. 

In September 1974, after his rightist supporters attempted without 
success to dislodge the left-wing inner circle of the MFA from con- 
trol, Spinola resigned the presidency. The leftist climate within the 
military strengthened as the MFA continued to shift radical officers 
into key positions while sidelining those considered to lack revolu- 
tionary zeal. Nevertheless, when officers were able to express their 
choice by ballot, support for the left wing seemed weak, and many 
officers were eager to return to the barracks. 

After conservative military units backing Spinola mounted an 
abortive countercoup in March 1975, Spinola and other officers 
were forced to flee to Spain by helicopter. The MFA moved rap- 
idly to consolidate its control, setting up a Council of the Revolu- 
tion that consisted of the leading MFA officers. The council had 
the power to control the presidency and a veto over the legislative 
process. 

Elections held for the Constituent Assembly in April 1975 showed 
the Communist and ultra-left parties to be in the minority. The 
MFA continued to advance revolutionary plans but became increas- 
ingly factionalized in the mounting political turbulence. The an- 
gry reaction to takeovers of the pro-Socialist opposition newspaper 
and of the Roman Catholic radio station by ultra-leftists, together 
with attacks against Communists by conservative northern peasants, 
attested to a shift in the tide against radical elements. 

Discipline began to break down within the armed forces under 
the anarchic conditions prevailing in the late summer and fall of 



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Portugal: A Country Study 



1975. Moderates, still a majority among the officers, gradually im- 
proved their position. A left-wing coup attempt by air force 
paratroopers and various Lisbon army detachments was decisive- 
ly put down by a well-organized countercoup on November 25, 
1975. COPCON was dissolved, Carvalho and 200 other radical 
officers were arrested, and others were purged from the armed 
forces. With the moderate element of the MFA firmly in charge, 
the military formally agreed to hand power back to the civilians 
after a new constitution was drawn up. 

The Armed Forces in Political Life after 1975 

The Council of the Revolution relinquished legislative power to 
the national parliament elected in April 1976, and two months later 
executive power was handed over to General Antonio dos Santos 
Ramalho Eanes upon his election as president. Eanes had served 
briefly as army chief of staff, and it was widely felt that having 
a military man as president would reduce the likelihood of renewed 
military involvement in politics. Eanes would only agree to become 
president if he were also made chief of staff of the armed forces. 
Thus Eanes served as both president and chief of staff until 1981, 
when the two positions were separated. In 1982 Eanes was deprived 
of exclusive power to select the chiefs of staff, who subsequently 
were appointed by the president acting upon a formal proposal of 
the government. Eanes was reelected for a second presidential term, 
but in early 1986 he was succeeded by the former prime minister, 
Mario Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares, who thus became the first non- 
military head of state in sixty years. 

Under Article 273 of the constitution of 1976, the armed forces 
had the "historic mission of guaranteeing the conditions permit- 
ting the pluralist and peaceful transition . . . towards democracy 
and socialism." Nevertheless, under Article 275, the armed forces 
were to be strictly nonpartisan and were not to use their arms or 
their ranks to "influence or impede the selection of a particular 
democratic path." The Council of the Revolution was retained. 
Its membership consisted of the president, the chief and deputy 
chief of staff and the three service chiefs, the prime minister if a 
military person, and fourteen MFA officers. The council advised 
the president on the selection of a prime minister and had veto power 
over pending legislation, as well as decision-making power over 
military regulations and appointments. The MFA leaders declared 
that they had no desire to retain these powers permanently but only 
until the democratic system was fully established. 

The continued existence of the Council of the Revolution be- 
came a political issue when the council frustrated the government 



234 



Portuguese marines practicing an assault landing 
Portuguese infantry during an air assault exercise 
Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington 



235 



Portugal: A Country Study 

by vetoing a number of laws, including those dealing with mili- 
tary reform and the denationalization of banks and industry. In 
1982 a center-right coalition government that had run on a plat- 
form of constitutional change was eventually able to force through 
amendments that dissolved the Council of the Revolution and re- 
moved the residual military powers over the elected civilian govern- 
ment. The council was replaced by the Higher Council of National 
Defense, whose powers are only advisory and are limited to ques- 
tions of national defense and the organization, functioning, and 
discipline of the armed forces. It also confirmed officer promotions 
to general rank. The revised Article 273 of the constitution re- 
stricted the mission of the armed forces to "safeguarding national 
independence, the integrity of the territory, and the freedom and 
security of the population against any external aggression or threat, 
while respecting democratic institutions." In justifying these 
changes, the minister of defense explained that the government 
"deemed it inadvisable to provide legal pretexts which might one 
day be invoked to justify appeals for the intervention of the mili- 
tary in resolving internal political problems by means alien to 
democracy and the Constitution." 

The subordination of Portugal's military to the civilian authorities 
was codified by the National Defense Law of 1982. It was passed 
in November of that year by the Assembly of the Republic over 
the objections of President Eanes who feared that the armed forces 
would be politicized by allowing the minister of defense to choose 
the chief of staff and the heads of the three services. 

In spite of the measures taken in 1982 to divest the military of 
its remaining political powers, the military retained for a time con- 
siderable weight in matters of security. It also continued to feel 
a measure of responsibility for maintaining internal stability. In 
1982 for example, the Association of the 25th of April, a club domi- 
nated by left-wing former members of the MFA, was founded to 
"fight for the preservation of the ideas" of the revolution of April 
25, 1974. 

By the early 1990s, however, under a determined prime minister 
and a strong minister of defense, the political influence of the mili- 
tary had waned. The National Defense Law of 1991 further 
strengthened civilian control. The law increased the power of the 
chief of staff and made him directly responsible to the minister of 
defense. Senior officers regarded as troublemakers or too active 
politically had been eased aside, and Portugal's military leader- 
ship differed little from that of other West European nations. 



236 



National Security 

Strategic Concepts Underlying the Portuguese Defense 
Posture 

Historically, Portugal has had two essential security objectives: 
the protection of its colonial empire and the maintenance of its status 
as a distinctive national entity on the Iberian Peninsula. The na- 
tion's geographic position — a band of territory on the Atlantic coast, 
isolated from the main powers of Europe — has always been cen- 
tral to its strategic thinking. Portugal has never been strong enough 
to defend itself without assistance, but it had a long tradition of 
resistance to the presence of foreign troops on its soil. According- 
ly, it has followed a policy of aligning itself with the leading naval 
power of the time. Its alliance with Britain, first established by the 
1 386 Treaty of Windsor, was periodically reaffirmed until the twen- 
tieth century. After World War II and the creation of NATO, a 
close relationship with the United States came to be regarded as 
essential to preserving the country's overseas possessions. The 
nation's territorial integrity has not been even remotely threatened 
since the Napoleonic period, nor have immediate concerns of 
national security been the most compelling factors in military 
planning or the decision to join NATO. Rather, the country's par- 
ticipation in NATO until the mid-1970s was primarily aimed at 
winning political and military support for its colonial policies in 
Africa. 

Portugal made only a marginal contribution to NATO during 
the Salazar and Caetano eras, and its involvement in Africa alienat- 
ed it from the other members of the alliance. However, the prevail- 
ing Portuguese attitude after 1974 was favorable to greater 
Portuguese activity in NATO and the defense of the West, based 
on recognition of the dangers represented by the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact. Public opinion polls in Portugal reflected a decid- 
edly pro- Atlantic, pro-NATO sentiment, especially when compared 
with that of other countries in NATO's southern tier, such as Spain 
and Greece. The events of 1974-75, when Portuguese Communists 
gained control of important functions of the state and deeply 
infiltrated the military, solidified the majority perception that the 
nation's interests lay in association with the West European com- 
munity and NATO. The upheavals of 1974-75, together with 
Moscow's role in supporting the African liberation movements, 
inclined the Portuguese military leaders to regard the Soviet 
Union as a hostile power against which the country must constantly 
remain vigilant. 

In geostrategic terms, the country is perceived as a narrow strip 
along the Atlantic flank of the Iberian Peninsula that, together with 



237 



Portugal: A Country Study 

the archipelagoes of Madeira and the Azores, forms the Portuguese 
"strategic triangle." It occupies an intermediate position between 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas and between Europe and 
Africa. The strategic triangle is crossed by important sea and air 
lines of communication, linking North America and the east coast 
of South America to Europe, southern Africa to Europe, and the 
Mediterranean lands to Northern Europe. In the event of an East- 
West confrontation, the defense of these waters would be impera- 
tive for reinforcing the European southern flank. The Portuguese 
territories and waters would also be critical to control over the Straits 
of Gibraltar. The Lajes Air Base in the Azores, in addition to its 
advanced position for air resupply, is ideal for surveillance of the 
Atlantic and the conduct of antisubmarine warfare. As stated by 
United States Secretary of State George Shultz in 1984: "The 
Azores base is pivotal if the United States is to react effectively to 
military challenges in Europe or to threats to Western security out- 
side NATO." 

The military doctrine incorporated in the Portuguese strategic 
concept emphasizes the role of air and naval components to protect 
communications linking the Azores, Madeira, and the Portuguese 
mainland. This task has always necessitated the employment of 
naval vessels equipped for antisubmarine warfare and the use of 
the "angles" of the strategic triangle as bases for maritime patrol 
and interceptor aircraft. Another part of Portuguese strategic thinking 
stresses the growing ability of the North African countries — Morocco, 
Algeria, and Libya — to engage in modern military operations. 
Regional or religious conflicts in the area or the establishment of 
Soviet basing privileges would affect NATO's lines of communi- 
cations and Portugal's responsibilities. Lisbon's efforts to foster good 
relations with the North African countries, especially Morocco, have 
as one objective, therefore, the reduction of such risks. 

Recognizing that with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cen- 
tral Europe and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact the military 
threat to Europe had subsided, the Portuguese political leadership 
became increasingly reluctant to assume financial and personnel 
commitments needed to carry out NATO missions. As of early 
1993, defense strategy was clearly at a transitional stage. According 
to official statements, the armed forces would continue to be scaled 
down in areas of secondary importance, while efforts would be made 
to continue modernization and to achieve high operational efficiency 
in designated areas, notably air defense, naval patrols, and rapid 
reinforcement capability at any point of the national territory. The 
break-up of the Warsaw Pact has not, according to the official view, 
caused all threats to disappear. There is no guarantee that regional 



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National Security 



crises, low-intensity conflicts, and religious fundamentalism will 
not destabilize nations and entire regions. Prime Minister Anibal 
Cavaco Silva pointed out in May 1990 that the NATO alliance 
had served peace for more than forty years over a vast territory. 
It would be rash, he said, for the West to disarm unilaterally and 
hurriedly and for the existing balance in Europe to be jeopardized. 
Similarly, Portugal was reluctant to assign security responsibili- 
ties to the European Community (EC — see Glossary) that would 
diminish the standing of NATO as the primary instrument of col- 
lective self-defense. 

During the period in late 1990 leading up to the Persian Gulf 
conflict, Portuguese political leaders supported the United Nations 
(UN) resolution and expressed strong solidarity with the country's 
allies. In addition to quickly approving transit facilities in the Azores 
and on the mainland, Portugal provided medical assistance teams 
and a transport plane for evacuating refugees. A cargo vessel is 
assigned to support the movement of British forces to the Persian 
Gulf, and Portuguese vessels joined NATO standby forces in the 
Mediterranean. However, the government announced that Por- 
tugal would not contribute ships or troop units to take a direct part 
in the conflict, a decision reportedly received with discontent by 
senior military officers. 

The Armed Forces 

The three services of the Portuguese armed forces had a com- 
bined personnel strength of about 61,000 in 1992: about 33,000 
in the army, 15,000 in the navy, and 13,000 in the air force. The 
president of the republic is commander in chief of the armed forces, 
while the senior military officer is the chief of staff of the armed 
forces. The president's formal powers include the right to declare 
war and appoint the chiefs of staff from names proposed by the 
government in power. The president chairs the Higher Council 
of National Defense, whose members are the prime minister, the 
minister of defense and other cabinet ministers; the chief of staff 
of the armed forces; the three service chiefs of staff; and the presi- 
dents of the regional governments of the Azores and Madeira (see 
fig. 10). 

Prior to the passage of the National Defense Law of 1982, the 
military controlled the passage of laws affecting the armed forces, 
established budgetary and procurement policies, and had the power 
to veto international agreements involving national defense. The 
1982 law was intended to make the military subordinate to civilian 
political authority, functioning through the minister of defense, in 
defense policy matters. Successive governments were reluctant to 



239 



Portugal: A Country Study 




240 



National Security 



antagonize the military establishment by depriving it of its former 
powers, and initially the chiefs of staff retained practical control 
over budgets, strategic options, and procurement matters. By the 
early 1990s, however, civilian authority incorporated in the 1982 
law was being more rigorously applied. 

Army 

The army's personnel strength was estimated at about 33,000 
as of late 1991 . About 75 percent of army personnel were conscripts 
serving a twelve-month period of service, and 10 percent were 
officers of both career and conscript status. The army was organized 
into four military regions (North with headquarters at Porto, Cen- 
tral with headquarters at Coimbra, South with headquarters at 
Evora, and Lisbon) and two military zones (Madeira with head- 
quarters at Funchal and Azores with headquarters at Ponta Del- 
gada (see fig. 11). 

The size of the army had been drastically reduced since 1974, 
when it consisted of 21 1 ,000 soldiers of all ranks, the bulk of whom 
were committed to the fighting in Africa. During the colonial wars, 
elements of two divisions remained in metropolitan Portugal; one 
of these was earmarked for assignment to NATO's Central Region 
along the Rhine River, and the other was assigned to peninsular 
defense in the framework of the 1939 Iberian Pact. Both divisions 
were below 50 percent strength and were equipped with outmod- 
ed weapons. 

Major revisions in the army structure have occurred since the 
withdrawal of troops from the colonies in 1974. Most of the army 
is organized along regimental lines. By 1992, it included fifteen 
infantry regiments, six artillery regiments, three cavalry regiments, 
two engineering regiments, one commando regiment, a signals regi- 
ment, and a military police regiment. The infantry regiments nor- 
mally consist of a headquarters battalion, an infantry battalion, 
and a training battalion. New recruits are immediately assigned 
to one of the regiments, where they receive their basic training. 
The infantry regiments bear the names of communities within the 
military region where they are located. Forces in the Azores and 
Madeira are designated as Home Defense Groups, each consist- 
ing of two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion with anti- 
aircraft and coastal guns, and support units. 

The army's two most important units are the Special Forces 
Brigade and the First Composite Brigade committed to NATO. 
Unlike other army formations, which are subordinate to regional 
military commanders in the areas where they are located, these 
two units are directly subordinate to the army chief of staff. For 



241 



Portugal: A Country Study 



P 

ii 
in 

IV 

v 

VI 



International boundary 
Military region boundary 
National capital 
Populated place 
NATO headquarters 

Headquarters of military 
regions and zones 
Air bases 

Naval headquarters 
Lisbon Military Region 
South Military Region 
Central Military Region 
North Military Region 
Azores Military Zone 
Madeira Military Zone 
25 50 Kilometers 



25 50 Miles 

Inset maps for Madeira and the 
Azores not in scale 



A p 



AZORES V 

TERCEIRA [ZJ 

SAO MfGUE£Z^~f~^~\ 
Ponta QelgacsT^, 



MADEIRA VI 

MADE>BA^*£; ncM ^ 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 




Atlantic 
Ocean 



PusbonJ\ 

V~^^J%MontijoJt 



SPAIN 



Figure 11. Major Military Installations, 1992 



purposes of logistics and administration, however, the First Com- 
posite Brigade is under the commander of the Central military 
region. 

The Special Forces Brigade, located in the Lisbon area, is com- 
posed of 2,000 men organized into two special forces battalions, 
one infantry battalion, and a logistics battalion. However, some 
units are only earmarked for service with the brigade and are still 
carried within the regimental structure. 



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National Security 



The organization of the First Composite Brigade was begun in 
1976 to replace the division previously committed to NATO. The 
brigade is located at Santa Margarida, 120 kilometers northeast 
of Lisbon, and maintained at 90 percent of its authorized strength 
of 5,200. Designed to conduct delaying and defensive operations, 
the brigade would come under Allied Land Forces Southern Eu- 
rope (AFSOUTH) in periods of crisis or war. It has taken part 
in NATO exercises in northeastern Italy. Its constituent units are 
one mechanized infantry battalion with M-113 armored person- 
nel carriers, two motorized infantry battalions, one armored bat- 
talion equipped with M-48A5 tanks, a field artillery battalion 
equipped with 155mm self-propelled howitzers, an armored recon- 
naissance unit, and engineering and signal companies. 

Beginning in 1987, the army acted to improve the combat poten- 
tial of the First Composite Brigade, particularly in overcoming its 
weaknesses in antitank weaponry and low-level air defense. The 
First Composite Brigade would face problems of transport and sup- 
ply if deployed in Italy at a distance of 2,500 kilometers from its 
logistics base. Most of the brigade would be airlifted to its assigned 
position, with the heavy equipment to follow by sealift. Portugal 
does not have sufficient transport aircraft available to move the 
unit quickly, nor are there plans to position equipment in Italy in 
advance of the troops. 

Newly enlisted army personnel are generally assigned to a unit 
from their own region of the country, where they also receive their 
basic training. After about six months of service, enlisted men who 
meet educational and other requirements can apply to the sergeants' 
school for training as noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Senior 
NCOs can qualify for commissions after attending the Higher Mili- 
tary Institute. 

Discharged personnel are assigned to the reserves. Conscripts 
are carried on the reserve rolls until the age of thirty-five. There 
is no annual training period, although the call-up system is tested 
from time to time. 

Young men aspiring for an army career can, after completing 
high school, compete for places at the Military Academy located 
near Lisbon; it had an enrollment of about 500 in 1991. Subse- 
quent training of officers is conducted in the specialized schools 
of the various branches of the service. Advanced officer training, 
corresponding to the Command and General Staff School and the 
Army War College of the United States Army, is carried out at 
the Institute for Higher Military Studies in Lisbon. The highest 
level of professional education, corresponding to the United States 
National Defense University, is the National Defense Institute. 



243 



Portugal: A Country Study 

The students, senior officers of the military, high civil servants, 
and leading figures in the private sector, devote half a day for one 
year to the program. The army also operates prestigious military 
academies at the high- school level, primarily for the children of 
career officers and NCOs but open to children of civilian families 
on a restricted basis. Most of the students continue on to universi- 
ty and a civilian career after graduation. 

The basic infantry weapon of the Portuguese army is the Heck- 
ler and Koch 7.62mm G-3 rifle manufactured domestically under 
a German license. Armored units are equipped with M-48A5 tanks 
and M-113 armored personnel carriers from the United States, 
supplemented by wheeled armored vehicles from a variety of 
sources. The principal antitank weapons are TOW (tube-launched, 
optically tracked, wire-guided) and Milan wire-guided missiles. In 
addition to a few self-propelled howitzers assigned to the First Com- 
posite Brigade, the army has an inventory of towed field guns and 
coastal artillery. The effort to modernize the NATO-earmarked 
First Composite Brigade has priority on resources, which means 
that units with home defense missions are equipped with obsolete 
weapons. Any substantial improvement is dependent on assistance 
from the United States, which has not supplied aid on the scale 
needed. It is possible that additional armored equipment, modern 
artillery, and antitank and air defense weapons will become avail- 
able after deactivation by the United States Army under the 1990 
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, although Portugal faces 
competing demands by other NATO countries (see table 12, Ap- 
pendix). 

Navy 

Portugal has a strong maritime tradition dating from the four- 
teenth and fifteenth centuries, when explorers inspired by Prince 
Henry the Navigator reached Madeira, the Azores, and the west 
coast of Africa, rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and sailed on 
to establish the sea route to India (see Maritime Expansion, ch. 1). 
Although traditionally the service with the greatest prestige, the 
navy declined during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For 
a period in the 1950s, this trend was reversed when modern frigates, 
corvettes, minesweepers, and patrol vessels are acquired through 
military assistance from the United States. After the Revolution 
of 1974, the number of operational fighting vessels declined by more 
than half, from forty to seventeen. 

During the colonial wars, the navy was active in efforts to inter- 
dict guerrilla movements on rivers, lakes, and coastal waters of Afri- 
ca. After the withdrawal of the armed forces from Africa, the navy's 



244 



National Security 



emphasis shifted to home waters, where its missions have been 
defined as protecting the sea lanes between the mainland and the 
islands of the Azores and Madeira, cooperating with the other 
services in the defense of Portuguese territory, patrolling the 200- 
mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off Portugal's coast, and 
meeting Portugal's NATO responsibilities in the Iberian Atlantic 
Command (IBERLANT) zone of operations (see Portugal and 
NATO, this ch.). 

The chief of the naval staff (an admiral) is supported by the vice 
chief of naval staff (a vice admiral), the continental naval com- 
mander (also a vice admiral), the Azores naval commander (a rear 
admiral), the Madeira naval commander (a captain), and the Ma- 
rine Corps commandant (a captain). The main naval base is at 
Alfeite near Lisbon, as is the Naval Academy. The continental naval 
command is at Portimao on the south coast. The commanders in 
the Azores and Madeira exercise the concurrent role of NATO is- 
land commander. 

Between the end of the colonial wars in 1974 and 1992, the navy's 
personnel strength decreased from 19,400 to 15,300. As of 1992, 
about 5,000 of the navy's personnel were conscripts serving for 
sixteen months. Standards of performance and motivation of career 
NCO personnel are reported to have been affected by the decline. 
Many NCOs, trained at considerable expense by the navy, departed 
for private- sector employment. Lack of advancement, wage levels 
not commensurate with the skills involved, and the diminishing 
prestige of naval careers are said to be contributing factors. As a 
result of the flight of technicians, previous training and fitness stan- 
dards could not be maintained. 

The principal combat vessels of the Portuguese navy are four 
frigates and three submarines of French construction and ten small 
frigates (sometimes classified as corvettes) built in Spain and Ger- 
many. The French frigates and submarines were commissioned 
in the late 1960s, and the corvettes were commissioned between 
1970 and 1975, although they were later modernized by the addi- 
tion of new communications and electronics gear. The navy also 
operates a number of coastal patrol and auxiliary vessels (see table 
13, Appendix). Three modern MEKO-200 frigates were commis- 
sioned in 1991. These ships, built in Germany and financed with 
the help of seven NATO members, were, at 3,200 tons, much larger 
than any other vessels in the existing fleet. They were to be armed 
with torpedoes, Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles, the Sea Spar- 
row SAM, and advanced sonar and fire-control systems. They 
would also accommodate two helicopters for antisubmarine oper- 
ations. 



245 



Portugal: A Country Study 

Even with the addition of the MEKO frigates, Portugal has only 
a limited capability to carry out its IBERLANT responsibilities. 
The main potential threats are submarines that might interdict the 
Atlantic sea lanes and mines that could force the closure of ports. 
The navy's antisubmarine warfare capability, although improv- 
ing, is still deemed deficient, particularly in view of the lack of air 
reconnaissance. The lack of minesweepers to operate in the 
Portugal-Madeira- Azores triangle is a further shortcoming in view 
of the strategic importance of this zone for European shipping. The 
navy has plans to replace its submarines and to purchase ocean- 
going patrol vessels and minesweepers, but it is not clear how they 
would be financed. 

The Marine Corps consists of 2,500 men, of whom approximately 
half are conscripts. They are organized into two infantry battal- 
ions and one naval police battalion. The marines are trained for 
small amphibious operations and shore patrol duties. In addition 
to light arms, their equipment includes wheeled armored vehicles, 
mortars, and landing craft. 

Air Force 

Although the Portuguese air force did not become an indepen- 
dent service branch until 1952, it has existed since 1912. Portuguese 
pilots flew missions in World War I, and Portuguese aircraft are 
involved in the Spanish Civil War. The air force played a major 
role in the colonial wars, attacking guerrilla raiding parties, sup- 
porting ground troops, and performing reconnaissance, transport, 
and medical evacuation missions. During this period, its strength 
increased from about 12,500 in 1962 to a peak of 21,000 in 1973. 
After the Revolution of 1974 and the withdrawal from Africa, air 
force strength shrank as low as 8,000, but it was at a level of 10,300 
in 1992. This total included 3,000 conscripts whose service obli- 
gation is sixteen months, as well as 2,200 airborne troops who were 
scheduled to be shifted to army command. The air force's sixteen 
squadrons operate from seven principal bases, including six in con- 
tinental Portugal and Lajes in the Azores. One battalion of the air- 
borne brigade is at the Monsanto Air Base, one battalion is at 
Aveiro, and the unit's training center is at Tancos. 

The air force has a reputation as a well-trained, dynamically 
led, and disciplined service. Its aircraft maintenance and overhaul 
facilities at Alverca are considered to be excellent. Nevertheless, 
it has not had a clearly defined mission since the end of the Afri- 
can wars, and its capabilities are limited by the lack of up-to-date 
combat aircraft. With the exception of ten Alpha Jets obtained from 
France and Germany in the early 1990s, the air force is largely 



246 




Portuguese Navy frigate of the Joao Belo class in a live-fire exercise 
A Portuguese Navy frigate of the Vasco da Gama class 
Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington 



247 



Portugal: A Country Study 

dependent on the transfer of obsolete aircraft from surplus stocks 
of other NATO members. 

The backbone of the air forces is composed of two squadrons 
of A-7P Corsairs received under the United States military as- 
sistance program between 1982 and 1985 (see table 14, Appendix). 
The air force had previously been dependent on Fiat G-91s in the 
attack role. Deliveries of these aircraft from the German air force 
began in 1965-66 as partial reimbursement for German use of the 
Beja Air Base for training purposes. Portugal has no planes designed 
primarily for air defense, but both the A-7Ps and the Fiat G-91s 
are equipped with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, providing them 
with the means to perform a secondary air defense role. 

A result of the 1989 review of the Lajes Air Base agreement is 
the delivery of seventeen F-16A fighters and three F-16Bs (train- 
ing versions) from the United States beginning in 1994. Although 
these are earlier models of the highly regarded F-16 series, the in- 
troduction of these aircraft will represent a significant upgrading 
of the Portuguese air defense capabilities. The F16s will operate 
from Monte Real Air Base and from two forward bases in Madeira 
and the Azores. As part of the same agreement, Portugal is sched- 
uled to receive a battery of Hawk SAMs and associated radar to 
boost its air defenses. 

In 1988 the air force acquired six Lockheed P-3B Orion mari- 
time reconnaissance aircraft that had previously been in service 
in the Australian air force. After modernization in Portugal by the 
addition of newer radar and navigation systems, acoustic sensors, 
and armaments, the aircraft entered service in 1990. Operating 
from Montijo Air Base, the aircraft provide the air force with a 
patrol capability against submarines within the sea space linking 
Portugal with the Azores and Madeira. For reasons of economy, 
however, few patrol missions have been flown. 

The air force also has in its inventory C-130H Hercules trans- 
port aircraft intended to provide partial airlift for the First Com- 
posite Brigade earmarked for NATO, as well as Spanish-built 
CASA C-212 Aviocar light transports, some of which are fitted 
for additional maritime surveillance, weather reconnaissance, and 
survey missions. Two of the C-130s are scheduled to be stretched 
to increase their load capacities, and an additional stretched C-130 
is to be acquired. No combat helicopters are included in the air 
force inventory of aging French-built Alouettes and Pumas, the 
survivors of a considerable fleet of helicopters used during the wars 
in Africa. Under the 1989 Azores review, the United States is com- 
mitted to supply fifty-seven combat, antisubmarine, and transport 
helicopters. 



248 



National Security 



A major component of the air force modernization plan is the 
introduction of an air command and control system for the plan- 
ning, tasking, and execution of air operations, including coordi- 
nation with ground and naval forces. The system will be linked 
to the Spanish, French, and NATO air defense systems. Although 
NATO approved a large share of the funding, a reassessment is 
underway in light of the dramatic changes in the European securi- 
ty situation. 

The Air Force Academy, a four-year institution, is located at 
Sintra near Lisbon. Elementary pilot training for cadets is con- 
ducted on Aerospatiale Epsilons, eighteen of which were acquired 
from France in 1989 for assembly in Portugal. Jet basic training 
follows on Cessna T-37Cs and advanced training on Alpha Jets 
or Northrop T-38A Talons. Additional officer training, carried 
out at the Air College, consists of a basic command course for lieu- 
tenants, a command and staff course for captains, and the air war 
course for colonels. 

The air force faces major problems arising from career dissatis- 
faction among its highly trained personnel. Pilots are requesting 
permission for transfer to the reserves, indefinite leave, or perma- 
nent discharge. As of the early 1990s, the pilot shortfall was esti- 
mated at about 30 percent. The principal reasons are economic. 
Even with flight pay, officers earn much less than commercial pi- 
lots. Air force pilots also complain that they do not have sufficient 
opportunity to develop and hone their skills. Annual flying times 
for pilots and crews are reportedly well below the NATO- 
recommended minima owing to budgetary and fuel restrictions and 
the shortage of serviceable aircraft. 

Conditions of Service 

The armed forces entered a period of transition in the early 
1990s that was the source of considerable uncertainty and turmoil 
among professional personnel. The severe cutbacks in the size of 
the military establishment, particularly the army, and the unset- 
tled status of the military role and missions had a demoralizing 
effect. Career prospects seemed increasingly circumscribed, and 
the government's budgetary measures made the armed services 
seem unattractive in comparison with the opportunities in civilian 
life. The promotion possibilities were limited by the excessive num- 
ber of officer personnel. As of 1988, the army's personnel strength 
had been reduced to only 20 percent of its strength in 1974. Yet 
during the same period, the officer complement had fallen by lit- 
tle more than half. The air force and the navy experienced more 
moderate reductions in staffing between 1974 and 1988. Naval 



249 



Portugal: A Country Study 



officer strength had declined slightly, but the number of air force 
officers had actually increased. 

The armed forces had formerly been admired as the defenders 
of democracy for their role in the toppling of the Salazar-Caetano 
regime in 1974. Military officers sensed that their profession had 
since suffered a decline in social status and prestige and that they 
were regarded by the public as superfluous. The historic left-wing 
and right-wing factions from the 1974-76 period were still distin- 
guishable in the officer corps, although younger officers who had 
entered the service since the end of the colonial wars represented 
a separate and growing category. The upsurge of discontent against 
the government's perceived indifference to career military personnel 
was common to all elements, however. 

The armed services are forbidden by law from forming unions 
to express their demands. This prohibition has been skirted by the 
formation of sergeants' "movements" and periodic large dinner 
gatherings among the officers. NCOs have also staged mild demon- 
strations to draw attention to their grievances. NCO advisory com- 
missions have been established by the government, but these have 
proven to be ineffective because the officers representing the mili- 
tary establishment have no authority to negotiate over the issues 
raised. The NCOs have sought the elimination of promotions out- 
side the normal sequence, reduction in the maximum time served 
at each grade, greater access to officer training courses, improve- 
ment in salary scales, and earlier retirement. Although sergeants 
could attain officer rank after attending the Higher Military Insti- 
tute, few could hope to be promoted beyond captain because of 
insufficient vacancies at the major level. Naval NCOs have sought 
more training opportunities and the establishment of new special- 
ties. The sergeants have called for an updating of the Code of Mili- 
tary Justice and Military Disciplinary Regulations, including the 
right of assembly and association. 

In addition to the general feeling that salary levels do not cor- 
respond to the demands and risks associated with the military profes- 
sion, officers feel that special benefits they previously enjoyed are 
being curtailed, including extra tax exemptions, subsidized gaso- 
line, and overtime pay. Prices for food at military commissaries 
are no longer significantly below prices in civilian outlets. The 
officers have sought a lowering of age limits on active duty at 
the upper ranks as a means of increasing opportunities for ad- 
vancement. 

The length of compulsory military service was a subject of con- 
tention in the early 1990s, and the outcome is likely to have a 
pronounced effect on the future status of the career service and 



250 



Jet fighters of the Portuguese Air Force 
Air Force personnel manning a control tower 
Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington 



251 



Portugal: A Country Study 

on the effectiveness of the armed forces. The army service obliga- 
tion, which had been twenty-four months at the end of the coloni- 
al wars in 1974, had been reduced to sixteen months by 1984 and 
to twelve months in 1990. Conscripts in the air force and navy 
served for sixteen months. In 1989, of 80,000 young men eligible 
for military service, 60,000 are deemed physically fit, although only 
45,000 were actually inducted. In 1990 the number of inductees 
was lowered to 35,000. Those considered first for exemptions from 
service, in order of priority, are married men, heads of households, 
and only sons. 

Conscientious objector status is recognized, although under the 
law, those granted exemption from active service are required to 
perform civil defense duties. Over 4 percent of those on enrollment 
lists file applications as conscientious objectors. Few young people 
acknowledge the need for military service, viewing it as a waste 
of time during a prime period of their lives. The youth branches 
of the main political parties are among those groups advocating 
a shorter period of military service. 

One plan for reducing the period of conscription to four months 
is under discussion in the early 1990s. Under the plan, 20,000 con- 
scripts would be in the service at any single time, 10,000 would 
be undergoing a two-month period of accelerated training, and 
10,000 would be serving in their units. A safety clause would per- 
mit the minister of defense to extend the period of service to eight 
months for the army and twelve months for the navy and air force 
if the needs of the services were not being adequately met. The 
government plan called for the introduction of two new recruit- 
ment systems: one for volunteers, who would serve a minimum 
of eight months, and another for contract enlistments, which might 
be as long as eight years, to attract specialists in such fields as 
telecommunications, electronics, and computer technology. It was 
foreseen that the eight-month volunteers would be attracted by a 
higher wage (about US$200 a month) than conscripts and incen- 
tives in the form of preferences for academic study and careers in 
the police services. 

This much discussed service plan is a further source of dis- 
satisfaction for many in the officer corps who feel that the four- 
month term of service, the shortest of any country in Europe, would 
lead to a military establishment that is more costly to maintain and 
only marginally effective. Although the total number inducted 
each year would increase, the time allowed for training is regard- 
ed as insufficient to teach more than basic infantry skills and would 
seriously degrade unit performance. Doubts have been expressed 



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National Security 



over the adequacy of the wages and incentives offered to retain a 
permanent cadre of skilled NCOs and specialists. 

Although women have the legal right to volunteer for military 
duty and the armed forces are under obligation to accept them, 
it was only in the late 1980s that a few women with special qualifi- 
cations, such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers, were taken into 
the officer corps. Several women were also enrolled at the Air Force 
Academy to train as pilots. No women were serving in the enlist- 
ed ranks. As of 1991, fewer than 100 women served in the armed 
services, fewer than any other country of NATO. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

The official grade structure of the Portuguese armed forces shows 
nine officer ranks for the army and the air force and nine for the 
navy (see fig. 12). The rank of general is not subdivided as in the 
United States Armed Forces. Officers of the highest rank, that of 
general, wear three stars, except for the chief of staff of the armed 
forces and the three service chiefs of staff, who wear four stars. 
The rank of marechal (fleet admiral in the navy) is honorary and, 
as of early 1993, is held by only two persons, both retired army 
generals. The army and air force each have nine enlisted ranks; 
the navy uses only seven (see fig. 13). Officer ranks are displayed 
by peak decorations on the headgear and chin cords. The peaked 
caps of all three services also bear the Portuguese coat of arms. 

On the pale gray full-dress uniform of the army, rank designa- 
tions are displayed in the form of gorget patches for general officers 
and cuff bars for other officers. On the olive green service uniform, 
usually worn with shirt and tie, shoulder board insignia denote 
officer ranks. Shoulder boards or sleeve chevrons are worn by en- 
listed personnel and warrant officers. The highest NCO rank of 
first sergeant is denoted by four upward-pointing chevrons. 

Army fatigue uniforms are olive green, and combat uniforms 
are of camouflage material. The standard headgear for enlisted per- 
sonnel is a brown beret bearing the national colors of red and green. 
Armored troops are distinguished by black berets, and paratroops 
wear green berets. Special forces wear distinctive camouflage uni- 
forms with red berets. 

The air force uniform is light blue with a peaked cap as stan- 
dard headgear for both officers and NCOs and berets for other 
ranks. All ranks wear garrison caps with nondress uniforms. Stars 
and sleeve rings denoting ranks are worn on the sleeve cuffs of officer 
uniforms. Rank chevrons similar to those of the army are worn 
on the shoulder by enlisted personnel. 



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Portugal: A Country Study 




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National Security 




Portugal: A Country Study 

Navy personnel wear either blue wool or white cotton uniforms 
for shore or sea duty. In either case, pullover blouses are standard. 
Navy enlisted men's headgear is similar to those of other Europe- 
an navies — round caps with the name of the ship sewn on the head- 
band. Peaked caps, bearing the state arms and designating rank 
by peak decoration, are worn by officers and petty officers. Ma- 
rines wear dark blue berets. Ranks displayed on uniforms consist 
of sleeve rings for officers and rank chevrons for NCOs. As in the 
other services, warrant officers' ranks are denoted by a combina- 
tion of chevrons and the coat of arms. 

Defense Expenditures 

The Portuguese defense budget was 197.5 billion escudos 
(US$1.25 billion) in 1989, 219.1 billion escudos (US$1.54 billion) 
in 1990, and 206.8 billion escudos (US$1.73 billion) in 1991 (for 
value of the escudo — see Glossary). Over the period 1978-89, the 
defense budget increased by an average of 1.9 percent annually 
in real terms. According to a survey by the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (AC DA), which applied cer- 
tain adjustments to the official figures for defense, Portuguese mili- 
tary expenditures rose in real terms from US$1 . 189 billion in 1979 
to US$1,457 billion in 1989 (both amounts in constant 1989 dollars). 

Portugal's defense outlays are the lowest in NATO with the ex- 
ception of Luxembourg (Iceland has no military forces). In terms 
of defense expenditures per capita, Portugal was the lowest in 
NATO (US$141 in 1989) with the exception of Turkey. However, 
in terms of the share of gross national product (GNP — see Glos- 
sary) allotted to defense, most NATO countries spent less than Por- 
tugal. Portugal's expenditures on its military establishment had 
risen from 4.5 percent of GNP in 1960 to 8.3 percent of GNP dur- 
ing the course of the colonial wars. In the 1980s, defense expendi- 
tures averaged 3.43 percent of GNP. Defense outlays, which had 
constituted 26.7 percent of the national budget in 1960, rose to 
nearly 46 percent of the budget during the peak of the overseas 
wars in 1971. By 1977 defense expenditures had declined to 10 per- 
cent of central government expenditures, and they remained be- 
low 10 percent throughout the 1980s. 

In 1988 expenditures were allocated among the services on the 
following basis: army, 36.9 percent; navy, 30.6 percent; air force, 
22.3 percent; and general staff, 10.1 percent. The largest expen- 
diture category was personnel (64.5 percent), among the highest 
in NATO and exceeded only by Belgium and Luxembourg. The 
principal cause was the fact that the rapid decline in total staff was 
not matched by a decline in the officer roster. Moreover, pension 



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payments to demobilized personnel were a significant cost factor. 
Of the service branches, the army was burdened with the highest 
outlay for personnel, amounting to 80 percent of its budget. This 
outlay was attributable in part to the large number of officers on 
active duty in excess of the army's requirements. By comparison, 
60 percent of the navy's budget was absorbed by personnel ex- 
penses. Portugal's outlays on major equipment items as a share 
of the defense budget (13.4 percent) were among the lowest in 
NATO, as well. 

Portugal and NATO 

Portugal was one of the founding members of NATO in 1949. 
For more than two decades, Portugal's material contribution to 
the alliance was marginal. Its armed forces were preoccupied with 
the fighting in Africa, and its efforts to maintain a colonial empire 
alienated it from the other members of the alliance. Nevertheless, 
its contribution in the form of strategically located bases and other 
military facilities was substantial. Major air bases and ports on the 
Portuguese mainland were deemed vital for rapid reinforcement 
and sea resupply of NATO forces on the continent. Control of 
Madeira was considered crucial for keeping the North Atlantic 
routes to the Straits of Gibraltar open for allied operations. The 
Azores provided essential refueling facilities for the rapid deploy- 
ment of forces to Central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Mid- 
dle East, as well as a key base for antisubmarine tracking and naval 
surveillance. 

In the immediate postrevolutionary period when leftist ideolo- 
gy was in the ascendancy in the military, the question of Por- 
tugal's continued active participation in the alliance came into 
question. In 1975 Portuguese representatives absented themselves 
from highly classified NATO discussions. By 1980, however, Por- 
tugal had returned to full participation, rejoining NATO's Nuclear 
Planning Group and again taking part in NATO exercises. The 
establishment of a pro- Western democratic government, followed 
by the accession of Portugal to the European Community (EC) 
in 1986, inspired renewed interest in an active role in the alliance. 
The desire to provide the armed forces with a meaningful military 
mission after the African operations ended and to divert them from 
further involvement in civilian politics were additional factors in 
Portugal's willingness to undertake fresh NATO commitments. 
Portugal accordingly accepted the obligation to equip the First Com- 
posite Brigade to be at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Com- 
mander Europe (SACEUR) and agreed to increase its surveillance 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

and control over a large sector of the eastern Atlantic by acquiring 
modern frigates and reconnaissance aircraft. 

The Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT), a major subor- 
dinate command under the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
(SACLANT) located at Norfolk, Virginia, has its headquarters at 
Oeiras, near Lisbon. Since 1982 the IBERLANT commander has 
been Portuguese, a vice admiral with a staff of about sixty-five 
officers and 200 enlisted personnel mainly from Portugal, the United 
States, and Britain. IBERLANT encompasses the area extending 
from the northern border of Portugal southward to the Tropic of 
Cancer and approximately 1,150 kilometers seaward from the 
Straits of Gibraltar. Madeira is within IBERLANT' s area, as are 
the Azores after transfer from NATO's Western Adantic Com- 
mand (WESTLANT) to meet Portuguese concerns. 

The IBERLANT commander has no permanendy assigned com- 
bat forces in peacetime. The IBERLANT staff carries out plan- 
ning and conducts exercises to ensure the headquarters' readiness 
to assume command and logistic support of forces that would be 
assigned in a period of tension or war. In addition to the adminis- 
trative facilities and underground command post at Oeiras, IBER- 
LANT has extensive communications links with SACLANT at 
Norfolk and other command posts. Other NATO facilities in Por- 
tugal include ammunition and fuel depots and strategic reserves 
at Lisbon and a reserve airport at Ovar near Porto. NATO also 
occupies a portion of the Montijo Air Base for the same purpose 
and has fuel storage areas and access to the air base in the Azores. 
The Portuguese navy participates in exercises with other NATO 
fleets, particularly those involving protection of resupply convoys 
in the IBERLANT area. 

When Spain became a member of NATO in 1982, Portugal is 
concerned that a reorganization of the NATO command structure 
might follow. Portuguese misgivings focused on the possibility that 
an integrated Iberian command would be formed under a Span- 
ish commander and that Spain might be entrusted with security 
tasks within the area of Portuguese territories for which the Por- 
tuguese armed forces were not yet fully equipped. After Spain's 
decision in 1986 to remain outside NATO's integrated military 
structure, however, the issue of assignment of commands and mis- 
sions in the Iberian Peninsula and adjacent sea areas became 
dormant. 

Bilateral Military Relations with Other Countries 

Since World War II, Portugal has maintained a significant level 
of defense cooperation with several NATO countries, but its military 



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relations with the United States have been of paramount impor- 
tance. The United States was granted facilities at Lajes Air Base 
on Terceira Island in the Azores in 1944. Under a 1951 bilateral 
defense agreement and subsequent technical agreements, the United 
States has continued to enjoy access to this base. Lajes has been 
an important refueling stop for military transport aircraft and a 
base for tanker aircraft to refuel fighter aircraft shutding between 
the United States and Europe and the Middle East. It has also been 
a base for American antisubmarine aircraft that patrolled a large 
sector of the sealanes linking the United States Sixth Fleet in the 
Mediterranean with its supply depots on the east coast of the United 
States. As of 1992, the United States had about 1,200 air force per- 
sonnel in the Azores. 

The use of the Lajes Air Base for non-NATO purposes required 
prior clearance by Portugal. When Israel was subjected to a sur- 
prise attack by Egypt and Syria in October 1973, the Lajes Air 
Base was used to support the emergency transport of military sup- 
plies to Israel. Portugal was the only NATO country to grant the 
United States the use of its facilities during the 1973 crisis. When 
UN forces were deployed in 1990 in response to the Iraqi occupa- 
tion of Kuwait, Portugal gave early and comprehensive approval 
to use Lajes and mainland bases for aerial refueling and moving 
United States aircraft and equipment to Saudi Arabia. 

The 1951 Azores agreement was extended in late 1983 to per- 
mit the United States to have continued use of Lajes for seven years 
until February 1991. As of 1993, no firm settlement had been 
reached to extend the agreement. As part of the 1983 understand- 
ings, the United States pledged its best efforts to bring its military 
aid up to an annual level of US$125 million. Assistance totaling 
US$90 million was provided in fiscal year (FY) 1984 and US$105 
million in FY 1985 but, owing to Congressional reductions in the 
administration's requests, was lower in subsequent years. Estimated 
military assistance obligations in FY 1990 were US$84.6 million. 
Disappointment expressed by the Portuguese prime minister with 
the level of military aid under the 1983 agreement led to consulta- 
tions in 1988. As a result, the United States agreed to supply ad- 
ditional weaponry to help Portugal bring its NATO-committed 
forces to a more active posture. Portugal's air defense capabilities 
were also to be strengthened by introducing interceptor aircraft 
and modernizing the A- 7 squadrons. Among the additional items 
of equipment the United States committed itself to supply were 
twenty F-16 fighter aircraft, fifty-seven helicopters of various types, 
a battery of Hawk SAMs, air defense radar, vehicles, ammuni- 
tion, and a hydrographic vessel. The previous delivery of P-3 



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Portugal: A Country Study 



maritime patrol aircraft and the United States contribution to the 
MEKO frigate program were aimed at augmenting Portugal's anti- 
submarine warfare capability in the Atlantic. 

The United States has also provided training assistance valued 
at about US$2.5 million annually. This aid enabled more than 500 
Portuguese personnel to receive professional military education each 
year, as well as training in the effective use and maintenance of 
weapons systems being delivered under the aid program. 

The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) has also been 
a substantial supplier of arms to Portugal, transferring excess Fiat 
G-91 aircraft, M-48A5 tanks, trucks, and other vehicles. In 1986 
West Germany announced that about US$200 million would be 
earmarked for the construction of the three MEKO-200 frigates. 
The West German air force maintains eighteen Alpha Jets at Beja 
Air Base for advanced training of its personnel under an agree- 
ment dating from 1960. Both the United States and Germany use 
the aircraft repair and overhaul facilities at Alverca under contract 
with the Portuguese air force. Several other NATO countries have 
contributed modestly to meet Portugal's military needs, including 
components for the MEKO frigates. France operates a missile- 
tracking station on Ilha das Flores in the Azores. In partial compen- 
sation, France provided Epsilon training aircraft to the Portuguese 
air force in 1989. 

According to data compiled by the ACDA, the value of arms 
transfers to Portugal amounted to US$370 million between 1984 and 
1988. Of this total, US$210 million originated in the United States, 
US$30 million in West Germany, and US$20 million in France. 
The remaining US$100 million came from a variety of suppliers. 

Domestic Defense Production 

Portugal has had a small defense industry since the eighteenth 
century, consisting originally of a naval arsenal, a gunpowder plant, 
a cannon foundry, and an arms factory. Beginning in the mid- 
nineteenth century, the military's food, supplies, and, later, fuels 
were provided by a government agency, the Manutencao Militar. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a factory for supplying 
military uniforms and equipment was established. During the 1960s, 
the defense industry expanded to meet the specialized requirements 
of the antiguerrilla operations in Africa. However, since the end 
of the fighting in 1974 and the subsequent scaling back of the armed 
forces, production capabilities have exceeded the country's needs. 
A modest level of sales abroad have helped the Ministry of Defense 
keep production lines open for artillery, mortar, and small arms 
ammunition. 



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Under Portuguese law, private companies are not permitted to 
engage in research, planning, testing, manufacturing or overhaul 
of equipment exclusively intended for military purposes. These laws 
have been interpreted to restrict to government-owned enterprises 
the production of bombs, missiles, torpedoes, mines, hand grenades, 
propellant powders, and other explosives. The construction of com- 
bat aircraft, helicopters, and warships is also limited to nationally 
owned companies, although component manufacture could be sub- 
contracted to private firms. 

In addition to Manutencao Militar, the principal government 
enterprises include Oficinas Gerais de Fardamento e Equipamen- 
to (OGFE) for production of uniforms and equipment; Oficinas 
Gerais de Material de Engenharia (OGME) for the overhaul of 
military vehicles; and Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico 
(OGMA) for maintenance and repair of all aircraft, avionics, en- 
gines, communications, and radar equipment of the Portuguese 
Air Force. OGMA also has maintenance contracts for United States 
air force and navy equipment and to supply parts and components 
to several European aircraft manufacturers. The main ordnance 
factory is Industrias Nacionais de Defesa E.P. (INDEP), a producer 
of 60mm and 81mm mortars, artillery and mortar munitions, small 
arms ammunition, machine guns, and, under a German license, 
the Heckler and Koch 7.62mm G-3 rifle used by the Portuguese 
army. Arsenal do Alfeite near the Lisbon naval base has facilities 
for building patrol craft, auxiliary ships, and corvettes, but all of 
its larger modern vessels have been constructed abroad, and its 
activities are confined to maintenance and overhaul. Bravia, a 
private company, produces a range of wheeled armored personnel 
carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, and military trucks. 

According to the ACDA, Portugal's arms exports reached a peak 
of US$220 million in 1986, falling off to US$40 million in 1989. 
In the latter year, arms exports accounted for only 0.3 percent of 
total Portuguese exports. In 1989 the minister of defense said that 
the defense industry, employing 3,000 to 4,000 people, faced con- 
traction because fewer countries were in the market for arms. 

Public Order and Internal Security 

Following the end of the long authoritarian regime in Portugal 
in April 1974, the system of internal security is reorganized. The 
Public Security Police (Policia de Seguranga Publica — PSP) and 
the National Republican Guard (Guarda Nacional Republicana — 
GNR), viewed as having been active supporters of the regime, were 
put temporarily under military command. As of 1990, internal secu- 
rity is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

of Internal Administration (formerly the Ministry of Interior). The 
forces of security were ctotrolled by, and fully responsible to, the 
government. 

The revolutionary turmoil of 1974 to 1976 imposed a severe 
challenge to the maintenance of law and order. In addition to oc- 
casional violence by leftist and rightist groups, the emergence of 
separatist activity in the Azores and Madeira posed threats to the 
territorial integrity of Portugal. After constitutional government 
was established in 1976, political violence abated. Between 1980 
and 1986, however, an ultra left-wing terrorist group, Popular 
Forces of the 25th of April (Forcas Populares do 25 Abril— FP-25), 
its name referring to the coup d'etat of April 25, 1974, conducted 
a campaign of bombing, assassinations, and bank robberies (see 
Terrorist Groups, this ch.). 

The Police System 

Although the main duties of the police had always been the 
prevention, detection, and investigation of crime and the main- 
tenance of public order, their involvement under successive govern- 
ments in suppressing political and labor organizations left a reservoir 
of fear and mistrust among the Portuguese people. The authority 
of the police, which was identified with the old regime, was seri- 
ously compromised by the Revolution of 1974. During the months 
after the revolution, there was a sharp rise in crime and disorder 
owing to the virtual disappearance of social and moral constraints 
imposed by tradition and reinforced by the authoritarian regime. 
Until the civilian police forces, disarmed after the revolution, could 
be reorganized and retrained to operate in Portugal's new politi- 
cal environment, armed forces security units assumed responsibility 
for internal security. By 1976, control of the police apparatus was 
returned to civilian authorities in the Ministry of Internal Adminis- 
tration. 

Article 272 of the constitution of 1976, as revised in 1982, em- 
phasizes the responsibility of the police to defend the democratic 
process and to ensure that they act within the law and do not ex- 
ceed their authority. In carrying out their mission of preventing 
crimes, including crimes against the security of the state, the police 
are enjoined to observe the rights, freedoms, and safeguards of 
citizens. The constitution stipulates that each of the forces of secu- 
rity are to have a single organization for the entire national territory. 

National Republican Guard 

The GNR was formed in 1913 as a heavily armed paramilitary 
constabulary organized up to battalion strength. It was intended 



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National Security 



as a check against the military and was first employed to confront 
monarchist-inspired revolts within the ranks of the armed forces. 
Although its essential mission was one of maintaining order in the 
countryside, the GNR's activities were subsequently extended to 
those of helping the urban police to control demonstrations and 
quell labor unrest. 

In 1990 the GNR numbered approximately 19,000 officers and 
men and was equipped with Commando armored cars and twelve 
Alouette II helicopters transferred from the German army. The 
guard is organized into battalions stationed in the major cities and 
companies and sections in district capitals and smaller communi- 
ties. Highway patrols are conducted by a separate Traffic Brigade 
and by rural units of the GNR. 

Reserve and career officers from all branches of the armed forces 
can be seconded to tours of duty in the GNR on a voluntary basis. 
Reservists who are university graduates can apply to continue as 
GNR officers upon completion of their military obligations. 

Public Security Police 

The PSP is a paramilitary police force under the jurisdiction the 
Ministry of Internal Administration. Its basic mission is the pro- 
tection of property and public security in urban areas. Before its 
reorganization in 1953, the urban police had been under the con- 
trol of provincial governors. During the colonial wars, security 
police assault units were dispatched to Africa, where they partici- 
pated in combat operations against guerrilla forces. The PSP was 
reorganized and retrained in 1975, and its heavy equipment was 
turned over to the army. 

PSP detachments operate from divisional headquarters in Lis- 
bon and from the eighteen districts of continental Portugal, which 
are divided into North, South, and Central zones. There are also 
headquarters for Madeira and the Azores and sectional headquarters 
in smaller towns. Greater Lisbon and greater Porto have separate 
commands. A specialized traffic service shares highway patrol 
responsibilities with the GNR Traffic Brigade. A special group, 
the Intervention Police, has mobile sections poised for deployment 
anywhere in the country. Criminal investigation and data gather- 
ing are centralized under the General Anti-Crime Directorate, 
which employs 1,500 specialized officers and investigators. As of 
1990, the PSP had a complement of 17,000 individuals. Staff are 
drawn from among former service personnel. Since the early 1970s, 
women have also been recruited for plainclothes investigations and 
traffic control assignments. 



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Portugal: A Country Study 



In 1989, a demonstration by some 1,000 police personnel out- 
side the Ministry of Internal Administration took a violent turn. 
The police had tried to form a union, but the government rejected 
the idea on grounds that the police, as a military organization, were 
prohibited by the National Defense Law of 1982 from having a 
union. The police maintained that they needed a union to improve 
working conditions that were marked by long hours and low pay. 
In the late 1980s, for example, an ordinary patrol officer earned 
the equivalent of only US$390 a month. 

Other Police Forces 

In 1990 the Fiscal Guard (Guarda Fiscal; also known as Trea- 
sury Police), a border control force, numbered 8,500 and was 
charged with customs inspections and the collection of import duties. 
In addition, the force investigates smuggling, tax evasion, and illegal 
financial transactions, particularly those involving import-export 
businesses and currency exchange. Most of its uniformed and plain- 
clothes police are stationed at frontier crossing points, ports, and 
terminals of entry. Their monitoring of entries and departures by 
foreigners also produces a flow of information needed by internal 
security agencies. The Maritime Police has functions similar to a 
coast guard service. The Judicial Police, responsible to the minister 
of justice, acts in conjunction with the court system in investigat- 
ing crimes, particularly those involving subversion and terrorism, 
and preparing cases for prosecution. 

Intelligence Services 

The existence in Portugal of an intelligence apparatus for polit- 
ical surveillance and control is as old as the modern state and dates 
at least from the sixteenth century. Under Salazar, however, a secret 
police organization of extensive and pervasive influence became 
a formidable component of his authoritarian regime. The secret 
police, called the International Police for the Defense of the State 
(Polfcia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado — PIDE), although un- 
der jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, was in fact controlled 
directly by Salazar. Under revisions of the law after 1954, PIDE 
officers were entitled to act as inquiring magistrates empow- 
ered to detain for trial persons suspected of crimes against the state. 
Suspects were routinely arrested without warrants and often held 
for months without specific charges brought against them and 
without access to legal assistance. Disappearance and torture were 
commonplace. 

Agents of PIDE carried out covert operations within communist 
organizations, the government-run labor unions, the armed forces, 



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the universities, and the Portuguese emigre communities abroad. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, PIDE directed its efforts to suppressing 
opposition to the war effort in the African colonies, particularly 
on university campuses, and to tracking down antiregime terrorists 
responsible for bombing military and strategic installations. 

Although PIDE was renamed the General Security Directorate 
(Direccao Geral de Seguranca — DGS) by Marcello Caetano's 
government, it retained its old image. The abhorrence felt for it 
was so strong that it was abolished in Portugal the day after the 
Caetano regime was toppled. Abuses by the security apparatus were 
subsequently reported in detail in the Portuguese press, causing 
even more revulsion among the public. Outrage over the prolonged 
detention and torture of suspected terrorists and opposition politi- 
cians resulted in the arrest of PIDE-DGS agents and investiga- 
tions of past operations of the organization. 

The lingering specter of PIDE and DGS as pillars of the 
authoritarian regime in the memory of the Portuguese people 
delayed the establishment of a new civilian intelligence agency for 
more than a decade. Following an Armenian terrorist attack on 
the Embassy of Turkey in 1983, the assassination of a Palestine 
Liberation Organization representative at a Socialist Internation- 
al conference the same year, and a number of domestic terrorist 
attacks, the Portuguese government became convinced of the need 
for a new intelligence agency. After the passage of authorizing legis- 
lation in late 1984, the Intelligence System of the Republic of Por- 
tugal (Sistema de Informacoes da Republica Portuguesa — SIRP) 
was established in 1986. SIRP was intended to be the parent body 
for three separate intelligence services: the Security Intelligence 
Service (Servico de InformacSes e Seguranca — SIS), the Military 
Intelligence Service (Servico de InformacSes Militares — SIM), and 
the Defense Strategic Intelligence Service (Servico de Informacoes 
Estrategicas de Defesa — SIED). SIS, under the minister of inter- 
nal administration, was given the mission of gathering intelligence 
to ensure internal security and to prevent sabotage, terrorism, es- 
pionage, and acts that could alter or destroy the constitutionally 
established state of law. SIM was intended to replace the Military 
Intelligence Division of the armed forces, but the transition had 
not been effected as of 1993. Military intelligence continued to be 
the responsibility of the chief of staff of the armed forces. Its authori- 
ty was limited to gathering intelligence needed to carry out the mis- 
sions of the armed forces and to guarantee military security, 
although some strategic intelligence collection abroad was report- 
edly also conducted. 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

Under the 1984 legislation, SIED, reporting directly to the prime 
minister, was to be responsible for producing intelligence needed 
to safeguard the independence and external security of the Por- 
tuguese state. The government decided to defer the creation of 
SIED, however, asserting that the limited financial resources avail- 
able should be dedicated to developing an effective internal secu- 
rity organization rather than an agency focusing on external 
security. Thus, SIS was the only arm of the intelligence apparatus 
operating as contemplated in the 1984 legislation. SIS functions 
under considerable handicaps, employing only about eighty per- 
sons as of 1990. Its sole office is in Lisbon, although branches are 
planned for Porto, Ponta Delgada, and Funchal. SIS agents are 
not authorized to make searches or arrests, to intercept correspon- 
dence or tap telephones, or to intervene in normal criminal cases. 
Although no SIS agents are known to have been exposed to vio- 
lence, they are entitled to hazardous duty pay at about 30 percent 
above normal civil service scales. 

The 1984 security law prohibited the employment of former PIDE 
agents in any Portuguese intelligence function. Accordingly, SIS 
was launched with few adequately qualified individuals. In spite 
of a public recruiting drive, analysts estimated that it would be some 
years before Portugal could boast of a domestic intelligence ser- 
vice staffed with fully seasoned personnel. 

In light of the history of violations of civil rights by PIDE, several 
bodies were formed to monitor the activities of the Portuguese in- 
telligence community. The Council to Oversee the Intelligence Ser- 
vices, composed of three deputies elected by the Assembly of the 
Republic, is mandated to review the actions of the intelligence ser- 
vices and report its findings annually to the Assembly of the Repub- 
lic. The Commission to Control Data, made up of three judges, 
monitors the intelligence data center to protect individuals against 
any collection of data violating their rights under the Constitution. 
The Superior Intelligence Council, a twelve-member intermini- 
sterial body, advises the prime minister and coordinated intelli- 
gence matters. 

Terrorist Groups 

Since the transition to democratic rule was completed in 1976, 
the country has been relatively free from subversive or terrorist 
activity threatening the maintenance of constitutional authority. 
The only significant terrorist group, the Popular Forces of the 25th 
of April (Forcas Populares do 25 Abril — FP-25), carried out a num- 
ber of attacks between 1980 and 1986, but at no time did it pose 
a major threat to the security of the state. Effective counterterrorism 



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National Security 



measures and the absence of public support sharply curtailed the 
ability of FP-25 to sustain its campaign of violent operations against 
the Portuguese government and Western and NATO missions in 
Portugal. 

FP-25 claimed to be a workers' organization dedicated to a strug- 
gle against exploitation, misery, and repression. Its stated goals 
were to defeat "imperialism," to lead a "workers' assault on bour- 
geois power," and to achieve the violent overthrow of the Por- 
tuguese government. The FP-25 also bitterly opposed the United 
States and NATO. No evidence of direct ties to other European 
terrorist groups existed, although Portuguese authorities asserted 
that some financial support had come from Libya. Between 1980 
and 1984, most FP-25 actions involved assassinations, bombings, 
and bank robberies. Beginning in 1984, the group focused its at- 
tacks on United States and NATO targets. Mortars were fired at 
the compound of the Embassy of the United States, at NATO's 
IBERLANT headquarters, and at NATO ships anchored in Lis- 
bon harbor. Bombs destroyed a number of cars owned by West 
German air force personnel. FP-25 's ability to wage its terrorist 
campaign was curtailed by the arrest of a large number of its ad- 
herents in June 1984, including Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who 
had become a popular hero in Portugal after playing a key role 
in the Revolution of 1974 (see The Military Takeover of 1974, this 
ch.). Other obscure radical groups claimed responsibility for sub- 
sequent minor bombing attacks, but such acts of terrorism abated 
in 1987. As of 1993, Carvalho was free on a conditional basis, and 
the issue of a general amnesty for members of FP-25 had aroused 
wide public interest. 

Separatist independence movements have long existed in the 
Azores and Madeira archipelagoes. The main group, the Azorean 
Liberation Front, has been responsible for many demonstrations 
but has not been associated with clandestine activities and violence. 
A newer group, the Azorean Nationalist Movement, is regarded 
as illegal because Portuguese law prohibits any association ad- 
vocating the independence of the Azores. The existing system of 
autonomy recognized by the constitution of 1976 and subsequent 
legislation have endowed the regional governments with consid- 
erable rights and gready reduced the appeal of the separatist move- 
ments. 

Judicial System 

Restrictions on freedom of assembly and of the press, on the rights 
of association and of public protest, and on the right to strike were 
removed with the promulgation of the new constitution in April 



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Portugal: A Country Study 

1976. The constitutionally mandated Council of Social Commu- 
nication, whose members are elected by the Assembly of the Repub- 
lic, act as a watchdog to protect freedom of speech and access to 
the media. The council publicizes abuses, makes recommendations 
to the Assembly of the Republic, and has enforcement powers; 
however, it has never been required to exercise such powers. There 
are two restrictions on civil liberties. "Fascist" organizations are 
prohibited by law. In addition, persons can be prosecuted for "in- 
sulting" civil or military authorities if such an "insult" is intend- 
ed to undermine the rule of law. Several prosecutions have resulted 
under these provisions. 

The constitution of 1976 drastically altered the role of the police 
to protect civil rights. It gives guidelines for criminal investigation 
and treatment of suspects. The constitution specifies that no per- 
son can be held without trial or imprisoned without a definite sen- 
tence. Individuals cannot be deprived of citizenship for political 
reasons. The principle of habeas corpus is restated and is applied 
without exception to both civilian criminal courts and military 
tribunals. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is to be answered 
by a judge within eight days. Torture and inhumane detention are 
made illegal. Confessions obtained under duress and any material 
obtained by illegal means are declared inadmissible as evidence 
in criminal proceedings. The privacy of personal correspondence 
and telephone communication is also guaranteed in the constitu- 
tion, and forcible entry into homes and searches without a judicial 
warrant are forbidden. 

Criminal Law Procedure 

The Portuguese criminal justice system is organized on a na- 
tional basis. The Ministry of Justice has control over the court sys- 
tem, the office of the attorney general, the Judicial Police, and 
prisons. The office of the attorney general has a hierarchy parallel 
to that of the judiciary. Its representatives prosecute cases in each 
of Portugal's judicial districts and their subdivisions. An assistant 
deputy attorney general prosecutes cases before the municipal court 
at the local level or municipality. At the district level, above the 
municipality, the deputy attorney general represents the state be- 
fore the district court, which houses a panel of one to three judges 
to determine guilt or innocence and decide the sentence. 

Portugal has four judicial regions, each with an appeals court 
having appellate jurisdiction over cases tried in the district or lower 
courts in its area. The districts are Lisbon, with 66 courts; Porto, 
with 110 courts; Coimbra, with 80 courts; and Evora, with 60 
courts. Appeals are allowed only on the basis of judicial error in 



268 



National Security 



the original proceedings. Cases tried in a district court are auto- 
matically reviewed after sentencing by the appeals court of the 
region. The Ministry of Justice reviews all cases and can intervene 
to initiate a formal appeal. Because the appeals process is often 
lengthy, bail is frequently allowed the accused during the proceed- 
ing, except in cases involving homicide, serious assault, or grand 
larceny, or when it is likely that the accused will flee. 

Persons apprehended while committing a crime are typically held 
in preventive detention and are usually not considered eligible for 
conditional liberty. Persons not caught in the commission of a crime 
are usually given conditional liberty on submission of a bail bond 
or article of value. An individual taken into custody may not be 
held for more than forty-eight hours without being brought before 
a prosecuting magistrate who reviews the case and determines 
whether the accused person should be held in preventive deten- 
tion or released on bail. Preventive detention is limited to a maxi- 
mum of four months for each crime. Because of the cumbersome 
and backlogged judicial system and vacant judgeships, however, 
detention beyond four months is not unusual for major crimes, such 
as murder or armed robbery. For this reason, judges are required 
to give priority to cases of those in preventive detention. 

Persons unable to afford an attorney have one appointed by the 
court. Detainees are given access to their lawyers while await- 
ing trial. The indictments are made available to the accused and 
their attorneys, and charges can be answered in briefs by the 
defense attorneys. Presiding judges can dismiss a case on the basis 
of a defense attorney's brief or continue the trial at their own 
discretion. 

A clear procedural distinction exists between arrest and trial. 
A panel of three judges (which do not include the prosecuting judge) 
presides over cases that go to trial. A ministerial delegate assists 
the judges in reviewing the evidence. At the request of the accused, 
a jury can be used in trials for major crimes. Provision for a jury 
system is a particularly significant innovation of the constitution. 

The constitution reaffirms the basic guarantee of a fair trial and 
stipulates that trials are to be public except when they could offend 
the dignity of the victim, as in cases involving sexual abuse of chil- 
dren. To avoid the malpractices of the authoritarian Salazar- 
Caetano regime, when agents of the secret police exercised the 
power of magistrates, strict judicial supervision over indictments 
and trial procedure is provided. An ombudsman, elected to serve 
a four-year term by the Assembly of the Republic, is Portugal's 
chief civil and human rights officer. The ombudsman receives about 



269 



Portugal: A Country Study 

3,500 complaints annually; the majority involve alleged maladmin- 
istration by the bureaucracy. 

Before the Salazar-Caetano era ended in 1974, persons accused 
of offenses defined as crimes against the state could be legally de- 
tained for periods ranging from six months to three years without 
being charged. Suspects convicted of crimes against the state could 
be held in prison for renewable three-year terms, which could result 
in life imprisonment. Those considered less dangerous were ex- 
iled to an overseas territory or were obliged to post large bonds 
as guarantees of acceptable conduct in the future. Acts and con- 
spiracies of military or civilians against the government were se- 
verely prosecuted. Advocating or acting in favor of African 
liberation movements was considered to be a political offense. Con- 
spiring to participate in antigovernment demonstrations or strikes, 
inciting others to strike, or taking part in violence associated with 
a strike were punishable under similar laws. Membership in the 
Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues — 
PCP) or in any group dedicated to the violent overthrow of the 
government was prohibited. 

After the revolution, specific laws against the PCP, which had 
been harshly suppressed and forced to operate clandestinely from 
1926 to 1974, were voided, allowing the party to participate openly 
in Portugal's political life. In spite of the ban on "fascist" organi- 
zations, some small extreme right-wing groups function without 
interference. The only other remaining restriction on political activ- 
ity bars simultaneous membership in more than one party. 

Although Portugal holds no political prisoners, some of the rad- 
ical leftist opponents of the regime have claimed that prosecutions 
for participating in terrorist organizations are politically motivat- 
ed. Among these is the 1987 prosecution of sixty-four persons sen- 
tenced to prison because they were members of FP-25; the most 
notable of those sentenced was Carvalho, one of the leaders of the 
Revolution of 1974 (see Terrorist Groups, this ch.). According to 
the United States Department of State's human rights reports, there 
appears to be substantial evidence for the criminal charges brought 
in these cases, and Carvalho 's conviction was upheld after appeal 
to the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice. 

Incidence of Crime 

In general, the Portuguese are law-abiding people who respect 
the virtues of honesty. In addition, social discontent has been kept 
low by emigration, which served traditionally as a release for social 
pressures in both rural and urban areas. Decolonization in Africa, 



270 



National Security 



however, brought over 500,000 unemployed refugees to Portugal, 
some of whom became involved in crime. Some other young adults 
and discharged soldiers, unemployed and unable to emigrate, 
turned to crime. Nevertheless, statistics on the commission of crime 
between 1984 and 1988 showed an actual reduction in most 
categories. Drug offenses, however, increased from 1,154 to 1,782. 
Portugal is an important transshipment point for narcotics because 
of its geographic position near the North African coast and on the 
air routes between South America and Western Europe. Indigenous 
drug use and production are not, however, considered to be major 
problems. 

Violent crimes, though not unknown in Portugal, are rare. 
Murders are generally crimes of passion and only infrequently as- 
sociated with robbery. Premeditated homicide is punishable by a 
prison sentence of from sixteen to twenty years, although mitigat- 
ing circumstances often lead to reduced terms. In 1988, out of a 
total of 513 homicide arrests, 205 were for negligent homicide; 331 
of the arrested received prison terms. 

Larceny is by far the most common form of crime. In 1988 over 
41 ,000 thefts of all kinds were recorded. They included 12,800 thefts 
under aggravated circumstances, 4,000 armed or violent thefts, 
7,400 cases of breaking and entering, and 5,300 automobile thefts. 
In 1988 nearly 4,000 cases of fraud and more than 17,000 cases 
involving bad checks were reported, although few of the latter result- 
ed in court trials. There were 121 rapes and 165 other sexual 
offenses. A total of 10,800 persons were tried for crimes against 
the person, although only 73 of these were classified as serious 
attacks. 

Penal System 

The Portuguese penal system is under the control of the mini- 
ster of justice. Portugal had thirty-nine civilian prisons and three 
military prisons as of 1988. The civilian prisons included twelve 
central prisons, twenty-four regional prisons, and three special 
institutions. Their total capacity was 7,633, and the actual popu- 
lation as of December 31, 1987, was 8,361. Of this total, 6,964 
were adult males, 475 were adult females, and 922 were youths 
under the age of twenty-one. There were 186 military prisoners. The 
prison population had remained fairly stable between 1984 and 
1988. By far the largest institutions were the central prisons, which 
had a total capacity of 4,870. The regional prison capacity was 
1,758; the special prison, 706; and the military prisons, 299. 
Seven reformatories held 457 male youths, and 211 female ju- 
veniles were detained at three institutions. The remainder were 



271 



Portugal: A Country Study 

assigned to observation and social action centers at Lisbon, Porto, 
and Coimbra. 

The average time served in prisons by adult males is about six 
months. The incarceration ratio in 1990 is 83 per 100,000 popula- 
tion, comparable to the ratios in neighboring Spain and France 
but only one-fifth that of the United States. 

The type of prison regime to which an offender is sentenced is 
designated by the district punishment court upon conviction. Youth- 
ful offenders are given opportunities to learn trades. The mastery 
of a trade while in prison and good behavior are considered in reduc- 
ing time spent in prison. Individuals convicted three times of the 
same crime are considered a danger to society and are not usually 
eligible for parole. Unlike other prisoners, who might be allowed 
to do farm work, they could be kept to a strict prison regime. All 
prisoners earn money for their work while in prison, and work is 
considered a necessary part of the rehabilitation process. 

Occasional complaints of individual mistreatment by police and 
prison authorities are investigated by the ombudsman. In 1985 a 
number of FP-25 prisoners engaged in periodic hunger strikes and 
other protests against prison conditions. A stricter regime was im- 
posed on those remaining after ten FP-25 members accused of com- 
mon crimes escaped from Lisbon's main penitentiary. The United 
States Department of State's human rights reports assert that no 
independent evidence has appeared confirming the inadequacy of 
prison conditions. 

* * * 

Among various studies analyzing Portugal's national security 
objectives, a particularly incisive treatment is "Portuguese Defense 
Policy," by Alvaro Vasconcelos. Appraising the armed forces' 
modernization program since the early 1980s, Vasconcelos also dis- 
cusses Portugal's changing goals during several phases of its mem- 
bership in the NATO alliance. Portuguese Defense and Foreign Policy 
since Democratization, edited by Kenneth Maxwell, contains a num- 
ber of valuable essays on Portugal's defense policy. A full account 
of the involvement of the Portuguese armed forces in the political 
events of 1974-75 can be found in Douglas Porch's The Portuguese 
Armed Forces and the Revolution. Richard Alan Hodgson Robinson's 
Contemporary Portugal addresses the relationship between the politi- 
cal and military leadership during the Salazar and Caetano eras 
and through the revolution. Works by Tom Gallagher and Thom- 
as C. Bruneau add observations on the interaction between the 



272 



National Security 



military and civilian politicians into the 1980s. The Portuguese 
justice system and the status of civil rights are briefly surveyed in 
the United States Department of State's annual Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices. 

Data on the size, organization, and armaments of the Portuguese 
armed forces can be found in The Military Balance, 1992-93, pub- 
lished by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Lon- 
don, supplemented by information in Jane's Fighting Ships, DMS 
Market Intelligence Reports, and occasional reports in the Portuguese 
press. Jane's NATO Handbook, 1990-91 contains additional infor- 
mation on the Portuguese defense establishment and on Portuguese 
links to NATO and IBERLANT. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



273 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population, Selected Years, 1801-1992 

3 Estimated Population by District and Autonomous Region, 

December 1989 

4 Selected Economic Indicators, 1960-73 and 1981-90 

5 Government Transactions, 1973, 1984, and 1990 

6 Composition of Labor Force by Sector, 1960, 1973, and 1990 

7 Grain Crop Yields of Selected European Countries, 1990 

8 Collective Production Units by District, 1979 

9 Foreign Trade by Country, 1985 and 1990 

10 External Public Debt and Debt-Service Indicators, Selected 

Years, 1980-90 

11 Parliamentary Election Results, 1975-91 

12 Major Army Equipment, 1992 

13 Major Naval Equipment, 1992 

14 Major Air Force Equipment, 1992 



275 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 




0.04 


inches 


Centimeters 


0.39 


inches 




3.3 


feet 




0.62 


miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 


Square kilometers 


0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 




0.26 


gallons 




2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 



(Centigrade) and add 32 



Table 2. Population, Selected Years, 1801-1992 1 
(in thousands) 

Year Population Year Population 

1801 3,115 1950 8,510 

1864 4,287 1960 8,889 

1878 4,669 1970 8,663 

1900 5,447 1981 9,776 

1920 6,080 1989 2 10,337 

1930 6,802 1992 2 10,448 

1940 7,755 

1 Includes the population of the Azores and Madeira. 

2 Estimate. 



277 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Table 3. Estimated Population by District and Autonomous 
Region, December 1989 
(in thousands) 



Administrative Division Population 



Districts 

Aveiro 674.4 

Beja 173.2 

Braga 784.8 

Braganca 182.8 

Castelo Branco 218.7 

Coimbra 446.7 

Evora 171.5 

Faro 344.9 

Guarda 191.8 

Leiria . 436.5 

Lisbon 2,130.6 

Portalegre 134.9 

Porto 1,695.1 

Santarem 459.0 

Setubal 817.9 

Viana do Castelo 266.9 

Vila Real 259.8 

Viseu 419.4 

Autonomous regions 

Azores 253.1 

Madeira 275.0 



TOTAL 10,337.0 



Source: Based on information from Portugal, Instituto Nacional de Estatfstica, Estatisticas 
Demogrdficas: Continente, Acores, e Madeira, 1989, Lisbon, 1990, 34. 



Table 4. Selected Economic Indicators, 1960-73 and 1981-90 
(in average annual percentage changes) 





1960-73 


1981-90 


Gross domestic product (GDP) 


6.9 


2.7 


Industrial production 


9.0 


4.8 


Private consumption 


6.5 


2.7 


Employment 


-0.5 


1.4 


Labor productivity * 


7.4 


1.3 




28.6 


10.1 




4.0 


17.9 



* GDP growth rate/employment growth. 



Source: Based on information from European Community, Commission, Directorate- 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Economy, No. 46, Brussels, 
December 1990, 126, Table 1; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Economic Surveys: Portugal, 1991-1992, Statistical Annex, Paris, 1992, 
112. 



278 



Appendix 



Table 5. Government Transactions, 1973, 1984, and 1990 
(as a percentage of GDP) 1 





1973 


1984 


1990 


Current account 








Revenues 








Direct taxes and social 










10.3 


17.7 


20.0 


Indirect taxes 


, . 10.8 


15.2 


15.2 


Other 


1.6 


1.7 


4.0 


Total revenues 


22.7 


34.6 


39.2 


Expenditures 










13.2 


14.4 


16.2 




1.0 


7.6 


1.5 




4.8 


13.6 


13.4 




0.4 


7.1 


8.2 


Other 


0.1 


— 


0.9 






42.7 


40.2 


Capital account 








Revenues 


. . . n.a. 


0.3 


1.3 


Expenditures 








Investment 


2.3 


2.6 


3.7 




0.9 


1.6 


2.0 




3.2 


4.2 


5.7 


Overall balance 2 


. . . n.a. 


- 12.0 


-5.4 


Lending capacity ( + ) or 










1.4 


- 13.4 


-6.3 



— means negligible, 
n.a. — not available. 

1 GDP — gross domestic product. 

2 Includes financial transactions and other adjustments. 



Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment, Economic Survey: Portugal, 1981, Paris, 1981, 23, Table 11; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Survey: Portugal, 1988-89, Paris, 
1989, 44, Table 15; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment, Economic Survey: Portugal, 1991-1992, Paris, 1992, 55, Table 13. 



279 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Table 6. Composition of Labor Force by Sector, 1960, 
1973, and 1990 



I960 1973 1990 

Sector Thousands Percentage Thousands Percentage Thousands Percentage 



Agriculture, 
forestry, and 

fishing 1,363 43.6 812 27.8 847 17.8 

Industry, 
including 

construction... 897 28.7 1,042 35.6 1,655 34.8 

Services 866 27.7 1,072 36.6 2,254 47.4 

TOTAL * 3,126 100.0 2,925 100.0 4,756 100.0 



* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Portugal, Secretaria-General da Assembleia Nacional, 
III Piano deFomento para 1968-1973, Lisbon, 1967, 321; Portugal, Presidencia do 
Conselho, IV Piano de Fomento, 1974-1979, I, Lisbon, 1973, 75-76, Tables VII and 
XV; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Out- 
look: Historical Statistics, 1960-1990, Paris, 1992, 40-41. 

Table 7. Grain Crop Yields of Selected European Countries, 1990 
(in kilograms per hectare) 



Crop Portugal Greece Spain West Germany France 



Cereals 1,731 2,769 2,488 5,790 6,205 

Wheat 1,502 1,758 2,373 6,615 6,487 

Rice 4,598 6,250 6,397 5,737 

Barley 1,171 1,739 2,160 5,432 6,499 

Corn 2,462 8,763 6,399 6,789 5,808 



Source: Based on information from United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 
Yearbook: Production, 1990, 44, Rome, 1991, 67-80, Tables 15, 16, 17, 19, and 20. 

Table 8. Collective Production Units by District, 1979 



Average Area 

Districts Number of Units Total Area of Units * per Unit * 



Evora 165 392,000 2,376 

Beja 80 284,258 3,553 

Setubal 78 92,000 1,179 

Portalegre 61 257,000 4,213 

Santarem 51 43,957 862 

Lisbon, Castelo 

Branco, and Faro 14 n > 062 790 

PORTUGAL 449 1,080,277 2,406 



* In hectares. 

Source: Based on information from International Labour Organisation, Employment and Basic 
Needs in Portugal, Geneva, 1979, 142, Table 71. 



280 



Appendix 



Table 9. Foreign Trade by Country, 1985 and 1990 
(in percentages) 



Country 



1985 



1990 



Exports, f.o.b. 1 

European Community 

Britain 14.6 12.1 

West Germany 13.7 16.7 

France 12.7 15.5 

Spain 4.1 13.3 

Italy 3.9 4.0 

Other 13.5 12.1 

Total European Community 2 52.5 73 7 

United States - 9.2 4.8 

Previous Escudo Area 3 3.9 3.4 

OPEC 4 2.5 0.6 

Other 21.9 17.5 

Total exports 100.0 100.0 

Imports, c.i.f. 5 

European Community 

West Germany 11.5 14.3 

France 8.0 11.5 

Britain 7.5 7.5 

Spain 7.4 14.4 

Italy 5.2 10.0 

Other 6.3 11.4 

Total European Community 45 9 59 \ 

United States 9.7 3.9 

Previous Escudo Area 1.2 0.4 

OPEC 17.3 6.8 

Other 25.9 19.8 

Total imports 100 100 

1 f.o.b. — free on board. 

2 Including figures for Spain, not yet a member. 

3 Former Portuguese colonies in Africa. 

* Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
5 c.i.f. — cost, insurance, and freight. 

Source: Based on information from Bank of Portugal, Report of the Directors and Economic 
and Financial Survey for the Year 1990, Statistical Appendix, Lisbon, 1991, Tables 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 



281 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Table 10. External Public Debt and Debt-Service Indicators, 
Selected Years, 1980-90 





1980 


1982 


1985 


1987 


1990 


External debt (in millions 












of United States dollars) .... 


8,978 


13,464 


16,682 


18,464 


18,434 


External debt as a 












percentage of reserves 1 .... 


56.3 


110.5 


167.2 


116.6 


72.2 


External debt as a 














36.3 


58.8 


80.4 


50.3 


28.9 


Debt service (interest and 












amortization) as a percentage 












of current account credits . . . 


15.2 


27.0 


37.0 


30.6 


16.7 


Interest payments as a 














3.0 


5.6 


6.5 


3.3 


2.9 3 



1 Reserves consist of gross foreign assets of the Bank of Portugal and the Treasury, with gold valued 
at market prices. 

2 GDP — gross domestic product. 

3 1989. 



Source: Based on information from Bank of Portugal, Annual Report, Lisbon, various years. 



Table 11. Parliamentary Election Results, 1975-91 



1975 1976 1979 1980 



Seats Percentage Seats Percentage Seats Percentage Seats Percentage 



Party 




of Votes 




of Votes 




of Votes 




of Votes 


PS 1 ... 


. 115 


37.9 


107 


35.0 


74 


27.4 


74 


27.8 


PSD 2 . 


. 80 


26.4 


73 


24.0 


128 


45.2 


134 


47.5 


CDS 3 . 


. 16 


7.6 


42 


15.9 


4 


4 


4 


4 


PCP 5 . 


. 30 


12.5 


40 


14.6 


47 


18.8 


41 


16.9 


PRD 6 . 


7 


7 


7 


7 


7 


7 


7 


7 



1983 1985 1987 1991 



Seats Percentage Seats Percentage Seats Percentage Seats Percentage 



Party 




of Votes 




of Votes 




of Votes 




of Votes 


PS 


. 101 


36.3 


57 


20.8 


60 


22.3 


72 


29.3 


PSD . . . 


. 75 


27.0 


88 


29.9 


148 


50.2 


135 


50.4 


CDS .. 


. 30 


12.4 


22 


10.0 


4 


4.4 


5 


4.4 


PCP . . 


. 44 


18.2 


38 


15.5 


31 


12.2 


17 


8.8 


PRD . . 


7 


7 


45 


17.9 


7 


4.9 





0.6 



1 Partido Socialista (Socialist Party). The PS was in an electoral coalition, the Republican and So- 
cialist Front (Frente Republicana e Socialista — FRS), with several smaller parties for the 1980 election. 

2 Partido Social Democrata (Social Democrat Party). 

3 Partido do Centro Democratico Social (Party of the Social Democratic Center). 

4 The PSD, the CDS, and two smaller parties formed an electoral coalition, the Democratic Alliance 
(Alianca Democratica — AD), for the 1979 and 1980 elections. 

5 Partido Comunista Portugues (Portuguese Communist Party). The PCP formed electoral coalitions 
with other leftist groups for parliamentary elections beginning in 1979: the United People's Alliance 
(Alianca Povo Unido — APU) for the 1980, 1983, and 1985 elections; and the Democratic Unitary 
Coalition (Coligagao Democratico Unitario — CDU) for the 1987 and 1991 elections. 

6 Partido Renovador Democratico (Party of Democratic Renovation). 

7 The PRD was not established until 1985. 



282 



Appendix 

Table 12. Major Army Equipment, 1992 



Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory 



Tanks 



M-47 


. . . United States 


43 


M-48A5 


-do- 


86 


Armored vehicles 








-do- 


172 


Chaimite V-200 




79 


Saladin reconnaissance vehicles 


. . . Britain 


8 


Ferret Mk 4 scout cars 


-do- 


30 


AML 60 armored cars 


. . . France 


40 


Self-propelled artillery 






155mm M-109A2 howitzers 




6 


Towed artillery 






105mm M-101 


-do- 


54 


105mm M-56 pack 


-do- 


24 






24 


155mm M-114 howitzers 


United States 


40 


Coastal artillery 






150mm, 152mm, and 234mm 


. . Britain and other 


27 


Mortars 






107mm M-30 




58 


1 90mm 




i on 

1 uu 


Antitank weapons 






90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles 


United States 


240 


TOW missiles 


-do- 


48 


SS-11 wire-guided missiles 


. . . France 


31 




-do- 


45 


Air defense weapons 










34 


20mm Rh-202 




30 






322 


Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles 


Britain 


12 


Chaparral surface-to-air missiles 


United States 


5 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 55; 
and Jane's NATO Handbook, 1990-91, Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom, 1990, 
461. 



283 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Table 13. Major Naval Equipment, 1992 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin 



In Inventory 



Frigates 

Vasco da Gama class (MEKO-200) Germany 3 

Joao Belo class France 4 

Baptista de Andrade class Spain 4 

Joao Continho class Germany and Spain 6 

Submarines 

Albacora (Daphne) class France 3 

Coastal patrol vessels 

Sao Roque class (converted 

minesweepers) Portugal 2 

Cacine class (large) -do- 10 

Dom Aleixo class -do- 2 

Albatroz class -do- 6 

Amphibious vessels 

Bombarda class LCT (landing craft, 

tank) -do- 3 

LDM-400 class LCM (landing craft, 

mechanized) -do- 6 

LDM-100 class LCM -do- 3 

Source: Based on information from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, London, 1992, 473-80. 



Table 14. Major Air Force Equipment, 1992 



Type and Description 



Country of Origin 



In Inventory 



Fighter- ground attack 

A-7P Corsair (including six 

training versions) United States 38 

Alpha Jet France and Germany 10 

Fiat G-91 Italy 29 

Maritime reconnaissance 

P-3P Orion United States 6 

Transport 

C-130H Hercules -do- 6 

CASA C-212 Aviocar Spain 26 

Falcon 20 France 3 

Falcon 50 -do- 3 

Liaison 

Reims-Cessna FTB-337G -do- 12 

Training 

Epsilon TB-30 -do- 18 

Cessna T-37C United States 23 

Lockheed T-33A -do- 7 

Northrop T-38 Talon -do- 12 

RF-10 Aerospatiale France 2 

Helicopters 

SA-330 Puma -do- 10 

SA-316 Alouette III -do- 35 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-93, London, 1992, 56. 



284 



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Study of Conflict, 1981. 

Midlane, Matthew. "The Spanish and Portuguese Defense 
Forces." Pages 126-56 in L.H. Gann (ed.), The Defense of Western 
Europe. Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1987. 

"Portugal." Pages 483-88 in John Keegan (ed.), World 

Armies. Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. 

Miguel, Mario Firmino. "Army Support of the Southern Flank: 



297 



Portugal: A Country Study 



The First Composite Brigade," NATO's Sixteen Nations [Brus- 
sels], 33, October 1988, 67-68. 

The Military Balance, 1990-1991. London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1990. 

The Military Balance, 1991-1992. London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1991. 

The Military Balance, 1992-1993. London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1992. 

Milton, T.R. "Airpower in Iberia," Air Force Magazine, 69, No. 
6, June 1986, 94-99. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures. Brussels: 
NATO Information Service, 1989. 

Pereira, Bernardo Futscher. "Portugal and Spain." Pages 63-87 
in Kenneth Maxwell (ed.), Portugal in the 1980s: Dilemmas of 
Democratic Consolidation. (Constributions in Political Science, No. 
138.) New York: Greenwood Press, 1986. 

Piatt, Alan. "NATO's Southern Flank: A Troubled Region." 
Pages 164-85 in Barry M. Blechman and Edward N. Luttwak 
(eds.), Global Security: A Review of Strategic and Economic Issues. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987. 

Porch, Douglas. The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution. Lon- 
don: Croom Helm, 1977. 

Portugal. Instituto National de Estatistica. Anudrio Estatistico 1988: 
Continente, Acores e Madeira. Lisbon: 1988. 

"Portugal." Pages 318-20 in Thomas Kurian (ed.), World Ency- 
clopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems. New York: Facts on File, 
1988. 

"Portugal." Pages 344-50 in Truppendienst Handbook: The Armies 
of the NATO Nations, 3. Vienna: Herold, 1987. 

"Portugal." In DMS Market Intelligenge Reports : Greenwich, Con- 
necticut: Defense Market Services, 1989. 

"Portuguese Air Force." Pages 385-88 in International Air Forces 
and Military Aircraft Directory. Stapleford Airfield, Essex, United 
Kingdom: Aviation Advisory Services, 1989. 

Robinson, H. Leslie. "Portugal." Pages 613-16 in Richard F. 
Staar (ed.), 1989 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs. Stan- 
ford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1989. 

Robinson, Richard Alan Hodgson. Contemporary Portugal: A Histo- 
ry. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979. 

Santos, Alberto. La Peninsula luso-iberique: Enjeu strategique. Paris: 
Fondation pour les etudes de defence nationale, 1980. 

Sharpe, Richard (ed.). Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93. London: 
Jane's Information Group, 1992. 



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Silva, Tomas George Conceicao. "Reorganization and Moderni- 
zation of the Portuguese Air Force," NATO's Sixteen Nations 
[Brussels], 36, No. 1, February 1991, 64-67. 

Snyder, Jed C. Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean, and 
the Persian Gulf. (SAIS Papers in International Affairs, No. 11.) 
Washington: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1987. 

Spmola, Antonio de. Portugal and the Future. Johannesburg: Per- 
skor, 1974. 

Stenhouse, Mark, and Bruce George. "Portugal." Pages 40-43 
in Bruce George (ed.), Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-90. Couls- 
don, Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group, 1989. 

Stenhouse, Mark. "Portugal." Pages 389-92 in Bruce George (ed.), 
Jane's NATO Handbook, 1990-91. Coulsdon, Surrey, United 
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Thomas, Nigel. NATO Armies Today. London: Osprey, 1988. 

United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Mili- 
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1990. 

Department of Defense. Terrorist Group Prof iles . Washing- 
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. Department of State. Background Notes : Portugal. Washing- 
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Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1989. (Report submitted to the United States Congress, 
101st, 2d Session. House of Representatives, Committee on For- 
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Washington: GPO, 1990. 

. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1990. Report submitted to the United States Congress, 
102d, 1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and 
House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
Washington: GPO, 1991. 

"Unsteady Course: Political Stability Being Attained by Inches," 
The Economist [London], 291, No. 7348, June 30, 1984, 7-10. 

Vasconcelos, Alvaro. "Portugal and NATO," NATO Review, 34, 
No. 2, April 1986, 8-14. 

"Portuguese Defense Policy: Internal Politics and Defence 

Commitments." Pages 86-139 in John Chipman (ed.), NATO's 
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1988. 

Wigg, Richard. "Neighbors with Their Backs to Each Other." 

NATO's Sixteen Nations [Brussels], (Special Issue, No. 2.), 28, 

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Williams, Louis A. "The Atlantic Connection— IBERLANT," 



299 



Portugal: A Country Study 

NATO's Sixteen Nations [Brussels], (Special Issue, No. 2.), 28, 
No. 6, 1983, 30-31, 33-35, 38. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: DMS Market Intelligence Reports; 
Economist [London]; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
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Washington Post.) 



300 



Glossary 



conto — See escudo. 

Council of Europe — Founded in 1949 to foster parliamentary 
democracy, social and economic progress, and unity among 
its member states. Membership is limited to those European 
countries that respect the rule of law and the fundamental hu- 
man rights and freedoms of all those living within their bound- 
aries. As of 1993, its membership consisted of twenty-seven 
European countries. 

d'Hondt method — Also known as the highest-average method of 
determining the allocation of seats to political parties after an 
election. It was devised by the Belgian Victor d'Hondt to be 
used in electoral systems based on proportional representation. 
In addition to Portugal, Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Swit- 
zerland have adopted the method. Under this procedure, voters 
do not choose a candidate but vote for a party, each of which 
has published a list of candidates. The party winning the most 
votes in a constituency is awarded the area's first seat, which 
goes to the candidate at the top of the winning party's list. The 
total vote of this party is then divided by two, and this amount 
is compared with the totals of other parties. The party with 
the greatest number of votes at this point receives the next seat 
to be awarded. Each time a party wins a seat, its total is divid- 
ed by the number of seats it has won plus one. This process 
continues until all the seats in a constituency are awarded. The 
d'Hondt method slightly favors large parties. Because there is 
no minimum threshold for winning a seat, however, small par- 
ties can also elect representatives. 

escudo — Basic Portuguese currency unit, consists of 100 centavos. 
1,000 escudos are a conto. The exchange rate averaged 27.5 
escudos = US$1 in 1975; 53.0 escudos = US$1 in 1980; 170.4 
escudos = US$1 in 1985; 144.0 escudos = US$1 in 1988; 157.5 
escudos = US$1 in 1989; 142.5 escudos = US$1 in 1990; 144.5 
escudos = US$1 in 1991; and 135.0 escudos = US$1 in 1992. 

European Community (EC — also commonly called the Commu- 
nity) — The EC comprises three communities: the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic 
Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Com- 
munity (EURATOM). Each community is a legally distinct 
body, but since 1967 they have shared common governing in- 
stitutions. The EC forms more than a framework for free trade 



301 



Portugal: A Country Study 

and economic cooperation: the signatories to the treaties govern- 
ing the communities have agreed in principle to integrate their 
economies and ultimately to form a political union. Belgium, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany) are charter members 
of the EG. Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined on January 
1, 1973; Greece became a member on January 1, 1981; and 
Portugal and Spain entered on January 1, 1986. 

European Currency Unit (ECU)— Instituted in 1979, the ECU is 
the unit of account of the EC (q.v.). The value of the ECU 
is determined by the value of a basket that includes the cur- 
rencies of all EC member states. In establishing the value of 
the basket, each member's currency receives a share that reflects 
the relative strength and importance of the member's economy. 
On September 30, 1992, one ECU was equivalent to US$1 .40. 

European Economic Community (EEC) — See EC. 

European Free Trade Association (EFT A) — Founded in 1961, 
EFTA aims at supporting free trade among its members and 
increasing the liberalization of trade on a global basis, but par- 
ticularly within Western Europe. In 1993 the organization's 
member states were Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Swe- 
den, and Switzerland. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The total value of goods and ser- 
vices produced by the domestic economy during a given peri- 
od, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed 
by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compen- 
sation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of capi- 
tal). Most GDP usage in this book is based on GDP at factor 
cost. Real GDP is the value of GDP when inflation has been 
taken into account. 

gross national product (GNP) — Obtained by adding GDP (q. v. ) 
and the income received from abroad by residents less pay- 
ments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP valued at mar- 
ket prices is used in this book. Real GNP is the value of GNP 
when inflation has been taken into account. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations (UN) that takes responsi- 
bility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. 
The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its 
members when they experience balance-of-payment difficul- 
ties. These loans often carry conditions that require substan- 
tial internal economic adjustments by the recipients. 

liberation theology — An activist movement led by Roman Catholic 



302 



Glossary 



clergy who trace their inspiration to Vatican Council II (1965), 
where some church procedures were liberalized, and the Sec- 
ond Latin American Bishops' Conference in Medellm (1968), 
which endorsed greater direct efforts to improve the lot of the 
poor. Advocates of liberation theology — sometimes referred to 
as "liberationists" — work mainly through Christian Base Com- 
munities (Comunidades Eclesiasticas de Base — CEBs). Mem- 
bers of CEBS meet in small groups to reflect on scripture and 
discuss its meaning in their lives. They are introduced to a rad- 
ical interpretation of the Bible, one that employs Marxist ter- 
minology to analyze and condemn the wide disparities between 
the wealthy elite and the impoverished masses in most under- 
developed countries. This reflection often leads members to or- 
ganize to improve their living standards through cooperatives 
and civic improvement projects. 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) — Established in 1961 to replace the Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation, the OECD is an interna- 
tional organization composed of the industrialized market econ- 
omy countries (twenty-four full members as of 1993). It seeks 
to promote economic and social welfare in member countries, 
as well as in developing countries, by providing a forum in 
which to formulate and to coordinate policies. 

rotativismo — The alternation of political factions at regular inter- 
vals with little or no change to the political system as a whole. 

single market — The Single European Act of 1987 committed the 
EC (q.v.) to gradually reduce restrictions so that by the end 
of 1992 the EC would constitute a single market in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, and capital was guaranteed. 

VAT — Value-added tax. A tax applied to the additional value creat- 
ed at a given stage of production and calculated as a percen- 
tage of the difference between the product value at that stage 
and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs. 
The VAT is the primary form of indirect taxation applied in 
the EEC (q.v.), and it is the basis of each country's contribu- 
tion to the community budget. 

Western European Union (WEU) — Founded in 1948 to facilitate 
West European cooperation in economic, social, cultural, and 
defense matters. Reactivated in 1984 to concentrate on the 
defense and disarmament concerns of its nine members (Bel- 
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, and Britain), the WEU is headed by a coun- 
cil consisting of its members' ministers of foreign affairs and 



303 



Portugal: A Country Study 

defense. The council meets twice a year; lower-level WEU en- 
tities meet with greater frequency. 
World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Cor- 
poration (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund ad- 
ministered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to fur- 
nish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier 
terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, found- 
ed in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through 
loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the 
growth of productive private enterprises in less developed^eoun- 
tries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD 
hold the same positions in the IFC. The four institutions are 
owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their 
capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states 
must first belong to the IMF (q.v.). 



304 



Index 



abortion, xxxiv, 82, 99, 204 

Abrilada revolt (1824), 44 

Accao Nacional Popular (ANP). See Na- 
tional Popular Action 

ACDA. See United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency 

AD. See Democratic Alliance 

Afonsine Ordinances, 22 

Afonso (duke of Braganca), 22, 23 

Afonso II, 12; landownership under, 16; 
royal patrimony under, 16 

Afonso III, 12, 13 

Afonso IV, 18, 19 

Afonso V, 22, 23; explorations under, 26; 

Moroccan campaigns of, 26 
Afonso VI, 37 

Afonso Henri ques: background of, 9; be- 
comes king, 10; land distribution by, 
12; political organization under, 13-16; 
religious administration under, 14-15, 
96; royal council of, 13; settler commu- 
nities under, 12; social organization un- 
der, 13-16; territorial administration 
under, 14; territorial enlargement by, 
10-12 

af ranees ados , 43 

Africa, 213-14; armed forces in, xxv, 60, 
227-34; decolonization of, xxvii, 233; 
emigration to, 78; exploration of coast 
of, 25-26; exploration of interior of, 
48-49; partition of, 49; Portuguese liv- 
ing in, 78; returnees from, xxviii, 73, 
75, 78-79, 95, 122, 136-37, 177 
Africa, North: relations with, 218, 238 
African campaigns, 171, 213-14, 230, 
263; arms supplied for, 232; deaths in, 
228, 229; military morale in, 229; op- 
position to, 230-31 
African Party for the Independence of 
Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), 
213-14, 228 
AFSOUTH. See Allied Land Forces 

Southern Europe 
agrarian reform, 143-44, 174, 209 
Agrarian Reform Law (1975), 143 
Agrarian Reform Law (1988), 144 
agricultural: development, 18, 40; estates, 
91, 124, 184; labor, 16, 143; policy, 



144; prices, 144; production, xxxii, 

140, 142; zones, 140-41 

Agricultural Institute, 104 

agricultural products (see also under in- 
dividual crops): Brazilian, 38; exports of, 
156; grain, 141; tree crops, 70, 140, 

141, 142 

agriculture: decollectivization of, 116, 
143-44, 209; in early history, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 16; employment in, xxxii, 134, 
136, 137; expansion of, 38, 40, 120; ex- 
port crops, 141; northern, 140-41; as 
percentage of gross domestic product, 
120, 123, 139; productivity of, xxxii, 
116, 140; suitability for, 70 

AIP. See Portuguese Industrial As- 
sociation 

Air College, 249 

air force, 238, 246-49; bases, 246; con- 
scripts, 246, 252; downsizing of, 249; 
insignia, 253; materiel, 246-48; mis- 
sion of, 246; modernization plan, 249; 
number of personnel, 239, 246; origins 
of, 246; pilot shortage in, 249; ranks, 
253; reorganized, 223; in Spanish Civil 
War, 246; spending on, 256; training, 
249; uniforms, 253; in World War I, 
246 

Air Force Academy, 249, 253 
Alans, 6 

Albuquerque, Afonso de, 31-32 
Alcalar necropolis, 4 
aldeamentos, 221 

Alentejo, 10, 13, 16, 67-68; capture of, 
10, 12; farmers in, 67, 91, 141; land- 
owners in, 88, 204; topography of, 67, 
140, 141 

Alexander VI (pope), 32 

Alfonso VI, 9 

Alfonso VII, 9, 10 

Alfonso VIII of Castile, 12 

Alfonso XI, 19 

Algarve, 7, 12, 67, 68; geography of, 69, 
141; Muslim influence in, 7, 67; topog- 
raphy of, 140; tourism in, 67 

Alianca Democraca (AD). See Democratic 
Alliance 

Alianca Seguradora, 155 



305 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (AF- 
SOUTH), 243 

Almeida, Antonio Jose de, 52 

Almeida, Francisco de, 31 

Amadora: population of, 74 

Amaral, Diogo Freitas do, xxvi, xxxi, 
201; as presidential candidate, 180 

Amarante, count of, 44 

Americas: emigration to, 77, 134, 160; in- 
terest in, 32 

Anchieta, Jose, 34 

Andalusia, 4 

Andeiro, Count, 19 

Angediva Island, 31 

Angola, 49, 227-28; armed resistance by, 
60, 170, 227; determination to retain, 
59; exploration of, 48; immigrants 
from, 95, 136; independence for, 124, 
175, 214, 228; made a province, 60; oil 
in, 60; Portuguese deaths in, 228; set- 
tlement of, 75, 225; troops assigned to, 
228 

ANP. See National Popular Action 

anticlerical laws, 51, 53, 97, 104; reac- 
tion to, xxv; reversed, 98 

Aqueduct of Free Waters, 39 

Aqueduto das Aguas Livres. See Aqueduct 
of Free Waters 

Arabic language: influence of, on Por- 
tuguese, 8, 67 

Argentina: emigration to, 77 

Arguin: factory at, 25; as slave entrepot, 
25 

armed forces {see also military), xxiii, 
xxv-xvi, xxvii, xxviii, 239-56; African 
missions of, 60, 227-34; autonomy of, 
202; breakdown in discipline of, 233; 
chief of staff of, 239; civilian authority 
over, 239; commander in chief of, 239; 
conditions in, 249-53; under constitu- 
tion of 1976, 182, 234-36; deaths of, 
in African colonial wars, 228, 229; 
decline in prestige of, 250; demobiliza- 
tion of, 136; dissension in, 170-71; 
downsizing of, 223, 249; historical 
background, 224-29; missions of, 224, 
257, 261; morale of, 229, 250; in New 
State, 225-27; pay and benefits in, 250; 
personnel strength of, 223, 239, 
249-50; political role of, 202-3, 229- 
36; promotions in, 250; purge of, 
234; reorganization of, 225; uniforms, 
ranks, and insignia of, 253-56 



Armed Forces Movement (MFA), xxiii, 
xxvi, 61, 124, 167, 172, 173, 198, 213, 
232; coup by, 171; factions in, xxvii, 
233; friction of, with Junta of Nation- 
al Salvation, 233; reorganization of, 
125 

army, 241-44; assignments in, 243; con- 
scripts, 241, 243; created, 225; demobi- 
lization of, 241; downsizing of, 249; 
factions in, 230; insignia, 253; liberals 
in, 43; materiel of, 244; military regions 
of, 241; military zones of, 241; num- 
ber of personnel in, 239, 241, 249; 
officers, 241; organization of, 241; 
ranks, 253; reorganized, 42; reserves, 
243; revolution by, 43-44; service ob- 
ligation, 252; spending on, 256, 256; 
training in, 241, 243; uniforms, 253 

Arriaga, Kaulza de, 232 

artisans: under Joao I, 22; and repub- 
licanism, 50 

Asian empire, 31-32; deterioration of, 36 

Assembly of the Armed Forces, 173 

Assembly of the Republic, xxviii, 187-90; 
appointments by, 188, 190-91, 266, 
268, 269; committees of, 189; constit- 
uencies of, 188-89; elections for, 196; 
members of, 188; popular view of, 
189-90; power of, 188; sessions of, 189; 
stability of, 208; Standing Committee 
of, 189; terms of office in, 188 

Associacao Industrial Portuesa (AIP). See 
Portuguese Industrial Association 

Association of the 25th of April, 236 

attorney general, 268 

austerity measures, xxxii, 177, 179 

auto-da-fe, 33 

Aveiro, 74; industry in, 146 
Avis, House of, 3, 19-23 
Azevedo, Jose Baptista Pinheiro de, 175 
Azorean Liberation Front, 267 
Azorean Nationalist Movement, 267 
Azores, 70, 73; autonomy of, 194; Brit- 
ish use of, 216; discovered, 25; govern- 
ment of, 195; Lajes Air Base in, 160, 
216-17, 223, 226, 238, 259; legislative 
assembly in, 195; minister of the repub- 
lic in, 194-95; powers of, 194, 195; 
separatist movement in, 262; strategic 
importance of, 217, 257, 260 

Baixa Pombalina, 40 



306 



Index 



balance of payments, 121, 158-59; under 

Salazar, 118 
Baldaia, Afonso, 25 
Balsemao, Francisco Pinto, 178; as prime 

minister, 178, 200; resignation of, 179 
Banco Borges e Irmao, 155 
Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP), 154 
Banco de Fomento e Exterior, 155 
Banco Internacional de Credito (BIC), 

154 

Banco Nacional Ultramarino, 155 
Banco Portugues de Investimento (BPI), 
154 

Banco Portugues do Atlantico, 155 
Banco Totta e Acores, 155 
bandeirantes, 38 

banking {see also financial sector), 153-55; 
foreign investment in, 161 

Bank of Portugal, 126, 153; foreign re- 
serves of, 158 

banks: commercial, 126; competition 
among, 126; control of, by elite class, 
118; denationalization of, 128; foreign, 
153; influence of, 118; nationalized, 
xxiii, 124, 125, 127, 153, 174, 211; 
privatization of, xxxiii, 153; problems 
in, 153 

Banque Nationale de Paris, 154 

Baptists, 102 

Barclays Bank, 154 

Battle of Alcacer do Sal (1217), 12 

Battle of Alfarrobeira, 23 

Battle of Aljubarrota, 20-21 

Battle of Atoleiros, 20 

Battle of Cerneja, 10 

Battle of Lourinha (1808), 42 

Battle of Lys (1918), 225 

Battle of Navas de Tolosa (1212), 12 

Battle of Salado (1340), 19 

Bay of Arguin, 25 

BCP. See Banco Comercial Portugues 

Beatriz (princess), 19 

Beira Alta, 69 

Beira Beixa, 69 

Beira Litoral, 69, 140 

Beira province, 67, 140 

Beja, 73; expropriations of land in, 143 

Beja Air Base, 248 

Belgium: Portuguese guestworkers in, 79 
Belmira Martins, Maria, 125 
Benedictines: monasteries of, 12; regional 

administration by, 15 
Benguela, 48 



Beresford, William Carr, 42, 43 

Berlin Conference (1884-85), 49; rose- 
colored map, 49 

BIC. See Banco Internacional de Credito 

Bloco Central. See Central Bloc 

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 41-42, 225 

book publishing, 212 

Borba Gato, Manuel, 38 

Borneo: exploration of, 32 

BPI. See Banco Portugues de Investimento 

Braga, 74; industry in, 146 

Braga, archbishop of, 17 

Braga, Teofilo, 51 

Braganca (district), 74 

Braganca, House of, 3; established, 22, 36 

brain drain, 116, 127-28; analysis of, 127; 
demographic distribution of, 127-28 

Branco, Aresta, 52 

Bravia, 261 

Brazil: attempt by Dutch to take over, 37; 
colonization of, 32, 75; development of, 
38-39; discovery of, 28; emigration to, 
127, 134; evangelization in, 33-34; im- 
migrants from, 95, 96; independence 
of, declared, 44; investment from, 161, 
217; investment in, 217; relations with, 
217-18 

Britain: alliance with, 21, 216, 225, 237; 
blockade of France by, 41; commercial 
activity of, in Asia, 36; investment by, 
160, 161; Portuguese guestworkers in, 
79; relations with, 37, 38; tourists from, 
150; trade with, 38-39, 157; ultimatum 
of 1890, 49-50 

Bucaco Mountains, 42 

bureaucracy (see also civil service): under 
Joao I, 22; in Revolution of 1974, 
xxxiii; under Salazar, xxxiii 

Burgundy, House of, 3 

business industrial class, 65, 86, 88-89, 
204; emergence of, 88 

Cabral, Pedro Alvares, 28 

Cacilhas dry docks, 69 

Cadiz: ancient trading post at, 5 

Caetano, Marcello Jose das Neves, xxv, 
60-61, 120, 224; background of, 61; 
censorship under, 211; discontent with, 
65-66, 203; economic policy of, 61; 
exiled, 171; military under, 231; polit- 
ical parties under, 197; as prime min- 
ister, 60, 170 



307 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Cahora Bassa hydroelectric power plant, 
214 

Caixa Geral de Depositos, 126, 155 
Camacho, Manuel Brito, 52 
Camerte, Paulo, 33 
Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses (CP), 

126, 152 
Camoes, Luis de, 21 
Canada: emigration to, 77, 134 
Cao, Diogo, 26 

CAP. See Common Agricultural Policy 

Cape Bojador, 25 

Capelo, Hermenegildo, 48-49 

Cape of Good Hope, 26 

Cape St. Catherine, 26 

Cape Verde, 26; independence for, 214 

Cape Verde Islands: discovered, 25 

capital: account, 121; expenditures, 131; 
flight, 117; formation, 122; repatriation 
of, 158 

captaincies, 32 

Captains' Movement, 232 

Cardoso, Augusto, 49 

Carlos I, 50 

Carlucci, Frank, 217 

Carmona, Oscar Fragoso, 54; as presi- 
dent, 54, 117, 225 

Carneiro, Francisco Sa , xxvi, 178; death 
of, xxviii, 178, 200; as prime minister, 
xxviii, 178, 200 

Carthaginians: conquest by, 5 

Carvalho, Otelo Saraivade, 172, 232; ar- 
rested, 234, 267; convicted, 270 

Carvalho Melo, Sebastiao Jose de, 39 

Castelo Branco, 74 

Castile, 4 

Catalan people: rebellion by, 36 

Catholic Church, Roman: disestablish- 
ment of, 51, 99; elite class in, 99; im- 
pact of revolution on, 98-99; influence 
of, xxxiv-xxxv, 99, 204; land owned 
by, 16, 17, 85, 97; middle class in, 206; 
official separation of, from state, 96, 
98-99; political role of, 203-4; power 
of, 97; principles of, 98; relations with, 
97; role of, 96-103, 108; under Sala- 
zar, 55, 58, 98; schools controlled by, 
98, 103; social welfare under, 208 

Catholicism, Roman: decline of, 99; hu- 
manization of, 102; introduction of, 96; 
saints in, 100 

Catholic University, 107 

Cavaco Silva, Anfbal, xxix, xxxi, 208, 



239; characteristics of, 208; economy 
under, 161; goals of, 208; popularity of, 
209-10; as prime minister, 168, 179, 
180, 186, 200; support for, 208, 210 

CCP. See Portuguese Confederation of 
Commerce 

CDS. See Party of the Social Democratic 
Center 

Celebes: exploration of, 32 

Celtic peoples, 5 

censorship: abolished, 171, 211; under 

Salazar, 169, 210-11 
census of 1864, 73 

Central Bloc (Bloco Central), 179, 200 

Centralcer. See Central de Cervejas 

Central de Cervejas (Centralcer), 126 

Cerejeira, Manuel Goncalves, 98 

Ceuta, 24, 26 

Ceylon: Jesuits in, 33 

CGTP-IN. General Confederation of 

Portuguese Workers-National Inter- 

sindical 

Chamber of Deputies, 44, 45, 47 

Chamber of Peers, 45 

Chamber of Senators, 47 

Champalimaud, 126 

Chase Manhattan Bank, 154 

Chaves Rosa, Jose, 125 

children: government subsidies for, 109; 
illegitimacy of, 80, 82; school atten- 
dance of, xxxiv, 108 

China: factories in, 32; Jesuits in, 33; 
Macau under, 195; materiel from, for 
African insurgents, 232; military train- 
ing by, of African insurgents, 229; 
trade with, 31 

Christianity {see also under individual denomi- 
nations): conversion to, 6 

Christians: Reconquest by, 8-9, 10, 12, 
13 

Christians, New. See Marranos 
chromium, 59 

churches: built in Brazil, 33; village, 100 
Church of England, 102 
Cimentos de Portugal (Cimpor), 126 
Cimpor. See Cimentos de Portugal 
CIP. See Confederation of Portuguese In- 
dustry 

citanias (Roman towns), 6 
Citicorp, 154 

civil liberties: restrictions on, 268 
civil service (see also bureaucracy), 191-92; 
employment in, 150, 192; middle class 



308 



Index 



in, 206; modernization of, 192; profes- 
sionalization of, 51; professors as em- 
ployees of, 107; proliferation of jobs in, 
122, 192; reform of, 192; selection for 
employment in, 192 
civil war, 53 

clergy: categories of, 15; disputes of, with 
nobility, 16; in early history, 15; land 
owned by, 16; privileges of, 15 

climate, 4, 69; rainfall, 4 

CNP. See Companhia Nacional de Petro- 
qufmica 

coal, 149 

coastline, 66 

Cochin, 31; Jesuits in, 33 

Code of Military Justice, 250 

Coimbra, 10, 13; French sack of, 42; 
population of, 74 

collectivization, xxvii, 91, 143, 174 

Colonial Act of 1930, 59-60 

colonies {see also under individual colonies): 
Asian, 32; development in, 58; estab- 
lishment of, 67; as factor in economy, 
xxiv, 119; granted independence, xxvii, 
124, 172, 213; investment in, 121; poli- 
cies in, 226-27; relations with, 214; self- 
supporting, 59-60 

colonies, African, 25-26, 48-49, 265; de- 
termination to retain, xxv; emigration 
to, 78; immigrants from, 95-96; in- 
dependence gained by, xxvii, 78, 213; 
independence struggle in, 119; Por- 
tuguese living in, 78; returnees from, 
xxviii, 95 

commerce, 150-52; employment in, 150; 
middle class in, 206; retail, 150 

Commission for Equality and Women's 
Rights {see also Commission on the Sta- 
tus of Women), xxxv, 83 

Commission on the Status of Women {see 
also Commission for Equality and 
Women's Rights), 83 

Commission to Control Data, 266 

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 115, 
144 

commoners: categories of, 16; in early his- 
tory, 16 

Common External Tariff, 115 

communications, 152 

Companhia de Seguros de Creditos 
(Cosec), 155 

Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade, 
155 



Companhia Nacional de Petroqufmica 
(CNP), 147 

Companhia Uniao Fabril (CUF): nation- 
alized, 125 

concelhos. See settler communities 

Concordat of 1940, 83, 98 

Confederagao de Industria Portuguesa 
(CIP). See Confederation of Portuguese 
Industry 

Confederagao do Comercio Portugues 
(CCP). See Portuguese Confederation 
of Commerce 

Confederacao Geral dos Trabalhadores 
Portugueses-Intersindical Nacional 
(CGTP-IN). See General Confedera- 
tion of Portuguese Workers-National 
Intersindical 

Confederation of Portuguese Industry 
(CIP), 206 

Conference of Samora, 10 

Congo, 227 

Congregationalists, 102 

Congress of the Republic, 51 

Constituent Assembly, xxvii, 47, 181; 
elections for, 168, 174, 233 

Constitutional Charter, 45; nullified, 46 

Constitutional Court, xxviii-xxix, 190, 
208; appointments to, 188; created, 183 

constitution of 1822, 44; reestablished, 46 

constitution of 1838, 47 

constitution of 1933, 56 

constitution of 1976, xxvii, 181; amend- 
ments to, xxviii, 168, 178-79, 182-83, 
208; armed forces under, 182, 224, 
234-36; cabinet under, 186; church un- 
der, 98-99; civil rights under, 268; civil 
service under, 191; controversy over, 
182; drafting committee for, 168; econ- 
omy under, 128; education under, 105; 
equal rights for women under, 82; ex- 
ecutive under, 182; judiciary under, 
190-91; parliament under, 182; police 
under, 262; president under, xxvii, 
182, 183-85; prime minister under, 
185-86; promulgated, 176, 181; sepa- 
ration of church and state in, 96, 98-99; 
women under, 82, 83 

construction, 147; growth of, 120; of 
housing, 110; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 120, 121; to support 
tourism, 150 

consumer groups, 129 

consumption, 121; growth of, 122 



309 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Continental Operations Command 
(COPCON), xxvi, 233; dissolved, 
xxvii, 176, 234; formed, 172 

Convention of Sintra (1808), 42 

COPCON. See Continental Operations 
Command 

copper, 59, 145, 149 

Cordoba, Caliphate of, 8 

cork, 70, 140, 141, 142 

Corporative Chamber, 56 

Correio da Manha, 211 

corruption: in government, xxv, 169 

cortes, 22; of 1211 (Coimbra), 13; of 1254 
(Leiria), 13; of 1385 (Seville), 20; of 
1433 (Evora), 22; of 1481 (Evora), 23; 
of 1641, 37; of 1828, 45 

Cosec. See Companhia de Seguros de 
Creditos 

Costa, Afonso, 52 

Costa, Alfred Nobre da, 177 

Costa Cabral, Antonio Bernardo da, 47; 
exiled, 48 

Costa Gomes, Francisco de, 173, 232 

Council of Europe, 215 

Council of Ministers, 156, 186-87; duties 
of, 186; members of, 186; specialized 
councils, 187 

Council of Social Communication, 268 

Council of State, 170, 172, 183, 185 

Council of the Revolution, xxvii, 203, 
224; eliminated, xxviii, 183, 203, 234, 
236; formed, 173, 233; Goncalves ex- 
pelled from, 175; members of, 234-36; 
military control of, 182 

Council to Oversee the Intelligence Ser- 
vices, 266 

Counter-Reformation, 32-34 

coup d'etat, attempted, of 1927, 230; of 
1961, 230; of 1975, xxvii, 124, 168, 
172-73, 176, 233, 234 

coup d'etat of 1841, 47 

coup d'etat of 1907, 50 

coup d'etat of 1910, 225, 229-30 

coup d'etat of 1917, 53 

coup d'etat of 1926, xxv, 54, 117, 169, 
203, 230 

coup d'etat of 1974. See Revolution of 
1974 

Court of Audit, 190 

courts: of first instance, 190; inefficiency 
of, 191; military, 190; of second in- 
stance, 190; special, 190 

court system, 190-91; ombudsman for, 



190-91 

Covilha, 146 

Covilha, Pero da, 28 

CP. See Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses 

crime: drug-related, 271; incidence of, 
270-71; types of, 271 

criminal justice system {see also judiciary; 
see also under courts), 268-70; appeals in, 
268-69; attorneys in, 269; control of, 
268; ombudsman for, 269-70; organi- 
zation of, 268; preventive detention in, 
269; supervision in, 269; trials in, 269 

crusades: of 1415, 24; of 1578, 34-35, 224 

CUF. See Companhia Uniao Fabril 

cult of the hidden prince, 35 

Cunha, Tristao da, 31 

Cunhal, Alvaro, xxvi, 199; return from 
exile, 171-72 

currency: in European Monetary System, 
xxiii 

current account, 121, 158; basic balance 
of, 159; public debt as percentage of, 
162 

current expenditures, 131 



da Palma Carlos, Adelino, 172 

de Arriaga, Manuel, 52 

death, causes of, 109-10 

debt, public, 58, 132-33, 162-63; amount 
of, 162; interest payments on, 131, 162; 
as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 131; ratio of, to gross domes- 
tic product, 132, 162; ratio of, to 
reserves, 162-63; trend in, 162-63 

debt servicing: as percentage of current 
account, 162; reduction of, 162 

Decree Law 353-73, 231-32; reaction to, 
231-32 

Defense Agreement of 1951, 226 

defense industry, domestic, 126, 244, 
260-61; production capabilities, 260; 
restrictions on, 261; sales by, 260, 261 

defense posture: strategic concepts of, 
237-39; transitional stage of, 238 

defense spending, 256-57; increases in, 
256; as percentage of gross national 
product, 256; on personnel, 256-57 

Defense Strategic Intelligence Service 
(SIED), 265, 266 

Delgado, Humberto, 56, 230; assassinat- 
ed, 230 



310 



Index 



democracy: consolidated, 176-80; estab- 
lished, xxiv; rescinded, xxv, 54-56; 
transition to, xxvi-xxix, 169, 174-76, 
180-81 

Democratic Alliance (AD), xxviii; dis- 
solved, 189; in elections of 1980, 178; 
formed, 178, 200 

Democratic Party (PD), 52, 172 

demography, 70-79 

demonstrations. See political demon- 
strations 

development: of Brazil, 38-39; economic, 

34, 65; in medieval period, 18-19 
DGS. See General Security Directorate 
d'Hondt method, 195, 196, 197 
diamonds, 38 
Didrio de Noticias, 211 
Dias, Bartolomeu, 26, 28 
Dias, Dinis, 25 

Dinis (king) ("the Farmer"): agricultural 
development under, 18; land disputes 
resolved by, 17; maritime activities of, 
24 

Direccao Geral de Seguranca (DGS). See 
General Security Directorate 

divorce, xxxiv, 80, 98, 99 

Dominicans: monasteries of, 12; regional 
administration by, 15 

drug-related crime, 271 

Duarte, 21, 22; crusades under, 26 

Eanes, Antonio dos Santos Ramalho: as 
president, xxvii-xxviii, xxix, 168, 176, 
234; qualities of, 184-85; state of emer- 
gency declared by, 176; supporters of, 
202 

Eanes, Gil, 25 
earthquake of 1755, 39 
EC. See European Community 
Economic and Social Program (1974), 
124 

economic development plans: first, 119; 

second, 119 
economic disequilibrium, 132-33 
economic growth, 122-23; impediments 

to, 128 

economic policy: of Caetano, 61; mercan- 
tilist, 59; of Pedro II, 37; of Pombal, 
40; of Salazar, 58-59 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 147 
economy: backwardness of, xxiv; charac- 
teristics of, 115-17; under constitution 



of 1976, 128; effect of European Com- 
munity membership on, 133, 215; im- 
pact of isolation on, xxiv; importance 
of colonies to, xxiv; in 1980s, xxiii, 
xxxii; problems in, xxix, 116-17, 
122-33, 139-40, 147, 153; under Sala- 
zar, xxv, 58-60, 117-20 
EDP. See Electricidade de Portugal 
education (see also schools), 103-8; at- 
tempts to improve, xxxiv; under con- 
stitution of 1976, 105; disrupted by 
Revolution of 1974, 104-5; elitism in, 
104; government control of, 107; 
government responsibility for, 97; 
Jesuit control over, 97, 104; prepara- 
tory, 105; preschool, 105; pressures for, 
66; primary, 105; problems in, xxxiv, 
107-8; public, 40, 104; reforms in, 104; 
role of church in, 96, 97; under Sala- 
zar, 58; secondary, 105; under Second 
Republic, xxx; vocational, 105-7; of 
women, 83 
Edward II: maritime trade with, 18 
EEC . See European Economic Community 
EEZ. See Exclusive Economic Zone 
EFTA. See European Free Trade As- 
sociation 
Egypt: sea battle with, 31 
elections: in First Republic, 52; of 1969, 

61; in Second Republic, 168 
elections, local, 196, 199 
elections, parliamentary, 196; of 1976, 
xxviii, 176, 201; of 1979, 178; of 1980, 
178; of 1983, xxix, 179; of 1985, 179, 
199; of 1987, xxx, 180, 199, 200, 201, 
207-8; of 1991, 200, 201, 209-10 
elections, presidential, 196, 209 
elections for Constituent Assembly: of 
1820, 44; of 1911, 51; of 1975, 168, 
174, 198 
electoral system, 195-96 
Electricidade de Portugal (EDP), 126, 149 
electricity, gas, and water sector: growth 
in, 145; as percentage of gross domes- 
tic product, 120 
elite class, xxiv, 88-90; economic power 
of, 118; education of, 107; families, 80; 
impact of 1974 revolution on, xxiii, 
204; inheritances in, 99; kinship net- 
works of, 84; liberalism among, 43; 
members of, 88-89; political role of, 
204; professions of, 99; under Salazar, 
55 



311 



Portugal: A Country Study 



emigrants, remittances from, 77, 115-16, 
121, 158, 159-60 

emigration, 73-74, 75-79; destinations 
for, 77-78; motives for, xxxiv, 73, 75, 
77, 122, 134, 141, 216, 231; of profes- 
sionals, 116; rate of, 70, 75, 136; by 
sex, 76; social impact of, 76-77, 136, 
170 

empire, 224; in Asia, 31-32, 36, 225; 
decline of, 34-43, 212, 225 

employment: abroad, xxxiv, 73, 79, 95, 
134; in agriculture, xxxii, 134; in com- 
merce, 150; decline in, 122; distribu- 
tion, 134-37; emigration for, xxxiv, 
122; in financial sector, 150; in fishing, 
134; in forestry, 134; in government, 
150; in industry, 117, 134; pressures 
for, 66; in public sector, 117; in service 
sector, 134-36; in tourism, 150; in 
transportation, 150 

energy resources, 148-49 

English language, 216 

Enlightenment: impact of, xxiv, 40-41, 
104 

ERP. See European Recovery Program 
Escudo Area, 119; dismantled, 124; trade 

with, 158 
Espiritu Santo family, 155 
Espiritu Santo Sociedade de Investimen- 

to, 155 

Estado Novo. See New State 
Estaleiros Navais de Setubal (Setenave), 

130, 147 
Estremadura province, 67, 69 
ethnic groups (see also under individual 

groups), 94-96; homogeneity of, 94; 

regional differences in, 94 
ethnicity, 94-96 

Europe: reaction of, to Revolution of 
1974, 167, 175; relations with, 214-16 

European Community (EC): and agricul- 
ture, 144; aid from, xxx, xxxii, 147, 
156, 159, 160, 180, 215; effect of, on 
economy, 133, 156, 215; effect of, on 
government, 215; effect of, on society, 
215; free trade agreement with, 120; 
membership in, xxiii, xxix-xxx, 115, 
139, 145, 156, 168, 213, 257; presiden- 
cy of, xxiii; requirements of, 115; secu- 
rity responsibilities of, 239 

European Economic Community (EEC): 
membership in, 115, 215 

European Free Trade Association 



(EFTA): assistance from, 160; mem- 
bership in, 115, 119, 155, 167, 215 

European Monetary System: Portuguese 
currency in, xxiii 

European Recovery Program (ERP) 
(Marshall Plan), 217 

European Social Fund: aid from, 139, 160 

evangelization, 32-34 

Evolutionists. See Republican Evolutionist 
Party 

Evora, 74; expropriations of land in, 143; 

rebellion at, 36 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 245 
exploration, xxiv, 26, 67, 244; of Africa, 

25-26, 48-49; of Angola, 48; of Asia, 

32; of Brazil, 32, 38; of Mozambique, 

49 

exports: of arms, 260, 261; of commodi- 
ties, 116, 156; of crops, 141, 142, 156; 
increase in, 156; in manufactured 
goods, 157; of minerals, 149; as percen- 
tage of gross domestic product, 155; 
products, 121 

Expresso, 178, 200, 211 

external credits, 119 



factionalism: in armed forces, xxvii, 233; 
in political parties, xxx-xxi, 50 

families, 79-82; children in, 80; elite, 80; 
equality in, 80; extended, 84-85; god- 
parents in, 84; middle-class, 80; organi- 
zation of, 80; relations within, 82; 
women in, 80 

family planning, 82 

Farmer, the. See Dinis (king) 

farmers: in the Alentejo, 91; living stan- 
dards of, 143; in the north, 91; public 
assistance to, 144; refusal of, to collec- 
tivize, 174; tenant, 85 

farms: collective, 143, 174 

Faro, 73, 74 

Fatima, 53, 57, 100 

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- 
many, Federal Republic of 

Felipe I, 35 

Fernando, 21 

Fernando, duke of Braganca, 23 
Fernando I: development under, 19; mar- 
itime activities of, 24 
Fidelidade, 155 
film industry, 212 

financial sector (see also banking), xxxiii, 



312 



Index 



153-55; changes in, 153; employment 
in, 150; government role in, 155 

financial strategy, 118-19 

First Composite Brigade, 223, 241-42, 
257-58; improvements in, 243; 
materiel of, 244; organization of, 243; 
problems in, 243; support for, 248 

Fiscal Guard (Guarda Fiscal), 264 

fishing, 40, 67, 142-43; amount of, 143; 
commercial, 142; growth of, 120; labor 
force in, 134, 137, 139; liberalization 
of, 153; as percentage of gross domes- 
tic product, 120, 122, 139; in Portimao, 
146 

FNLA. See National Front for the Liber- 
ation of Angola 

Forcas Populares do 25 Abril. See Popu- 
lar Forces of the 25th of April 

Ford- Volkswagen automotive complex, 
161 

foreign assistance: from European Com- 
munity, xxx, xxxii, 139; as percentage 
of gross domestic product, 139 

foreign community, 95 

foreign economic relations, 155-63 

foreign exchange: income, 116, 160; re- 
ceipts from tourism, 150 

foreign income: from emigrant remit- 
tances, 77, 115-16, 121, 158, 159-60; 
from tourism, 115 

foreign investment, xxxii, 58, 160-61; at- 
tempts to limit, 161-62; from Britain, 
160-61; in colonies, 60; in commerce, 
150; conditions for, 161; in economic 
development plans, 119; in financial 
sector, 161; impact of Revolution of 
1974 on, 125; increase in, 160; in in- 
dustry, 146; in manufacturing, 161; in 
service sector, 161; in tourism, 161; 
trends in, 160-61 

foreign relations, 212-18; history of, 
212-13 

forestry, 142; exports by, 156; growth of, 
120; labor force in, 134, 137, 139; as 
percentage of gross domestic product, 
120, 122, 139; products, 70, 140, 142, 
145 

forests, 70; amount of, 140, 142 
FP-25. See Popular Forces of the 25th of 
April 

France: British blockade of, 41; emigra- 
tion to, 134, 216; influence of, on le- 
gal system, 191; invasions by, 42-43; 



materiel from, 245, 246-48, 260; occu- 
pation by, 42; Portuguese guestworkers 
in, 79, 136, 160; relations with, 216; 
trade with, 157; war of, with Spain, 41 

Franciscans: monasteries of, 12; region- 
al administration by, 15 

Franco, Joao: dictatorship of, 50 

Franco, Francisco, 59, 226 

Freemasons, 43 

Free University, 107 

Freire de Andrade, Gomes, 43 

Freitas, Jose Vicente de, 54 

Frelimo. See Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique 

French language, 216 

French Revolution: reaction to, 41 

Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique 
(Frelimo). See Front for the Liberation 
of Mozambique 

Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Ango- 
la (FNLA). See National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola 

Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
(Frelimo), 214, 229 

Galicia, 4 

Gama, Vasco da, 28 
gas, natural, 149 

GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT): membership in, 119 
General Anti-Crime Directorate, 263 
General Confederation of Portuguese 

Workers-National Intersindical (CGTP- 

IN), xxvi, 125, 138, 175, 198, 205; 

growth of, 205; opposition to, 205 
Generale de Banque, 154 
General Security Directorate (DGS), 265 
General Union of Workers (UGT), 205; 

organized, 138 
geographic regions, 67 
geography, 4, 66-70 
Germanic invasions {see also under individual 

tribes), 6-7 
Germany, Federal Republic of (West 

Germany), 199; emigration to, 134; 

materiel from, 224, 245, 246-48, 260, 

263; Portuguese guestworkers in, 79, 

136; trade with, 157 
Gini ratio, 137 



313 



Portugal: A Country Study 



glassmaking, 40 

GNP. See gross national product 
GNR. See National Republican Guard 
Goa: immigrants from, 95; Indian recap- 
ture of, 59, 231; occupation of, 31 
gold, 38 
Gold Coast, 26 
Gomes, Fernao, 26 
Gomes da Costa, Manuel, 54 
Goncalves, Vasco, 172, 173-74; expelled 
from Council of the Revolution, 175 
government: church under, 51, 95, 98- 
99; education under, 97; effect of 
European Community membership 
on, 133, 215; income-leveling policies, 
138; as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 174; revenue, 130; role of, 
in financial system, 155; system of, 
189-95 

government, local, 192-94; administra- 
tive regions in, 193; administrative sys- 
tem in, 192; districts in, 193; governor 
of, 193; municipal assembly, 193-94; 
municipalities in, 193-94; parishes in, 
193 

government, provisional: of 1911, 51; of 
1970s, xxvii, xxviii, 168, 172, 173, 178 

government deficit, 128, 130-31; effect of, 
132-33; financing structure of, 132; as 
percentage of gross domestic product, 
133 

government spending, 128, 130-32; pat- 
terns of, 131; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 130 

governor of district, 193 

Great Depression, 118 

Greeks: conquest by, 5 

gross domestic product (GDP): composi- 
tion of, 120, 122; growth of, 115, 117, 
120, 122, 145; per capita, 115, 123; ra- 
tio of debt to, 132, 162; ratio of interest 
to, 162 

gross domestic product percentages: 
agriculture, 120, 122; borrowing, 128; 
budget deficit, 133; construction, 120; 
energy, 120; exports, 155; fishing, 120, 
122, 139; foreign assistance, 139; for- 
estry, 120, 122, 139; government ser- 
vices, 174; imports, 156; industry, 120, 
122; manufacturing, 120, 122; mining, 
120; privatization proceeds, 133; pub- 
lic debt, 131, 162; public enterprises, 
129; service sector, 115, 121, 122, 150; 



tourism, 122, 150 
gross national product (GNP): defense 

spending as percentage of, 256 
Group of Nine, 175 
Guarda (district), 73, 74 
Guarda Fiscal. See Fiscal Guard 
Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR). 

See National Republican Guard 
Guinea, Portuguese, 49; armed resistance 

by, 60, 170, 228-29; made a province, 

60; Portuguese deaths in, 229 
Guinea-Bissau: independence for, 172, 

213, 229 
Gypsies, 95 

health care, 109-10; government pay- 
ments for, 109; role of church in, 96 

health care professionals: distribution of, 
110; number of, 110 

health care system, 110 

health facilities, 110 

health problems, xxxiv; causes of death, 
109-10; malnutrition, 110 

Henrique (cardinal), 35 

Henrique (prince) ("the Navigator"), 18, 
21, 244; death of, 25; as master of Or- 
der of Christ, 24; naval school found- 
ed by, 24 

Henry (of Burgundy), 9 

Henry the Navigator. See Henrique 
(prince) 

Higher Council of National Defense: 
formed, 183; members of, 239; powers 
of, 236 

Higher Council of the Bench, 188, 190; 

appointments to, 188 
Higher Military Institute, 250 
Historia Genealogica da Casa Real (Sousa), 39 
Historicals {see also Progressives; Septem- 
berists), 48; conflict of, with Regener- 
ators, 50 

Holy See: land claimed by, 16, 17; rela- 
tions with, 40, 41 

housing, 110-11; construction, 110; of 
elite, 111; government responsibility 
for, 111; lack of, 110-11; pressures for, 
66 



Iberian Atlantic Command (IBER- 
LANT), 59, 245, 246, 258; area con- 
trolled by, 258; commander of, 258; 



314 



Index 



headquarters of, 258 

Iberian Pact (1939), 59, 223, 226, 241 

Iberian Peninsula: climate of, 4; geogra- 
phy of, 4 

Iberian Union, 35-37, 215 

IBERLANT. See Iberian Atlantic 
Command 

Ibero people, 5 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
immigrants (see also returnees from Afri- 
ca): assimilation of, 95; from colonies, 
95 

imports: in manufactured goods, 157; of 
oil, 148, 157; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 156 

income: from emigrant remittances, 77, 
115-16, 121, 158, 159-60; from invisi- 
bles, 121; from tourism, 121 

income distribution, 121, 122, 127, 129, 
134, 137-39; functional approach to, 
138; size of, 137-38 

INDEP. See Industrias Nacionais de Defe- 
sa E.P. 

Independente, 211 

India: commercial activity of, in Asia, 36; 
commercial hegemony in, 31; first 
voyage to, 28; Jesuits in, 33; sea route 
to, 26-31; second voyage to, 28-31 

industrial dynasties, 1 18; licensing, 118, 
119, 120; organization, 146-48; pro- 
duction, 122; regions, 147 

Industrias Nacionais de Defesa E.P. (IN- 
DEP), 261 

industry, xxxii-xxxiii, 145-49; decline of, 
34; foreign ownership in, xxxii, 146, 
147; growth in, 120, 145; mergers in, 
125-26; middle class in, 206; nation- 
alization of, 124, 125; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 120, 122; pri- 
vate ownership in, xxxii-xxxiii, 146, 
209; productivity in, 146-47; under 
Roman occupation, 6; state ownership 
in, xxxii, 146, 147, 147-48; work force 
in, 86, 117, 134, 136 

infant mortality, xxxiv, 109 

inflation, 117; under Caetano, 61; in 
1970s, 176; in 1980s, xxix; rate of, 122 

infrastructure: development of, 6, 147; 
military, 37; projects financed, 118, 
147; under Roman occupation, 6 

inland waterways, 152 

Inquisition, 33, 35; abolished, 44, 97; 
deaths in, 33; established, 97; expul- 



sions by, 102; schools under, 103-4 
Institute for Higher Military Studies, 243 
Institute for State Participation, 127, 129; 

created, 125 
Institute of Applied Psychology, 107 
insurance services: competition among, 
126; foreign investment in, 161; nation- 
alized, 125, 127, 153; privatized, 153 
intellectuals, 55; political activities of, 198; 

political role of, 206-7 
intelligence services, 264-66; powers of, 
264-65 

Intelligence System of the Republic of 

Portugal (SIRP), 265, 266 
internal security, 261-67; as mission of 

armed forces, 261; reorganization of, 

261 

International Labour Organisation, 137 
International Monetary Fund (IMF): 
austerity program of, 177; membership 
in, 119; stabilization program of, 128, 
156 

International Police for the Defense of the 

State (PIDE), 264-65 
Intervention Police, 263 
investment, 131, 158; coefficients, 122- 

23; in colonies, 121; constraints on, 

117; institutions, 154; productivity, 

123 
Isabel, 22 
Islam. See Muslims 

isolation, 66; impact of, on economy, 

xxiv; under Salazar, 86 
Ivens, Roberto, 48 



Japan: investment from, 161; Jesuits in, 
33; Pacific islands occupied by, 59; re- 
lations with, 32 

Java: exploration of, 32 

Jehovah's Witnesses, 102 

Jesuits, 35; activities of, 33; education 
controlled by, 97, 104; expelled, 40, 97; 
founded, 33 

Jews: expelled, 97; number of, 103; perse- 
cution of, 33, 34, 103; population of, 
95; role of, 8 

Joao. See Joao I 

Joao, duke of Braganca (see also Joao IV): 

proclaimed king, 36 
Joao I, 19-22; maritime activities of, 24; 

nobility under, 21 
Joao II: crowned, 23; nobility under, 23 



315 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Joao III, 26; death of, 34; expeditions of, 

32; Inquisition established by, 97 
Joao IV, 37; crowned, 36 
Joao V, 39 

Joao VI, 41; accession of, 43; return to 

Portugal, 44 
Joao Afonso, 20 
Joao das Regras, 20 
John of Gaunt, 21 

Jose I, 39; attempted assassination of, 40 

joust of Arcos de Valdevez, 10 

Juan I, 19 

judges, 190, 191 

Judicial Police, 264, 268 

judicial regions, 268 

judiciary, 190-91, 267-72 

Junot, Andoche, 42 

Junta of National Salvation, 172, 232-33; 

abolished, 173; friction of, with Armed 

Forces Movement, 233 



kinship relations, 79, 84-85; economic, 
84, 196-97; godparents in, 84; politi- 
cal, 84 

Kissinger, Henry, 175 

Korea, Republic of (South Korea): invest- 
ment from, 161 



labor force: agricultural, 143; composition 
of, 134-37; dismissal procedures, 139; 
distribution of, 134-37, 139; growth of, 
137; industrial, 86, 117; percentage of, 
in unions, 138, 205; in service sector, 
150; size of, 136 

labor laws, xxix; attempts to reform, 
xxxiii; reforms, 139, 208 

labor productivity, 122, 141 

labor unions: agenda of, 138; government 
control of, 86; growth in, 65; leaders 
of, exiled, 205; membership of, 205; 
origins of, 204-5; outlawed, xxv, 205; 
percentage of labor force in, 138, 205; 
political role of, xxvi, 204-5; special- 
ized, 205; strength of, 138, 205 

Lajes Air Base, 216-17, 223, 226, 238, 
248, 259 

land: arable, 140; area, 66, 140; expropri- 
ations of, 143, 207; holdings, 143; pres- 
sures for, 66; privatization of, 209 



land distribution, 12 

landowners, 85, 88; abuses of, 17, 143; 

confirmation of, 16-17, 85 
land tenure, 6, 116, 143-44 
latifundidrios . See landowners 
Lavrador, O. See Dinis (king) 
Law of the Sesmarias (1375), 19, 25 
legal system: influences on, 191; 

medieval, 18 
Leixoes, port of, 152 
Leonor of Aragon, 22, 108 
liberalism, 43 
life expectancy, 109 
Ligure people, 5 

Lisbon: captured by Afonso Henriques, 
10; earthquake in, 39; economic activi- 
ty in, 67; immigrants to, 74; industry 
in, 146; population of, 74; population 
density in, 73; rebuilt, 39-40; religious 
practice in, 99; suburbanization of, 74 

Lisbon Stock Exchange, 153 

literacy rate, 65, 212; in First Republic, 
117; improvement in, xxxiii-xxxiv, 
105; in nineteenth century, 104; in 
1990s, xxxiii, 107, 212 

livestock, 142 

living standards, xxxiv; of farmers, 143; 

improvement in, xxxiv, 94; of working 

class, 94 
Louis XIII: alliance with, 37 
lower class, 91-92; kinship networks in, 

84-85 

Loyola, Ignatius de, 33 
Luisa de Gusmao, 37 
Lundberg, Erik, 124 
Lusitania, 4 
Lusitanian people, 5 
Luso-American Development Founda- 
tion, 217 
Luso-Iberian Council, 216 

Macau: Chinese rule of, 195; immigrants 
from, 95; occupation of, 32, 59; popu- 
lation of, 195 

Madagascar: explored, 31 

Madeira Islands, 70, 73; autonomy of, 
194; colonized, 25; discovered, 25; 
government of, 195; legislative assem- 
bly in, 195; minister of the republic in, 
194-95; powers of, 194, 195; separatist 
movement in, 262; strategic importance 
of, 257 



316 



Index 



magazines, 211; censored, 210-11 
Maia, Manuel da, 39 
Makler, Harry M., 127 
Malacca: conquest of, 31 
Malaga: ancient trading post at, 5 
Malaysia: spice trade in, 31 
Mantua, duchess of, 36 
Manuel I, 26; accession of, 28; death of, 
32 

Manuel II, 50 

manufactured goods: exported, 156; im- 
ported, 156 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 153 
manufacturing: foreign investment in, 
161; growth in, 145; labor costs of, 157; 
nationalization of, 127; as percentage 
of gross domestic product, 120, 121, 
122; sales, 147 
Manutencao Military, 260 
Maria I: accession of, 41; death of, 43 
Maria II (Maria da Gloria), 45; crowned, 
46 

Maria da Fontes movement, 47 
Maria da Gloria. See Maria II 
Marie-Francoise Isabelle of Savoy, 37 
Marine Corps, 246 

maritime expansion, 3, 23-34; factors in, 
24 

maritime insurance, 19 

Maritime Police, 264 

Marranos, 103; persecution of, 33, 35 

marriage, 80; arranged, 82; equality in, 
80; separation in, 80-82; women in, 80 

Marshall Plan, 217 

Masons. See Freemasons 

Massena, Andre, 42 

materiel: from France, 245, 246-48, 260; 
from Germany, 224, 245, 246-48, 260, 
263; obsolescence of, 223; from Spain, 
245, 248; spending on, 257; from Unit- 
ed States, 223-24, 248, 259-60; value 
of, 260 

maternal leave, 82 

Matos, Norton de, 56 

Matosinhos, 142 

May 28 Movement, 54 

MDP. See Portuguese Democratic Move- 
ment 

media, 210-12; freedom for, 267, 268; 
government involvement in, 211; un- 
der Second Republic, xxxiv, 211 

Megalithic period, 4 

Mendes Cabecadas, Jose, 54 



Menenses, Luis de (count of Ericeira), 37 

mergers, 125-26, 129 

Methodists, 102 

Methuen Treaty (1703), 38 

MFA. See Armed Forces Movement 

middle class, 85, 90-91; characteristics of, 
xxiv; economic definition of, 90; emer- 
gence of, 65, 86, 170; families, 80; 
growth of, 94, 205; impact of, on po- 
litical system, 90; impact of, on social 
system, 206; political loyalties of, 91, 
206; political role of, 205-6; in Revo- 
lution of 1974, 206; social definition of, 
90-91; values of, 53, 90-91 

Middle East: relations with, 218 

Miguel I, 44-45 

military (see also air force; armed forces; 

army; navy): dictatorship, 52, 54-55; 

doctrine, 238; intelligence, 265 
Military Academy: enrollment in, 243; 

students in, 231 
military conscripts: exemptions for, 252; 

number of, 252; recruitment for, 252; 

reduction of term for, 252-53 
Military Disciplinary Regulations, 250 
Military Intelligence Service (SIM), 265 
military officers, 55, 89, 241; arrest of, 

in 1975 coup, xxvii; characteristics of, 

203; elite in, 231; middle class, 206; 

morale of, 245, 249; noncommissioned, 

243; pay of, 226; social pressures on, 

226; training of, 243, 249; women as, 

253 

military service: alternative, 103, 252; 
conscientious objectors to, 252; emigra- 
tion to avoid, 75, 231; length of, 250-52 

minerals, 148-49; export of, 149 

Minho province, 67, 69 

mining, 145, 149; of copper, 59, 145, 149; 
growth in, 145; of iron, 149; as percent- 
age of gross domestic product, 120; of 
tungsten, 149 

Ministry of Defense, 260 

Ministry of Education and Culture, 107, 
192 

Ministry of Employment and Social Secu- 
rity, 109 

Ministry of Health, 109, 192 

Ministry of Interior, 262 

Ministry of Internal Administration, 262 

Ministry of Justice, 261, 268 

Ministry of Public Instruction: estab- 
lished, 104 



317 



Portugal: A Country Study 



missionaries: restrictions on, 102-3 
monarchy: formation of, 9-10 
monarchy, constitutional, xxiv, 3-4; 

abolished, 51; established, 44; reaction 

to, 44; restoration of, 201 
monasteries, 12 
Monastery of Alcobaca, 12 
Monsanto Air Base, 246 
Monsaraz necropolis, 4 
Monte Real Air Base, 248 
Montijo Air Base, 258 
Mormons, 102 

Morocco: war in, 24, 26, 34-35, 224 
Mota Pinto, Carlos, 177 
mountains, 68, 69, 140 
Movement of Democratic Unity (MUD), 
56 

Movimento das Forcas Armadas (MFA). 

See Armed Forces Movement 
Movimento Democratico Portugues 

(MDP). See Portuguese Democratic 

Movement 
Movimento de Unidade Democratica 

(MUD). See Movement of Democratic 

Unity 

Movimento Popular de Libertacao de An- 
gola (MPLA). See Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola 

Mozambique, 49; armed resistance by, 
60, 170, 229; determination to retain, 
59; development in, 60; exploration of, 
49; immigrants from, 95, 136; indepen- 
dence for, 124, 175, 214, 229; made a 
province, 60; number of troops in, 229; 
Portuguese deaths in, 229; settlement 
on, 48, 75, 225 

MPLA. See Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola 

MUD. See Movement of Democratic 
Unity 

Musa ibn Nusair, 7 

Muslim conquest, 7-8 

Muslim influence, 8, 67 

Muslims 7-8, 10, 12, 18-19, 95, 103; cru- 
sades against, 24, 34-35, 224; expelled, 
96, 97, 224; as slaves, 16; trade by, 31 

Mussolini, Benito, 59 

Napoleonic Code, 191, 192 
National Assembly, 56 
National Board of Education, 187 
National Defense Institute, 243-44 



National Defense Law (1982), 203, 224, 

236, 239-41 
National Defense Law (1991), 236 
National Development Bank, 126 
National Front for the Liberation of An- 
gola (FNLA), 227 
National Housing Institute, 111 
nationalization, xxvii, 125-27, 173, 174; 
of agricultural estates, 91; of banks, 
124, 125, 174, 211; effects of, 122; of 
industries, 124, 125, 145; of insurance, 
125; and redistribution of income, 121; 
of shipping, 125; of transportation, 125 
National Library, 210 
National Popular Action (ANP), 197 
National Republican Guard (GNR), 171, 
261, 262-63; formed, 262; materiel of, 
263; mission of, 263; number of per- 
sonnel in, 263 
national security: cabinet responsibility 
for, 186 

National Union (UN), 56, 197; philos- 
ophy of, 56 

National Union for the Total Indepen- 
dence of Angola (UNITA), 228 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization 

Naval Academy, 245 

naval school: of Henrique, 24 

navy, 238, 244-46; aid to, 244; bases of, 
245; chief of staff, 245; conscripts in, 
245, 252; decline of, 244; downsizing 
of, 249-50; exercises of, 258; insignia, 
256; materiel, 224; missions of, 244-45; 
mutiny of 1910, 50; number of person- 
nel in, 239, 245; ranks, 253; reor- 
ganized, 223; under Spanish Armada, 
224; spending on, 256, 257; uniforms, 
256; vessels of, 244, 245 

necropolises, 4 

Neolithic period, 4 

Netherlands, 225; attempt by, to take 
over Brazil, 37; commercial activity of, 
in Asia, 36; Portugese guestworkers in, 
79; relations with, 37 

neutrality, 59 

Neves Corvo copper mine, 145, 149 

newspapers, 210-11 

New State (Estado Novo), xxv, 55- 
60; armed forces under, 225-27; bu- 
reaucracy under, xxxiii; censorship 
under, 169, 210-11; church under, 55, 
58, 98, 203; detentions under, 270; 



318 



Index 



economy under, 117-20; education un- 
der, 58; isolation under, 86; labor un- 
ions under, 86; middle-class opposition 
to, 206; plans for, 55, 118; political par- 
ties under, 197; politics under, 57; 
repression under, 169-70; tenets of, 57; 
tenor of, 56; transition to, 56, 169; vot- 
ing under, 80; women under, 83 

Nkomati Accords, 214 

nobility, 85; abuses by, 23; categories of, 
15-16; disputes of, with clergy, 16; in 
early history, 15-16; under Joao I, 21; 
killed in crusades, 35; land owned by, 
16; modern, 88; origins of, 88; under 
Pombal, 40; privileges of, 15-16; prop- 
erty disputes of, 23; restored, 41 

Nobrega, Manuel de, 33 

Noronha, Fernao, 32 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA- 
TO), 249, 257-60; Central Region of, 
241; contribution to, 223, 237, 257; ex- 
ercises, 258; facilities, 258; membership 
in, 59, 115, 167, 212-13, 215, 223, 226; 
missions in, 257; and Revolution of 1974, 
257; Spain as member of, 216, 258 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nu- 
clear Planning Group, 257 

Nova University, 107 

Nunes, Antonio, 40 

October 1973 War, 259 

OECD. See Organisation for Economic 

Co-operation and Development 
Office of Techno-Legislative Support, 187 
Oficinas Gerais de Fardamento e Equi- 

pamento (OGFE), 261 
Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronauti- 

co (OGMA), 261 
Oficinas Gerais de Material de Engenhar- 

ia (OGME), 261 
OGFE. See Oficinas Gerais de Fardamen- 
to e Equipamento 
OGMA. See Oficinas Gerais de Material 

Aeronautico 
OGME. See Oficinas Gerais de Material 

de Engenharia 
oil: exploitation of, 60; exploration for, 

149-49; imported, 148, 157; price 

shocks, 145, 147, 170 
O Lavrador ("the Farmer"). See Dinis 
Olivares, duke of, 36 
Oliveira, Julio Domingos de: resignation 



of government of, 55 
Olivera, Manoel de, 212 
OPEC . See Organization of the Petroleum 

Exporting Countries 
O Povoador ("the Populator"). See San- 

cho I 

Order of Avis (see also Order of the 
Calatravans), 17, 18; Henrique as 
master of, 21; Joao as master of, 19 

Order of Christ, 17-18; Henrique as 
master of, 24 

Order of the Calatravans (see also Order 
of Avis), 13; nationalized, 17; region- 
al administration by, 15 

Order of the Hospitallers, 13; national- 
ized, 17; regional administration by, 15 

Order of the Knights of Saint James, 13; 
nationalized, 17; regional administra- 
tion by, 15 

Order of the Templars, 13; regional ad- 
ministration by, 15; suppressed, 17 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), xxxii, 215 

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC): trade with, 158 

PAIGC. See African Party for the In- 
dependence of Guinea and Cape Verde 

Pais, Alvaro, 20 

Pais, Leme, 38 

Pais, SidoniO, 53 

Paiva, Afonso de, 28 

Paiva Couciero, Henrique, 53 

Paiva de Andrade, 49 

Paleolithic period, 4 

Palmela, duke of, 46 

Palmela necropolis, 4 

Partido Africano pelo Independencia de 
Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). See 
African Party for the Independence of 
Guinea and Cape Verde 

Partido Comunista Portugues (PCP). See 
Portuguese Communist Party 

Partido Democratico (PD). See Demo- 
cratic Party 

Partido do Centro Democratico Social 
(CDS). See Party of the Social Demo- 
cratic Center 

Partido Popular Democratico (PPD). See 
Popular Democratic Party 

Partido Popular Monarquico (PPM). See 
Popular Monarchist Party 



319 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Partido Renovador Democratico (PRD). 
See Party of the Democratic Renovation 

Partido Republicano Evolucionista (PRE). 
See Republican Evolutionist Party 

Partido Republicano Portugues (PRP). 
See Portuguese Republican Party 

Partido Social Democrata (PSD). See So- 
cial Democrat Party 

Partido Socialista (PS). See Socialist Party 

Party of the Democratic Renovation 
(PRD), 179, 202, 210 

Party of the Social Democratic Center 
(CDS), 200-201, 206; in elections, 176, 
179; founded, 201; platform of, 201; in 
Revolution of 1974, xxvi, 168, 174 

Passos, Manuel da Silva, 46 

PCEDED. See Program for the Structur- 
al Adjustment of the Foreign Deficit 
and Unemployment 

PCP. See Portuguese Communist Party 

PD. See Democratic Party 

Peace of Tuy, 10 

peasants, 85; marriage of, 80; oppression 
of, 207; political role of, 207 

Pecanha, Manuel. See Emmanuele 
Pessagno 

PEDAP. See Specific Plan for the Develop- 
ment of Portuguese Agriculture 

PEDIP. See Specific Plan for the Develop- 
ment of Portuguese Industry 

Pedro (Duarte's brother), 21; killed, 23; 
as regent, 22 

Pedro I (of Brazil), 45; abdicated, 46 

Pedro II, 37 

Pedro II (of Brazil), 46 

Pelayo, 8 

penal system, 271-72; incarceration ra- 
tio in, 272; ombudsman for, 272; time 
served in, 272 

Peninsular Wars, 41-43 

Pentecostals, 102 

Pereira, Nun'Alvares, 20 

Peres, Fernando, 9, 10 

Persian Gulf war, 239, 259 

Pessagno, Emmanuele (Manuel Pecan- 
ha): naval exploits of, 19; navy devel- 
oped by, 18 

Petrogal. See Petroleos de Portugal 

Petroleos de Portugal (Petrogal), 126, 130 

Philip II, 35, 36 

Philip III, 36, 224 

Philip IV, 36 

Philippa of Lancaster, 21 



Phoenicians: conquest by, 5 
physical environment, 66-70 
PIDE. See International Police for the 

Defense of the State 
Pintado, Valentina Xavier, 120 
Pintasilgo, Maria de Lourdes, 177 
Pinto, Fernao Mendes, 32 
pirates: European, 23, 32; Moroccan, 24 
plague, 22; of 1348-49, 19; of 1384, 20; 

of 1438, 21 
plains, 68 

Piano de Correccao Estrutural do Deficit 
Externo e Desemprego (PCEDED). See 
Program for the Structural Adjustment 
of the Foreign Deficit and Unemploy- 
ment 

Piano Economico para o Desenvolvimen- 
to da Agricultura Portuguesa (PEDAP). 
See Specific Plan for the Development of 
Portuguese Agriculture 

Piano Economico para o Desenvolvimen- 
to da Industria Portuguesa (PEDIP). See 
Specific Plan for the Development of 
Portuguese Industry 

P6, Fernao do, 26 

police, national, 262; civil rights protect- 
ed by, 268; control of, 262; duties of, 
262; mistrust of, 262 

police, secret, xxv, 169-70; abhorrence for, 
265; abolished, 171, 265; abuses by, 
265; activities of, 210 

Policia de Seguranca Publica (PSP). See 
Public Security Police 

Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Esta- 
do (PIDE). See International Police for 
the Defense of the State 

political demonstrations, 50, 173 

political parties (see also under individual par- 
ties), 195, 197-202; alliances among, 
xxvi-xxvii; banned, xxv, 57, 169; fac- 
tions in, xxx-xxxi; far left, 197-201; far 
right, 201-2; ineffectiveness of, xxiv- 
xxv; middle class in, 206; organization 
of, 167; popular view of, 196; precur- 
sors of, 197, 207; in Revolution of 1974, 
xxvi-xxvii, 167; strength of, 197 

political system (see also political parties): 
armed forces in, 234-36; impact of mid- 
dle class on, 90-91; military control of, 
183; structure of, 196-97 

Pombal, Marques de, 39-41; impact of 
Enlightenment on, xxiv; Jesuits expelled 
by, 97; reforms of, xxiv, 104 



320 



Index 



Popular Democratic Party (PPD) {see also 
Social Democrat Party), 200; in elec- 
tions of 1976; in provisional govern- 
ments, 174; in Revolution of 1974, 
xxvi, 174 

Popular Forces of the 25th of April 
(FP-25), 262; arrests of members of, 
267, 270, 272; attacks by, 266-67; goals 
of, 267; reaction to, 267 

Popular Monarchist Party (PPM), 178, 
201-2; support for, 201 

Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA), 214, 228 

population, 70, 73-75; age distribution in, 
74-75, 76; of Amadora, 74; of Coim- 
bra, 74; decline in, 74, 136; density, 73, 
140; distribution of, 73; in 1864, 73; 
Gypsies in, 95; Jews in, 95; of Lisbon, 
74; in 1992, 73; of Porto, 74; project- 
ed, 73; rural, 74; of Setubal, 74; struc- 
ture, 73-75 

population percentages: allowed to vote, 
48, 56; attending university, 107; in- 
volved in agriculture, xxxii; middle 
class, 90; in poverty, 109; practicing 
religion, 99; Protestants, 102 

population statistics: emigration rate, 70; 
growth rate, 70, 73, 76, 137; infant 
mortality rate, xxxiv, 70, 109; life ex- 
pectancy, 109; sex ratio, 74-75, 76 

Populator, the. See Sancho I 

Portalegre: expropriations of land in, 143 

Portela Airport, 152 

Portimao, 142, 146 

Porto, 8; as bastion of liberalism, 43; im- 
migrants to, 74; industry in, 146; popu- 
lation of, 74; population density in, 73 

Porto Santo, 25 

ports, 126, 152 

Portucel, 126 

Portugal and the Future (Spnola) , 171, 213, 
232 

Portugal-Madeira- Azores triangle. See 

strategic triangle 
Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), 

xxxi, 167, 198-99; decline of, 198-99, 
210; in elections, 176, 178, 179, 210; 
geographic distribution of, 67; leaders 
of, exiled, 198; outlawed, 270; peasants 
in, 207; in provisional governments, 
174; in Revolution of 1974, xxiii, xxvi, 
171-72, 173, 174; Stalinism of, xxxi- 

xxxii, 198; support for, xxxi, 91 



Portuguese Confederation of Commerce 

(CCP), 206 
Portuguese Democratic Movement 

(MDP), 174, 197-98; influence of, 198; 

members of, 198 

Portuguese Guinea. See Guinea, Por- 
tuguese 

Portuguese Industrial Association (AIP), 
206 

Portuguese language: Arabic influence 
on, 8; as language of Macau, 195; as 
national language, 18; regional differ- 
ences, 94 

Portuguese Legion, 59, 226; abolished, 

226; number of personnel in, 226 
Portuguese Republican Party (PRP), 52 
post office, 126 

poverty, 58; population living in, 109 
Povoador, O. See Sancho I 
PPD. See Popular Democratic Party 
PPM. See Popular Monarchist Party 
PRD. See Party of the Democratic Reno- 
vation 

PRE. See Republican Evolutionist Party 
Presbyterians, 102 

president, 183-85; under constitution of 
1976, xxvii; duties of, 184; elections for, 
176, 180, 184, 196, 209; power of, 
183-84; term of office, 184, 196; veto 
power of, 184 

press {see also media; newspapers): control 
of, xxv, 210; freedom for, xxiv, 169, 
211 

Prester John's kingdom: search for, 28 
prices: agricultural, 144; fixed, 138 
prime minister, 185-86; independence of, 
185; indirect election of, 185; term of 
office of, 185-86 
Principe Island: discovered, 26 
prisoners, 271-72; juvenile, 271-72; mili- 
tary, 271; number of, 271; work by, 
272 

prisons, 271-72 

private sector: creation of, 120; elite domi- 
nation of, 118; size of, 116 

privatization, xxxii, xxxiii, 147-48, 183, 
209; enacted, 133; objectives of, 133; 
partial, 155; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 133; proceeds of, 133 

professions, 89; women in, 83 

Program for the Structural Adjustment of 
the Foreign Deficit and Unemployment 
(PCEDED), 156 



321 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Progressives {see also Historical; Septem- 
berists), 48 

proletariat, lumpen, 92 

Protestant Reformation, 32 

Protestants, 95; as conscientious objec- 
tors, 103, 252; expelled, 102; number 
of, 102 

provinces, 67-68 

PRP. See Portuguese Republican Party 

PS. See Socialist Party 

PSD. See Social Democrat Party 

PSP. See Public Security Police 

public enterprises, 128; denationalization 
of, 128; financial condition of, 130; na- 
tionalized, 129-30; nonfmancial, 128- 
30; overstaffing of, 130; as percentage 
of gross domestic product, 129; unions 
in, 129 

Publico, 211 

public order, 216-67 

public sector: borrowing, 128, 132, 133; 
employment in, 117; expansion of, 127; 
role of, 128-33; size of, 116, 126-27; 
spending, 128 

Public Security Police (PSP), 261, 
263-64; demonstration by, 264; head- 
quarters of, 263; mission of, 263; re- 
organized, 263; women in, 263; zones 
of, 263 

purges: after 1974 revolution, 116, 127 
Pyrenees Mountains, 66 



Quadragesimo Anno (papal encyclical) 

(1931), 98, 203 
Quadruple Alliance, 47 
Quimigal, 125, 147 



radio, 152; freedom for, 211; national- 
ized, 125, 210, 211 

Radiodifusao Portuguesa (RDP), 212 

Radio Marconi, 126 

Radio Renascenca, 212; closed, 211 

Radiotelevisao Portuguesa (RTP), 212 

railroads, 126, 152 

RDP. See Radiodifusao Portuguesa 

rebellions: Abrilada, 44; against ab- 
solutists, 45; by Catalans, 36; at Evora, 
36; of Saldanha, 48; Septemberist, 47; 
Vilafrancada, 44 



Reconquest, 8-9, 10, 12, 13 
Regenerators, 48; conflict of, with Histor- 
ical, 50 

religion {see also under individual sects), 
96-103; folk customs in, 100-2; histo- 
ry of, 96-98; practice of, 99-102; su- 
perstitions in, 102 

religious groups: expelled, 102; restric- 
tions on, 102-3 

remittances from emigrants, 77, 115-16, 
121, 158, 159-60 

Republic, First, xxiv, 4, 51-54; agitation 
for, 206; anticlericalism under, 53, 97; 
economy under, 117; education under, 
104; elections in, 52; end of, 54; insta- 
bility during, 52, 169; military under, 
203, 225, 230; separation of church and 
state in, 96; women under, 83 

Republic, Second, xxx, 4, 168 

Republica, 175, 211 

Republican Evolutionist Party (PRE), 52 

republicanism, 49-61 

Republican National Union (UNR): fac- 
tions in, 52 

Republican Union (UR), 52 

Rerum Novarum (papal encyclical) (1891), 
98, 203 

retirement, 109 

retornados. See returnees from Africa 

returnees from Africa, 73, 122, 177; 
benefits for, 136-37; crimes by, 271; 
impact of, 78-79, 136, 214; number of, 
xxviii, 95, 136 

Revolution of 1820, 43-44 

Revolution of 1974, xxiii, xxvi-xxvii, 61, 
167, 171-74, 203, 225, 230-34; armed 
forces in, 224; bureaucracy under, 
xxxiii; causes of, 65-66, 170, 213; con- 
sequences of, xxiii, 123-28, 197, 262; 
and church, 98-99; and class system, 
89; and education, 104-5; and elite 
class, xxiii, 77, 89-90; emigration to es- 
cape, 77; middle class in, 206; peasants 
in, 207; political parties in, xxvi-xxvii; 
reaction to, 167, 174-75, 217; and so- 
ciety, 92-94; students in, 207; and 
women, 79 

Rhodes, Cecil, 49 

Ribatejo, 142 

Richelieu (cardinal), 36 

Rio Chanca, 70 

Rio Douro, 6, 67, 69, 140, 141 

Rio Guadiana, 70 



322 



Index 



Rio Lima, 70, 141 

Rio Minho, 69, 140 

Rio Mondego, 70, 141 

Rio Sado, 70 

Rio Tamega, 70 

Rio Teja. See Tagus River 

Rio Zezere, 13 

rivers, 69 

roads, 152; under Roman occupation, 6 

Roberto, Holden, 227 

Rocha, Paolo, 212 

Rodoviaria, 126 

Rodrigues, Simao, 33 

Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic 
Church, Roman 

Roman law, 191, 192 

Roman occupation, 5,6; influence of, on 
legal system, 191; legacy of, 6; resto- 
ration of, 7 

rotativismo, 48, 202; collapse of, 50 

royal patrimony: confirmation of, 16-17; 
control of, 16-18; dispute over, 16-17 

RTP. See Radiotelevisao Portuguesa 

rural areas: population in, 74 

RXT Metals Group, 149 

SAC EUR. See Supreme Allied Com- 
mander Europe 

SACLANT. See Supreme Allied Com- 
mander Atlantic 

Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira {see also New 
State), 4, 224; appeal of, 55; back- 
ground of, 55; death of, 60; as minister 
of finance, 54-55, 117, 169, 225, 230; 
as minister of war, 225; opposition to, 
206; as prime minister, 117, 169, 225; 
rise to power of, xxv, 117, 203; stroke 
of, 60, 170; world view of, 57 

Salazaristas, 170 

Saldanha, duke of, 46 

Sancho I: territorial expansion by, 10-12 

Sancho II, 12 

Sanders, Thomas G., 134 

Santa Casa de Misericordia, 108 

Santarem, 75, 143 

Santos, Eugenio dos, 39 

Sao Tome Island, 214; discovered, 26; 
immigrants from, 95; slave trade 
through, 48 

sardine, 142 

savings, household, 134, 160 

schools, xxxiv, 103; built in Brazil, 33; 



conditions in, 108; church control of, 
98; enrollment in, 105, 107-8; girls', 
104; government control of, xxv; un- 
der Pombal, 40; preparatory, 105; 
primary, 105; public, 40; under Roman 
occupation, 6; secondary, 105, 108; 
vocational, 105-7 

Sebastian. See Sebastiao 

Sebastianism, 35 

Sebastiao, 34-35, 224 

Security Intelligence Service (SIS), 265, 
266 

security policies, 223 
seigniorial rights: abolished, 44 
Senegal River, 25 

Septemberists {see also Historicals; Pro- 
gressives), 47, 48; rebellion by, 47 
serfs, 16, 85 

Serpa Pinto, Alexandre, 48, 49 
Serra da Estrela, 69 
Serra de Monchique, 69 
Serra do Caldeirao, 69 
Serra do Geres, 69 

services sector, xxxiii, 150-55; expansion 

of, 115, 120; foreign investment in, 

161; labor force in, 134-36, 137, 150; 

as percentage of gross domestic 

product, 115, 121, 122, 150 
Servico de Informacoes e Seguranca 

(SIS). See Security Intelligence Service 
Servico de Informacoes Estrategicas de 

Defesa (SIED). See Defense Strategic 

Intelligence Service 
Servico de Informacoes Militares (SIM). 

See Military Intelligence Service 
Setenave. See Estaleiros Navais de Setubal 
settler communities {concelhos), 15 
Setubal: expropriations of land in, 143; 

immigrants to, 74; industry in, 146; 

population of, 74; vineyards in, 141 
Seville: ancient trading post at, 5 
shipbuilding, 126; nationalized, 125 
shipping: nationalized, 125 
Shultz, George, 238 
Siderurgia Nacional, 126, 147, 148 
SIED. See Defense Strategic Intelligence 

Service 
Silva, Anfbal Cavaco, 128 
Silva, Antonio Maria da, 54 
Silva Porto, Antonio Francisco, 48 
Silves, Diogo de, 25 
SIM. See Military Intelligence Service 
Sinedrio, 43 



323 



Portugal: A Country Study 



Sines: industry in, 146, 161; port of, 152 
SIRP. See Intelligence System of the 

Republic of Portugal 
SIS. See Security Intelligence Service 
Sistema de Informacoes da Republica 

Portuguesa (SIRP). See Intelligence 

System of the Republic of Portugal 
Six- Year Plan for National Development 

(1959-64), 119 
slaves, 16, 25; importation of, 38; trade 

in, 48 

Soares, Mario Alberto Nobre Lopes, 
xxvi, 175; exiled, 199; popularity of, 
209; as president, 168-69, 180, 234; as 
prime minister, xxix, 176, 179; quali- 
ties of, 184-85; return from exile, 
171-72, 199 

social classes, 85-94; changes in, 88, 94; 
divisions among, 65; in early history, 
15; identification of, 92; impact of 1974 
revolution on, 89-90; mobility among, 
65, 85, 92, 120, 127; organization of, 
85; perpetuation of, 86-88 

Social Democrat Party (PSD) (see also 
Popular Democrat Party), xxix, xxxi, 
168, 199-200, 206; origins of, 200; sup- 
port for, 91, 186, 200, 208, 210 

Socialist Party (PS), 167, 199; in elec- 
tions, xxviii, 176, 178, 179, 210; lead- 
ers of, exiled, 199; origins of, 199; 
peasants in, 207; platform of, xxi, 199; 
in provisional governments, 174; in 
Revolution of 1974, xxvi, 171-72, 174; 
support for, 91, 199 

social revolution, 21-22 

social structure, 85-94 

society: changes in, xxxiv-xxxv, 65, 167, 
170; effect of European Community 
membership on, 133, 215 

Society of Jesus. See Jesuits 

Socotra Island, 31 

Soult, Nicholas, 42 

Sousa, Caetano de, 39 

Sousa, Martim Afonso de, 32 

Sousa, Tome de, 32, 33 

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of 

Soviet Union, 237; materiel from, for 
African insurgents, 232 

Spain: annexation of Portugal by, 35; fear 
of reannexation by, 37, 66, 215; invest- 
ment from, 161; materiel from, 245, 
248; as member of North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, 216, 258; rela- 



tions with, 215-16; tourists from, 150; 
trade with, 116, 157; war of, with 
France, 41 
Spanish Civil War (1936-39), 59; aid to, 

226; participation in, 226, 246 
Special Forces Brigade, 223, 241-42; per- 
sonnel of, 242 
Specific Plan for the Development of Por- 
tuguese Agriculture (PEDAP), 160 
Specific Plan for the Development of Por- 
tuguese Industry (PEDIP), 160 
spices: cultivation of, 38; trade in, 23-24 
Spmola, Antonio de, xxvi, 61, 171-74; 
book by, 171, 213, 232; as governor of 
Portuguese Guinea, 228; as head of 
Junta of National Salvation, 232; ob- 
jectives of, 124-25; as president, 124, 
172; resignation of, 233 
state enterprises: abolished, 41 
state of emergency, 176 
Straits of Gibraltar, 238, 257 
strategic triangle (Portugal-Madeira- 
Azores triangle), 223, 237-38 
students: political activities of, 198; po- 
litical role of, 206-7 
suffrage. See voting rights 
sugar: as Brazilian export crop, 32 
Sunda Islands: spice trade in, 31, 31 
Superior Council of Finance, 187 
Superior Council of the Administrative 

and Fiscal Courts, 190 
Superior Intelligence Council, 266 
Supreme Administrative Court, 190 
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 

(SACLANT), 216, 258 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

(SACEUR), 216 
Supreme Court of Administration, 190 
Supreme Court of Justice, 190 
Swabians, 6; defeat of, 7; legacy of, 6 
Switzerland: Portuguese guestworkers in, 
79 



Tabaqueira, 126 

Tagus River, 4, 69, 140, 141, 142 
Tanzania, 31 

TAP. See Transportes Aereos Portugueses 
tariff system, 119 
Tariq ibn Ziyad, 7 

taxes: evasion of, 131; increase in revenue 
from, 132; local, 194; to pay for re- 
forms, 104; under Spanish occupation, 



324 



Index 



36; by Turks, on spice trade, 24; value- 
added, 131-32 
tax reform, 124, 131; phases of, 131-32 
teachers: morale of, xxxiv, 108; and 
republicanism, 50; salaries of, xxxiv, 
108 

Technical University of Lisbon, 107 
Teixeira, Pedro, 38 
telephones, 152 
Teles, Leonor, 19 

television, 152; freedom for, 211; nation- 
alized, 125, 210, 211 
Temple of Diana, 6 
Teodosio, 37 
Tercira, duke of, 46 
Teresa (of Leon), 9 
Terra dos Vaqueiros, 26 
terrorism, 265-67 

textile industry, 37-38, 40; exports by, 
156, 157 

Timor, 218; exploration of, 32; im- 
migrants from, 95; independence for, 
175; occupied by Japan, 59 

Tomas, Americo, 56, 61, 170, 230 

topography, 67-69; suitability of, for 
agriculture, 70 

torture, 264 

tourism, xxxiii, 159-60; in the Algarve, 
67; attractions of, 150-52; employment 
in, 150; foreign investment in, 161; 
growth of, 159; income from, 115, 121, 
150, 158, 159; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 150; volume of, 150, 
159 

trade {see also exports; imports): with Brit- 
ain, 38-39; composition of, 156-58; 
deficit, 121, 158; direction of, 156; in 
manufactured goods, 157; with Spain, 
116; in spices, 23-24; strategy, 118-19 

Traffic Brigade, 263 

transportation, 130; employment in, 150; 
improvements in, 152; infrastructure, 
152; nationalization of, 125 

Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP), 
126, 152 

Tras-os-Montes, 67, 69; insurrection in, 

44; topography of, 140 
Treasury Police. See Fiscal Guard 
Treaty of Fontainebleau (1807), 42 
Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression 

(1939). See Iberian Pact 
Treaty of San Idelfonso (1800), 41 
Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), 32 



Treaty of Windsor (1386), 21, 216, 237 
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe 

(1990), 244 
Tristao, Nuno, 25 
Tuchman, Barbara, 65 
Turks: restrictions by, on spice trade, 24 

UGT. See General Union of Workers 
UN. See National Union 
UN. See United Nations 
underemployment, 141 
unemployment: benefits, 109; in 1970s, 

176; rate, 136, 139 
Uniao Geral dos Trabalhadores (UGT). 

See General Union of Workers 
Uniao Nacional (UN). See National 

Union 

Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola (UNITA). See Nation- 
al Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola 

Uniao Nacional Republicana (UNR). See 
Republican National Union 

Uniao Republicana (UR). See Republican 
Union 

Unicer, 126 

Unionists. See Republican Union 

UNITA. See National Union for the To- 
tal Independence of Angola 

United Nations (UN), 218; admitted to, 
59, 215; declaration on colonialism 
(1960), 60 

United States, 216-17; aid from, 160; 
emigration to, 77-78, 134, 160; invest- 
ment from, 161; Lajes Air Base used 
by, 226, 248, 259; materiel acquired 
from, 223-224, 248, 259-60; military 
assistance from, 244, 248, 259; military 
relations with, 259; military training 
by, 260; reaction of, to Revolution of 
1974, 167, 175, 217; relations with, 
213, 237; trade with, 157 

United States Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency (ACDA), 256 

universities, 107; admission to, 107; en- 
rollment, 107; faculties of, 107; faculty 
ranks in, 107; middle class in, 206; 
politicization of, 207; reform of, 40-41, 
207 

University of Coimbra, 18, 39, 107; es- 
tablished, 103; reforms in, 104 
University of Lisbon, 107 



325 



Portugal: A Country Study 



University of Porto, 107 

UNR. See Republican National Union 

UR. See Republican Union 

urban areas: working class in, 92 

urbanization, 65, 170 

Vandals, 6; exiled, 7 
Venezuela: emigration to, 77, 134 
Verney, Luis Antonio, 40; reforms by, 
104 

Vilafrancada uprising (1823), 44 
Vila Real, 74 
Viriato, 5 
Viseu, 8, 74 
Viseu, duke of, 23 

Visigoths, 7; Christianity introduced by, 
96; reconquest by, 8 

voting rights: age for, 195; for emigres, 
183; percentage of population extend- 
ed to, 48, 56; restrictions on, xxiv, 56; 
under Second Republic, xxx; of wom- 
en, 56 

wages, 137-39; average, 138; increases 
in, 139; maximum, 138; minimum, 
138; in 1970s, 176; per capita, 139 

War of the Oranges, 41 

War of the Two Brothers, 45-46 

Warsaw Pact, 238-39 

welfare, xxxiv, 108-11; lack of funds to 
implement, 108; private responsibility 
for, 108; programs, 109 

Wellesley, Sir Arthur (duke of Welling- 
ton), 42 

Western European Union (WEU), 215 



West Germany. See Germany, Federal 

Republic of 
West Irian, 218 

WEU. See Western European Union 

Wheeler, Douglas L., 117 

Wiarda, Howard J., 118 

wine: export of, 141-42, 157-58; indus- 
try, 40, 216 

women, 82-84; in armed forces, 253; un- 
der constitution of 1976, 82; education 
of, 83, 104; equal rights for, xxxiv- 
xxxv, 82, 83-84; under First Repub- 
lic, 83; impact of emigration on, 77; im- 
pact of 1974 revolution on, 79; 
independence of, 80; marriage of, 80; 
maternal leave for, 82; maternity 
benefits for, 109; under New State, 83; 
in police force, 263; in professions, 83; 
religious practice by, 100; roles of, 47; 
subservience of, 82-83; voting rights of, 
56 

workers: rights of, 51 
Workers' Committees, xxvi, 181 
working class: growth of, 170; kinship 
networks in, 84-85; living standards of, 
94; marriage in, 80; after Revolution 
of 1974, 139; in rural areas, 92 
World Bank: economic plan from, 124; 

membership in, 119 
World War I, 53, 225, 246 
World War II: neutrality in, 59 

Xavier, Francisco, 32, 33 

Zaire, 227 



326 



Contributors 



Eric N. Baklanoff is Research Professor of Economics Emeri- 
tus at the University of Alabama. 

Walter C. Opello, Jr. is Chairman of Political Science at the 
State University of New York at Oswego. 

Eric Solsten is Senior Research Specialist in West European 
Affairs, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 

Jean R. Tartter is a retired Foreign Service Officer, who has 
written extensively on Western Europe for Country Study 
volumes. 

Howard J. Wiarda is Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Massachusetts/ Amherst. 



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